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PERSONAL IDENTITY: THE SIMPLE VIEW 
by 
Susan Jane Southgate 
ABSTRACT 
i 
In the examination of the concept of personal identity, 
this thesis concentrates upon the central·. divide between 
complex and simple accounts. The opposing theories have 
been evaluated with respect to their ability to produce a 
concept of persons which will fulfil the role of a forensic 
being. Thus, the criticisms suggested are not made solely 
in consideration of the coherence of supportive arguments 
but also on the ability to provide accurate accounts of a 
person as a moral agent: whether value and responsibility 
are sufficiently met by the concept and whether the 
resulting person can be objectively and reliably identified. 
The thesis begins with an explanation of the historical 
roots of the debate, considering the originators of the 
simple view in their criticism of Locke's conception of 
personal identity. It then moves on to examine the modern 
version of the simple view, explaining its arguments and 
providing a critique. Finally, modifications to the modern 
simple view are suggested, ·pointing the way to a more 
satisfactory debate within personal identity theory, whilst 
showing the central epistemological role that such a debate 
has. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is time to explain myself - let us stand up. 
Walt Whitman 
'Song of Myself' 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 THE PROBLEM 
The philosophical problem of personal identity has 
produced many different theories, all of which have have 
advantages, but all of which are somehow unsatisfactory. 
This thesis is an examination of the basic issues 
influencing accounts of persons and identity, and a 
suggestion of the fundamental ingredients that any 
successful theory should contain. 
1 (i) Personal Identity 
The problem of personal identity concerns the concept of 
persons at one time and over a period of time - what it is 
that cons ti tu tes a person and what makes that person the 
same person from one moment to the next. It is a search for 
the essence of personhood not the incidental and 
accidental trimmings associated with persons but the basic 
necessary elements without which a person would not be. 
Once these are found, a criterion of both synchronic and 
diachronic identity can be offered. 
Expressed in this way, the task seems fairly 
straightforward. However, like most philosophical pursuits, 
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the project is far from simple. For apart from fundamental 
questions relating to epistemology and ontology, the 
examination of persons leads to intricate paths tracing 
their way through the basic philosophical fields of identity 
and morality. 
It is the ideas and conclusions drawn from these broader 
issues that influence and produce different theories of 
personal identity. f ')'( Thus the various accounts o persons 
can be classified into groups according to the character of 
the theory that produces them: Lockean, neo-Lockean, 
dualist, naturalist, functionalist, idealist, realist ••• the 
'lists' seem endless. But there is one categorisation which 
strikes at a more basic level, aligning all the traditional 
oppositions into two distinct and exclusive groups. This 
opposition or conflict has become known as the simple versus 
complex account of personal identity. 
1 (ii) Complex and Simple Accounts of Personal Identity 
The complex account is exemplified in Locke and all 
subsequent, largely empirically based theories of personal 
identity. The most obvious characteristic uniting these 
theories is that they literally give a complex account of 
persons - that is, their theories assume that the person is 
made up of a number of parts to which their identity can be 
* By which I mean concept of person - throughout the text 'person' 
carries such an implication. 
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reduced. The term person thus stands for something which is 
composite and made up of more fundamental things: its 
identity over time will be ensured if tho~e things persist 
in some defined manner. Such parts can be classed as 
properties or qualities - the particular criteria necessary 
to the person differs from theory to theory, but the fact 
remains that properties of some sort constitute the essence 
of personhood. 
In contrast, the simple account is fundamentally 
rationalist. Based in Cartesian and dualist philosophy, it 
denies that the essence of person lies in something like 
properties. It does not completely disassociate the person 
from properties - they do have or possess such things. It 
is just that properties are not essential to the person, the 
identity of which lies in something else. The simple view 
generally offers a non-reductive account of personal 
identity, taking the person to be a basic term which can be 
reduced no further - any attempt to do so cannot capture the 
true essence of person. 
It is this fundamental debate, and the attempt to produce 
theories fitting each of tnese conflicting views, which will 
be examined by this thesis. It will consider the origins 
of the debate, examining the reactions of Butler and Reid to 
. . ~·( Lockean theory of personal 1dent1ty ; and also focus on the 
* Locke 1690, Butler 1736, Reid 1785. 
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recent re-emergence of the simple view, looking at theories 
such as those offered by Madell, Swinburne and Chisholm*. 
~ ~ - - -- -- -
This analysis will provide the central piv~t of the thesis, 
for the simple view provides both a criticism of empirical 
accounts of personal identity from philosophers as widely 
ranging as Parfi t, Lewis and Williams+; and responds with 
its own rationalist theory. In addition, a critique of the 
simple view will test the strength of its claims and the 
sufficiency of its account often in the light of insights 
gained from the complex theory. In reply to these findings, 
I will suggest a new view of personal identity, following on 
the suggestions of Nagel#. 
Of course the above is a very basic outline, but from it 
emerge three basic problems facing any account of personal 
identity: whether it can be reduced to an informative 
criterion or not; whether it is a reductive criterion or 
not; and finally whether it displays real identity or not@. 
The direction taken on these more refined issues concerning 
personal identity will rely upon conclusions arising from 
the more fundamental areas mentioned above, that is, the 
concepts of identity, persons and morality. Therefore, 
before embarking upon a detailed examination of the opposing 
* Madel! 1981, Swinburne (1) 1984 & (2) 1986, ChishoLm (1) 1976 & 
(2) 1981 
+ Parfit 1984, Lewis 1980, Williams 1973 
# Strawson 1964, Nagel(!) 1964, (2) 1979 & (3) 1986 
@ This characterisation is taken from Noonan ch. 5.5. 
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views of personal identity and other associated problems, I 
want first to consider the principal features of 
- - -- -· - . -
identit% persons and morality as they affect the simple and 
complex theories. 
6 
2 THE CONCEPT OF IDENTITY 
The Eounda_tion of the co_n.c.e.).2t o_f id~nti ty is neat,ly 
expressed in the Leibnizian 'Principle of indiscernibility'* 
(x=y if and only if x and y have all and only the same 
properties) which expresses a fundamental criterion of 
sameness. Yet when talking of identity this basic notion is 
applicable to different aspects of the object. We might, 
for example, be referring to numerical or qualitative 
identity; synchronic or diachronic; as an act of 
individuation or merely description. 
2 (i) Forms of Identity 
Between individuation and description there are 
interdependent links, for individuation would appear to be 
impossible without some form of description. For example, 
in order to isolate a particular gnome in a shop display, I 
will need some form of description or idea of its 
characteristics, to enable me to decide which it is out of 
all the gnomes present. The problem of identity which is of 
philosophical interest concerns the isolation of essential 
individuating features only - whereas a description may well 
cover a whole host of merely contingently associated 
factors. When I use the term 'identity', I shall be using 
the notion of individuation rather than characterisation. 
* Leibniz 1716 
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In the uses of numerical versus qualitative identity, 
the relationship is similar. One isolates the object as an 
individual object, the other fills it out and gives it 
character. The qualitative identity of my gnome may well be 
matched in a hundred other gnomes, made from the same mould; 
but there is a difference in them not reducible to qualities 
- they are numerically distinct. Once again, the two may 
overlap but it is the numerical identity that is of clear 
philosophical interest, for it concerns the individual 
essence of a particular token thing rather than the type of 
thing that is being identified. 
Synchronic and diachronic identity are of equal 
philosophical interest, and the two levels of description 
must be recognised by any complete account of individuation. 
A clear awareness of them is essential: one aspect informs 
us of criteria needed to determine numeri~al identity at one 
time, the other indicates sameness over a period of time, 
and neither can function properly without the presence of 
the other. 
Temporal persistence has a more obvious dependence upon 
synchronic identity than vice versa. We have to have an 
accurate and precise understanding of the 'idea' before we 
can determine the persistence of the thing to which it 
refers. That is, we have to know what the gnome is like to 
know whether it continues to exist. However, a practical 
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existence for the synchronic idea relies upon a temporal 
nature, for, however momentary, existence in time is 
necessarily implied by actual existence, implicitly if not 
explicitly. Thus, if my gnome is to exist more than just 
conceptually, it is necessary that it exists in time, even 
if it is only momentarily. 
The latter consideration has led modern debate to 
challenge the possibility of a purely synchronic 
description,* and mutual dependence does seem to imply 
inseparability. Yet if we perceive these descriptions as 
only dependent upon each other in actual existence, then the 
possibility of conceptual differentiation remains. This 
idea is more comprehendible if we consider the use of 
synchronic identity in representing the 'idea' of the thing. 
2 (ii) Identity and Change 
From the early his tory of the philosophy of identity, 
the problem of diachronic identity through change has 
formed a central contention. Whether Heracleitan flux, 
Theseus 1 ship or the simple life-span of a oak tree, the 
difficulty remains the same - the successive nature of most 
objects in the world means that they undergo partial, or 
even total, change of material or parts during their 
existence. This being so, if an object 1 s parts clearly do 
not remain the same, how can it be said to remain identical 
* See Brennan 1988, ch.S. 
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through time? 
Many theories of identity have been subsequently formed 
trying to explain a way around this problem. All of them 
carry within them the fundamental tenet that if a thing is 
to have identity through time, then it must be ·unchanging. 
If any change does occur, then either it is no longer the 
same thing, or the difference is not integral to the thing 
or necessary to its existence. This idea is central to all 
theories of identity, though their solutions to the problems 
caused by it may be widely differing. 
Types of identity theory can be broadly divided into 
those which allow identity in combined parts and through 
change by ascribing a form of overriding unity or 
underpinning continuity; and those which demand one unit 
which has no parts and persists through time. The difference 
is between perdurance and endurance*: in the one case 
complete although gradual change might take place, in the 
other all remains the same. The choice that a theory makes 
at this level will effect the character of any theory of 
persons subsequently devised. 
2 (iii) Complex and Simple Identity 
Perdurance theories are those of the complex view - they 
offer a reductionist account of identity. Criteria are 
* Noonan 1989 p.122 
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used to provide a check list against which to determine the 
identity of a thing. In effect, the identity is reduced to 
its necessary constituents - if these are. present, or some 
form of continuity is upheld by them, then the thing has 
temporal identity. This is the concept of identity invoked 
to avoid the problems of changing complex things, · for it 
allows some parts not to be identical. 
However, this is not the sole form that identity takes, 
for there are cases in which a reductionist account is not 
necessary, because the object or thing concerned is 
irreducible or simple. Rather than analysing it into the 
relevant constituent parts, the individual thing is taken to 
be a unit, incapable of description in any more basic terms. 
Consequently the account of identity becomes non-
reductionist, perceiving the identity of the thing to be 
basic and irreducible. 
Whether the concept of identity applied is simple or 
complex depends upon what the thing in question is and what 
we mean when we talk of it. Under a reductionist account, 
an object is the collective term for those qualities or 
parts into which it can be further analysed. Even its 
identity is expressed in terms of those qualities, 
consequently they become more important than the thing 
itself, for its value is derived from them. However, if the 
thing is classed as irreducible, further explanation or 
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analysis of it or its value is impossible, and so. any 
relevance or importance is derived solely from the thing 
itself. 
This debate has ?eveloped the distinction between single 
and complex accounts into a major point of 'contention, 
questioning the validity of a reducible concept of identity. 
For one consequence of the simple account is that it 
tolerates no change. The thing, being basic and 
unanalysable, must continue in completeness to be the same, 
and in this way maintains perfect identity. By contrast, a 
reducible thing can show some degree of change and is 
therefore not strictly identical. It seems that both 
accounts can be applied to the world and what we believe 
about it but, the question remains, Which one is a reliable 
base upon which to base our understanding of objects? In 
this thesis I shall argue that both are necessary, even when, 
in some cases, they are applied to the same thing. 
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3 THE CONCEPT OF PERSON 
The concept of person will quite obviously affect the 
criteria of identity involved in its existence. As pointed 
·'-
out above", until it is known what kind of thing we are 
dealing with, how can it be known what the criteria of its 
existence and persistence are likely to be? It is wise 
therefore, before trying to offer a criterion of personal 
identity, to clarify the notion of person to be used. 
The dictionary account of person ranges over five or six 
definitions: individual human being; living body of a human 
being; human being or corporate with recognised rights and 
duties; character in a play or story; one of three modes of 
being of the Godhead; and one of three classes of personal 
pronouns denoting respectively the person writing or 
speaking, writ ten or spoken to, or writ ten or spoken of. 
The root of the word is from the latin 'persona' meaning 
actor's mask, character in play or human being+. If all 
these are taken into account what emerges, and is also 
indicated clearly by the root, is that 'person' has an 
ambiguous connotation - that of being both a public and a 
private thing. 
3 (i) The Public and Private Person 
The definitions seem to deal with what is essentially a 
·k p.6 
+ Taken from the 'Concise Oxford Dictionary' 
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socially interactive thing, but one which is an identifiable 
individual with a certain character. The person definitely 
has a public face, whether formal or informal we 'play' a 
role in our social position and have a character by which we 
are known to others. Yet these ideas of mask and role have 
a resonance of some further thing behind the facade - the 
individual, the particular body or personality. This 
intention is usually indirect, being implied by the very 
term 'mask' or 'character', but it is also directly evident 
in the way that we refer to what might be considered the 
most private parts of our bodies as our 'person' and the 
fact that 'personal' indicates a degree of specific 
privateness and exclusivity. 
The tension evident in the dictionary definition of 
person, is also present in its everyday use. 'Person' often 
seems to connote both private and public aspects, and 
concepts like those of personal rights and personal status 
reflect this duality, recognising the person in both a 
public and private social role. Furthermore, it is with 
respect to personhood that moral responsibility, and with it 
punishment and reward, is attributed; and likewise we are 
compensated or deprived in- the light of actions done to us 
as persons. 
It might be argued that concepts concerning rights and 
the individual change over time and place: for example, 
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pre~Christian society used a very different conception of 
person and its role in society than twentieth century 
western culture does. But the fact remains that, whatever 
the limits or boundaries to which the denotation of 'person' 
reaches, the idea encapsulated by responsibility for actions 
and the concept filled by our word 'person' is one of a 
necessarily private and public intention. Wherever one has 
public responsibility, the idea of private agency or 
volition seems to follow. 
In the tradi tiona! philosophical treatment of persons, 
the duality of public and private plays a central role: not 
as forming part of the same concept but as exclusive 
options. From these two aspects is formed a division, the 
demand for philosophical clarity causing a focus on one or 
the other side of the definition. The key features of each 
aspect or connotation have been seized upon and theories of 
personal identity have tended to hold an either I or 
position. The person is taken to be either a forensic 
social entity, or a private subject or self. More often 
than not, the two are treated as mutually exclusive, the 
opposing view of each being relegated to a secondary and 
non-essential role. 
3 (ii) Simple and Complex Persons 
The simple and complex 
this divide: the complex 
views can be easily located in 
theorist concentrates upon the 
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subjective or objective empirical notion of a person, with 
its character and value in the properties that it possesses; 
whereas the simple view focuses upon something other than 
those properties, in effect, emphasising the essentially 
private nature of the person. The former results in 
empirical theories of functionalism, behaviourism, and all 
reductive accounts of the person; the latter opens the door 
to the dualism found in rationalist epistemologies. 
In this thesis, I shall examine the arguments and claims 
made for both simple and complex views of personal identity, 
and then argue that an adequate notion of 1 person 1 must 
combine both public and private areas of connotation within 
its meaning. The concept of person must be able to satisfy 
certain social functions whilst retaining the individual and 
uniquely private role we also ascribe to it. Without both, 
we are simply not dealing with what is meant by the term 
'person' and the moral implications it holds. 
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4 MORALITY AND PERSONAL IDENTITY 
Given the account of persons just outlined, it is of 
little surprise that morality is intimately linked to the 
notion of personal identity: if persons are something to do 
with responsibility for action, then they must be somehow 
connected to the guides and codes concerning that action. 
The concept of person and the notion of personal rights have 
a role in both judgement and expectations in ethics: it is 
the person who is responsible, morally reprehensible or 
virtuous; and it is the person who is accorded certain 
rights associated with action and existence. 
4 (i) Identity and Responsibility 
Personal identity is of prime importance to morality: for 
if the person is the unit of responsibility, its identity 
will be important in deciding who is to be blamed or praised 
for certain actions. Identification is a necessary condition 
for the attribution of responsibility, since it is identity 
that allows the synchronic and diachronic individuation of 
any given person from others, and thus enables a 
characterisation of that person as an individual and 
responsible agent. 
This notion of identity is fundamental to our concepts of 
reward and punishment with regard to others (things and 
persons) and to ourselves. If we cannot identify ourselves 
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or other agents the concept of responsibility has no 
practical usage because we have no means by which to apply 
~ 
it. In addition, at a more fundamental level, if we have no 
idea of identity, we will not conceive of things as 
persisting through time, and therefore will have no meaning 
for responsibility at all - for all we know, ·things will 
have no future or past to be responsible for. 
4 (ii) The Dual Nature of Morality 
In general morality can be characterised as a code for 
~ 
behaviour, for it deals with right and wrong actions. The 
origin and status of the code is widely debated in ethics, 
but a general division emerges between absolutist and 
relativist standpoints. These opposites each reflect certain 
instincts or beliefs we have about morality. On the one 
hand there is an absolute answer to what is right and wrong, 
regardless of who and how many people are in the world; 
whilst on the other each situation and set of rules can be 
argued on its own merits and the different codes of, practice 
all seem ·to have validity. As in the case of persons, it 
seems that the history of morality has urged the division of 
these two descriptions along with the relegation of one or 
the other to a subsidiary role. 
More obviously parallel to the simple and complex 
division in the definition of persons, is the difference 
between fact and value in moral philosophy. A neat 
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dis tine tion in morality opens up along the complex/simple 
divide. For those theories endorsing a morality which can 
be reduced to some form of factual statement frame the 
value of persons in the complex terms of their properties -
the properties of the person emerge as the primary concern 
of morality. By contrast, moral theories which deny the 
possibility of reducing value to any form of fact, 
consequently place the value of persons in something more 
than properties - in effect, adopting a simple-type view of 
persons. 
4 (iii) Simple and Complex Identity and Morality 
The simple view's refusal to admit real identity to 
changing things stems from the reasoning that if something 
undergoes change, then it is no longer the same; and if it 
is no longer the same, it argues that it is different, and 
therefore no longer persists. If such change occurs in 
persons, it causes major problems for the forensic function: 
for if a person were to change through time, he then would 
be no longer the same person and therefore could no longer 
be responsible for the actions of the original agent. The 
idea of personal identity must therefore be one of perfect 
and strict identity. 
In contrast, the complex account claims that real 
identity does not hold such a crucial position: that the 
loose 'identity' obtained in continuity or perdurance is 
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sufficient. The reasons take many forms: from the idea that 
loose identity of a thing exists despite changes in its 
essential material constituents; to a. denial of the 
importance of identity to persons and their concerns. 
Whatever the particular theory, the main point remains that 
such theorists are quite satisfied with the' notion of 
perdurance rather than endurance in the case of morality and 
persons. 
In this thesis I shall argue that both claims are in fact 
necessary to the concepts of persons, responsibility and 
morality. Once again, to impose a strict division between 
the two approaches will result in a necessarily incomplete 
and inaccurate account of personal identity. 
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5 THE AIMS OF THIS THESIS 
The modern simple view has increased the breadth of the 
debate concerning personal identity, and although in itself 
proves insufficient as an account of persons, it does open 
the doors to a new direction for the philosophy of mind, the 
concept of persons, and indeed for epistemology in general. 
The simple view acts as the hub of this thesis, focussing 
old and new arguments against empirical theories of persons 
and providing the bedrock for a new theory of persons. 
Thus, although the argument as a whole will be more than 
just an analysis of the simple view which ·the title 
suggests, the work is closely built around an evaluation and 
response to this newly emerged simple account. It aims to 
examine the support for such a position (in tandem with any 
support for the complex view) - assessing the validity of 
its arguments, and to offer suggestions for modifications. 
I shall start by explaining the historical roots of the 
debate, considering the originators of the simple view in 
their criticism of Locke's conception of personal identity. 
I shall then move on to examine the modern version of the 
simple view, explaining its arguments and providing a 
critique. I shall finally suggest modifications to the 
modern simple view, pointing the way to a more satisfactory 
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debate within personal identity theory, whilst showing the 
central epistemological role that such a debate has. 
I will not be concerned with the individual merits of 
each particular theory of personal identity - rather I shall 
deal with the origins and arguments of the simple/complex 
divide. Where nece~sary, the particular arguments of 
particular theorists will be discussed, but only in support 
of the broader position within which the argument finds 
itself. 
I do briefly explore the methodologies used by 
philosophers writing on the subject, and as a result have 
tried to avoid making the assumptions I accuse them of 
making, since the assumed starting point of study often 
profoundly influences the outcome of any investigation. It 
seems that to avoid any preconception and undue influence 
from the methodology, it is best to start from definition -
with what we mean by certain terms, and what is entailed by 
the way the concepts are used. Using this approach it can 
be shown that a study of personal identity involves a study 
of general philosophical methodology: that the outcome of 
the study of persons has · profound repercussions for the 
general epistemological approach. 
It is of general methodological importance that reliance 
upon the definition of 1 person 1 as a forensic unit, both 
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private and public, is justified, for it seems to be the 
only neutral starting point. In this thesis I try to employ 
a methodology relying on our actual use of the term person 
and its moral connotations, attempting to describe the way 
the person is and must be to function within our concepts of 
morality and responsibility. Morality is an· active and 
living concept: it involves our actions, attitudes arid 
behaviour towards ourselves and others - activities which 
seem to be indivisible from the beliefs impelling them. 
Even if the reality associated with those beliefs does not 
exist, the ideas suggested by them are needed for our 
concepts to function as they do. 
Among these ideas the concept of person is central. It 
seems that if 1 person 1 is to be used as a term imputing 
moral rights and responsibility, certain necessary ideas 
associated with the concept must pertain. It is these ideas 
which this thesis sets out to examine, in the attempt to 
clarify the issue of personal identity. 
PART I 
THE COMPLEX VIEW 
of 
PERSONAL IDENTITY 
I celebrate myself, and sing myself, 
And what I assume you shall assume, 
For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you. 
Walt Whitman 
'Song of Myself' 
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CHAPTER 1 LOCKE 
Locke~'( deals with personal identity in a short, 
straightforward account. He provides a seem;ingly simple 
concept of identity, laying the blame for difficulties. or 
apparent complexities in the lap of confusion or undue 
carelessness. Yet his views are based in a set of broad 
assumptions and formed as a consequence of certain 
considerations, not least as reactions to the problems 
outlined in the introduction - that is, the nature of the 
concept of person and the moral considerations bearing upon 
it, and the effect of change upon both. As such, Locke 
provides a good starting point from which to consider the 
concept of identity. 
* Locke 1690 
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1 .. 1 IDENTITY 
The concept Locke describes is one principally of 
individuation. Identity is concerned with the isolation of 
a particular object as itself through time. What identity 
describes is sameness of the object, and in contrast to 
diversity, identity is: 
When the ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what 
they were that moment wherein we consider their former 
existence, and to which we compare the present. 
Locke p.206 
1.1 (i) Numerical and Qualitative Identity 
In using the term identity, Locke's intention is to 
understand the 'is' of being, rather than the 'is' of 
constitution - numerical rather than qualitative identity. 
As such, Locke is dealing primarily with a quantitative 
notion of identity: identity involves isolation of a 
particular object rather than describing what that object is 
like. It may be that descriptions will be needed to help 
achieve individuation, but such qualitative identification 
is not essentially the object of concern. 
This notion is clearly illustrated in his comment that 
identity makes us sure that: 
When we see anything to be in any place in any instant of 
time, we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that very 
thing, and not another which at that same time exists in 
another place, how like and undistinguishable soever it may 
be in all other respects. 
Locke p.206 
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- a clear recognition that being an individual concerns more 
than just being of a certain constitution or certain type of 
thing. The particular or token object is identified by more 
than just its kind of qualities, otherwise it cannot be 
uniquely individuated. 
The impetus of such a claim comes from two clear sources~ 
both of which involve the nature of qualitative identity: 
one is the recognition of the last quotation, that it is 
possible that the 'properties' be the same yet the 
individual different; and the other is the fact that in some 
cases it has proved possible that the qualities change and 
yet the individual remain. 
Such possibilities stem from the relationship between the 
thing and its constituents or properties. Some objects are 
essentially connected to particular properties of their 
constitution in ways which do not allow for their removal, 
for example substances (in the Lockean sense)*. These 
things will have coincidental quantitative and qualitative 
identity. But for others, the properties of their 
constitution are merely contingent; and if this is the case 
then it is possible to hoid that even though qualitative 
identity changes completely, the original object can still 
remain. 
* See Section 1.3 
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Even in cases where the qualities are considered to be 
essential, it is not always particular qualities that are 
necessary to the object, only the type of quality: in most 
complex organic objects, it is far from always the case that 
particular properties are necessary to the object's 
identity. In such cases although properties of· a certain 
type are necessary to the object, the actual token 
properties may change. For example, a tree must have a 
certain cell structure, but the actual cells may fluctuate 
and change. It seems here that the properties are only 
derivative in value to the object; that actual token 
identity does not matter. 
In these complex relationships it becomes evident that 
the quantitative identity of an object does not necessarily 
lie in the qualitative description. Although it may be that 
the properties before us are of the same type as our 
original object, they may not belong to the same token 
individual. Moreover, even if the same token properties 
are present, they may still be part of a different 
individual. For example, the same type of wool can be found 
on two different sheep; and the same token wool might be 
found first on a sheep, the~ in a cardigan. 
These distinctions embody within them the problem of 
h . d . h . d t• * c ange ment~one ~n t e ~ntro uc ~on • Difficulties for 
* See Introduction Section 2 
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identity arise when we consider that qualitative identity 
can change through time yet somehow the individual remains. 
The examples of this are manifold - indeed s9me philosophers 
hold that the entire world is in this constant state of 
change. How then can identity be said to hold in anything? 
The Idea 
In Locke, the problem of change arises from a conflation 
of property and object (quality and quantity), a confusion 
which can be avoided through attention to the idea. The 
difficulty faced in the Heraclei tan flux is a result of 
failure to understand the real idea of the thing being 
identified. A river is not only the water and the banks -
it is something over and above the combination of the two 
together. 
Since numerical identity applies to the thing in itself 
rather than just its qualities; and the thing itself is 
represented by what Locke terms the idea; numerical 
identity is to be found in the idea. Thus Locke states 
that: 
••• to conceive and judge of it aright, we must consider what 
idea the word it is applied _to stands for. 
Locke p.210 
Clarification of the idea then, will reveal the essential 
features of the object: what it is for it to exist at a 
certain place and time and the criteria for its persistence. 
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If the idea is understood, then the nature of the thing is 
comprehended, and the object of identity isolated. Hence 
an accurate understanding of the idea sh,;>Uld enable the 
ascription of identity or diversity in the object. As Locke 
states: 
••• and in this consists identity, that the ideas. it is 
attributed to vary not at all from what they were that 
moment wherein we consider their former existence. 
Locke p.206 
The idea then, can be understood as the concept of the thing 
the definition or even the essence. In effect, Locke 
proposes that we know the essential synchronic identity of 
the object before we can determine its diachronic identity. 
The problem of succession, and this solution to it, is 
exemplified in Locke's treatment of the identity of bodies. 
The constant variation visible in certain bodies, for 
example living organisms, could result in a lack of 
identity. However, Locke makes it clear that unlike "atoms" 
and "masses of matter" (Locke p.208), the ideas associated with 
'animal' or 'plant' do not find their reference in the 
material constituents they exhibit. Instead, these ideas 
refer to something like a 'life-force' which remains 
constant and unvarying de~pite material changes. Each 
collection of matter is part of the animal or plant at that 
point in time, but it is the "continued organisation" (Locke 
p.209) of matter which unites the succeeding parts through 
time. It is to this unifying organisation that the ideas of 
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'plant' or 'animal' refer, and therefore it is that in which 
their identity is to be found. 
Thus it is clear that numerical, as opposed to 
qualitative, identity is the notion being employed by 
Locke. He uses identity to mean the isolation of.a specific 
idea or object associated with that idea, rather than 
referring to any accidental or coincidental features 
associated with the idea. Contingent features may come and 
go yet the idea maintains steady persistence and identity; 
quantitative identity may continue even though the parts 
constituting the idea change. It is therefore possible that 
the identity of the individual or idea is preserved through 
the change of its parts. 
1.1 (ii) Criteria of Identity 
How then can we identify an object? By what criteria can 
we individuate it? If the above account is accurate, an 
exclusive concentration upon qualitative identity will at 
best result in the isolation of a type of thing through its 
properties: it cannot produce a universally effective 
principle of individuation. To produce a quantitative 
individuation, some criterion must be produced which will 
isolate what is necessa~ and unique to all objects. 
Locke suggests that this is answered by the spatial and 
temporal coordinates of each thing. In effect, he claims 
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that identity is to be found through spatia-temporal 
mapping: that each object can be individuated by its 
relationship to its beginning and its posi.tion in * space • 
He states that: 
••• the principium individuationis; and that it is plain, is 
existence itself; which determines a being of any sort to a 
particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of 
the same kind. 
Locke p.208 
In this way, an object can be defined apart from its 
constituents, through the most objective and least 
qualitative (and thereby, hopefully least open to mistake) 
description of any object. Situation in space and time are 
unique to each and every individual: spatially because "we 
never finding, nor conceiving it possible, that two things of the same 
kind should exist in the same place at the same time" (Locke p.206-7); 
and temporally because " ••• one thing cannot have two beginnings of 
existence, nor two things one beginning." (Locke p.207) 
This principle, Locke claims, should produce accurate 
identification: if not, it is through "the little care and 
attention used in having precise notions of the things to which it is 
attributed." (Locke p.207) The Lockean concept of identity 
thus involves two basic elements, change and origin. 
Identity holds if no change occurs and a unique connection 
to time and place of origin is preserved. 
* See also Marr 1982 
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lol (iii) Complex and Simple Identity in Locke 
This theory of identity embraces both simple and complex 
forms of identity. Substances and thoughts. etc., which are 
basics, are described as having simple identity, in that 
they cannot undergo a change of parts but are simple units 
without parts. Consequently they cannot be reduced further 
to criteria, for their identity consists in their total 
persistence. By contrast, bodies and animals can and do 
have a complex form of identity where their qualitative and 
quantitative identities do not necessarily coincide, and 
their persistence through time is in a continuum of changing 
parts. 
It is the idea in Locke that holds the identity; but what 
is the nature of the identity of the idea? Is it possible 
that the idea has complex identity; or, since it does not 
change, is it necessary that it be simple and basic? At 
first it may be tempting to adopt the view that ideas have 
simple identity, for they must persist in total with no 
change for identity to hold. However, ideas can be of 
complex things and their identity can be reduced to criteria 
other than the idea. The complex things of Lockean 
description can persist though change of their parts, and 
their idea is reducible to those parts. 
It is this notion of a complex idea which causes possible 
problems for the account for its status and for its 
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acceptability. As shown, the idea provides an umbrella term 
to link the various changing parts of complex items: but the 
reality of the objects referred to by such terms, and 
therefore their identity, can be doubted. 
The Status of the Idea 
Such doubt finds a foothold on a number of levels - not 
.t. least in the work of Humeft. His brand of scepticism doubts 
the real existence of any connective or embracing unifiers 
that cannot be perceived. Any continuity we attribute has 
the status only of inference, which ultimately is nothing 
but "a fiction of the imagination" (Hume p.160). Thus he claims, 
for example, terms such as necessity, causation, life, and 
even identity, are in effect nothing but fabrications of 
our minds. We do not know the identity of anything 
empirically perceived, for such identity is an inference of 
the mind. 
An attempt to produce a less sceptical account might 
suggest that natural kinds and organic forms beyond the 
reach of doubt, claiming that life forms share an objective 
unity unlike that imposed by our constructed ideas upon 
'artificial' unities. Thus· a horse has an incontrovertible 
unity and identity, whereas a choir or nation may be less 
cut and dried. Yet, still, even the status of these terms 
* Hume (1) 1739, 
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.... 
is doubted by thorough-going sceptics such as Quine", who 
claim that in effect all identity amounts only to Humean-
type conventions. Such doubt is based on. the belief that 
the patterns we make of the world through our perception are 
entirely subjective. 
It is not necessary to enter the epistemological dead-erid 
envisaged by the total scepticism of the modern empiricist 
to make use of the main thrust of their arguments. For, 
even if one wishes to maintain the possibility of an 
independent and 'real' world with real identity existing in 
'basics', a degree of scepticism might be retained with 
respect to complex objects. Such scepticism focuses on 
those objects which manifestly do change, claiming that if 
they are to have identity through time, a continuity must be 
found which can claim to be more than just convention. It 
is possible then to maintain a deep difference between 
complex and simple identity: for the problem encountered by 
the complex view is not just a sceptical difficulty common 
to all theories - it has its own individual problem which 
the simple view does not incur. 
* Quine (1) 1960 or (2) 1969 
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1o2 THE IDEA OF THE PERSON 
Heeding Lockean warnings over confusion in identity, it 
would seem wise to ensure that the idea of 'person' is 
thoroughly understood before proceeding on to an analysis of 
personal identity. How then does Locke use the term person? 
What exactly does he mean by the idea of person? 
simply: 
••• It is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their 
merit, and so belongs only to intelligent agents, capable of 
a law, and happiness and misery. 
Locke p.220 
••• a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and 
reflection, and can consider itself as itself ••• 
Locke p.211 
Quite 
'Person', then, has two main characteristics- it refers 
to a thinking being and it is a forensic term. But what 
does this actually mean? How does Locke get to this 
conclusion? 
1.2 (i) The Rational Being 
To get a clear notion of a thinking, intelligent being, 
Locke's concept of thought must be understood. Locke took 
the human understanding to function on two basic levels, and 
from these knowledge is gained. Firstly, sensory 
information about the world is perceived by the mind: 
"External objects furnish the mind with ideas of sensible qualities, 
which are all those different perceptions they produce in us." (Locke 
p. 91). Secondly, the mind works upon certain information 
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that is received to produce more ideas of 'knowledge': 
" ••• and the mind furnishes the understanding with idea of its own 
operations." (Locke p.93) 
Hence, there are two levels, 'perception' and 
'reflection': the one concerning basic information, such as 
taste, colour or sound; the other providing concepts such as 
mathematics, causation and indeed identity. These fields 
correspond to the mind's function of basic experience and 
thinking, and neither can occur without our awareness of 
them: 
••• sensation, which is such an impression or motion made in 
some part of the body, as produces some perception in the 
understanding. It is about these impressions made on our 
senses by outward objects that the mind seems first to 
employ itself in such operations as we call perception, 
remembering, consideration, reasoning, etc. 
Locke p. 77 
The thinking being must be able to perform both of these 
functions, for without the input from the senses there would 
be nothing for the mind to work upon*. Moreover, the 
product of these two workings is always conscious we 
cannot have an unconscious idea. This Locke explains is 
because "it is impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving 
that he does perceive" (Locke p.2~1) and "consciousness is inseparable 
from thinking" (Locke p. 211) • Hence, both these acts of the 
mind are part of consciousness, for we cannot experience 
sensation or thought without perceiving that we do. 
*The view that the mind, is blank sheet or 'tabula rasa' (Locke p.89). 
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The key to understanding why this is so, is to recognise 
the Lockean use of the word 'perception' to entail not 
merely passive intake, but some form of affectation. When 
we smell, hear, or have any other experience, we know that 
we do so, for we are somehow affected by it: smelling, 
hearing or sensing, implies some sort of action, not just 
reception. We are changed in some way when sense, even if 
it is just from a non-hearing state to a hearing state. In 
other words, we experience something; and according to 
Locke, once we do experience something, we cannot but help 
be aware of ourselves. 
Thinking emerges as the conscious act of reflection or 
reasoning and cannot occur sub-consciously: it is 
intrinsically tied up with consciousness because, Locke 
claims, it cannot occur when we are not conscious of it. 
Consciousness always attends thinking, for to be thinking we 
must somehow be aware of our perceptions - it is something 
which we know we are doing, we cannot help but know. 
The Self 
It is through this consciousness that we come to know our 
selves - Locke shows that w~ experience a thinker or self in 
the changes made by the thought or experience. Thus he is 
claiming more than just the Cartesian 'cogito ergo sum': for 
whereas Descartes* bases the logical existence of the 
* Descartes 1641 p.105 
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thinker in the fact of thinking or experiencing going on, 
Locke has empirical evidence of that thinker. This link 
between perception and its effect upon us is evident in the 
following quotation where Locke questions the ability not to 
be conscious of changes wrought in us by thought: 
••• it being hard to conceive that anything should think and 
not be conscious of it. If the soul doth think in a 
sleeping man without being conscious of it, I ask whether 
during such thinking it has any pleasure or pain or be 
capable of happiness or misery? I am sure the man is not, 
no more than the bed, or earth he lies on. For to be happy 
or miserable without being conscious of it seems to me 
utterly inconsistent and insupportable. 
Locke p.94 
In this way, Locke produces an idea of a self which does 
have an empirically observable ascription: in contrast to 
''~ Hume's 'bundle of perceptions'", Locke postulates that we do 
know the self empirically - in the unification of those 
perceptions: 
When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will 
anything, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to 
our present sensations and perceptions, and by this everyone 
is to himself that which he calls self. 
Locke p.211 
It must be emphasised that this self is no more than the 
unity of consciousness. Locke does not imply the existence 
of some separable self or subject: the self here begins and 
ends with consciousness. It is consciousness which makes 
the individual or self: 
..;, Hume (2) 1793 
For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it 
is that that makes everyone to be what he calls self, and 
there by distinguishes himself from all other thinking 
things ••• 
. Locke p. 212 
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It is only through this awareness of being an 
experiencer, that the person is formed: person means no more 
than being conscious of being a self. Since consciousness 
necessarily entails thought (that is, it is not passive 
reception of experience but active awareness of it), that 
which is conscious must be a thinker. The self is a 
rational, intelligent, self-conscious being. 
lo2 (ii) The Forensic Being 
But why is this phenomenon subsequently called a 'person' 
as opposed to simply self or consciousness? Why is it that 
this thing is what the person is? The answer lies once 
again in his argument for our awareness of the self. It is 
through consciousness that we become aware of being a 
reactive thing which is both affector and affected. The 
reactions stem from awareness of being changed, and this 
awareness is often attended by feelings of happiness or pain 
- we are aware of being things which feel: 
All which is founded in · a concern for happiness, the 
unavoidable concomittant of consciousness; that which is 
conscious of pleasure and pain desiring that that self that 
is conscious should be happy. 
Locke p.220 
Thus, we have concern for this self which feels: such 
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concern extends to all parts we are conscious of - for all 
of them have the power of affecting or being affected by us. 
It is simply one step more which takes this ~oncern into the 
field of responsibility, and with it the attribution of 
punishment and reward. For as: 
This personality extends itself beyond present existence to 
what is past, only by consciousness, whereby it becomes 
concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to itself past 
action, just upon the same ground and for the same reason as 
it does in the present. 
Locke p.220 
In recognising this link between consciousness and 
responsibility, Locke introduces to the idea more than just 
the existence of a kind of reflexive thinking - in addition 
'person' has a more abstract or social connotation involving 
right and wrong. The Lockean person is a moral or legal 
unit of responsibility, susceptible to praise and blame, 
reward and punishment. All of this is rooted in the real 
consciousness of the individual. 
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1.3 PERSONS, MEN AND SUBSTANCES 
The definition of person being thus characterised, to 
what does it actually refer? What is the relationship 
between the thinking being and other things often 
coincidental or even constitutive of persons? Is the person 
the same as the man or human? Is the person the same as 
some form of substance? In order to make the exact idea 
clearer, Locke discusses both of these options stating that 
it is: 
••• one thing to be the same substance, another the same man, 
and a third the same person, if person, man and substance 
are three names standing for different ideas. 
Locke p.210 
1.3 (i} The Natural Man 
The most often and commonly interchangeable of the three 
are man and person: Locke himself remarks that "in the 
ordinary way of speaking 'the same person' and 'the same man' stand for 
one and the same thing" (Locke p. 216) • Yet in his analysis of 
their ideas and identity, what emerges is a clear 
distinction between the forensic 'person' on the one hand 
and the natural kind term 'man' on the other. 
Locke's idea of 'man' is ·one which concerns both body and 
spirit. However, although the place of an unchanging 
immaterial soul is recognised, he argues that the soul does 
not equate to the idea of 'man'. This he illustrates firstly 
by describing a case where a man's soul migrates to 
41 
another's body, concluding that the new combination could 
not be identified with the original as the same 'man'; and 
secondly by stating that even if an animal such as a parrot 
were to exhibit more reason than its owner, we would never 
call it a 'man': 
For I presume that it is not the idea of a thinking or 
rational being alone that makes the idea of man in most 
people's sense, but of a body, so and so shaped, joined to 
it. 
Locke p.211 
'Man' emerges as a notion necessarily concerned with a 
body - not just the material of the body, but the persisting 
organisation of that material. The concept is grouped with 
the class of living organisms, and like other natural kind 
terms, the identity of 'man' is not held in the constitutive 
matter, but in the unifying life: 
••• in nothing but a participation of the same continued 
life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in 
succession vitally united to the same organised body. 
Locke p.210 
Locke's definition of a thinking intelligent being seems 
to echo that part of man which is not sufficient for the 
ascription of the idea of 'man' - the soul or spirit. This 
is the name he gives to th~ part that thinks, simply as a 
way of distinguishing it from material substances a 
necessary distinction, for when it comes to thinking and 
feeling he states that they "cannot be the action of bare 
insensible matter; nor ever could be, without an irrmaterial thinking 
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being." (Locke p.193) The contrast between these ideas is 
reinforced by Locke's treatment of the intelligent parrot -
where the description 'man' was denied it, .he allows it the 
status of 'person'. The purely rational nature of person 
does not then involve any necessary attachments to the 'man' 
to fulfil it as a concept. 
lo3 (ii) Constitutive Substances 
It seems that person is not limited to any particular 
form of animal or collection of substances. But is it 
necessarily linked to any particular type or even token 
substance? Since the person is the thinker, and the 
thinker is associated with spiritual or thinking substance, 
change of material substance does not affect identity - its 
relationship to the person is one of belonging, not being as 
such. And the same is true of individual thoughts: although 
thoughts which constitute or belong to the person are always 
changing, the person persists. But what is the 
relationship of the thinker to thinking substance~ 
The problem is parallel to the problem of the change of 
substances in man. The 'man' can survive change of material 
whilst the new substance is· "vitally united to the same organised 
body" (Locke p.211). Clarity in understanding of the idea of 
'man' clearly shows this to be possible - for although the 
'man' is made up of, and in this respect is, the rna terial 
parts, the idea of 'man' does not refer to this substance 
43 
itself, but to the persisting unit of linked substances. In 
this way, Locke establishes that the idea of 'man' as a 
link, though dependent upon substance, is not dependent on 
particular nor persisting substance. Likewise: 
••• different substances, by the same consciousness, (where 
they do partake in it) being united into one person\ as well 
as different bodies by the same life are united into one 
animal, whose identity is preserved in that change of 
substances by the unity of one continued life. 
Locke p.212 
But can such a relationship be true in the case of a thinker 
and spiritual substances? What is the relationship between 
consciousness and the substance that thinks? 
The difficulty arises over the question of uniqueness and 
ownership - whether the presence of the thinking substance 
which had the original experience (or thought) is necessary 
for that thought to be part of the same connecting 
consciousness. In other words, whether a thought - in a 
present act or remembered depends upon a particular 
thinking substance. 
Locke professes that lack of understanding of the nature 
and workings of thinking substance hinders any certain 
conclusions; but this does _not prevent him from analysing 
the problem into two distinct questions and then offering a 
tentative suggestion about the relationship. He claims that 
'same consciousness' is ambiguous and can be used to 
describe two different and distinguishable acts: the 
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original act of thinking or being aware; and the remembrance 
or consciousness of that act. The problem involves the 
possibility of the transference of the individual thought to 
new substance and the translocation of the memory of that 
thought. In answer to this problem Locke concludes: 
I grant, were the same consciousness the same individual 
action, it could not; but, it being a representation of a 
past action, why it may not be possible that that may be 
represented to the mind to have been what really never was, 
will remain to be shown. 
Locke p.214 
Therefore, taking 'same consciousness' (when used in 
personal identity) to have this latter implication, Locke 
decides that such consciousness can persist through change 
of substance: for as we can be aware of unreal 
representations in dreams, he can see no reason: 
Why one intellectual substance may not have represented to 
it, as done by itself, what it never did, and was perhaps 
done by some other agent. 
Locke p.214 
It seems therefore that substances are not essential to 
the 'person' - it is the quality or nature of the content of 
the thought, rather than the ac tua 1 thought or substance 
itself, which is of importance. The thinker is removed from 
the mechanics of thinking -·what is essential to the person 
is the thought or consciousness rather than that which makes 
it possible. In producing such a theory, Locke is not 
necessarily discarding the necessity of some form of 
substance, but as such it is a necessity which is purely a 
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practical requirement for instantiation. The particular 
substance is not essential. What is of essence is the 
quality of the thought and the consciousness. of ownership. 
Such an account of persons shows the person as definable 
in terms of consciousness - and within that consciousness 
are many different parts. What is the person, is defined by 
that which is present in self-consciousness. 
46 
le4 PERSONAL IDENTITY 
According to Locke, personal identity over time, like the 
definition of person, is based in consciousness. His theory 
simply expands the idea of conscious unity at one time, to 
embrace a temporal dimension: that is, personal identity 
consists in unified consciousness extending backwards. Once 
again, he expresses himself in straightforward terms, which 
belie the complexity of his suggestions. He states that: 
••• to find wherein personal identity consists, we must 
consider what person stands for: which, I think, is a 
thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, 
and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, 
in different times and places; which it does only by that 
consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it 
seems to me, essential to it; it being impossible for anyone 
to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive. 
Locke p.211 
• 
1.4 (i) Consciousness and Personal Identity 
In order to understand this clearly it is necessary to 
remember again the Lockean theory of consciousness. Input 
from the senses acts on the blank page of the mind and 
causes in it certain ideas: but it also has the ability to 
think or reflect, using the mind to understand or 
acknowledge awareness of certain things. The sensory 
information feeds reflection and in effect our knowledge is 
made up of a combination of these two. 
Consciousness itself Locke defines as "the perception of 
what passes in a man's own mind" (Locke p. 96), implying that rather 
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than just plain sentience, consciousness involves the 
awareness of perceptions. And these are on all levels of 
the mind, from plain sensory input, to our experience of 
meditation upon that input. Within that consciousness, we 
can be aware of perceiving - a logical implication described 
J. 
by the cogito experiment, and, as explainedn, the awareness 
we have of ourselves. 
Thus, the consciousness gives rise to the person; and 
subsequently, it is consciousness which provides our 
criterion of personal identity. More precisely, personal 
identity consists in unity of consciousness through time -
the past self and the present self must be unified in the 
same consciousness. Our knowledge of consciousness of past 
selves is contained in our memories of experiences, and if 
these are contained in our present consciousness, along with 
a concern felt for them as being part of us, then they are 
part of us. It is important that we feel the same concern, 
that we recognise our present sense of belonging in those 
past memories - that the content of the memories holds the 
same relationship to us that our present experiences do. If 
this relationship pertains, then identity holds. Thus Locke 
claims that: 
For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of 
any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at 
first, and with the same consciousness it had of any present 
action, so far it is the same personal self. 
Locke p.213 
* Section 1.2 (i) 
In this alone consists personal identity, ie. the sameness 
of a rational being; and as far as this consciousness can be 
extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far 
reaches the identity of that person. 
. Locke p. 212 
Thus Locke an identity is firmly rooted in 
48 
the 
consciousness, and the co-presentation of conscious states 
creates the self through time. If we are reflectively 
aware, with the same sort of consciousness past and present 
joined in the present consciousness by thinking, we know we 
are the same self. Moreover, it is not just a case of 
knowing that we are that same self, we are that self. For 
being a self consists in no more than a unified 
consciousness. 
The person and its identity thus not only has a character 
of being known by consciousness, but also of actually being 
that consciousness. The person is the name given to the 
unity of consciousness whether at one time or over a period 
of time; the self arises from such consciousness and does 
not precede it. From what Locke says it is clear that the 
person is unified consciousness, not the unifier of 
consciousness. Nowhere does he take the further step of 
. 
implying that the self might persist independently of 
consciousness - or, to put it in dualist terms, that the 
self is the separable and therefore independently persisting 
subject of thoughts. For Locke, the self is thought and is 
thus inseparable from it. 
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1.4 (ii) The Changing Person 
This is demonstrated by Locke through all of his work, 
especially in his reference to the inseparability of the 
consciousness from thinking and in his subsequent treatment 
of the person. Because of this inseparability, it is 
characteristic of the Lockean person to be a ·precarious 
thing. If consciousness ceases to be continuous, then the 
self or person ceases too. Clearly there is no a hint of 
belief in the person as an underpinning or persistent thing 
through these lapses of consciousness. There is no self 
which persists independently of consciousness simply 
because consciousness is what the self is: 
I say, in all these cases, our consciousness being 
interrupted, and we losing sight of our past selves, doubts 
are raised whether we are the same thinking thing. 
Locke p.212 
Considering Locke's usual realism, the self has a 
curiously phenomenological character; but if it is 
remembered that the nature of the self is essentially 
consciousness which is immaterial and self-dependent, then 
the surprise lessens, for as such it does not have a further 
character in an independent physical world. There is no 
reason why there should be PFimary qualities attributable to 
the self, as one might wish to ascribe to 'man', for there 
is no further fact about persons beyond the experience of 
the self. 
so 
Locke's empiricist background is quite evident in such a 
conclusion - he will not postulate the existence of anything 
for which we have no experiential proof •. Since the only 
evidence we have of consciousness is our own experience of 
it - indeed, since consciousness and the self are defined as 
a first-person experience (the self is not a physical object 
but something that is in essence experienced), it makes no 
sense to talk about persons in anything but subjective 
terms. Thus Locke does not imply from the phenomena of 
unified consciousness the existence of anything beyond which 
causes the phenomena, he simply defines the person in terms 
of those phenomena. 
This becomes more comprehensible if, once again, 
attention is paid to the account of thought. Locke defines 
thought as an essentially conscious activity - we cannot be 
unconscious of thinking for it is by definition a conscious 
act. Once we are no longer conscious, we are no longer 
thinking. If therefore, the person or self is a thinking 
being, once thought and consciousness cease, that being no 
longer persists. There is no such thing as an unconscious 
person. Thus Locke arrives at the apparently strange 
conclusion that: 
To punish Socrates waking for what sleeping Socrates 
thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of, would 
be no more of right than to punish one twin for what his 
brother twin did, whereof he knew nothing ••• 
Locke p.216 
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The strange conclusions of Lockean theory might be better 
understood if the forensic nature of person is remembered. 
The introduction of temporal dimension to the concern felt 
as a self, extends to cover the past and future selves. The 
person is aware of the effects of experiences and actions; 
is defined by the consciousness of them; and thus feels 
concern at present for the pains and pleasures of past 
selves, likewise anticipating the future. 
This concern is empirically locatable only to the self -
there seems little empirical evidence independent of the 
subject to support a concept of person as a forensic thing. 
Since Locke is trying to account for persons through 
empirical evidence, it is with the self's concern that he 
must remain if he is to produce an account of person that is 
not just a social construction. 
If the person is defined by self-concern, it is 
reasonable to assume that once the concern is removed or is 
no longer there, then the person is no longer involved. And 
since concern arises out of unification to consciousness, 
once the person is no longer conscious of something, it is 
no longer his to worry about. Hence, if I no longer feel 
concern for a past act because it is completely forgotten, 
then it is not an act of mine as the person I am now. 
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By retaining his empirical rigour, Locke produces an 
account of person as a forensic being, which is essentially 
dependent upon the consciousness of the self. As such, it 
takes on a character and identity as precarious as the 
identity of the content of self-consciousness. 
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1.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The Lockean account of personal identity is clearly a 
complex account of persons for Locke is concerned to 
reduce 'person' to unified or self-consciousness. Thus it 
is not the equivalent of the Cartesian soul, nor is it 
something like a separable self: the Lockean person is not a 
basic, it does not underlie the properties. Nor is it 
thought to be something over and above the consciousness. 
In effect, it is the experience described by consciousness -
no matter how that is maintained. 
The self or person in Locke is thus defined purely in 
terms of certain properties pertaining: that is, person is 
the property of a unified consciousness. The person can be 
reduced to a description or list of the properties within 
that consciousness at any one time and over a period of time 
~ in effect, the person is that for which it feels concern, 
and therefore is the set of properties maintained within its 
unity. The unity is not something imposed upon the 
consciousness from without by some basic form of thing: it 
is engendered by experiencing unity. 
Hence, although there may be a temptation to claim that 
the Lockean self is not really a complex thing, for the self 
does persist unchanged throughout, this must be res is ted. 
For the identity of the Lockean self is a very different 
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form of persistence from that which a simple account of 
identity describes. The person of a simple view is 
irreducible; the self of Locke is definable in terms of 
consciousness united through time. 
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CHAPTER 2 THE LOGIC OF THE COMPLEX VIEW 
The earliest criticisms of Lockean Personal Identity come 
from Butler and Reid. Their first objection deals with the 
logical consistency underlying the Lockean criterion ·of 
personal identity. If such a criterion cannot be supported 
with valid and cons is tent argument, then it remains 
unjustified. This criticism focuses on the relationship 
between evidence of personal identity itself: finding Locke 
guilty of conflating the two, and thus questioning the 
logical basis of his use of "same consciousness" as a 
criterion of identity. 
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2.1 THE PROBLEM 
Butler* and Reid+ point to what they see as a confusion 
in Locke in which, they claim, he fails to distinguish 
between personal identity and the evidence we have for it: a 
confusion between the existence of something and the 
evidence we have of that existence. They claim that: 
One should really think it self-evident, that consciousness 
of personal identity presupposes and therefore cannot 
constitute, personal identity, any more than knowledge, in 
every other case, can constitute truth, which it 
presupposes. 
Butler p.100 
••• in this doctrine, not only is consciousnesses confounded 
with memory, but which is still more strange, personal 
identity is confounded with the evidence we have of our 
personal identity. 
Reid p.115 
There are two possible ways of interpreting the intention 
of these comments: either that they accuse Locke of offering 
a criterion which presupposes a knowledge of personal 
identity; or, more simply, that Locke confuses evidence with 
truth. Subsequent defences of Locke by others differ with 
the interpretation read; yet whether begging the question or 
confusing evidence with truth, the logical implication of 
the original objection remains the same: unless he can 
support his theory without inconsistency and circularity, 
his attempt to establish his criterion of personal identity 
will fail. 
"~• Butler 1736 
+ Reid 1785 
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2.2 PRESUPPOSITION 
As said, one way of interpreting the original criticisms 
is to read them as implying that Locke cannot define 
personal identity in terms of consciousness of personal 
identity, for the simple reason that the latter assumes 
prior knowledge of the former: that the idea of personal 
identity is needed to help apply the criteria of personal 
identity; which is a blatant case of assuming that which it 
sets out to prove. 
The problem arises from Locke's account both of the 
relationship between a person and his parts, and of how that 
person comes to know himself. To be aware of personal 
identity, a person must be aware of past consciousness in 
his present consciousness; but in order to achieve this, he 
must be able to say accurately whether or not a certain past 
or present consciousness is his. This of course will 
involve some method of determining what is, and what is not, 
a part of the consciousness; and to do this he must have 
some idea of what cons ti tu tes being part of that 
consciousness in other words, an idea of personal 
identity. 
The first interpretation of the criticism therefore 
accuses Locke on the grounds that his theory means that 
knowledge of what is and what is not the self, presupposes 
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an awareness of the self; so identity cannot be known unless 
it is already known what that identity entails. The result 
is a circular argument in which the explanans is used in the 
explanandum. 
2.2 (i) Sensation and Reflection 
If the account explained earlier is remembered*, then the 
problem voiced by such a criticism becomes less difficult: 
this apparent difficulty can be simply avoided by 
recognising the differing activities of thought engaged in 
sensation and reflection. For within consciousness Locke 
postulates two levels: straightforward representative 
experience, originating from sensory information or 
memories; and reflection upon that experience. It is 
through the first of these that awareness of the self is 
given, but it is the second, that is active awareness or 
consciousness of experiences, which constitutes being the 
self. 
For example, this idea is explained by Behan+, who 
equates the experiences with the public man, and the thought 
with the private man. Thus he recognises that there is a 
potential difficulty in the authentication of memories, 
false memories being qualitatively similar to valid ones. 
Circularity arises for validation can be done only by the 
"!( Section 1.1 
+ Behan 1979 
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consciousness, and it is the consciousness which is being 
tested. 
Such circularity can be avoided in the recognition that 
Lockean personal identity in fact involves two stages: 
firstly, the knowledge of what parts constitute'the self at 
any one time in the present and past; and secondly that 
there is a consciousness of these memories or parts of the 
present self . 
••• an individual must know who he is as a man before he can 
know what he is, i.e. what is part of his self or person. 
Behan p.379 
Thus personal identity involves both first and third-
person identification. In order to identify the memories as 
being mine, I must employ certain third-person 
identification methods linking the content of memories to 
actual persons of the past and present. If interpreted this 
• 
way, Locke does not encounter the problem of circularity, 
for past selves are known by methods used by any third-
person identifier, that is, by their physical manifestation, 
or parts. Behan explains that: 
••• for Locke there clearly was a subject - moral man - who 
is able to be aware of who, as a public particular, he is, 
and, aware of himself as others are aware of him. He can 
also be self to himself; that is to say, he can then 
appropriate his actions, thoughts and substances to himself 
as his. Concerned consciousness, in other words, 
presupposes the third-person identity of moral man, and 
constitutes the first-person identity of moral man. But the 
third-person identity of moral man is constituted in the 
same way as the third-person identity of natural man, 
through continuity of life. 
Behan p.S80 
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However, this is not satisfactory on a number of levels, 
not least because Locke claims that natural 'man' and 
'person' do not always coincide, persons being equivalent to 
intangible selves. Moreover, Behan's interpretation 
deviates from Locke's intention, by introducing the notion 
of a fixed person prior to self-consciousness of it. He 
claims that concerned consciousness, or in other words the 
person, presupposes knowledge of its parts, and in so doing 
implies that knowledge of our parts is something separable 
from our concern for them. That is, the 'person' is 
separable from the parts belonging to it. To state this is 
to imply that the person exists in an absolute way, 
independent of consciousness or concern: something to which 
parts objectively belong; something which exists prior to 
any belonging parts. 
However, the Lockean conception is not like this - his 
person exists only through a consciousness of parts 
belonging to a unified consciousness. It is the concern 
felt towards parts, which makes them part of the self; and 
concern is engendered by the effect of consciousness. Thus 
the person is concern for parts; and what are parts of the 
person, are those for which. concern is felt, nothing more. 
There is no other way of determining identity - it is simply 
self-consciousness. 
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2.2 (ii) Synchronic and Diachronic Distinctions 
Another approach to avoid circularity involves a further 
attempt to break the function of personal identity into two 
stages, this time through a synchronic diachronic 
distinction. That is, the knowledge of what we are at any 
one time is presupposed by any inference showing what we are 
over time; but since the two are different forms of 
individuation, circularity is not a problem • 
.,J,. 
Hughesn produces this kind of interpretation. He 
maintains that a distinction between synchronic and 
diachronic identification enables a characterisation of 
temporal identity in terms of an 'appropriate causal 
relationship', holding between independently defined 
synchronic persons. Thus he writes: 
••• it is easy for Locke to define the diachronic self, or 
person, as constituted by instantaneous selves linked by the 
causal process appropriate for the production of a 
sufficiently rich pattern of memories. 
Hughes p.SS7 
However, he does remark that there is a danger that this 
merely throws the problem back one stage: that is that the 
preliminary identification of the synchronic self shows 
signs of further circulariti. For in Locke, self-knowledge 
of the present person is described as something known 
through consciousness of our different parts; but those 
parts are united to us if we are conscious of them. The 
* Hughes 1975 
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parts therefore belong to the person if joined to him by 
consciousness, and the person knows they are part of him if 
he is conscious of them. It would appear .that the act of 
apprehending the parts is also what makes them to be a 
person's parts; in other words, the evidence is the same as 
the truth. 
But Hughes claims that this potential difficulty is 
overcome if, once again, at tent ion is paid to the various 
uses which Locke assigns to consciousness, for he uses it as 
a general term referring to all levels of mental activity. 
Consciousness is used to indicate not only the awareness of 
living creatures, but knowledge of that awareness. This 
self-awareness embraces two forms of experience - it is the 
recognition of straightforward experience at the present and 
also awareness of such sensations experienced in the past, 
i.e. memory. 
The use of consciousness in Locke, when referring to 
memory, can be subsequently characterised in two further 
separate concepts (though to Locke they are in fact 
inseparable): 'straightforward recall' and 'remembering with 
awareness of ownership, or thought'. It is the reflex 
action of remembering which is associated with 'man' and 
sentience; but, more importantly, it is the forensic memory 
and self awareness which are associated with the 'person'. 
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Having made clear these distinctions, the account of 
Locke offered by Hughes can be more easily understood: parts 
are united to us by the basic 'consciousness' given through 
sensation; and our knowledge of such belonging is through 
self-awareness of those sensations, an awareness which 
subsequently gives rise to concern. The persistence of the 
person through time is ensured by the presence of the 
consciousness of past selves or memories; but knowledge of 
temporal identity is through consciousness that they are our 
own memories - that is, memory with concern. He says: 
What is included in the present self is explained ••• by 
reference to an aspect of consciousness different from both 
those I have mentioned so far, a kind of concern ••• Having 
thus defined the present self without vicious circularity. 
Hughes p.SS7) 
2.2 (iii) Continuity Accounts of Personal Identity 
The new modern accounts therefore perceive the person as 
a system of causal connections through time, one stage 
causally linked to the next - often by a large overlap in 
particular content to reinforce the link. As seen, Hughes 
and Behan try to forge a link through successive stages of 
consciousness of parts - creating a two stage system, the 
second stage of memory uniting the first stage of 
independently indentifiable co-consciousness. Others try to 
force the link into the public field: for example, Williams* 
perceives the person as some necessarily physically 
·k Williams 1973 
64 
continuous object; Lewis* and Parfit+ as psychologically 
continuous objects. 
It is the attempt to reduce the possibility of 
circularity that results in the further stage being added. 
The modern complex accounts seem to work from the premise 
that, if it is possible that one can determine the identity 
of memories independently of consciousness of them, a 
circular account is avoided. Thus by introducing this form 
of two-stage identification of persons, the modern complex 
view hopes to avoid presupposition, at the same time 
objectifying the person. 
Despite the difference in details, it seems that the 
intention is to explain the continuity or unity of 
psychological states in terms other than just the 
perspective of first-person consciousness. Such accounts 
force the personal identity into the public arena, for if 
the person's parts can be identified independently of 
consciousness, then the ownership rests in something more 
than just consciousness. 
It is therefore possible within such theories that some 
memories of which the person is conscious are not in fact 
his. To Locke, this is impossible, but to later empiricists 
*Lewis 1980 
+ Parfit 1984 
" .. \ ..
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it is important not only in terms of an attempt to avoid 
circularity but also because it introduces an element of 
objectivity and genuine history to the con.cept of person. 
However, it can also be shown that such modifications also 
fail to avoid the problem of circularity. 
2.2 (iv) Circularity in Continuity Accounts 
The circularity is of a form similar to that which Butler 
and Reid thought they found in Locke: that it is impossible 
to individuate persons without first knowing their identity. 
The problem arises in this case from the complex view's 
attempt to provide an objectively reductive account of 
persons: for any reduction of the person to a set of 
properties, causally interconnected or not, is an attempt to 
treat persons or selves as ordinary objects. However, by 
treating them in this way, it is impossible to individuate 
or sufficiently account for conscious states. 
For the very nature of consciousness is awareness; and 
awareness makes little sense if nothing is being aware. The 
idea of a subject is essential to their definition: 
conscious states cannot exist unless they have a subject; 
without this extra factor· they are merely impulses or 
events, not perceptions or thoughts. A sound is not a sound 
until it is heard; a thought is not a thought unless someone 
is thinking it. The causes of these conscious states may 
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persist independently of the subject, but the states 
themselves cannot. 
Moreover, it seems that subjects cannot be identified in 
solely objective empirical terms - a reduction to a list of 
properties fails to account for subjectivity. It. seems that 
any effective criterion of personal identity must contain 
within it mention of the subject, if persons with conscious 
states are to be recognised. Thus, any attempt to account 
for persons with psychological states which is expressed in 
purely third-person terms, is doomed to failure. For to do 
so would be to consider conscious states to be like any 
other object; and as it has become apparent, conscious 
things are not normal objects 
dimension, they have subjects. 
they have an extra 
The problem in objective empirical accounts is therefore 
a consequence of failure to recognise logical necessities at 
a fundamental level: that psychological states must be owned 
by a subject - they cannot be individuated, indeed cannot 
exist, without a subject. To speak of psychological states 
is to imply that they belong to someone - even to isolate 
them we must know who that·owner is. The logic of this is 
founded in the Cartesian 'cogito' and can also be found in 
Locke: both claim that the thought cannot occur without the 
thinker. 
... 
As LoweA writes of individual token psychological 
"f( Lowe(1) 1991 
modes such as belief states or memories: 
••• such individual mental states are necessarily states of 
persons: they are necessarily 'owned' ~ necessarily have a 
subject. The necessity in question arises from the 
metaphysical-cum-logical truth that such individual mental 
states cannot even in principle be individuated and 
identified without reference to the subject of which they 
are states. 
Lowe p. 98 
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Thus, any empiricist account suggesting that the person 
or personal identity can be reduced to a continuum of parts, 
will find that it is impossible to use particular 
psychological states except with implicit reference to their 
owner. As Lowe writes: 
What is wrong with the Neo-Lockean theory is that, in 
purporting to supply an account of the individuation and 
identity of persons it presupposes, untenably, that an 
account of the identity conditions of psychological modes 
can be provided which need not rely on reference to persons. 
But it emerges that the identity of any psychological mode 
turns on the identity of the person that possesses it. 
Lowe p. 78 
The problem is clearly expressed in Madell*, who focuses 
on the empiricist claim that the unification of experience, 
synchronically and diachronically, can be expressed only in 
terms of belonging to a certain continuous body or 
manifestation. This, he states, amounts to the claim that 
"I know my experiences to be mine in virtue of the fact that they are 
tied to this body." (Madell p.62). Thus, in order to establish 
that any experience past or present is mine, I have to 
identify it as being part of my body. However, to 
-lr Madell 1981 
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do this, I have to first have a means of identifying which 
experiences I am identifying: 
We are bogged down in a vicious . circularity. . In order to 
establish that any group of simultaneous experiences as 
mine, I have to establish that it satisfies the criterion of 
being connected with this body, but in order to do this I 
first have to identify the group of experiences in question, 
and to identify them just is to pick them out as mine. 
Madell p.60 
Thus the bodily criterion is quickly shown to be 
insufficient to the task of individuation of persons, for 
further criteria than it offers are evidently needed to 
identify psychological states - and the same is true of any 
criteria of connectedness not employing an idea of the self. 
The missing element is the property of belonging to someone 
or of being mine. 
The physicalist might claim that he avoids this criticism 
in his account psychological states are owned by a 
subject, but that subject is identified with the brain, or 
some such physical thing. A;L though this does avoid any 
irreducible reference to a self at this stage, unless the 
brain is equivalent to the self, subject or owner, then such 
theories do fall into the original problem of circularity 
described by Madell. 
2.2 (v) Lockean Circularity 
Apart from these difficulties, although such accounts as 
described above are attempts to help Locke out of his 
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apparent circularity, they are also inconsistent with the 
original intention of the Lockean theory. In fact, it is 
the failure to maintain the fundamental insight of Locke 
which causes their downfall: where Locke can be read in a 
way which is far from circular, the modern empiricist 
cannot. 
It is not the case that his personal identity involves 
somehow knowing the self then attributing certain parts to 
it. Locke states that it is experiences which give rise to 
the self, which amounts only to an awareness of being an 
experiencer. If then, it is through the parts that we 
become aware of the self, we cannot know the self before we 
are aware of its parts: moreover, there cannot be a self 
before the awareness of it occurs. This is not circular: 
the person is merely defined as consciousness of being a 
subject to various experiences through having experiences. 
We do not need to know in any other way which experiences 
are ours, because if we experience them, then they are ours. 
Likewise, this applies to memories. Locke does not need 
to show that knowledge of memories, such as those of our 
past consciousness, can be determined in some way before we 
are aware of them as ours: for awareness of the first-person 
memories in the present is what makes them part of our 
present self. In effect, in Locke the evidence about 
personal identity is also the truth about it. 
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Locke's notion of personal identity does not then involve 
two conceptual stages: for him there is only one - the 
present consciousness. Thus in the present. I know who I am 
because I am conscious of all my parts. I know who I was in 
the past, if I am at present co-conscious with memories 
which contain the appropriate feelings of first-person 
consciousness. The key point is, that to Locke it does not 
matter whether the appropriate feelings are part of the past 
of the individual or not for if they are part of my 
consciousness now, then they are part of me as a person now. 
It is in order to avoid this strange conclusion that 
complex views after Locke have attempted to remove the 
unstable per spec ti ve-rela ted character of Lockean personal 
identity. In an effort to make identity fixed and somehow 
public, they attempt to create a more stable person. This 
they do through developments in the line of continuities -
either in body or mind - having the effect that the person 
is objectified, or made into an object existing through 
time. However, as -~ shown' , by doing so they involve the 
empiricist account in the problem of circularity in a way 
originally envisaged by Butler and Reid. 
Hughes and other such theorists separate the person in 
actuality from the person as perceived by the person: by 
creating two-stage identification methods, they offer a 
* Section 2.2 (iv) 
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theory in which the person is a fact independent of the 
evidence we have for it. This is to read Locke as intending 
the same - to believe that Locke tried to produce a theory 
in which persons and their parts are joined in a way more 
stable and objective than awareness. 
But Locke does not make this distinction. He clearly 
states that the person is what we are conscious of, and no 
more: the crux of Lockean theory is just that the person is 
self-reflexive consciousness. We do not have the various 
parts of the person before we are aware of them: it is the 
awareness that makes them part of the person. The identity 
of persons is known in one fell swoop in one 
consciousness, and in what is within that consciousness. To 
say as the Neo-Lockeans try to, that the person persists 
independently of our consciousness of being persons is to 
imply that the person is more than consciousness. 
It seems that Locke has recognised the unique aspect of 
consciousness usually associated only with dualist or simple 
theories: that it is intrinsically related to the subject. 
Since self knowledge is the only empirical evidence one has 
of the ownership or subjective awareness of conscious 
states, the individuation of consciousness becomes solely a 
first-personal rna t ter. Locke remains an empiricist - for 
the subjectivity he describes is experienced, moreover it is 
directly known with certainty. To make claims of 
subjectivity beyond the 
move beyond the bounds 
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first-person account would be to 
of empirical evidence: a fact 
illustrated in the later complex views which, when on moving 
into an objective empiricism, find it necessary to deny the 
real existence of the subject. 
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2.3 EVIDENCE AND TRUTH 
The last point mentioned above overlaps the second 
interpretation of the Butler and Reid criticism: that is, 
that their comment was formed partly in response to a 
logical error of a different kind from straightforward 
circularity; that Locke 1 s theory involves a confusion of 
fact with evidence. As Noonan explains*: 
To read Butler as making so sophisticated an objection, is 
mistaken. His thought is simply that in general, one cannot 
define what it is for it to be the case that P in terms of 
what it is for it to be known that P, and that, as a special 
case of this, one cannot define what it is for personal 
identity to obtain in terms of what it is for it to be known 
- or to be an object of consciousness - that personal 
identity obtains. 
Noonan p.68 
The complaint thus read, is simply that Locke is guilty 
of assuming that because we have memories providing 
knowledge of identity, it means that identity obtains. As 
Reid states, this is by no means the case, for: 
••• to say that my remembering that I did such a thing, 
or ••• my being conscious that I did it, makes me to have done 
it, appears to me as great an absurdity as it would be to 
say, that my belief that the world was created made it to be 
created. 
Reid p.116 
Such an accusation implies that either Locke is guilty of 
making a great mistake, or that he is using a strange form 
of 1 knowledge 1 • As seen, Hughes offers one defence which 
relies on the different intentions behind the use of 
"'/( Noonan 1989 
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consciousness; in the following account from Noonan, these 
differences are reinforced by a clear emphasis on the 
distinction between personal identity and the knowledge of 
that identity. 
2c3 (i) Identity and Thinking Substances 
Noonan interprets Locke's identity theory to be one that 
defines personal identity, not through knowledge of personal 
identity, but through our knowledge of the identity of 
consciousness. That is, awareness of personal identity is 
based in a knowledge of thinking substances, not persons. 
Moreover, he claims that this knowledge is not held by 
persons but by thinking substances. Thus, it is the 
thoughts that contain the knowledge of identity, not the 
subject of those thoughts. 
Reading Locke in this way, it becomes possible to explain 
his account in a form which does not express identity in 
terms of relationships between persons, nor muddle the 
awareness of personal identity with personal identity 
itself. For: 
To 
••• the relation in terms of which Locke defines personal 
identity, that is samenes~ of consciousness, is not a 
relation between persons, but a relation between thinking 
substances. 
clarify this point, Noonan 
Noonan p.69 
calls upon * Fregean 
.... , Frege 1950 
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specifications of identity, which define the identity of a 
thing in terms referring to certain relationships holding 
between specified parts of it. With respect to Lockean 
identity, Noonan claims that the identity of persons can be 
defined through relationships held between thinking 
substances, in particular the relationship of c9nsciousness 
of the same actions. Hence, i E the content o E thought or 
consciousness is the same, then the two instances are of the 
same person. He interprets Lockean personal identity to be 
expressed as: 
••• the person in which thinking substance 'a' thinks at time 
t = the person in which thinkinp substance 'b' thinks at 
time t' if thinking substance 'a is conscious of the same 
actions and experiences as thinking substance 'b'. 
Noonan p.70 
Crucial to this claim is the maintained distinction 
between persons and thinking substances, but there is no 
difficulty in finding this expressed in Locke under the 
recognition that persons are to be distinguished from their 
parts and substances. He does claim that the person is a 
thinking intelligent being, but he strictly denies that this 
implies anything more than the contingent ownership of 
J. 
thinking substancesn. Under this description the person's 
identity exists in the presence of 'consciousness of same 
actions', but that consciousness is something experienced by 
the thinking substance of the person. 
* See Section 1.3 
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This view interprets Locke as holding that, for the 
persistence of a person, the thinking substance need not be 
the same but the existence of the same memories within its 
consciousness is essential. Indeed, it is the continuation 
of these memories which constitutes the continuation of the 
person. 
Although it seems that Noonan has isolated some truth in 
Locke, he is still guilty of separating the person from 
consciousness. It is true that Locke does define personal 
identity in terms of special relationships to experiences: 
at one time, self-awareness induced by them, and over a 
period of time, a self-awareness of the past contained in 
present self~awareness. Thus Locke did feel that we must 
have a certain relationship to the consciousness for 
identity to hold. 
But that relationship between consciousness and self-
awareness is the relationship between the self and its 
thoughts. It is concern which entails ownership, for 
identity of the self depends upon feeling concern for the 
content of consciousness. It is not just continuity of 
content that makes identity, it is continuity of self-
concern. 
Moreover, though separate as an idea, the person is not 
separable from consciousness in fact. Once again, it is not 
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the case that Locke is postulating that we observe certain 
connections between things, consider them and then decide 
upon identity of a person: the person is the observation of 
the connection between things. 
2.3 (ii) Evidence of Subjective Persons 
It is ridiculous, to try separating the fact from the 
evidence - for to Locke evidence is the fact. To divide our 
awareness from personal identity itself, is to misunderstand 
what persons are: identity of persons is the awareness. As 
Locke shows, the forensic nature of person simply entails 
that this concern and experience of being are fundamental to 
the notion of persons: such experience being what fulfils 
this characterisation. It is only the awareness, rather 
than some independent 'being' or fact merely demonstrated in 
awareness, that is of importance. 
It is this forensic guilt as conceived by the self which 
is ultimately what determines the identity of the person; 
and it may well be that in this final conclusion is the 
source of the Butler and Reid critic isms. For although at 
first sight, their objections appear weak, and it is fairly 
easy to defend Locke against both interpretations of their 
criticisms, it can be shown that the intuition behind both 
Butler and Reid not only implies both interpretations, but 
accurately picks out a failing in Locke's account on a more 
fundamental level. For it is against the methods by which 
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Locke reaches his conclusions that the objections hold most 
force: if they are looked at more closely, he can be found 
guilty of presupposition and establishment of fact from 
evidence. 
Locke's ideas of persons seem to come exclusively out of 
self-examination and self-knowledge: he is aware of himself 
as a thinking intelligent being and uses this as his basic 
concept of person. He carefully analyses his own self 
knowledge synchronically and diachronically, and from this 
constructs a theory not only about persons and their 
identity but also about the nature of the being of a person. 
Having concluded that what is important to the self is what 
the self is conscious of, he concludes that persistence of 
such consciousness ensures the persistence of the self. 
In this method Locke is guilty of using the evidence he 
has of his existence - synchronic and diachronic - n6t just 
to imply the truth of that existence but to characterise it. 
This can be illustrated in Noonan's conclusion, where the 
evidence Locke has of himself that is memories - is used 
to define himself. Thus he is quite blatantly guilty of 
that which Butler 
. 
accuses him: of using knowledge of 
personal identity to constitute personal identity. Locke 
employs his findings about personal identity to characterise 
the person and therefore the truth about personal identity. 
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As explained, the motivation for such a method can be 
understood with regard to his empiricism, for if 
consciousness is something essentially subjective, then the 
truth about consciousness can only be given in first-person 
terms. Such a move would be acceptable if the self or the 
mind were equivalent to persons but Locke needs to argue for 
this fact in addition to his other claims. 
The assumption that only the self can fulfil the concept 
of person, unduly limits the whole of Locke's enterprise: 
since the self is characterised as the person, and the self 
is the only thing that has direct access to the self, 
personal identity becomes self-identity. But if he were to 
consider other aspects of the person, most especially the 
full social implications and limitations of its forensic 
role, it is possible that the conclusions might not 
characterise quite such an obscure and ephemeral thing. For 
if 'person' were not limited to the intangible thinking 
being, his theory may have resulted in more acceptable 
conclusions when considered in a forensic light. 
The intimation behind the comments of Butler and Reid may 
well be the realisation ·that what Locke tells us about 
selves is not in itself wrong, but it is not the whole story 
about personal identity. Persons are not limited to the 
evidence of selves; persons have an existence independent of 
evidence of them. 
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2o3 (iii) Evidence of Objective Persons 
It is in response to the public aspect of persons that 
empiricist developments of personal identity theory throw 
the person into the objective realm. Following on the heels 
of Humean rigour the modern complex accounts decline to talk 
about further non-experienced or intangible selves, placing 
all that there is to know about persons firmly in the field 
of the objective empirical evidence we have of them. 
Hume' s empiricism.,.(' led him to a reduction of the thing 
itself to the phenomena, for the inference of anything over 
and above the phenomenological was meaningless - thus, for 
example, talk of peaches entails no more than a reference to 
certain skin texture, colour, or taste; and talk of persons 
is ultimately reducible to observations concerning 'bundles 
of perceptions'. Kantian empiricism+ comes to a similar 
conclusion - that, once removed of all properties, there 
would appear to be nothing left of the person. Thus the use 
of terminology referring to persons is empty - no more than 
a grammatical necessity, for there is no subject or self. 
As seen with regard to Locke, empiricists equate their 
-
criteria or evidence of identity with the identity itself. 
The qualities are no longer a part of or sign of some 
further thing but the thing itself. 
* For example as found in Hume 1739 
+ For example as found in Kant 1781 
This stems directly 
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from the empirical method, for it is vacuous to talk of 
anything not determinable in empirical 
,_ 
terms". Hence to 
refer to the persistence of some intangible thing is 
meaningless persistence necessarily being measured in 
terms of continuance of certain properties. 
By asking what matters in the persistence of persons, the 
empiricists naturally fix upon tangible and evidential 
factors. The empiricist reduction of the person to purely 
third-person properties results in complex theories of 
psychological and physical persistence. What matters is 
expressed in terms of qualities or properties valued in a 
person and thus there is a move toward a qualitative notion 
of identity. 
Developments of this can be seen in theories such as 
Parfit's+, which concerns itself. with the continuation of 
psychological properties - of beliefs, memories, hopes 
essentially those things that he finds when he asks 'what is 
it that I value in myself and in other persons?' These 
qualities are not only evidence of persons but they are 
essentially what persons are - because they are what is of 
value and importance about persons. Thus it is the 
persistence of these particular qualities which is of key 
interest to the person who, in Parfitian terms, will 
* Eg. Hume 1739 & Ayer 1936 
+ Parfit 1984 
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'survive' through time with the persistence of them. 
From this it might be concluded that within the modern 
complex account the person is only of derivative value. 
For, if what is important is the persistence of certain 
qualities of properties, the person is only needed so long 
as it ensures the persistence of those qualities. It may be 
that the person is defined in terms of properties, and 
therefore is properties and of equal value, but the interest 
is essentially in the properties and not the person. 
Derivative Value and Persons 
However, it is this focus on 'what matters' which leads 
to a major objection to complex accounts. For it is claimed 
such theories 'lose' the person in favour of the properties: 
that they cannot account for the idea that there is 
something more to the person than just its properties and 
that is, that there is a self who owns them. Once again, 
there is a return to the idea that properties on their own 
do not provide a sufficient account of persons; it is only 
in association with a subject that they can possibly satisfy 
the concept. 
For example, such an objection is voiced by Chisholm*, 
who uses Hume to illustrate his point. 
both peaches and persons is inaccurate 
-.': Chisholm 1976 
Hume's account of 
for it does not 
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correctly describe our intention. When we talk of peaches 
we do not mean just their properties, we have an idea of 
something that has those properties. Likewise, our idea of 
persons is not an idea of certain perceptions: 
It is not the idea of the perception of love or hate and the 
perception of cold or warmth, much less an idea of love or 
hate and of heat or cold. It is an idea of that which loves 
or hates, and of that which feels cold and warm. 
Chisholm (1) p.39 
He claims that Hume is mistaken in the fundamental 
analysis of person in terms of properties - such an account 
fails to accommodate the true meaning of person. The 
Kantian argument is rejected on a similar point his 
concept also fails to accord with what we mean by person. 
It gives an analysis in terms only of properties, then 
declares that it is impossible to conceive of a person 
beyond those properties. Such an argument clearly begs the 
point, for it is only true that we cannot make sense of a 
non-experienced person under a third-person empirical 
account. Moreover, Chisholm claims that little proof is 
given for this analysis of person which is clearly 
inconsistent with our intention to refer to subjectivity. 
This objection thus concerns the efficacy of the 
empirical theory to reflect accurately our use of language. 
The theories of both Hume and Kant are criticised as 
incomplete for they do not coincide with our beliefs and 
intentions in using self-reference. For Chisholm this 
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problem presents a major objection, for what they propose is 
contrary to common sense and lacks justification. 
2.3 (iv) Empiricism 8 s Failure to Accommodate Meaning 
This last point raises a fundamental problem concerning 
the method by which we investigate philosophical conceptso 
By appealing to Moore's 'A Defence of Common Sense'*~ 
Chisholm sets out a basis for a criterion of acceptability 
or justification. His theory takes into account our 
fundamental sources of knowledge, such as the beliefs we 
have about our experiences, our bodies and our desires past 
and present. He states that: 
These different facts may have different degrees of 
justification. At the very least, each of them is something 
which, for me, has some presumption in its favour. That is 
to say, it is more reasonable to think it is true than think 
it false. 
Chisholm (1) p.17 
As part of our pre-philosophical and pre-analytic 
information, Chisholm states that such beliefs are 
justifiable as philosophical data. Moreover "Any 
philosophical theory which is inconsistent with any of these data is 
prima facie suspect." (Chisholm (1) p.18) 
In effect, Chisholm clai.ms that the empiricists go too 
far. What they offer is only negative evidence against the 
subject: that is, they have failed to find it on their 
"fr Moore 1925. 
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terms. But this is far from proving that there is no 
subject - indeed they exclude too much, making a claim which 
goes beyond the realm of their evidence. 
Clearly, then, Chisholm considers himself to have shown 
that empirical theories of persons fail to provide either an 
account in keeping with our basic beliefs or to give 
sufficient evidence to support a change in those beliefs. 
As such, third~person empiricist accounts of personal 
identity are unacceptable. 
The idea that there must be something more than just 
properties is reinforced by drawing attention to the 
fallibility of empirical evidence. The fact that bodily 
criteria, and indeed psychological criteria, can ever be 
recognised to be corrigible, points to the notion that they 
are corrigible with respect to some further independent 
fact. If the evidence amounted to the fact about personal 
identity, as most empiricist theories can be reduced to 
claiming, such fallibility would make little sense. 
.... 
For example, this point is expressed by Swinburne". He 
both recognises and accepts that memory plays a part in our 
awareness of persons through time, yet he does not, as Locke 
and subsequent empiricists do, take the evidence to amount 
to what persons essentially are. For despite the 
* Swinburne ( 1) 1984 
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justification in using the evidence of memory as indicative 
of personal identity, such information is clearly still 
fallible. Like all conclusions which go beyond their 
premises, evidence from the memory is entitled to claim only 
probability thus any conclusion reached under its 
justification is fallible. 
Swinburne concludes that our memories can therefore be 
considered only to be evidence of personal identity. 
Moreover, the fact that they can be considered as fallible 
itself implies that there is something more to personal 
identity than the memory, or that the memory is inaccurate 
with respect to something; and since all empirical data 
seems subject to fallibility, that something cannot be 
guaranteed through a purely empiricist account of persons. 
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2.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The problems associated with the employment of empirical 
criteria of persons (in terms of its properties or 
qualities) seems reducible to the basic problem encountered 
by Locke: that in concentrating upon what seems to be the 
person (both to himself and others), the result is a 
peculiarly one-sided account of persons. 
Although Locke is a realist, his comments about persons 
do not imply the existence of some further experience-
independent object of which the phenomenal representations 
are only signs. As explained, to Locke the phenomena are 
equivalent to the reality about persons. In this case, talk 
about persons is simply talk about how it seems to be. Thus 
we are certainly and directly acquainted with ourselves as 
persons through our experience. 
Yet where Locke seems to err too far in favour of the 
self - reducing person to a privately manifested thing, the 
later empiricists seem to range to the opposite - producing 
an essentially publicly manifested thing. For in the 
modification of the acc_ount, they encounter more 
difficulties. As is seen, in concentrating on objective 
persons, the complex account loses the ability to identify 
or individuate person without using a circular argument. 
Some reference to the owner of experiences is needed, yet to 
88 
provide this empirically would enforce a regression back to 
the first-personal account of Locke. 
The complex view, then, concentrates upon some perception 
of phenomena and in so doing enables the person to persist 
only in terms of a perceived continuity rather than an 
objective and factual continuity. Thus the person has no 
further fact about it that is independent of the way it is 
experienced. Such conclusions create difficulties if a 
thing persisting through time, rather than a set of 
apparently connected properties, is desired. The arguments 
against the complex accounts do focus on the desire for an 
independently persisting thing for as shown, any attempt to 
account for the connection between properties denies 
reference to such a thing. 
The criticisms of the complex accounts focussing on 
logical consistency seem to spring from the desire to see 
the person as a real and persisting thing. However, all 
that the criticism of circularity can achieve is to show 
that we need an idea of a subject of experiences if we are 
to individuate them at any one time - not that this subject 
is something persisting through time. This point must be 
argued for more strongly; for Locke, and subsequent complex 
theorists, in effect claim that person does mean merely the 
perceived persistence of certain properties - and that talk 
of anything more is unjustified. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE ABSURDITY OF THE COMPLEX VIEW 
A second criticism of Locke questions the sufficiency of 
the criterion to achieve the task of isolating persons 
correctly. Such an inability is problematic not only 
because of its apparently absurd results, but also because 
it might lead to inaccurate identification, and subsequently 
injustice, 
incorrectly. 
as rewards or punishments are meeted out 
This objection centres upon the relationship 
of Locke 1 s criterion of 1 same-consciousness 1 to the actual 
fact of personal identity itself: that is can evidence or 
consciousness provide an accurate criterion of identity and 
an acceptable account of persons? 
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3.1 THE PROBLEM 
The early critics of Locke interpreted his use of 
consciousness as a criterion of personal identity as 
advocating a memory theory of personal identity. They took 
Locke to be stating that memory forms the identity of the 
person and that the contents of the memory serve to identify 
past actions as those of a particular present person. 
Whilst this link of memory is maintained, the identification 
of the past agent with that present person persists: 
••• Mr. Locke attributes to consciousness the conviction we 
have of our past actions, as if a man may now be conscious 
of what he did twenty years ago. It is impossible to 
understand the meaning of this, unless by consciousness be 
meant memory, the only faculty by which we have an immediate 
knowledge of our past actions ••• When therefore, Mr. Locke's 
notion of personal identity is properly expressed, it is, 
that personal identity consists in distinct remembrance. 
Reid p.115 
3.1 (i) Absurdity of the Memory Theory 
However, if this is a true representation of Locke, 
Butler and Reid feel it entails unpalatable consequences 
concerning responsibility; problems which arise not only 
through what might be termed 'mal-functioning' of memory, 
but also in the everyday workings that the memory has. Reid 
illustrates his objection u~ing a scenario which exemplifies 
the strange implications of Lockean personal identity even 
when considered in quite normal situations. 
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He imagines a young apple-thief who grows up to become an 
army hero and, in later years, a general. As a young 
officer, the individual remembers the flogging he suffered 
as punishment for his boyhood crime and as a general, he 
recalls the honour won through heroic deeds on the battle 
field; yet the old man has lost consciousness of·the antics 
of the schoolboy. According to the Lockean account the boy 
is the same person as the young man and the young man is the 
same person as the veteran; but the veteran is not the same 
person as the boy. As Reid points out, this means "that a 
man may be, and at the same time not be, the person that did a 
particular action." (Reid p.114) Such a conclusion blatantly 
contravenes the laws of transitivity of identity, which 
entail that if A=B and B=C then A=C. 
However, this is not the only problem of such a theory, 
for not only does it fly in the face of accepted logic, in 
doing so it produces absurd and even paradoxical conclusions 
about a person's identity. For under this view, not only 
might a person be and not be himself but, in both the 
extreme case of abnormal memory functioning and that of 
everyday remembering and forgetting, the result will be 
that: 
••• a person has not existed a single moment, nor done a 
single action but what he can remember, indeed none but what 
he reflects upon. 
Butler p .100 
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Such implications give cause for concern for they entail 
that if a person has total amnesia relating to the first 
thirty years of his life, he is no longer -the same person 
that experienced those thirty years. Likewise, if a person 
were to have memories of an existence starting thirty years 
before his birth, he would be classed as the same person 
that had those experiences. Such a state of affairs might 
result in an individual, on the plea of amnesia or 
ignorance, being left unpunished or unrewarded for actions 
committed by him as a man; and likewise, that a person may 
be held responsible for actions committed before the 
existence of his present form as a man. 
3.1 (ii) Lockean Acceptance of Multiple Relationships 
Such consequences, however are not of difficulty to 
Locke, nor would they surprise him - indeed he anticipates 
and accepts them in his descriptions and examples. They are 
perfectly cons is tent with his description of 'person' as 
consciousness. His account entails that those who have no 
consciousness of certain acts are not the same persons that 
performed them; and those who are conscious of certain acts 
are the persons that are responsible for them. It is 
because his concept of 'person' is essentially located in 
the feeling of concern, not in some other historical fact or 
action, that Locke allows these conclusions. Moreover, he 
goes so far as to state: 
Let anyone reflect upon himself ••• let him once find himself 
conscious of any of the actions of Nestor, he then finds 
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himself the same person with Nestor. 
Locke p.215-6 
Thus, when Butler and Reid object that the 'person' gets 
away without punishment for crimes he performed 30 years 
hence, they are using 'person' to mean something different 
from Locke's intention: they mean by 'person' that thing 
which historically performed the action. Although it seems 
reasonable to a Lockean that a person may have a one-many or 
many-one relationship with an historical individual, to 
Butler and Reid this is completely incomprehensible. For 
them the person is historically fixed and can have only one-
one relationships with the past and future: hence, one 
individual cannot possibly have more than one person 
associated with it; and one person cannot be responsible for 
the acts of more than one individual. 
Butler and Reid work with a far less fragile, more 
objective and permanent notion of 'person' than Locke. 
Their person does not rely upon remembrance but is a fixed 
thing, once action is done, or certain deeds are attributed 
to the person, those things cannot be lost. Locke's person 
can and does lose and gain _pasts - for all that the person 
over time can be, is the remembrance of being past persons. 
To accuse Locke of absurdity is a failure to understand 
the full intention of Lockean theory - for the results of 
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the theory are only absurd if one judges them against a 
different (ie. some sort of fixed) concept of person. The 
outcomes which 
cannot be used 
cause such problems 
at this level to 
for Butler and Reid 
provide a condemning 
argument, for they are perfectly consistent with Locke's own 
account. To accuse Locke of absurdity, it must b~ sh6wn why 
his outcomes are unacceptable in a broader framework - for 
example in their moral or logical implications. 
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3.2 LOGICAL ABSURDITY 
The logical inconsistencies mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter are less easy to explain away - indeed as it 
stands, Locke cannot avoid the problem associated with 
transitivity. In making consciousness of self-i4entity the 
fact of personal identity Locke turns the whole issue into 
something dependent upon a fallible or representative 
awareness: the person's identity relies on the judgement of 
one person, from a first-person perspective, at one time. 
This by its nature provides an odd identity relationship 
for it means that the identity statement will be true only 
at the present; and that the persons identity relationships 
with other persons in the past and future can vary from 
moment to moment. The identity of persons according to 
Locke is therefore not a linear progression but full of 
branching and converging individuals. For Lockean theory to 
be acceptable, then~ something must either be changed about 
the imposed limits of our identity of logic or his theory of 
persons modified to eliminate the possibility of multiple 
and branching relationships. 
3.2 (i) Modification of Person 
There have been many attempts to defend the basic memory 
criterion of personal identity, modifying the sense in which 
consciousness provides a link for the person through time. 
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Rather than accepting Locke's theory to intend literally 
everything, and thus only that which is present or 
presentable to the memory at a given. instant, they 
reformulate the theory in terms of 'continuity' of 
consciousness. 
Continuity of Consciousness 
Typical of most neo-Lockean attempts, Noonan* tries to 
defend Locke's account by redefining the meaning of a 
"consciousness extending backwards" (Locke p.2i2). In replacement 
of the possibility of direct and total recall at any one 
instant, he suggests that: 
What is needed is just the distinction between consciousness 
and continuity of consciousness, where continuity is defined 
in terms of connectedness by saying that a later person P2 
at t2 has a consciousness which is continuous with that of 
an earlier persons Pi at ti just in case he is the last link 
in a chain connecting persons beginning with Pi at ti, each 
of whom is conscious with the experiences and actions of the 
preceding link in the chain. 
Noonan p.67 
Noonan thus characterises personal identity as being made 
up of a limited chain of memories. Whi 1st each link is 
continuous with the next (in the case of Locke, remembered 
by the next) then the entire chain is one person. If 
somewhere along the line oni link forgets a former one then, 
so long as that former one was remembered by its successor, 
it is still part of the same person. 
* Noonan i989 
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This modification certainly allows for the everyday 
ephemerality and fading of our memories, yet it still fails 
to account for the fluctuating effect on identity caused by 
amnesia between juxtaposed or successive links. For 
example, if sudden and permanent amnesia occurred in a 
chain, then a new person would come into being;, If the 
amnesia was not permanent, yet still occurred to all the 
memories, then the person existing whilst suffering amnesia 
and the person with the regained memory, will be different 
persons. Moreover, if the cured amnesiac remembers both the 
forgotten past and the time of amnesia, he will have the 
memories of, and indeed be continuous with, two persons. 
Any number of scenarios can be envisaged in which the end 
result is that one individual is more than one person. With 
the introduction of paramnesia, the situation can become 
more complicated still. 
Continuity with an Appropriate Cause 
An attempt to avoid the kind of problems above can be 
seen in a second type of modification, an example of which 
is suggested by Hughes*. As in Noonan's modification, this 
type of explanation centres on a causal account of 
continuity but adds within it the proviso that each memory 
must have a 'normal' cause. Hughes opposes any account 
which interprets Locke's theory as claiming "that a merely 
present memory creates an identity which must have existed 
-,tr Hughes 1975 
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in the past and up to the present" (Hughes p.S48), preferring 
instead one which adds to that presence of memory the 
condition that it has a 'normal' cause. Thus, he explains 
that: 
What Locke is really and rightly saying is that 
consciousness is a causal process with at least two aspects, 
of which present memory of past acts is one. For him, the 
self X belongs to the same person as the self Y if X' s 
present consciousness about the past is the result, by the 
appropriate causal process continuing through the past 
(though not necessarily without interruption) and up to the 
present, of the consciousness Y had in the past about what 
was then present." 
Hughes p.S48 
Such an interpretation removes from personal identity the 
difficulties arising from the effects of an extreme 
malfunction of the memory by claiming that any memory not 
genuinely experienced by the individual is abnormal and 
therefore cannot constitute a bona fide cause. 
Despite the logical acceptability of such theories, it 
does seem that Locke has been pulled away from his central 
contention: that it is felt concern which is of importance, 
rather than any kind of actual connection or link through 
time. If this dislocation from the original intention were 
to be allowed, his theory not only would be less rigorous 
and show internal inconsistency but it would create a person 
divorced from the primary arguments establishing its 
existence. 
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To objectify the person so that it consists of linear, 
objective and historically linked memories, is to move away 
from the person of the self-consciousness and concern 
described by Locke. Such a person is something other than 
consciousness, something perhaps known through consciousness 
but not dependent upon it. It is true that, by objectifying 
the person in this way, the absurdities of multiple 
relationships can be avoided but, as already shown in the 
previous chapter, the criterion of person consequently 
encounters the circularity problems originally opposing 
Locke. 
Locke cannot be interpreted in this way if he is to 
retain his meaning of person and with it internal 
consistency. Perhaps, then, it is the limits of the 
identity logic that must be modified or understood more 
clearly. 
3.2 (ii) The Logic of Multiple Relationships 
Not all of the modern complex theorists believe that the 
logic of identity must be linear in the way that the above 
modifications try to enforce. Some are happy to accept that 
persons involve a different form of survival from normal 
identity - something which allows the kind of relationships 
envisaged in Locke. Parfit* and Nozick+ are examples of 
·k Parfit 1984 
+ Nozick 1981 
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such philosophers. 
Despite the fact that their theories a.re expressed in 
terms which make use of objective continuity thus rejecting 
the historical ephemerality of Locke, they do accept that 
persons can have strange many-one, one-many relationships. 
Both incorporate this phenomenon into their theories~ 
producing accounts whereby the person deviates from a normal 
linear causal chain, becoming a branching and converging 
thing. 
It is true that their desire for a near 'normal' causal 
progression through the past to the future means that once 
created the person-chain remains historically fixed; but in 
terms of irregular logic of 'identity', their ideas are 
similar to those accepted in Locke. In fact, Parfit ceases 
to talk of 'identity' with regard to persons, preferring to 
term the persistence 'survival' - a clear recognition that 
in his account persons do not conform to the usual logic of 
identity that traditionally might have been enforced. 
In Parfit and Nozick, the theories are a result of 
exclusive concentration on qualitative rather than 
quantitative identity. What is of importance is the 
survival of certain qualities, rather than any particular 
subject or individual possessing them. As seen in Chapter 
1, qualitative identity allows and exhibits fluctuation and 
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change in a way that numerical identity will not tolerate. 
Thus, anything for which the quality or properties are the 
essence will become enmeshed in a form of l~gic unlike that 
applicable to purely quantitative notion of identity. 
The Lockean acceptance of a form of 'persons' which 
allows for these multiple relationships is not therefore 
necessarily logically absurd: some later complex theorists 
also believe that persons are the sort of thing that can 
branch and converge over time. Is, then, Locke referring to 
what should really be termed survival, rather than identity 
of person? 
Lockean Logic of Identity 
As already shown in Chapter 1, in Locke the concept being 
employed is clearly quantitative, moreover he does mean to 
say that the person is an idea which does have identity in 
and through time. The idea of person is of concerned 
consciousness, not any particular series or chain of 
properties (as envisaged in Parfi t and Nozick). It would 
seem therefore that it is something, quite different from 
fluctuating properties, which leads to the possibilities of 
multiple relationships in Locke. 
To understand Lockean acceptance of this different logic 
of identity it must be made clear once again how Locke uses 
the term 'person'. As described earlier, Locke employs a 
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more complex notion of 'remember' than is contained in just 
consciousness, for in the act of thinking we are aware of 
concern and thus recognise our forensic nature as persons. 
Behan* recognises this when he analyses Locke's account 
of humans into two main descriptions: that of the 'natural 
man' (or man in 'Physike'); and that of the 'moral man' (or 
man in 'Praktike'). Our memory functions differently for 
each of the two separate cases, in the first as mere 
remembrance but in the second as the added dimension of 
self-awareness and the subsequent feeling of responsibility 
that it occasions: 
When Locke used the word 'consciousness ' in physike, he 
meant by it reflexive perception of thinking. When however, 
he spoke of consciousness in praktike - ie. in connection 
with moral man - concern was added to consciousness." 
Behan p.578 
This notion of 'concern' is not just something which applies 
to the self - it encompasses the various parts that the self 
possesses. 
The Lockean account considers the relationship between 
the person and his substances to be one of ownership and 
owned, the substances being part of and owned by the self 
whilst they are united to ir by consciousness: 
••• thus any part of our bodies, vitally united to that which 
is conscious in us, makes a part of ourselves; but upon 
separation from the vital union by which that consciousness 
is corrmunicated, that which a moment since was part of 
... tc Behan 1979 
ourselves, is now no more so than part of another man's self 
is a part of me. 
Locke p.219 
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Whilst any substance is part of the self, the self has a 
concern for it as its own and as explained, this concern 
brings with it an awareness of responsibility of 
punishment and reward and what that means to the self. Thus 
forensic responsibility seems to be essentially linked to 
the self and for what the self feels that concern. It is 
the anticipation of happiness or misery felt by the self in 
response to consciousness of actions or events that the 
memory represents as its own. 
It is this reliance on the self-consciousness that leads 
to apparently strange conclusions for personal identity: for 
the self in itself and its own consciousness cannot 
distinguish between true and false representations of 
memories (internally). It is true that we actually have a 
memory, but that memory may or may not be a faithful 
representation of historical fact. However, whether we 
remember something genuinely or mistakenly, the texture of 
the memory is the same and likewise our emotional response 
and concern about it are the same. 
For Locke this inability to discern 'true' from 'false' 
memories leads to the individual's belief that even false 
memories are his own. He consequently experiences genuine 
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feelings of concern and responsibility for their contents, 
sincerely feeling the guilt or lack of guilt and perhaps the 
appropriate censures involved. All of this is felt, 
regardless of the factual and historical past, simply 
because it is his memory informing him how to respond. 
Thus, what Locke describes and associates most strongly 
with the person is the conscience - our "moral sense of 
right and wrong" (C.O.D.) and the source of this he 
literally attributes to our being conscious. Without 
consciousness of the action there is no feeling good or bad 
about the act, for we are neither made aware of our self nor 
the reaction of the self to the experience of consciousness. 
How then can the self feel responsible if the fundamental 
link between an action and our moral feelings towards it, is 
absent? 
Identity of First-Person Experience 
The Lockean theory clearly links the concept of 
responsibility to a first-person perspective that is fixed 
in the present. As Hughes describes it: 
The problem of personal identity, as Locke conceived it, is 
not a third person problem concerning either unity or 
substance. In fact, it is not a third-person problem at 
all. It is the first-person problem of how a moral man 
becomes accountable to himself for his substances, thoughts 
and actions. 
Hughes p.S78 
The logic of personal identity may well shift to 
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accommodate this peculiar phenomenological stand-point. It 
is not the case that Locke is dealing with an objective 
thing, with an objective identity, for .the person is 
essentially subjective. Thus the logic cannot be the logic 
applied to the 'real' world but must be that of the way 
things seem; and the way things seem to Locke· from the 
first-person present at time t 1 may be completely differeni 
from the way they seem to Locke from the first-person 
present at t2. 
The person 
present, and 
has 
that 
an identity which exists only in 
identity depends exclusively upon 
the 
the 
content of its consciousness. The person's identity, that 
of its past and present, can only be known at one point in 
time - the next moment it may well have shifted. When it 
is considered what the idea of the person stands for this 
notion becomes less obscure, for to Locke the person is 
linked exclusively to self-concern. 
It seems, then, that the logic of personal identity can 
be altered to accommodate Lockean theory, for he is not 
concerned with straightforward object identity. What he 
describes is the identity of self-awareness, which depends 
upon the phenomena of the experience of co-consciousness 
something notoriously fluctuating and ephemeral. 
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3e3 PRACTICAL ABSURDITY 
Although Locke can be shown to be internally coherent, 
the characterisation of subjectivity still creates a 
difference between him and Butler and Reid. Belief in an 
unchanging fact of subjectivity means that their concept of 
person becomes a fixed and objective thing. 
The discomfort Butler and Reid feel when faced with the 
consequences of Lockean theory seems to be the product of a 
deep-felt notion that historical fact and certainty play an 
unwavering role in the attribution of moral responsibility -
without some objectivity, problems arise concerning the 
functioning of the concept. For if the self is the sole 
determinant of responsibility, and if the self is as elusive 
and ephemeral as Locke claims, how are we to attribute 
praise and blame, or administer punishment or reward, from a 
third-person point of view? 
3.3 (i) Third-Person Individuation 
If personal identity involves simple self-identity then 
the matter of responsibility in such areas of doubt can be 
decided only by a personal _testimony from the self. This 
may seem plausible enough, until it is realised that 
personal testimony is based in something that is fallible. 
For as mentioned earlier, it is possible that the self can 
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be mistaken about the veracity of its memory - resulting in 
a inappropriate feeling of responsibility towards its past. 
We are directly acquainted with our memories as we are 
with our experiences, but any double-checking of their 
representations to us has to be carried out using methods 
beyond our selves. Such verification will ultimately 
involve a need for third-person methods of identification, 
for it is the methods of first-person identity that are 
undergoing examination and therefore cannot themselves be 
used. It therefore seems that if we are to do ourselves 
justice in this world we do need some form of third-person 
identity criterion. 
However, Locke's account of person as 'self' excludes the 
possibility of being directly acquainted with another 
person, for in a third-person situation we are only 
acquainted with the parts owned by the person. The self is 
a thinking and intelligent being, but it is not a material 
substance. We can, it is true, have indirect access or 
awareness of another person through its tangible parts, but 
these are substances that belong to that person only whilst 
the consciousness unites them to him and are by no means 
permanently adjoined to that person. It might be thought 
that a testimony or expression from the person will indicate 
identity, but this will not provide the corroboration we are 
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looking for since it is that testimony we are trying to 
test. 
Once more, Locke is fully aware of this relationship 
between the self and others and perhaps this explains his 
reliance on self-identity as the sole criterion in his 
theory. With reference to the identity of the prince who 
occupies the body of a cobbler, he declares that, since it 
is the body or man that others interact with, and in this 
case it is still the body of a cobbler, " ••• it would be the 
same cobbler to everyone else besides himself [the prince]" (Locke 
p.216) 
The Moral Ineffectiveness of Self-Identity 
The possibility of mistaken identity is enormous, for we 
have only the first-person testimony of the present to go 
by. Since not everyone is honest or infallible, there is a 
distinct possibility of false testimony - intentional or 
unintentional. Locke himself anticipates this problem, 
avoiding its uncomfortable conclusions by referring to the 
Day of Judgement "at the great day, when everybody shall reveal 
according to his doings, the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open." 
(Locke p.220) Though we may indeed be comforted by the 
prospect of God's perfect justice, this will not help us 
deal with the consequences of genuine or pretended mistakes 
of memories in this life. Nor will it help the course of 
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justice on earth ~ a problem affecting both the self and 
others. 
These remarks from Locke do in fact betray some idea that 
he believes that God can tell the identity of person in a 
way different from the way we do. It is possible that he 
intends by this simply that those intending deception shall 
be caught out; but it strikes the reader as containing some 
intimation that there is indeed some objective identity, 
other than the content of consciousness, by which we shall 
be judged for our actions. Thus it seems that even Locke is 
unable totally to divorce himself from a belief in objective 
responsibility. 
It seems unlikely that Locke's notion of a forensic being 
could exist in a solely first-person environment without the 
possibility of third-person identification; ideas of guilt 
or punishment involve more than it is possible to draw from 
this idea of person centred solely on the self. The concept 
really needs interaction of persons with the ability to 
individuate others accurately, and thus the concept of 
person should involve some manifestation, reliably linked to 
the self though not solely concerning that self. 
This then, is the kind of difficulty associated with 
equating the person with the first-person self: and it seems 
that the concept of person employed by Locke is exactly 
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this. Any attempt at corroboration is dogged by circularity 
and, moreover, accurate identification of others becomes an 
impossibility. It seems that such a concept of person 
cannot therefore be an accurate reflection of the truly 
forensic entity described by Locke, for it is impossible to 
identify it with certainty from a third-person stand point -
and some belief in certainty is surely necessary for the 
implementation of punishment and reward. 
3.3 (ii) The Modern Objective Complex Person 
The difficulty of individuation is a problem only to 
theorists who portray the person as a necessarily 
subjectively determined thing. If the person is self-
awareness, then it will come and go and be known only by 
that self-awareness. Logically speaking it cannot be 
determined from a third-person standpoint. Even if the 
dependence upon self-awareness is only for evidence or 
knowledge of the self then the problem, although less 
dramatic, still involves the difficulties associated with 
relying upon personal testimony. 
Those theories which develop Lockean theory by placing 
continuity in something less precarious such as 
psychological continuity, or in something more tangible such 
as the continuity of brain or body, or even in the simple 
view's 'self', push the person or self into an actual 
continuity which can persist and be known independently of 
111 
the first-person perspective. It is true that such 
modifications alter the sense in which 1 person' is being 
used, removing it from the urgency of the '.conscience'; but 
in so doing, they effectively open the notion of 
responsibility to the possibility of something objective or 
historically traceable. 
As seen in the previous chapter, to achieve this the 
complex theorist reduces the person to a set of objective 
properties. Once these have ex is ted as that person, they 
remain so, fixed and sure - it is not the whims of memory or 
consciousness that determine their identity or continuity. 
Whether these criteria are essentially the person or merely 
necessary pragmatically (for persistence and 
identification), it would seem that the intention is the 
same: to objectify the existence of the history of the 
person and remove it from the ephemerality of Lockean 
consciousness. 
The Insufficiency of Complex Theories 
However, this insistence upon empirical criteria involves 
most complex theorists in a further problem of 
individuation: that is, they fail to isolate the individual 
unique!~ The essence of this problem lies in the fact, 
noted in Chapter 1, that a concentration upon the 
properties of the person can produce only type-identity; it 
fails to individuate token-identity uniquely. Thus, in 
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addition to the circularity problems, an objective account 
fails in accurate individuation, which in turn means that it 
will encounter difficulties in the field of responsibility 
and punishment. 
The problem is articulated in an example · found in 
.J. WilliamsA, used to criticise the memory criterion, but it 
can be extended to cover all complex theories of personal 
identity which use criteria linked to properties of some 
sort. It is what has become known as 'the duplication or 
re-duplication problem'. 
The argument imagines a scenario in which two persons, 
Charles and Robert, both claim to be Guy Fawkes. Both have 
equal claims to such identity in terms of evidence, for both 
have similar distinct memories comparable with those one 
might expect of Guy Fawkes himself. If this property of 
memory is taken to indicate personal identity, then we have 
two such persons with identical properties which are also 
shared by a third, earlier person. How then are we to 
decide who is who? The conclusion to be drawn from the 
evidence is that both persons are identical with the 
original. 
The possibility that such properties might be only partly 
continuous opens another difficulty. For it is conceivable 
* Williams 1973 
113 
that that Guy Fawkes' properties might be evenly divided 
between Charles and Robert so that each is different from 
the other (and therefore not identical),. yet both are 
equally continuous with, and therefore to be identified 
with, Guy Fawkes. In both cases, if properties are taken 
as evidence, then trying to sort out identity will . cause 
difficulties: but if properties are taken to be the facts 
about the identity, then we face insurmountable problems. 
For, as the original complaint against Locke objected, the 
result is that we have a concept of personal identity which 
allows multiple-one and one-multiple relationships between 
persons through time, causing what critics have considered 
to be forensically and intuitively absurd situations. The 
conclusion drawn is that evidence must be restricted to the 
role of evidence, for it is not truth. As Swinburne 
remarks: 
For although there can be equally good evidence that each of 
the later person is the same as an earlier person that 
evidence is fallible; and since clearly only one person at 
one time can be strictly the same person as some person at 
an earlier time, it follows that in one case the evidence is 
misleading - although we may not know which. 
Swinburne (1) p.20 
There is clearly no way of choosing between Robert or 
Charles as to who ls now Guy.Fawkes, yet it seems ridiculous 
to claim either that neither is or that both are. One must 
be chosen, but it is impossible to do so from the empirical 
criteria. The choice must therefore be made according to 
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something else according to the empirical theory of 
persons, it is a matter of convention as to who is who. 
Objectors to the complex view claim that such failure 
serves to widen the gap between evidence and identity, 
supporting the intuition that personal identity involves 
more than just properties: 
There seemed to be a further truth - that I would or would 
not have those experiences - beyond any truths about the 
exponent of similarity in apparent memory and matter of 
future persons to myself. 
Swinburne (1) p.20 
Thus Swinburne uses Williams' arguments to move towards 
the view that properties fail to give an individuating 
criterion of personal identity. Complex theories miss the 
crucial notion that properties must belong to something and 
that something, in the case of persons, is not analysable in 
terms of those properties. 
3.3 (iii) The Necessity of Subjectivity 
To be able to pick out a person as a token individual, 
some sense of unity or identity must be given over and above 
the objective qualities and properties he/she has from a 
third-person view point. Tnis point comes out more clearly 
* in the discussion of the problem found in Madell , where he 
produces a set of arguments illustrating the inability of 
the empirical criteria to uniquely individuate persons • 
... -r Madel! 1981 
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Each of the illustrations is a restatement of the 
duplication problem, but each brings out more clearly the 
failure of any third-person empirical criterion. 
Madell puts the argument into three forms: a possible 
world scenario; a situation involving disembodied persons; 
and the phenomenon of identical twins. The last of these 
briefly shows the inability of a purely physical criterion 
to capture the asymmetry of identical twins. To all intents 
and purposes, the empirical criteria cannot distinguish 
between them, yet: 
One would suppose it to be beyond question that, if I am one 
of a pair of identical twins, what we have is something 
which, to the objective eye, is more or less perfect 
symmetry, but which from my point of view must appear 
asymmetrical. 
Madel! p.72 
Likewise, Madel! imagines a situation in which there are 
two exactly similar disembodied persons. Empirically the 
two are distinguishable whilst embodied, being spatially 
differentiated. But, once they lose their bodies, they 
might occupy the same place in space and thus become 
indistinguishable to the empiricist. This failing arises 
because they are treated a~ merely objects by the bodily 
criterion; it proves inaccurate, for the properties of 
persons have an extra aspect which other objects do not have 
- they are or are not the properties of someone: 
Experiences certainly exist in time and at the very least, 
may exist in space, but in addition any experience has a 
dimension which no object can have: it is either mine or not 
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mine. 
Madell p.22 
Recognition of this subjective dimension of experiences 
solves the difficulties of individuation, for in it, they 
have a unique and asymmetrical identity: the property of 
belonging or not belonging to a subject. It is a definition 
of experiences that has already been noted with reference to 
Lowe - that conscious states, by definition, are the states 
of a subject 
. * exper1.ences • 
without the subject they are not 
This same contrast is illustrated with respect to 
temporal identity in a further example using the idea of 
possible worlds. For the argument, Madell imagines the 
existence of two 'counterparts' of himself, both existing in 
some possible world. One of these two has an alternative 
life from his, the other a distinct life. These two terms 
refer to the difference of being the same person but with 
altered properties and being a different person but with the 
same properties. One is considered to be the original; the 
other is not. It is quite possible that there is a world in 
which both these 'counte~parts' have exactly similar 
properties. If this is so, then how does one distinguish or 
stipulate which is the original and which is not? 
* Section 2.2 (iv) 
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Individuation by Origin 
Under an empiricist description, which claims that the 
properties of a person constitute its iden~ity, it appears 
that there is no way of identifying the original. However, 
the traditional empiricist line, as noted with reference to 
Locke, does give each object a unique identifying feature -
that of having a particular origin. Thus, one might offer 
the suggestion that the the original person might be 
identified with his real counterpart by tracing their 
origins to the same source. 
Yet, Madell claims, this criterion for individuation is 
not pertinent in the case of personal identity. Though it 
is true in the case of objects, this does not mean that it 
is so with respect to persons for, unlike objects, he claims 
that our personal identity does not depend upon a certain 
beginning. It is perfectly coherent to imagine ourselves 
continuing to persist if we had different origins 
something many people do if wistfully thinking of an 
alternative existence from that which they have now: 
We lose our conception of what it is for an object to be 
identical with some object in a foreseeable world if we do 
not recognise that an object's origin is of essence, but 
this is far from being the case when we consider persons and 
their identity. · 
Madell p.87 
It is far from easy to see how this thesis of the necessity 
of origin can be applied to persons. 
Madell p.19 
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Our origin as objects is not what is of important to us 
as persons, for we can believe in our persistence through a 
change of objective identity: what is of importance to our 
persistence is the continuation of the subject and the 
individuation of this has more to do with the beginning of 
subjective awareness than objective origins. 
Thus Madell postulates a logical gap between a person and 
an ordinary object in terms of origin, to reinforce the 
already looming gap arising from the essential subjectivity 
of consciousness seen in the previous chapter. These 
objections demonstrate the inadequacy of any criterion which 
fails to recognise this essential difference. He states: 
It is quite clear that the account we must give of the 
identity of persons is very different from that which we 
have to give for the identity of objects. 
Madell p.87 
For if we do treat persons as just objects, with identities 
which are similarly reducible to phenomena, somewhere in the 
account the ability to uniquely individuate is lost. 
Despite the obvious differences in the form of the self, 
such comments have clear parallels to the suggestions made 
by Locke: that it is the self which is of prime importance 
in terms of personal identity; that the person can only be 
individuated with reference to subjective considerations; 
and that self is created and lost in ways not describable in 
the realm of objectivity. 
119 
3.3 (iv) Personal Identity as Derivative in Value 
A reply to such objections is taken up by the more 
rigorous and therefore more extreme complex theorists such 
as Parfit or Nozick who, as noted in Section 3.2 (ii), are 
not worried about identity in persons. What is of 
importance to them is the persistence of certain ~ualities, 
regardless of whether or not they are unique. To them, the 
token propertyless subject has little or no value in itself. 
This is clearly exemplified in Parfit's discussion of the 
continuation of a loved one. He claims that what is of key 
importance to us is the survival of certain qualities - the 
particular individual associated with them is only 
instrumental to their survival*. But such an outcome is a 
result of concentrating upon finding some empirical 
explanation of value: and if that is all one searches for, 
it is all one will find. Moreover, the outcome is in fact 
not true: for it is surely not the case that one would be 
completely satisfied with an exactly similar twin, or clone, 
or even robotic replacement for the person we love. Is it 
not so that part of real love is the desire for the unique 
individual, or subject or self which has those properties? 
However, even if it is true that the value we place in 
others is entirely derivative, it is not so with regards to 
ourselves. This asymmetry is brought out more effectively 
* Parfit 1984 Ch.13 
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in Parfit's tele-transporter example, in which a man 
... 
survives at both ends of the tele-transportern. Where the 
final individual is no different qualitativ~ly to himself or 
to others, he certainly is different from the perspective of 
the original man: and the only difference is in the change 
of perspective or subjectivity. It is of little·comfort to 
the original (who knows that he will in fact no longer 
exist) that someone somewhere does continue to exist who 
looks like, thinks like, and believes that he is, him. The 
intuition that the person is more than just properties is 
brought home here with a force. 
+ Parfit 1984 Ch.lO 
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3.4 CONCLUSIONS 
It can be seen that the implications to be drawn from 
this second line of criticism are similar ·to those of the 
previous chapter. Although they provide an alternative 
route, concentrating upon the logical and practical 
consistency of a complex account of persons, the conclusions 
and final objections are in essence the same: that the 
Lockean view of persons fails to accommodate the practical 
and social role of persons; and that at tempts to remedy 
this, by producing an objectively empirical account, result 
in problems for individuation. 
The intuition behind Butler and Reid's original 
objections therefore still have force - that Locke's account 
does not give an account of personal identity that satisfies 
the demands of the person's forensic nature. The overriding 
difficulty with the complex view remains that it is 
unsatisfactory to its opponents, who believe that the person 
is a more stable and fixed entity than Locke can offer. 
However, these complaints only carry weight if it can be 
shown that assumptions of the objectors are fair: that is, 
that the moral or forensic person must be something which 
can be accurately and definitely individuated. Such a 
consideration brings the examination to the third and final 
objection to Locke: that he fails to provide an account 
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which has real and fixed identity - factors which it is 
claimed are necessary to a moral concept of person. 
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CHAPTER 4 THE COMPLEX VIEW AND REAL IDENTITY 
In this final objection to Locke, the criticism is that 
he produces a criterion which is unable to assure real and 
strict identity. It is claimed that if this proves to be 
so, the function of the person in a forensic role will be 
severely limited, if not impossible. The objections focus 
upon the use of "same consciousness" and its relationship 
to the form of identity it produces in persons. 
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4o 1 THE PROBLEM 
The objection from Butler and Reid focuses upon the 
belief that Locke's criterion can provide only an identity 
that is 'loose and popular' and which is consequently 
insufficient as an account of persons. This comment arises 
out of several assumptions: firstly, that substance in Locke 
is equivalent to being; and secondly, that consciousness 
means only each individual thought or presentation to the 
mind. It is from these two basic premises that they make 
the above conclusion for, under such an interpretation, 
Locke's characterisation of person emerges as being 
equivalent to a substance and, moreover, a substance that 
undergoes constant change through time. 
This interpretation of Locke is understandable, for his 
text holds within it a potential ambiguity in the use of 
substance, especially 
Aristotelian notion of 
if one reads with an assumed 
* substance • For in Aristotle, 
substance is a term which applies to units or entities such 
as horses, trees, men, rocks, etc. Since Locke states that 
p~rsons are beings, and beings to Aristotle are usually in 
the substance classification~ it is easy to see how Butler 
and Reid fasten upon this notion, writing: 
••• he defines person, a thinking intelligent being etc. and 
personal identity the sameness of a rational being. The 
question then is, whether the same rational being is the 
same substance, which needs no answer, because being and 
* Aristotle (1) 
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substance, in this place, stand for the same idea. 
Butler p.101 
This understanding of substance is then applied to 
consciousness and the substance of consciousness is each 
individual thought. Hence, Butler and Reid understand by 
'consciousness' a concatenation of individual apparitions 
and substances and it is this which leads to the problem in 
Locke. For as noted, Locke draws an equivalence between 
persons and consciousness, which under this line of 
reasoning, since consciousness is ephemeral and momentary, 
will entail that the person be constantly changing. 
the comment is made that: 
Is it not strange that the sameness or identity of a person 
should consist in a thing which is continually changing, and 
is not any two minutes the same ••• 
Reid p.116 
Thus 
If this is taken as a true reading of Locke, personal 
identity is necessarily a weak or loose form of identity, 
for it is evident only in the apparent or inferred 
continuity of fleeting substances. The forensic implications 
of this are wholly unacceptable - as Reid states: 
••• if personal identity consisted in consciousness, it would 
certainly follow that no lllfln is the same person any two 
moments of his life; and as the right and justice of reward 
and punishment are founded on personal identity no man could 
be responsible for his actions. 
Reid p.116-7 
If Locke is to weather this objection, the relationship 
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between persons, consciousness and substance must either be 
interpreted in a different way, to ensure that personal 
identity does not rest in something successive and changing, 
or the notion that real identity is necessary for 
responsibility must be rejected. If neither is possible, 
Locke will be unable to avoid the consequence th~t 'person' 
will not be able to fulfil its forensic role. 
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4.2 PERSONS AND SUBSTANCES 
From what has already been said, and from any 
conscientious reading of Locke, it might be realised that 
his theory of persons does not have the same intention as 
that believed of him by Butler and Reid. Apart from the 
fact that Locke provides a discussion followed by a clear 
s ta temen t that persons are not substances, any at tempt to 
prove that he does equate them flounders in inconsistency 
and inaccuracy. 
4.2 (i) Lockean Substance 
The key point to note is that Locke does not employ an 
Aristotelian notion of substance. In Locke can be found a 
explicit definition of substance as unchanging stuff which 
is the basic building block out of which other things are 
created. All three cases of substance described are 
consistent with such a reading, bearing more resemblance to 
Aristotle's concept of 'matter' 
... 
than to substance". For 
example, God, finite spirits and rna terial things are all 
different types of basic substance rather than different 
complex units. 
This understanding of Locke can be found in Alston and 
Bennett+, who examine the concept of substance that Locke 
uses in response to the apparent contradiction as expressed 
* Aristotle (1) 
+ Alston & Bennett 1988 
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by Butler and Reid, which is involved in taking the 
Aristotelian line. Their analysis defines the Lockean use 
of substance in a narrow and special sense, .taking it to be 
a general term not making particular claims about nature but 
referring to the most basic entity in one's ontology. 
This clearly is the use to which Locke puts the term, for 
in his discussion of substance he refers to the most 
fundamental building block of objects, the nature of which 
we do not know but the concept of which we certainly do 
* need • He even talks of different forms of substance -
spiritual and material - intending the distinction to cover 
the different kinds of things we talk about - for example 
sentient and insentient beings. 
Under this interpretation, substance comes to mean "thing-
like item that is quantified over at a basic level of of one's ontology" 
(Alston & Bennett p.38), characterised as a thing to predicates 
are ascribed or the basic subject. In such a fundamental 
role, substance does not have any parts which it can 
conceivably lose or gain and therefore is practically 
irreducible. Nothing can be added or taken away from it, 
for it will not survive a change of parts. This definition 
of substance produces something which therefore has perfect 
identity. 
*Locke Bk.II Ch. xxiii 
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Employing such a concept of substance, the problem of 
whether the same person entails the same substance in Locke 
(essentially the equivalence suggested by Butler), becomes a 
que s t ion of "when you have one enduring person, do you have one 
enduring thing of a basic kind?" (Alston & Bennett p.40). In 
contradiction to Butler's conclusion, Alston and Bennett 
take Locke's answer to be essentially 'No': 
In the widest understanding of substance - that which has 
properties and stands in relations in contrast to the 
properties that are had and the relations that bind - Locke 
does take people to be substance. But where 'substance' is 
restricted to the most basic thing-like entities out of 
which all others are in some sense composed or constructed, 
neither people nor oaks are substances, but are rather 
composed of, or derived from, substances, in such a way that 
one and the same oak (person) may be composed of, or 
otherwise derived from, many different substances. 
Alston & Bennett p.40 
Person as Substance? 
Under such an interpretation, Locke clearly does not 
equate persons to substances; for the former are things made 
up of parts, the latter unable to be so. Persons have 
substances but the particular substances in the person are 
constantly changing and are therefore not identical with the 
person. 
Even if Locke can thus· avoid the identification of 
persons with substances, there still remains a difficulty. 
This is recognised in part by Butler, who explains that the 
original problem still remains, 
substance or not?: 
is the consciousness 
••• our substance is indeed continually changing; but whether 
this be so or not, is, it seems, nothing to the purpose; 
since it is not a substance, but consciousness alone, which 
constitutes personality; which conscious~ess, being 
successive, cannot be the same in any two moments, nor 
consequently the personality constituted by it. 
Butler p.102 
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As an objection this can be avoided, once more, by an 
appeal to a mistake made by the accusers. For the concept 
of person involves complete consciousness rather than its 
particular constituents. When Butler and Reid identify 
consciousness in a narrow way to entail only individual 
thoughts, they misread Locke's intention. For as noted, 
Locke uses consciousness in a much broader way, 
characterising it as an all embracing unifier of individual 
thoughts. 
Thus, it is not Locke's intention that the person be 
identified with anything fluctuating or successive: its 
parts or constituents might change through time but the 
essential referent of the concept of person itself, or the 
idea of person, persists. 
4.2 (ii) Actual Distinction of Persons and Substances 
Locke does, then, intend a difference between the person, 
its thoughts and its substances. However, though he makes 
the distinction, and it is consistent with the rest of his 
theory, it can still be asked whether persons can really be 
distinguished from persisting thinking substance or 
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consciousness. Thus the basic intuition behind the 
criticism remains intact, for it is on the distinction 
between the two that the question of real identity rests. 
That this separation proves difficult is recognised even 
by Locke, for in practice persons are always found along 
with thinking substance. Thus even though he presses for 
the likelihood that a person might survive a change of 
thinking substances, he is unwilling to commit himself on 
the precise nature of the relationship between them, saying: 
••• that cannot be resolved but by those who know what kind 
of substances they are that do think; and whether the 
consciousness of past actions can be transferred from one 
thinking substance to another. 
Locke p.214 
The two are quite obviously closely connected, at the 
very least forming a constant conjunction if not a more 
necessary link. Can Locke then maintain a clear distinction 
between persons and substances? Conceptually he can - for 
it must be remembered that what Locke is interested in are 
the ideas. There is, as noted in Chapter 1, a clear 
distinction between the ideas of a person and of substance; 
and even if persons are to be found in constant conjunction, 
-
even in necessary conjunction with substance, this does not 
entail that they are dependent upon the same particular 
substance. Conceptually speaking Locke claims that the 
substances can shift and change completely, 
person being touched or altered at all. 
without the 
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Separability of Substance and Selves 
However, the fact of the constant conjunction makes it 
appear as though consciousness is in fact what the person 
is. Indeed, some believe that it would make more sense 
actually to claim that the substances, or alternatively 
J. 
thoughts, were the person. For example, Chisholm" develops 
an attack upon Locke, which states that the 'thinking 
substances' are more like persons than Locke's 'persons'. 
His argument is founded in the problem· at hand - the 
original Butler/Reid distinction between objects with strict 
identity and those with only a loose and popular form. The 
former, he terms mereologically consistent; the latter 
mereologically variable+. Mereologically variable things 
are those which can survive a change of parts; 
mereologically constant, those which cannot. Accordingly 
variable things are ultimately constituted out of the 
constant things, relying on them for their character at time 
of possession. 
If this description is accurate, Chisholm claims that 
objects which undergo changes of parts have characteristics 
only in virtue of those parts: in effect they 'borrow' their 
qualities from their current substances. Thus an oak tree 
is only wooden and green in virtue of the fact that the 
* Chisholm (1) 1976 
+ Eg. Chisholm (1) 1976 p.89 
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substances that constitute it have those particular 
properties; and a person will only have a body of flesh and 
blood by virtue of the miterials it possess •. In consequence 
a person will only have certain thoughts if the thinking 
substances forming it has those thoughts. Of this Chisholm 
writes: 
There is no reason whatever for supposing that I hope for 
rain only in virtue of the fact that some other thing hopes 
for rain - some stand-in that, strictly and philosophically, 
is not identical with me, but happens to be doing duty for 
me at this particular time. 
Chisholm p.104 
Such a notion results in the possibility of the thinking 
substance being more of a person than the person: 
If there are thus two things that now hope for rain, the one 
doing it on its own and the other such that its hoping for 
rain is done for it by the thing that now happens to 
constitute it, then I am the former thing and not the latter 
thing. 
Chisholm p.104 
In his criticism Chisholm clearly misrepresents or 
misunderstands the intention of Locke's writing. Chisholm 
implies that there are two things, the subject and the 
qualities of the subject, and moreover that the subject 
exists 'in waiting' for the particular qualities. Implicit 
in this is the fact that the self comes first and the 
qualities are joined to it later: an imported dualism 
inconsistent with the original Locke, for Locke does not 
make such claims. 
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As described earlier in Chapter 1, the self arises out of 
the actions of the consciousness; without the thoughts 
contained within one consciousness there is. no self. Thus 
particular thoughts are represented themselves in other 
thoughts of co-consciousness or unity in the mind. 
If the person or thinker is equivalent to that thought of 
self-consciousness, this might lead to the conclusion that 
the thought and the thinking of the thought are indeed 
inseparable - for how can a thought be framed without some 
way of thinking it? But to Locke such inseparability is 
only in practice: for although the person is reducible to 
that conscious thought, conceptually it is the idea of a 
concerned and rationalising individual. Thus the two are 
divisible - one having the connotation of a consciousness 
containing different thoughts; the other the idea of a 
subject or self, the individual who has the thoughts, is 
affected by and affects them. This difference in the idea 
extends to a difference in identity: in the former case the 
identity of the idea relies upon particular thoughts or 
experiences; in the later the identity depends upon 
awareness of those individual elements in the consciousness. 
Personal Identity is Essentially a First-person Account 
The difference in understanding occurs because of 
perspectives once again Locke is interpreted wrongly 
because attention is not paid to the distinction between 
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first and third-person accounts of consciousness. The 
Lockean person is essentially subjective and can only be 
described through a first-person account. . The person does 
not exist in an objective, experience-independent world -
to Locke it is essentially subjective. The person is in the 
realm of phenomena and the experience of it is all that it 
is. Thus it has a different identity condition from any 
third-person and empirically objective description of 
consciousness, simply because it cannot be identified from a 
third-person view. 
As seen in Section 3.2, the Lockean self does not have 
the usual logical description of objective identification 
over time. It presents a queer and perspectival form of 
identity, based in the identity of appearance rather than of 
'reality'. Personal identity can be determined from only 
one perspective and only at the present time. What is the 
past of a particular person is only what that person can 
remember when looking back: there is no account of a 
personal past to be given by reference to objective 
historical fact. The history of a person can change from 
moment to moment. 
F 
4.2 (iii) Change in the Lockean Person 
It does seem from this clarification as though Locke is 
concerned with particular qualities of the person, rather 
than a purely quantitative identity. The person knows who 
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he is by the particular content of consciousness and a 
change in content will change the person. In terms of 
identity over time the person knows who he.was in the past 
by the content of remembrance and a change in the particular 
memory might change who he is and was. 
On a synchronic level this presents no problems - it is 
the same as Butler's objections* and can be answered 
likewise: the content of consciousness presents us with our 
personality, but does not amount to our numerical identity 
which is to be found in the unifying consciousness. But in 
the case of identity over time, the qualities are elevated 
to a position of being the quantitative identity as well: 
for it is in the content of the memory that temporal 
identity is placed. In this way, the person becomes 
something which does change and fluctuate through time, for 
if the memory changes, so does the history of the person. 
This can be dealt with once again by reference to the 
idea - the overriding thought of co-consciousness. The 
diachronic identity, like tne synchronic, is found in the 
unifying thought. But in this suggestion a fundamental 
problem emerges, which can be seen to extend to the case of· 
synchronic identity as well. For what is this unifying 
* Section 4.2 (i) 
137 
consciousness? If it is a thought, then like other thoughts 
it will change from moment to moment. The act of 
unification is of certain things now whereas when the next 
moment arrives it will be unifying other things - it will be 
a different thought or act of co-consciousness. This is 
brought out more clearly when considering ·diachronic 
identity, for what unifies all the co-consciousness over 
time is an act of historical co-consciousness; but as seen, 
co-consciousness changes with each increasing moment to 
encompass more or less of the past with the present. 
Lockean personal identity thus involves a thought of 
unifying consciousness which occurs only at one moment in 
time, and then changes to another thought of co-
consciousness. The person of the present is strietly 
identical with all the past things it unifies to it, for the 
person is one basic and indivisible thought. But such a 
thought is only at one particular time, then like the rest 
of consciousness, it is no longer. 
Thus it seems that, even if consciousness is taken to 
represent the Lockean act of thought or self-awareness, the 
problem remains - that each individual act of self-awareness 
is only a momentary thing, having no obvious links between 
them. The person therefore cannot have real identity 
through time in an historical way and does indeed have the 
momentary nature that Butler and Reid envisage. 
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4.2 (iv) Modern Complex Accounts 
As seen, the later complex accounts develop and modify 
Locke in an attempt to extend the existence of person beyond 
the immediate present. As such their theories can be seen 
as attempts to give the person some form of historical 
identity. By concentrating upon the use of 'ideas' and 
unifying concepts, they try to give the thing identity 
through time by describing it as a third-person or 
historically objective thing. By divorcing it from the 
ephemerality of the first-person, the idea of the person as 
some form of property can be given persistence through a 
unifying 
viable. 
continuity which is fixed and therefore morally 
As also explained, the consequence of the complex view's 
empiricism - that persons are reducible to some set of 
their properties which are continually changing - is that 
persons do not have strict or absolute identity over time. 
What identity they do have is something conferred upon them 
by us: that is we group together certain properties and 
impose a unity on them from our perspective. The identity 
of one person is thus constructed by an umbrella term r~ther 
than a naturally fixed unity. 
It is recognised that strict identity cannot hold in such 
a conjunction, but complex theorists claim that this is not 
important. At least the person has a form of identity and 
139 
can therefore be tracked and individuated in a public way. 
The loose form of identity they have is all that is needed = 
it is a convention by which we attribute responsibility in 
society. What is of interest is that certain crucial 
properties do survive = and if they do, then the person 
persists. 
Person, in effect becomes a social group term and the 
rules for its identity are created by the society. Thus it 
is possible for the identity to appear to be indeterminate 
for if the concept is forced beyond its usual use, we 
have no precedent with which to judge the situation. 
However, new rules will be created and identity conferred 
but the identity will still be only a matter of social 
convention. 
The notion of such conventional identities is a 
consequence of empiricism, indeed some claim the ultimate 
status of any empirical knowledge is a matter of convention 
- that all the objects we deal with are composed by our 
interests, the patterns we make of our experience being 
determined by ourselves. Whether idealist or realist the 
. 
subjectivity of our perception necessarily enforces a human 
framework upon the world which entails that our perception 
of identity will necessarily be a matter of convention. 
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The Moral Sufficiency of Loose Identity? 
It can still be objected to this account that, in effect, 
persons only 
Unless the 
"perdure" (Noonan p.l22) rather. than "persist". 
connection is a 'real' one (satisfying the 
scepticism of Hume), persistence of the idea simply does not 
involve persistence of a real thing. Where Locke'~ unifying 
idea is a real and observable one (if only momentary and 
first personal), most objectively described continuity can 
amount only to the imposition of a link reducible to a 
matter of convention. As explained, this form of identity 
is intolerable to an advocate of the Butler and Reid style 
of morality: for although the notion is 'fixed 1 in our 
human terms, is not fixed in reality thus relativising. the 
concept of responsibility to the particular society's or 
person's idea of what constitutes personal identity. 
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4o3 REAL IDENTITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 
If, then, Locke and the complex theorist cannot be shown 
to have real identity, it must somehow be argued that a 
sufficient account of persons does not need real identity. 
It is the claim of the simple view that real identity is 
necessary for our notion of morality. 
4.3 (i) Morality and Identity as Convention 
The origin of this problem once again can be found in 
Butler and Reid, and Madell quotes the latter as 
characterising the individuation of things with only loose 
identity as "often a question of words" (Madell p.13). Such a 
comment is a recognition that, in attributing identity to 
successive objects, persistence is there only by virtue of a 
'conceptual' continuity or unity. This same observation was 
developed by ... Quine", who states that object identity is 
reducible to what is of importance to the perceiver. 
Unity of successive objects is thus arbitrary and noticed 
only if the object is of relevance to the observer. Objects 
are created by the priorities of perceivers: 
The view is that the unity of a thing at any one time is 
much like the unity whiCh results from an assembly of 
building blocks, and that it is a matter of convention 
whether we call the result one thing or many things. 
Madel! p.14 
* Quine (1) 1960 & (2) 1969 
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Madell does not consider this implication to be a 
criticism of empirical object identity; what is unacceptable 
to him is that persons should be treated so, for the chief 
consequence of doing so would be that our identity, future 
and past, becomes a matter solely of convention. What is 
and is not me would depend upon what I, or other people, 
decide is or is not me. This is an unacceptable 
consequence, not least because it conflicts with our notion 
of responsibility. Madell states that: 
••• our present notion of responsibility would be destroyed 
by a view of personal identity as essentially a matter of 
convention seems to me almost beyond question. 
Madell p.16 
Like Butler and Reid, the modern simple view relates our 
rationale for agency to the person. The point is argued at 
two levels: that, without a real and strict identity 
exhibited in the self, responsibility, and with it all the 
trimmings of morality, will dissolve; and that our own 
personal perspective of responsibility begins with our own 
concern for our self. Thus the person is to have 
determinate and absolute identity. 
Responsibility and Determina~e Identity 
It is true that it is difficult to make real sense of the 
notion of indeterminate identity. It is a contradiction in 
terms to talk of identity and to describe it with the term 
'indeterminate'. Although inability to determine and know 
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identity is conceivable, indeterminacy of the thing in 
itself seems absurd. How can an object not have an 
identity? It is part of being that a being is something; 
and anything that is something has an identity of some sort. 
Even if we cannot determine a thing's identity, we do not 
hold that it has no identity. Even if we believe·an object 
to be a social construction and not objective, we still 
attribute to that thing an identity. 
At this level the notion of indeterminacy does not make 
sense and the simple view seems justified in rejecting any 
view that claims as such. However, the complex view does 
not claim this and one cannot adduce it as an implication. 
The conclusion that can be reached through the complex view 
is that it can be indeterminate whether or not a person 
survives and that survival is not a matter of identity. 
The claim of the complex view is not absurd in this 
respect. But the conclusions it draws are a result of an 
assumed empiricism and a preconceived notion of the status 
of the person. That things can have identity, which is just 
convention, is acceptable. Whether such a form of identity 
is acceptable in persons is another consideration. For it 
to be so, it must be acceptable that our belief in 
persistence, and the morality which depends upon it, be only 
a social construction rather than a real fact. 
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Responsibility and Convention 
It is true that responsibility hinges upon the belief 
that the same person is present and this would imply that 
perhaps identity is, after all, important to our morality. 
However, it can be shown that our concept of responsibility 
does not rely upon a fixed and absolute notion of identity, 
it functions equally well in situations where identity is a 
matter of convention; where identity is of a loose form. 
For example, the concept of a nation or a clan is a group 
term, relying upon social definition rather than natural 
kind grouping, yet we still use and apply the concept of 
responsibility with respect to them. A nation might be held 
responsible for causing a war, although the action may have 
been taken by a minority; a tribe is often considered a unit 
and one member can bring a revenge upon the whole tribe. 
Although the strength of blame does become diluted, in both 
cases the whole takes the responsibility for the parts, even 
though all parts might not have been actually causal in the 
action. The parts might even shift and change - the glory 
or disgrace of a nation or tribe can be thought to belong to 
the descendants through the ages. 
Thus the problem of identity and responsibility envisaged 
by the simple view is not as ominous as first appears. An 
individual might still function under a concept of 
responsibility even if exact identity is not upheld. In the 
difficulties considered by the reduplication * case , 
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it is 
far from absurd that responsibility might become a matter of 
convention: responsibility does not necessarily function on 
a one-one exact and absolute level. To assume that the self 
is necessary for the notion of responsibility in persons is 
to assume that 'person' is an absolute concept. 'The simple 
view fails to argue for the point and so fails to prove 
through this channel that real identity is necessary for our 
concept of personal responsibility. 
In fact philosophers such as Parfit are quite willing to 
accept that traditional morality, and the persisting self on 
which it is founded, are no more that conventional beliefs. 
They acknowledge that we can still have a moral attitude 
towards ourselves and concern for our own survival, even if 
that concern is founded in something that changes. Parfi t 
himself goes so far as to state that we would be better off 
rejecting beliefs relating to identity and focussing on fact 
- and that is, that the persistence of certain properties is 
what is of most importance to us as individuals. 
4.3 (ii) Identity Does Not Matter 
Thus the conclusions about identity encountered by 
philosophers such as Parfit cause no worry. They claim that 
our concern is felt for a particular set of beliefs and 
* Section 3.3 (ii) 
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memories held within the consciousness: that they should 
persist rather than some experiencer of them. Moreover, 
Parfi t claims that the belief in anything more - like an 
indivisible self - is merely an illusion or taught belief: 
The truth is very different from what we are inclined to 
believe. Even if we are not aware of this, most of us are 
Non-Reductionists. If we considered my imagined cases, we 
would be strongly inclined to believe that our continued 
existence is a deep further fact, distinct from physical and 
psychological continuity, and a fact that must be ali-or-
nothing. This is not true. 
Parfit p.281 
It is in the persistence of certain properties that the 
moral attitude should be focussed, and these may survive in 
more than one 'branch' of the person. Parfit, like Locke, 
recognises that a branching system of indeterminate identity 
cannot be one which maintains identity and so he casts off 
identity as unimportant to the concerns of persons. It is 
not identity which is of prime importance to Parfit, it is 
the presence of certain qualities. 
Concern and Real Identity 
In opposition to this empiricist stand, Chisholm claims 
that, if only this loose form of identity is possible in 
persons, they will be reducible and describable in terms of 
their properties. Thus, the empirical account treats 
persons as "entia per alio" (Chisholm (1) p.104), deriving their 
nature and ultimate value from something other than 
themselves. Chisholm believes, as do Butler and Reid, that 
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this characterisation of the concern we feel for ourselves 
is intuitively unacceptable. 
Chisholm illustrates this unacceptability by showing that 
characterisation of persons as just properties is absurde 
This objection was described earlier that, ·under the 
empirical description, if I hope for rain, I do so only in 
virtue of something else hoping for rain, something which is 
not identical with me but is doing duty for me at the 
moment. Of this Chisholm comments that: 
If there are thus two things that now hope for rain, the one 
doing it on its own and the other such that its hoping is 
done for it by the thing that now happens to constitute it, 
then I am the former thing and not the latter thing. But 
this is to say that I am not an ens successivum. 
Chisholm (1) p.104 
Hence the empiricist account of persons is thought to be 
insufficient that, in fact, intuitively there is more to 
the person and its identity than the successive properties 
that the body and manifest person form. This extra factor 
is something which thinks or feels; not merely something 
which is thought for or felt for. Moreover, it is this 
thing for which we feel concern. 
Madell also argues for this point. If we consider our 
future, we feel concern for ourselves as the same person who 
will experience that future, we fear pain as people who 
will feel that pain. In an empiricist account, this fear 
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amounts to the fact that our concern "that the person who will 
be in pain will have certain memories and personality traits" (Madell 
p.lS). Yet this is clearly inaccurate, for· surely what we 
fear is that the pain is something that we ourselves mighi 
experience: 
••• and it seems absolutely clear that this is not what one 
is afraid of at all. What one is afraid of is just that the 
person who will be in pain is oneself. Pains are one sort 
of thing, memory impressions quite another and it is truly 
difficult to see just why the fearfulness of the one should 
rest on the presence of the other. 
Madell p.15-6 
In this way, Madell gives a clear reason to believe in a 
subject which does not reduce to the psychological 
properties of the person, for our concern for our imagined 
future takes its meaning from the existence of just such a 
subject. 
4.3 (iii) Responsibility and the Self 
There is a strong intuitive belief that the concern and 
responsibility starts with the self. This idea has been 
described in Locke, and his entire thesis of persons is 
built up on it. As seen, his is different enough from most 
complex views to place the value of the self in this 
concern, rather than just the properties, and although 
giving a complex account of personal identity, Locke avoids 
the problems associated with real and loose identity at one 
time. 
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However, concentration upon the self's idea of the self 
means that the logic of Lockean identity is something 
impermanent it does not hold through time in the 
traditional way. The simple view demands a fixed thing that 
is factual and in the objective world. If morality can be 
reduced to 'how it seems', chaos will ensue for such a 
person cannot support a truly forensic role. 
In Locke, persons do not conform to the usual rules of 
cause and effect. The peculiar workings of the mind, and 
the random possibilities of experiences represented to it, 
are removed from the orderly world of causality in which one 
experience is thought to cause another and individuals are 
held responsible for certain actions they have performed. 
The Lockean person labours under no such predictable links 
to the actions done by its parts. The cause of the person 
is the presentation in the consciousness - and what causes 
the ingredients of a particular consciousness at any one 
time is to a certain extent accidental, or at least 
unpredictable in normal causal terms. 
To understand the Lockean person and its identity will 
thus involve deep research into its psychology. What is or 
is not represented to the mind at any one particular time, 
and therefore what is or is not the person, will be a case 
for psychologists to determine and this will only be rough 
approximation, for the person is essentially subjectively 
150 
determined. The field of responsibility would be likewise 
dependent upon the workings and representations of the 
present mind, first-person consciousness alone determining 
whether or not a person is guilty or innocent. 
It is in identity's dependency on this asymmetry and 
unilateral perspective that the real problem exists, for it 
is claimed that something with such 'identity' cannot 
produce a satisfactory unit of social responsibility. For 
social responsibility involves attribution of praise or 
blame from others - yet if those others have no perspective 
from which to individuate, how can they apportion or direct 
their judgements? Responsibility demands some form of 
objectively discernible identity and, as I have shown, 
Locke's account effectively removes the logical possibility 
of such a view. 
Responsibility and Concern 
Linked to this problem is a further difficulty concerning 
the action of the person in society. Although Locke gives 
good reason for the basis of our concern for ourselves - in 
terms of awareness of being experiencers he does not 
provide sufficient reason why this should give rise to a 
feeling of responsibility. The understanding that we are 
affected and respond to certain input means only that we 
feel a concern for our present and future experiences. Such 
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a situation cannot give rise to a feeling of responsibility: 
for that we need to have some idea of ourselves as agents. 
Thus it seems that in the self-appraisal of the Lockean 
view, 
feel 
the person cannot have a social role. 
socially responsible nor will it 
It will neither 
be· publicly 
reprehensible. Once again then, the intuition of the Butler 
and Reid objections still stand: that the person of Locke is 
unable to fulfil its forensic role, being only a fleeting 
and momentary thing of the present. 
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4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Once again an essential difference has emerged between 
the thinker and agent, thoughts and deeds. The division is 
that between the rationalist and the empiricist, each 
arguing their case from their own corner. 
It has been shown that Locke endorses a strange form of 
empiricism, which results ultimately in an ephemeral and 
fluctuating person - not much good as a socially forensic 
unit but understandable in terms of self-concern. 
Subsequent complex theorists develop and modify Locke into 
more stable and historically objective accounts. But, if 
they are to be accepted, it seems that we must also accept 
the possibility that our beliefs about persons and the 
foundations of morality are not what we think: that in fact 
the person does not persist in anything but a conventionally 
agreed way. 
The objective empiricist will accept no reference to a 
mysterious sort of self with no empirical manifestation, so 
he chooses to adopt the properties and qualities as personal 
identity. The repercussions this has for our beliefs about 
persons and morals are either embarrassingly forgotten or 
brazenly faced out with new prescriptions for our beliefs 
offered. 
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The rationalist claims that empiricism takes its claims 
too far. But to make the step of claiming more beyond 
empirical manifestation needs proof other than the 
particular objections voiced so far. The appeal to our 
basic beliefs and concerns about ourselves is attractive but 
unless it can be proven rationally that this 'view of a 
persisting self is essential to our ideas of morality, there 
seems little to go on, apart from background epistemological 
beliefs, when making a choice between the two accounts. 
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CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY CONCLUSION 
The complex view 
the result of an 
produces a concept of person which is 
empirical approach. Unexplainable 
intuition is not a justifiable basis, it must be possible to 
account for persons in terms of experienced evidence. Hence 
the complex accounts try to provide a concept of person 
referring to properties - psychological or physical - with 
persons being reducible to these criteria. 
The actual criterion of personhood varies from theory to 
theory - from pure psychological phenomena to the entire 
body. What is universal to all theories is the claim that 
the person can be characterised by some quality or property 
and it is that property which is of chief importance in 
personal identity. Thus, the person persists only by virtue 
of the continuity of some property, its identity and essence 
resting in this alone. In the empiricist's view, what the 
philosopher must do is to find which is the essential 
criterion of person, rather than to discover whether or not 
an empirical criterion can ·be found. 
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Sel LOCKEAN PERSONAL IDENTITY 
The Lockean theory of persons is based in the definition 
of the person as a rational and moral thing. It has both 
the ability to think and reflect and, in addition, it is a 
unit of moral responsibility. The self emerges as the best 
candidate for this definition, for it is a being which 
thinks and feels concern for its condition. Evidence of the 
self is given in self-consciousness: it is in the awareness 
of being conscious that we become aware of ourselves as 
existing. 
Thus in his empiricism, Locke focuses upon the self, the 
evidence for which is found in subjective experience or 
self-consciousness. Since the only evidence we have of 
other subjects is through argument by analogy or other 
indirect experience, it is impossible to provide any degree 
of empirical proof of persons from a third-person 
perspective. Hence the Lockean theory of personal id~ntity 
is expressed solely in first-personal terms. His account 
remains essentially subjective, with identity and 
persistence of persons described only in terms of self-
awareness. 
5.1 (i)) Problems in Locke 
Although Locke's theory is both empirically rigorous and 
internally consistent, it fails on two levels. Firstly it 
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produces a concept person which is intuitively at odds with 
our beliefs of persistence; but more profoundly, the person 
of Locke is unable to fulfil its forensic definition. For 
in its obscurity to all but the self, it cannot play a 
socially interactive or morally responsible role. The self, 
as described by Locke, cannot therefore provide a sufficient 
account of persons. 
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5.2 MODERN COMPLEX ACCOUNTS 
In reaction to this problem, subsequent modifications and 
developments of Locke have attempted to force personal 
identity into an objectively empirical realm. In order to 
produce a socially effective person, these have been 
focussed upon tangible properties and qualities associated 
with persons, rather than upon subjectivity. Since most 
empirical criteria are flue tua ting, the complex account of 
persons postulates an entity which changes over time yet is 
still considered to persist. Most posit some form of 
continuity or persistence through the change, either actual 
and therefore 'real' or imposed and therefore constructed. 
Thus the person is recognisably something with loose 
identity. Its parts and character change, yet it is 
considered that it still persists. 
The more rigorous complex theorists acknowledge that 
persons cannot have strict identity, subsequently discarding 
identity as a concern and emphasising the importance of the 
survival of what seems to be of value. Hence, the role of 
objective criteria, empirical value and what appears to be 
the case are pushed to the fore-front of complex accounts -
personal identity emerging as a thing of qualitative concern 
rather than numerical. 
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The advantage of the complex view is that it provides a 
criterion of identity - we can understand what persons are 
in terms not referring to the word 'person' itself and 
without recourse to something mysterious or intuitive. This 
extends to explanations of the value of persons and their 
identity we are provided with a list of qualities or 
properties by which we can judge the existence or 
persistence of persons. 
By concentrating upon objective criteria, the complex 
account produces a person which is a public thing. It can 
be observed and judged from a third-person, objective stand 
point as well as a first-person perspective. Since it 
appears that consciousness or the self cannot be accounted 
for in objective empirical terms, subjectivity is sacrificed 
to ensure this empirically supported social viability. 
5.2 (i) Problems in the Modern Complex View 
However, this line of account encounters problems of its 
own or, rather, it falls prey to the original objections 
which Locke himself manages to avoid. For the modern 
complex theories produce a criterion which cannot identify 
persons without circularity; and further, a criterion which 
fails to individuate persons uniquely. 
This 
account 
can 
to 
be attributed to the failure of 
recognise the fundamental gap 
the complex 
between the 
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properties of the person and the person himself. It has 
been suggested that empirical criteria for personal identity 
can be treated only as evidence of that identity, not the 
truth or fact of the identity. By stating that properties 
are the person, the complex account fails to make this 
crucial distinction between evidence and fact: an·assumption 
of which leads to the exclusion of the subject. 
For in providing an account of persons based only in 
evidence, the complex view fails to capture the essence of 
subjectivity. Not only is this anti-intuitive but it 
results in a circular and incomplete account, failing to 
identify persons both synchronically and diachronically. 
Without the idea of a subject, properties cannot be 
individuated as belonging to any. particular persons. It 
seems that by elevating objectivity to a primary role, the 
modern complex account excludes the only method by which 
unique and non-circular identification can be attained, that 
is through the property of subjectivity. In effect the 
nature of persons is forgotten and lost in the evidence we 
have for them. 
Moreover, it is claimed that despite their objectivity, 
empiricist theories fail to provide an account of persons 
which is morally satisfactory. In theories advocated by the 
empiricist line, the issue of identity is ultimately 
reducible to a matter of convention, something which is not 
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only instinctively but forensically untenable. That the 
empiricist account is insufficient is emphasised through an 
-
exainiiia t-iori oT its implications for the concept of identity. 
The properties in which it claims identity consists can in 
fact hold only a loose form of identity and this is out of 
keeping with our beliefs about ourselves and our· ideas of 
ourselves as unified per sis tent beings. Thus, the 
concentration upon the phenomena of things entails that 
modern complex theories ultimately fail to give an account 
of anything which has real or strict identity. 
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5.3 INSIGHTS OF THE COMPLEX VIEW 
It is qg.ains L this- las-t- obj-ec-tion t-o --the form o-f complex 
personal identity, that the modern empirical accounts can 
claim some success. For they do show that strict identity 
is not necessary for a fully functional concept of 
responsibility: that responsibility can function based on an 
agreed and conventional persistence. Thus it also seems 
that one of the main objections to Locke might be removed. 
If it can be shown that morality can function on 
conventional identity, then the loose identity in persons is 
no longer a problem. 
Having explored and rejected the avenues of objectively 
empirical persons, is it possible that modern complex 
theories might support a return to the Lockean subjective 
account of persons? If the problem of loose identity is 
removed, might not Locke's concept of person succeed? It is 
true that as an account of subjectivity, Lockean theory 
remains intact and viable. Indeed as an account of self, 
self-awareness and first-person evidence of the self, it 
displays both sense and rigour; with the added bonus of 
being empirically supported •. 
However, Locke still cannot avoid the intuitive 
difficulty of postulating a person without a fixed history; 
and even if this intuition can be shown to have no 
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foundation, the subjective character of self raises 
fundamental moral difficulties concerning public 
--
individuation of persons. 
5.3 (i) Conclusion 
In conclusion then it seems that the obscurity and 
ephemerality of the Lockean self makes it an insufficient 
account of persons. In the face of the failure of the 
complex account of personal identity, I shall turn next to 
an examination of the simple view. 
PART II 
THE SIMPLE VIEW 
of 
PERSONAL IDENTITY 
My dinner, dress, associates, looks compliments, 
dues, 
The real or fancied indifference of some man or 
woman I love, 
The sickness of one of my folks or of myself, or 
ill-doing or loss or lack of money, or 
depressions or exaltations, 
Battles, the horrors of fratricidal war, the 
fever of doubtful news, the fitful events: 
These come to me days and nights and go from me 
again, 
But they are not the Me myself. 
Walt Whitman 
'Song of Myself' 
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CHAPTER 6 THE SIMPLE VIEW 
In contrast to the empirical reductionist view, stands 
the simple view of personal identity. This holds that the 
subjectivity necessary to persons can only be encompassed by 
some further fact over and above empirical properties: that 
the person is more than mind or body, it is a subject. 
Hence the simple theory centres upon the notion of the 
subject, claiming that persons are essentially equivalent to 
a self which forms the unanalysable fact of personal 
identity. 
The simple view is an attempt to capture the subjectivity 
central to Locke without necessarily involving the fleeting 
nature characteristic of self-consciousness. Thus in an 
at tempt to avoid the implicit reductionism involved in a 
posteriori argument, they focus instead upon providing 
proofs of the historically persisting persons in a priori 
terms. 
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6.1 BUTLER, REID AND THE SIMPLE VIEW 
The theories of personal iden~ity offered by_ Butler1( and 
Reid+ really only emerge through their· analysis and 
criticism of Locke. Few positive arguments are given in 
support of their claims and we are made aware of their ideas 
chiefly by negative definition. 
6.1 (i) The Butler and Reid account of Personal Identity 
Their concept of person sets out to achieve that which 
the Lockean concept cannot: that is, it tries to accommodate 
real identity and forensic applicability. Like Locke, they 
focus upon consciousness and thought in persons; but unlike 
him, they reject a reductive account equating persons to 
consciousness ~ for the simple reason that it cannot exhibit 
a 'real' identity through time. 
The basic definition of person Butler and Reid give is an 
account of the person as a subject or self. As in Locke, 
'person' is that which wants, hopes, feels, reacts - all the 
activities of a subject which is affected by its environment 
and experiences. The person of Butler and Reid is that for 
which each individual feels concern; the centre of 
experience and action; what each of us thinks we essentially 
are; "That which each man calls himself." (Reid p.103). 
1( Butler 1736 
+ Reid 1785 
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However, it is only in definition that their views and 
Locke's coincide. Once they move on to discuss what will 
fulfil s-uch a conce-pt, to de-sc.r-H:'le th-e on-to-logical s-t-atus of 
person, vast differences between them emerge. Where Locke 
is happy to produce an account identifying the self simply 
with the property of consciousness, Butler and Reid choose 
to argue that it is something over and above the properties. 
Where the self of Locke is a complex amalgamation of 
consciousness and subjectively connected phenomena, in 
Butler and Reid self emerges as a basic, objectively 
persisting unit, independent of what seems to be the case. 
Locke provides a reductive account of the self in terms of 
self-consciousness; Butler and Reid refuse to allow that the 
self can be explained in terms other than its subjectivity. 
Thus both Butler and Reid insist that any concept which 
does justice to our beliefs must attribute strict identity 
to persons. It is this demand which engenders the 
distinction they enforce between the person and its 
properties. Since properties and parts which belong to a 
person fluctuate through time, they cannot provide real 
identity. If then, persons are to persist in a strict 
sense, they must be in es-sence something other than these 
properties. Rather than an objective, property-based 
entity, the person is characterised as an empirically 
intangible subject of properties and experiences: 
That indivisible thing which I call myself. Whatever this 
self may be, it is something which thinks, and deliberates, 
and resolves, and acts and suffers. I am not thought, I am 
not action, I am not feeling. I am something that thinks, 
and acts, and suffers. 
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It is this notion of a separable subjectivity which leads 
to the rejection of the person as consciousness; and this 
extends through to the complex idea of temporal identity 
which states that persons are linked to past selves only 
through some sort of continuity of memory or psychological 
state. Although Butler and Reid admit that remembering 
gives rise to our knowledge of past selves, they cannot 
accept that this amounts to the truth or fact about who we 
were or are now. Firmly insisting upon a distinction 
between evidence and reality (something ignored in Locke's 
account of persons), they state that our persistence cannot 
be dependent upon certain properties; that the memory is 
evidence for, but not constitutive of personal identity: 
It is very true that my remembrance that I did such a thing 
is the evidence I have that I am the identical person who 
did it ••• but to say that my remembrance that I did such a 
thing or my consciousness, makes me the person who did it, 
is, in my apprehension, an absurdity too gross to be 
entertained by any man who attends to the meaning of it. 
Reid p.llS-6 
Emerging from this distinction is a kind of dualism: one 
between the subject and the properties. What Butler and 
Reid focus upon is the necessity of the subject - that there 
is something that owns the properties which is not 
reducible. There are two things involved in persons and 
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they cannot be reduced down to one type of thing: there are 
properties of persons and persons themselves. It is the aim 
-~ 
of the simple view to show that the self is separable from 
its properties. 
6.1 (ii) The Necessity of Real Identity 
The impetus behind this demand for real and fixed 
identity is based in the fact that properties, though 
providing good evidence, cannot fully account for the 
concern we feel for and the awareness we have of ourselves. 
Any attempt to reduce the person to properties misses 
something - and that something seems to persist through 
time. 
Belief in a fixed and therefore more objectively 
persisting self has been noted as one reason for the 
rejection of the complex theory*. As seen, Locke himself 
produces an extremely ephemeral and subjective account of 
persons; and even later empiricist at tempts to produce a 
historically fixed self, fail to provide anything more than 
a loose form of identity in their criteria of persons. The 
fact that loose identity entails only a conventional kind of 
persistence has been explained+, and it is this conclusion, 
applied to personal identity, which forms the main reason 
for the simple view's argument • 
.,.( See Part I 
+ See Introduction 
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Thus in contrast to the empiricist line, Butler, Reid and 
all subsequent simple accounts believe that rather than the 
loose identity evident in successive things, persons must 
have a strict or real identity; and this demand finds its 
source in two main arguments: that the foundation of 
morality depends upon the belief in a persistence .self; and 
that our fundamental beliefs must take priority in any. 
epistemological conflict. 
They claim that if persons have only a loose form of 
identity, they cannot really be said to persist, any kind of 
survival they exhibit is merely a matter of convention or 
custom. Yet this conflicts with beliefs about ourselves 
which inform and underlie the foundations of morality. For 
it is a fundamental belief about ourselves and others that 
persons persist in actuality rather than just as constructed 
things. Moreover, it is this belief which forms the 
foundation of concern and responsibility for ourselves, now 
and in the future, and which in turn is necessary to all 
moral action. Without this belief moral chaos will ensue. 
The distinction made by the simple view, between persons 
and properties, can therefore be seen to rest upon a belief 
about ourselves; but at base that is really all it amounts 
to - a belief. Butler and Reid are simply responding to 
the basic intuition that we are more than just our 
properties; that any theory which tries to effect a 
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reduction to properties must be rejected just because it 
produces conclusions contradictory to our basic intuitions 
and beliefs. 
In allowing this to be such a persuasive factor, the 
early simple view lays great importance upon the role of 
intuition and imagination in epistemology. In both Butler 
and Reid such considerations are given a central position at 
the very base of our knowledge. Both stress not only the 
limits of doubt to which we may reasonably go but also 
insist upon innate beliefs as central to our notion of 
rationality: 
The consciousness; which every man has of his Identity as 
far back as his memory reaches, needs no aid of philosophy 
to strengthen it, and no philosophy can weaken it without 
first producing some degree of insanity ••• that this 
conviction is indispensably necessary to all exercise of 
reason. 
Reid p.107 
Dissatisfaction with the empiricist account thus stems 
from its inability to provide the intuitive and morally 
effective person. What emerges then, is a very different 
methodology from that of Locke the empiricist - one which 
appeals to innate and therefore a priori and rationalist 
evidence of the self. · In placing such fundamental 
importance upon intuition, Butler and Reid commit themselves 
to a rationalist path - one which they hope will give them 
knowledge of a person which does indeed persist with real 
identity. 
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6.1 (iii) The Modern Simple View 
A revival of the simple view has recently emerged and 
this takes up and extends the original Butler/Reid thesis. 
It considers personal identity to be essentially different 
from ordinary object identity, rejecting the straightforward 
empirical thesis which holds that personal identity consists 
in the persistence of apparent memory or psychological 
connectedness. 
The motivation behind modern simple views is likewise 
similar to that of Butler and Reid. It demands that 
personal identity be of a strict kind, forming a solid base 
for moral responsibility and rationality. It supplements 
the original account, stating that, as well as being in 
accordance with basic intuitive moral beliefs about 
ourselves, real identity is necessary for our knowledge of 
any identity. In effect they claim that without the 
knowledge we have of identity in ourselves, we could have no 
conception of true identity at all. 
The modern simplists follow Butler and Reid in 
demonstrating that empirical accounts are insufficient to 
describe our sense of persons. They too show that 'person' 
defies any reduction into an account using properties. 
Their claim is based primarily in the fact that empiricism 
cannot account for our beliefs about ourselves: that it does 
not capture the sense we have of our own identity as 
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something real. Like its predecessors, the modern simple 
view concludes that persons are more than just their 
properties; and this something more they call the self. 
However, the modern simplists argue for the existence of 
a propertyless subject through more than just our intuitive 
awareness of it. They show that we are intimately aware of 
ourselves, actually experiencing the self synchronically and 
diachronically, and thus having a priori certain knowledge 
of the self's identity. Their proofs find a common base in 
Cartesian arguments concerning the awareness of the self 
through experience, the essence of which can also be found 
in Butler: 
So likewise, upon comparing the consciousness of oneself or 
one's own existence in any two moments there inmediately 
arises to the mind the idea of personal identity. 
Butler p.99 
Although he is writing here of temporal identity, Butler's 
fundamental idea relies upon the notion of the experiencer 
being known through experience. 
In using this form of argument, it would seem that the 
simple account follows closely upon Lockean characterisation 
of persons. But here as before with Butler and Reid, the 
modern simplists carry the implications beyond the 
phenomenon of unified consciousness to the postulation of an 
independent subject. Where Locke claims that the unity is 
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the self; the simple view holds that it is only evidence of 
the self. 
The simple view demonstrates this separability of the 
self through the use of thought experiment and logical 
argument. It is claimed that one can readily i{llagine the 
separability suggested, and that this conceivability entails 
the logical possibility that a person is essentially non-
property based. Moreover, it is possible to identify the 
self independently of properties, which possibility is held 
to entail that the self is distinct from them. From this it 
is concluded that we are actually more than just our 
properties. Although personal identity can be evidenced by 
the empirical features, it is not constituted by them. 
Subject/Property Dualism 
The crucial feature of the simple view is that it wishes 
to maintain a form of dualism with regard to things: it is 
not necessarily a mind/body or mental/material distinction -
it is a subject/property dualism. It is of central 
importance to the simple theory of personal identity that 
such a dualism can be maintained, that subjectivity cannot 
be reduced to empirically objective terms. The main thesis 
of the simple view that the subject is different from mere 
properties, it is the owner of the properties. 
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Such an account is more than the Lockean description of 
subjectivity, for Locke claims that the self is a property, 
-- - -- -- ---
-- --- -- ~- ~ 
This is clearly insufficient for 
the simple theory, for any property-based criterion will 
ultimately fail the test of persistence. What the simple 
view aims to achieve is proof of the self which does not 
resort to a reduction to any criteria, thus ensuring the 
possibility of a real persistence of persons. 
The simple view must therefore be judged on several 
levels: firstly, on its ability to prove that there is a 
self which is separable from properties; secondly, that such 
a self is necessary to morality; and finally, if this self 
does exist, why it is necessarily equivalent to the person. 
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6.2 THE ARGUMENTS OF THE SIMPLE VIEW 
persons are intangible, unanalysable and indivisible 
subjects of experience. As said, few positive proofs for 
such an account are given by the early advocates, the major 
support of their claim being the logical fact that their 
description of persons is necessary for our conceptions of 
morality and reason. What few throw-away arguments they do 
give are generally mere statements of what is taken to be 
fact; however, their presence has served to associate the 
person of the Butler/Reid theory inextricably with the 
'soul' of Descartes' writings. 
6.2 (i) Arguments of Descartes 
It is to the writings of Descartes that one must look to 
find the arguments for the existence of the separable self 
and indeed the supplementary arguments offered by the modern 
.... 
simplists, as briefly noted beforen, can also be shown to 
find some of their sources in Cartesian rationality. On a 
superficial level, the description of persons in Descartes 
and the simple view amount to the same - both characterise 
them as intangible extra-bodily entities. On a deeper level 
too, the accounts coincide, focussing on consciousness and 
the separability of an indivisible subject. 
* Section 6.1 (ii) 
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The Cartesian concept of the self or soul is to be found 
J. 
clearly stated in the 'Meditations'" - specifically in the 
second and sixth. The discovery and characterisation of the 
soul is a by-product of Descartes' more general search for 
knowledge and truth, yet it subsequently forms a fundamental 
building block for his thesis. 
The argument arises from the 'Method of Doubt' by which 
Descartes sets himself the task of systematically rejecting 
all doubtable impressions, accepting only certain percepts 
as knowledge. His conclusions find that all of his beliefs 
based in experiences of the world can be doubted - that it 
is not logically impossible that all such things are mere 
deceptions. However, to this he finds one exception - that 
he cannot doubt the existence of his doubt and this fact 
implies that there is something that doubts: 
No indeed, I existed without doubt, by the fact that I was 
persuaded, or indeed by the mere fact that I thought at all. 
Descartes p.103 
Thus, Descartes established for himself a grain of 
certainty, and it is from this certainty that he then argues 
for the existence of his soul. The fact of conscious 
experience or thought entails the existence of a thinker; 
and what we become aware of in thinking is ourselves as 
thinkers. In short, Descartes believes himself to have 
proof of himself as a persisting subject of thought: the one 
* Descartes 1641 
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fact that can be known with certainty is knowledge of the 
self as a thinking being- 'cogito ergo sum': 
~ 
But what, then, am I? A thing that thinks. What is a thing 
that thinks? That is to say, a thing that doubts, perceives, 
affirms, desires, wills, does not will, that imagines also 
and which feels. 
Descartes p.107 
The Nature of the Soul 
However, Descartes does not stop at this realisation, for 
he goes on to a further investigation of the subject. With 
the intention of isolating its indubitable essence, 
Descartes undertakes to examine the various aspects 
attributable to the person. 
His bodily characteristics, and all functions or 
attributes dependent upon them, are quickly disqualified 
from his real being, for such parts are subject to the 
possibility of demonic deception. In his imagination too, 
he can separate himself from his body and its perceptions; 
in effect, he can make sense of the idea of continuing 
without his various bodily and psychological properties. 
However, awareness, or ability to feel, is not dependent 
upon these dubious experiences; indeed, as soon as he 
considers the removal of the ability to think, he can no 
longer make sense of continuing to be. In fact, he 
concludes, it is impossible to imagine the subject of 
experience without the ability to experience. This shows 
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that the ability to think must be the essence of the person, 
for in this he discovered "an attribute which does belong to me; 
-
this alone cannot be detached from me." (Descartes p.105) 
It is by thus extending the 'Cogito' argument through the 
use of the imagination that Descartes estab~ishes the 
essence of the soul as thinking. Where the body can be 
doubted and discarded, the thinker cannot; the two are 
separable concepts, the one being contingent, the other 
necessary to the person. Hence he concludes that the body 
is only contingently associated with the person, and that: 
••• I do not observe that any other thing belongs necessarily 
to my nature of essence except that I am a thinking thing, I 
rightly conclude that my essence consists in this alone, 
that I am a thinking thing, or a substance whose whole 
essence or nature consists in thinking. 
Descartes p.156 
The essence of the person being 'a thinking being', 
personal identity consists in the persistence of the 
thinking being. Therefore, to continue as a person, ability 
to think must persist; indeed, "it might perhaps happen, if I 
ceased to think, that I would at the same time cease to be or to exist." 
(Descartes p.105). 
Of importance to understanding clearly the nature of 
Descartes' self is the underlying assumption of substance 
dualism: that there is a mutual exclusion between mental and 
physical things. Thus, if the self is in essence associated 
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with the mental, it cannot be also material. It is this 
fundamental belief, combined with the findings of his 
imagination, which leads Descartes to the conclusion that 
the self is separable from its properties. 
6.1 (ii) Descartes and the Simple View 
Even through this somewhat brief account of the Cartesian 
soul, it is clear that its implications for persons and 
their identity coincide with the Butler/Reid ideals. 
Descartes' characterisation of the person is almost exactly 
the same as the definition that Reid offers of a person, in 
which he states that "it is something which thinks, and 
deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and suffers." (Reid p.109). 
Moreover, despite the fact that like Locke, Descartes 
places the identity of the self in thinking, there is a 
crucial difference between their accounts which makes 
Descartes more attractive to the simple view than Locke. 
For although in some places Descartes does seem to imply 
that thinking is the essence of the soul, elsewhere he 
argues a separability from the individual experiences and 
sensations he has, giving reason to believe that he means 
that the soul is the thinker rather than the thoughts. 
Descartes 
consciousness 
forges 
and 
a clear distinction 
self-consciousness: that 
between 
whereas 
sensations imply only the existence of awareness, thought 
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necessarily involves the presence of a subject. For to 
think, one must actively think: the subject is necessary to 
something thinking. Whereas sensations imply merely a 
consciousness (and non-human animals can be considered 
conscious in this way); thinking implies self-consciousness 
- the act of a soul. Thus thinking can be di<$tinguished 
from sensation; for thinking involves the action of reason, 
the awareness of being. 
It may be that this is the sole reason that thought is 
distinguished from sensation and that indeed Descartes does 
equivocate the soul simply with thinking, rather than the 
thinker. But thought necessarily entails the existence of a 
subject, and it is definitely the thinker rather than just 
thought that Descartes is interested in. For unless the 
distinction is made, his account amounts to no more than the 
Lockean notion of self-consciousness, and there are strong 
reasons for believing that this is not so, that rather in 
Descartes, the thought is only indicative of the subject, 
not the subject itself. 
For another characteristic of the soul is that it is 
indivisible, and thereby persists unchanged Descartes 
cannot imagine it having parts as the body or sensations 
might. Clearly individual thoughts in the mind can be 
divided into parts. Moreover, just thoughts do not have 
real identity through time: it is the thinker that seems to 
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persist undivided. To interpret Descartes' intention with 
consistency, one therefore needs to focus on the thinker, or 
-
subject of thoughts, rather than the thoughts themselves: 
for thoughts clearly do not persist. 
The difference between Descartes and Locke becomes 
further entrenched when Cartesian substance dualism is 
examined. Moving from the premise that anything that is 
made of parts cannot be the mind, he argues that since 
material substance is made of parts, the thinker cannot be 
material. What is not material is surely immaterial; thus 
the thinker must be immaterial. This in its turn entails 
that immaterial substance must be indivisible; which in 
effect excludes the differing empirical content of thought 
from being what Descartes means by immaterial substance. It 
seems that the only candidate for being the thinker is a 
subject which does not change through time. The Cartesian 
soul thus seems to amount to the mind as an indivisible 
subject; anything more does not have the essential 
qualifications. 
Descartes thus makes a point of inferring actual 
separability of the person· from all empirical properties 
apart from thinking, whereas Locke rests content with 
distinctness of idea. This means that whilst the Lockean 
person is made up of many parts (being identical with 
consciousness), Descartes' self is a soul, of which he "can 
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distinguish no parts" (Descartes p.164) and which is logically 
separable from its body. Hence, unlike Locke's account, 
Descartes' theory satisfies the most important condition of 
acceptability to Butler and Reid: that persons are not 
subject to the identity problems incurred by material and 
successive objects: 
A part of a person is a manifest absurdity ••• a person is 
something indivisible ••• My thoughts, and actions, and 
feelings change every moment; they have no continued, but a 
successive existence; but that self, or I, to which they 
belong, is permanent, and has the same relation to all the 
succeeding thoughts, actions and feelings which I call mine. 
Reid p.109 
Subject/Content Dualism 
The Cartesian account of the soul can therefore be 
interpreted as an attempt to impose a form of 
subject/properties distinction as well as the mind/body 
dualism; or rather what it maintains is that the soul has 
only one property, that of thinking. For as seen, a simple 
distinction between mind and body is not enough to account 
for identity: Locke implies a mind/body dualism, yet is not 
commit ted to a subject/property separability or real 
identity. There must be a fundamental difference between 
the nature of the soul and its properties if persistence is 
to be upheld: for properties are divisible or changing; the 
soul is not. Through this difference, Descartes postulates 
a substance dualism that the soul must be made of 
indivisible immaterial substance; and this in turn enables 
him to enforce a subject/properties dis tinction: the 
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difference between a persisting unity and the changing parts 
it is aware of. 
Even if this is wrong, and such an interpretation is not 
the intention of Descartes, the fact that there is a 
fundamental distinction between an indivisible and divisible 
substance, between the mind and body, implies that he is 
concerned with a subject/content distinction. At this 
stage, it seems that this is enough to associate the 
subject/property dualists with his endeavour, for the 
intention is to isolate something which has real identity -
to free the self from the flue tua ting content. Perhaps, 
then, the term subject/content dualism would be a more 
accurate description of Descartes' theory, and would mark 
out the distinction between a single ·property simple view 
and that which wishes to postulate a total subject/property 
dualism. 
It may well emerge that in the simple view the 
distinction between properties and the subject extends even 
to the basic property of thinking; but the similarity of 
approach - the belief in an immaterial further fact has 
served to associate the early simple view with Cartesian 
dualism. For the soul of Descartes possesses the necessary 
conditions to satisfy the person of the simple view, and the 
impetus behind the account seems to have a fundamental 
commonality - that is that the self cannot be divisible; 
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that it persists with real identity through time. It seems 
reasonable, then, to consider the subject/content 
distinction in Descartes; to discover whether it is indeed 
enough to maintain the concept of the self as the simple 
view sees it. 
6.2 (iii) Rational Argument 
It is not just in their accounts of the self that the 
theories of Butler, Reid and Descartes are alike, but also 
in th~ fundamental under-pinning of knowledge of that self. 
Through the rejection of empirical criteria, both accounts 
are forced to find justification elsewhere. Butler and Reid 
do little more than state the certainty of the conviction 
that each man has of his identity, and the impossibility of 
imagining the pe~son to be different. Yet even these 
unsupported assertions link their theory to Descartes. For 
their certainty and obviousness closely ties in with the 
Cartesian notion of clear and distinct perceptions. 
As seen in Section 6.2 (i), the bare logical conclusion 
that a thought must have a thinker, drawn from the 'Method 
of Doubt', is joined by a further argument to conclude that 
thinking is the essence of-persons and these are justified 
by an appeal to the reliability of our conceptions. In 
turn, this appeal is based in Descartes' belief that a good 
God would not allow him to go so badly astray as to have 
strong convictions of the truth of things which are in fact 
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false. The certainty of the 'cogito' is an obviousness he 
puts down to just such clear and distinct perceptions: it 
has a logical certainty that seemingly can~ot be otherwise. 
Moreover, he feels quite justified in extending such 
certainty to further cases of clear perceptions: hence, if 
he can quite readily imagine his existence without a body or 
its attributes, and do so without hesitation, then it must 
be true. 
Relying upon this idea, Descartes claims that the 
disjunction of the soul and the body is possible because he 
can clearly and distinctly perceive such a thing; and 
because it is conceivable, it must logically be possible. 
Descartes supports this further move by linking his 
conceptions to the omnipotence of God - if he, a mere mortal 
can think of something, then God, who is omnipotent, must be 
able to instantiate that state of affairs. Thus, he feels, 
he has sealed the reliability of his imagination: 
Because I know that all the things I conceive clearly and 
distinctly can be produced by God precisely as I conceive 
them, it is sufficient for me to be able to conceive clearly 
and distinctly one thing without the other to be certain 
that the one is distinct or different from the other, 
because they can be placed in existence separably, at least 
by the omnipotence of God. 
Descartes p.156 
The use of imagination underlies much of Descartes' 
rational enterprise. The 'Method of Doubt' is fundamentally 
a thought-experiment, its conclusions relying ultimately 
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upon what can and what cannot be imagined. Furthermore, the 
conclusions of such an exp~riment ~re fo_rmed fr-om ou-r 
intuitive reactions to situations of an imagined world which 
we do not come across in our normal everyday experience. 
The Cartesian theory is therefore effectively resting in 
this basic premise: that we can trust our instinct and ideas 
as justifications of knowledge. 
As explained, it seems that intuition provides the 
predominant source of arguments used by the simple view 
against empirical theory. The belief in ourselves as 
persisting and the fundamental role this has in morality, is 
very similar to the reason for which Descartes insists upon 
dualism - that he cannot imagine the soul to have parts. 
,t:l 
As will be seen these primary intuitions are joined by 
developments made through thought experiment. Like 
Descartes, the simple view uses the imagination to postulate 
logical possibilities: and although not a wholesale modal 
shift from possibility to actuality, there is a distinct 
leaning towards accepting, as strong proof, suggestions 
which are conceptually acceptable. 
6.2 (iv) Non-Cartesian Interpretation 
However, this claim that the simple view upholds a form 
of Cartesian dualism, is just one possible interpretation. 
Since the distinctness of the properties from the self is of 
I 
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main importance, it is conceivable that ontological dualism 
and. tn(fepe-naent separate persls-~enc.-e ts- not implie-d. It -may 
be that when Reid states that "I am not thought, I am not action, 
I am not feeling. I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers." 
(Reid p.109), what he means is simply that there is more to 
himself than just activity - there is something which acts. 
Such a claim does not entail any form of separateness or 
independence between that which thinks and the activity of 
thinking. 
This possibility of an alternative interpretation will be 
explored, and it will be considered whether a denial of 
ontological separateness is cons is tent with the idea of a 
real self with real identity. If it is not, then it can be 
asked whether the simple view is able to uphold its claims 
to have produced an account of person which accords with our 
moral intuition and does not dissolve into a Lockean-type 
account of the self? 
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6.3 CONCLUSIONS 
It has been shown that the simple view holds strong 
similarities to Cartesian Dualism and, although it must not 
be assumed that the simple view advocates mind/body or 
substance dualism, the fundamental intention of some form 
subject/content dualism is common to both. Parallels can 
therefore be drawn between the simple view and Descartes, 
for there is a degree of overlap both in intention and 
argument: both Descartes and the simple view wish to hold 
that the self cannot be reduced to a list of properties; and 
both make extensive use of imagination and logical 
possibility to support their ends. 
However, it is also possible despite these similarities, 
that the simple view, though maintaining a subject property 
distinction, does not wish to follow Descartes into 
ontological dualism. It may be that although the self of 
the simple view entails more than just properties, it does 
not have an independent or separable existence. 
The simple view must therefore be considered in the light 
of both of these interpretations. Through an examination 
of its reasons and arguments, this thesis will suggest the 
most likely and consistent intention of the simple view. It 
will consider first the Cartesian line, for it is certainly 
true that the fate of the earlier advocates of the simple 
188 
view was determined by the strength of Descartes' account. 
Mo_re()_v~r,_ t~e _objection_s_tq_ ~r~esian _clt!<:t.lism_wbe_n_ d_ir_ec_ted 
against the simple view can help to clarify the aims of 
simple view thesis - even where the target of criticism is 
not so obviously similar many critic isms hold through the 
transition between theories. 
The comparison to Descartes and the failings of such an 
interpretation, lead to a discuss ion of alternative 
possibilities and meanings. Subject/property dualism will 
be considered apart from ontological separateness 
especially in the light of comments from modern advocates of 
the simple view and their possible intentions. 
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CHAPTER 7 METHODOLOGY 
The strongest critic isms raised against Descartes find 
their sources in empirical philosophy. The fundamental 
empiricist approach has been explained: it is evident, for 
example, in the philosophy of Hume who claimed that to talk 
of anything beyond what is given through experience and 
deduction is to make empty statements about things we cannot 
possibly know to exist. Such concepts, for example 
causation, are the products of our psychological nature and, 
as such, are the subjects of psychology not philosophy. 
The force of this basic objection against rationalism 
concerns proof and justification: it is claimed that the 
conclusions of such theories as that of Descartes move 
beyond the legitimate confines of empirical and deductive 
evidence. It is from this background that the major 
critic ism of dualist theories emerges: that is that they 
fail to support adequately the postulation of a separable 
self with a continued existence. 
On a fundamental level, therefore, there is a conflict of 
method; and perhaps this should be clarified and decided 
before the details of the arguments considered. If, indeed 
it can be shown that the simple view's methods are 
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insufficient to support their claims, then large areas of 
its position will be discredited. It will then have to 
~-- -
rely upon -other forms of argument to support its dualist 
account of personal identity. 
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7.1 A USE FOR THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS 
The most ft.lndCimen~al ob_j_ecJ.io_n to ])oth Descart_es and the 
simple view concerns the basic role they ascribe to the role 
of imagination and intuitive knowledge. 
7.1 (i) Rational Use of Thought Experiments 
As noted in Section 6.2, Descartes relied on both 
imagination and intuition to support his main thesis and 
these allowed him to move beyond the confines of his 
empirical data, to provide evidence of the existence of a 
separable self. Descartes justified their employment 
ultimately by reference to a deity. 
The modern simple view justifies its own reliance on 
intuition with the common-sense argument and with the threat 
of the alternative - total scepticism. On a general level, 
the use of intuition relates to the beliefs we have about 
ourselves and our properties and the concern that we feel 
for our present and future. Thought experiments are used to 
clarify and evaluate these instincts, which subsequently 
play a central role in the rejection of empiricism and 
acceptance of dualism. Mo~e significantly, the simple view 
produces arguments to justify their use, formulating an 
epistemology founded in instinct. 
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Such arguments employ a notion of rationality which 
claims that it is irrational to go against our instinctive 
and oasic belle~fs. It is only by relying on our "pre-
philosophical beliefs" (Chisholm (1) p.104) or a "credulity principle" 
(Swinburne (1) p.55) that we can ever produce a satisfactory 
body of knowledge. Indeed, any theory which contradicts 
such intuition must be severely tested before it can he 
acceptable. 
For example, Chisholm considers the idea of a momentary 
self which does not persist through time. Such a self would 
entail that the convictions we have of ourselves with a past 
and a future are false: 
••• then the things I think now about my past history may all 
be false even though they may be true of the person I now 
happen to constitute) and I may have no grounds for making 
any prediction about my future. 
Chisholm (1) p.104 
However, since the arguments supporting this momentary self 
are themselves weak and, Chisholm claims, incoherent, he 
feels we are justified in clinging to our original beliefs 
that we persist. 
Swinburne too makes use of such knowledge, by appealing 
to the validity of our basic and intuitive beliefs. He 
suggests that we have a right to take at face value the 
information we receive through our senses and treat as valid 
the inferences we instinctively make about an independent 
world: 
The most basic principle for making inferences from 
experience to the world, which I have called elsewhere the 
principle of credulity. That states that probably things 
?re as (in_ the _epis_t_emologicaL _ sense} they -seem -to 
be ••• there is no other access to justified belief about the 
world except by means of the principle of credulity. If you 
refuse to believe anything until you have other evidence for 
it, you will never believe anything. 
Swinburne (1) p.53-5 
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In this way, the simple view employs the imagination and 
intuition, both to heighten the insufficiencies of 
empiricism and to suggest a dualistic replacement. But in 
doing so it commits itself to a path of argument which is 
far from straightforward. For such methods can produce 
conclusions which are not only surprising but often 
inconsistent and puzzling. For example, Bernard Williams* 
comments on the conflicting impressions arising from thought 
experiments that: 
••• we seem to reach an impasse. On the one hand, we have a 
type of speculation which can, perhaps rather compulsively, 
seem to make sense; on the other hand, considerations which 
show that the speculations must fail. The way out of this 
impasse lies, I think, in diagnosing an illusion that lies 
in the speculations. This illusion has something to do with 
the imagination." 
Williams p.43 
In consequence, it seems wise to question the use of 
imagination to reach our cpnclusions, before adjusting or 
rejecting any particular theory under scrutiny. 
-/( Williams 1973 
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7.1 (ii) Thought Experiments 
On a general level, the use of thought experiments 
-
pro<hices forceful disagreement which centres upon ability to 
actually prove anything employing such a method of argument. 
On one side of the fence, critics offer an argument of 
relativism. Frequent dispute and inconsistency over the 
implications to be deduced, added to the evident conflicting 
responses of the intuition, lead them to conclude that 
relativism is endemic to the use of such arguments. 
Consequently, critics claim that thought experiments cannot 
be used to prove anything. In contrast, supporters of 
thought experiments declare that intuition forms an ultimate 
truth-base for all knowledge, without which we are doomed to 
'""' scepticism. For example, Kripke" writes: 
Of course, some philosophers think that something's having 
intuitive content is very inconclusive evidence in favour of 
it. I think it's very heavy evidence in favour of anything, 
myself. I really don't know in any way what more conclusive 
evidence we can have about anything, ultimately speaking. 
Kripke p.265-6 
The abstractions and extensions described in thought 
experiments are used in many fields of enquiry (including 
science and philosophy) to ex tend our range of knowledge 
beyond the present condit~ons. They place a concept in 
different, often unencountered situations in order to test 
its parameters. The value of this method is that it 
highlights the limits or possibilities of the concept 
"'( Kripke 1980 
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often attention is drawn to overlooked or assumed factors 
as ideas are contrasted against unfamiliar backgrounds. The 
realm of possible knowledge is also significantly increased 
when thought experiments are used to predict the action or 
reaction of a thing in future or different situations. 
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7.2 THE PROBLEM OF PRECONCEPTION 
However the unfamil~a17iJ:y of the situation,_ wh-i-G.h is 
considered the imagination's greatest advantage, proves also 
to be its greatest disadvantage: for this means that we have 
to use the criteria of the known with which to judge the 
unknown. If we have never encountered a particular in a 
certain environment, nor have ever needed to use our 
concepts in the extreme conditions imagined, we will not 
have witnessed how that concept functions outside our 
everyday limits. Thus any conclusion drawn can be done so 
only with uncertainty: for although it will be made on the 
strength of deductions, those deductions are based in 
limited known situations. 
Hence, the process falls foul of true logic because its 
conclusions extend beyond the content of the premises it 
relies on. In effect thought experiments are condemned for 
the same reason that all inductive statements are thought to 
encounter problems; that is, they are not justified in using 
the conclusions drawn from known facts in order to make 
predictions about the unknown. 
7.2 (i) Assumption 
This basic difficulty brings with it a plethora of 
subsequent uncertainties and associated problems. If the 
background conditions of the experiment are unfamiliar, we 
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cannot guarantee that the change of environment will not 
induce a change in the object or idea we transfer to it. To 
m-infmise the effect of such unknowns, we ·must familiarise 
ourselves with all the background relevancies. 
However, this too is problematic, for what is or is not 
relevant may also be unknown: if we move to unencountered 
situations, the practical limitations of our environment may 
be removed and then anything becomes conceivable. The rules 
of logical necessity will remain in place, for their 
parameters are fixed and defined by us anyway; but beyond 
the logical restrictions, anything becomes a possibility. 
If our range of potential is 1 imi tless, how can we even 
begin to dictate background conditions? 
In the absence of usual limitations, it will be left to 
an informed guess or a personal choice as to what conditions 
will prevail. Consequently, the justification for any such 
descriptions ultimately will be based on non-objective 
preconception and dogmatism - personal and social. Under 
such guidance, thought experiments will be far from 
objective, for the method will be influenced by our own set 
of social or natural interests. In fact, as Williams shows 
in 'The Self and The ·'( Future'' , by changing the set of 
background assumptions and perspective, thought experiments 
can be used to prove anything: 
·k Williams 1973 
It looks as though there are two presentations of the 
imagined experiment and the choice associated with it, each 
of which carries conviction,_ and 1ffiic,h_lead _to __ contrary. 
conc-lusions~~ ~T'm-noC in -the least clear which option it 
would be wise to take if one were presented with them ••• 
Williams p.61 
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If the starting conditions are thus uncertain, the 
conclusions produced will be influenced by the situations 
that the thinker prescribes: in effect he will be able to 
'choose' the outcome by dictating the starting point. 
Moreover, in drawing those conclusions he will need to rely 
upon his background of encountered situations; once again 
influencing the results with certain preconceptions and 
ideas. Even the articulation of the account will affect the 
results; for in the realm of thought experiments there is no 
objectively agreed viewpoint. Faced with the unlimited 
possibilities provided by our imagination, the conclusions 
drawn will effectively depend upon what we are capable of 
imagining - which will vary from person to person, society 
to society. 
As a method of gaining knowledge, this free-for-all 
situation is not logically justifiable: contrary to what 
Descartes claims, conceivability is far from actuality. 
Being able to imagine or think of a thing does not make that 
thing so. It is true that it may be so in some other 
possible world, but that is of little use to us and our 
concepts as we use them in this world. We need more 
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evidence than conceivability to draw conclusions about 
anything. As Wilkes* states: 
; •• attfiough we can in a-sense imagine all sorts of things -
anything in fact, that is not a logical impossibility - this 
kind of imaginability does not validate thought experiments 
built upon it. 
Wilkes p.21 
7.2 (ii) Natural Necessity 
The solution to the difficulty is to curtail the range of 
potential with some notion of practical possibility. This 
would mean that the experiment is controlled throughout by a 
set of parameters describing the background of situation and 
possibility. To avoid problems of preconception, such 
limits need to be based in agreed 'objective' rules 
perhaps those of scientific law which, of any laws, seems 
the least subjective. Thus the sense of 'anything goes 1 
begins to recede. What emerges is a form of limiting 
synthetic necessity, contingent upon the way the world is. 
Within science, this is a generally accepted method and 
provides the framework for thought experiments. 
writes:+ 
••• the imagined situation must allow the scientist to employ 
his usual concepts in the ~ay he has employed them before. 
It must not, that is, strain normal usage ••• Though the 
imagined situation need not be even potentially realizable 
in nature, the conflict deduced from it must be one that 
nature itself could present. Indeed, even that condition is 
not quite strong enough. The conflict that confronts the 
scientist in the experimental situation must be one that 
* Wilkes 1988 
+ Kuhn 1964 
Kuhn 
however unclearly seen, has confronted him before. Unless 
he has already had that much experience, he is not yet 
prepared to learn from thought experiments alone. 
Kuhn- f>e265 
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Yet even the necessity of natural laws is only a second-
rate necessity, ultimately based in the disputed status and 
subjective observation of the world. Any philosopher of 
science is aware of the difficulties involved in 
establishing conclusions from real experiments: that 
scepticism, relativism and social influence all affect the 
outcomes. Moreover, many important advances of natural 
science are often made through intuitive leaps, and research 
is often commissioned according to need. Indeed, in a 
philosophy based on the implications of sceptical 
empiricism, Feyerabend* highlights the influence of 
preconception and social dogma upon science. He takes such 
an idea to its logical extremes claiming that an account of 
science or scientific method amounts to no more than social 
science and history. 
Scientific experiments are thus open to relativism: if 
our scientific experiments cannot produce justifiable 
results, what hope can we h~ve that our thought experiments 
might? It would appear that any conclusion ranging beyond 
the limit of analytic necessity or logical deduction, has 
its ultimate authority in intuition and preconception. 
* Feyerabend 1975 
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In effect, the problems involved are reducible to that 
affecting all empirical knowledge - the impossibility of 
empirical method is underwritten by the problems of 
subjectivism and its attendant preconception of 
interpretation. Our use of thought experiment.does leave 
the realms of empiricism but as such, if it is to have any 
credibility, it needs to delineate its framework with some 
notion of possibilities. It appears therefore that the 
rationale for the use of thought experiments comes to rest 
ultimately upon the justification of relying on intuition as 
a basis for knowledge. 
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7.3 THE JUSTIFICATION FOR USING INTUITION 
The debate concerning such just~fi~at~sm i~ ~adicaLLy 
polarised: as a justification for knowledge, intuition is 
considered by one extreme to be the only objective method 
and by the other, the most subjective approach. This 
dispute can be unders toad by characterising it as being 
entangled in the debate over the status of the concepts we 
use: that is, whether those concepts refer to something in 
the world, or to a construction we impose upon the world. 
7e3 (i) The Pro-Intuitionist Claim 
As seen, the simple view, along with those philosophers 
such as Russell* and Kripke+, give intuition a basic and 
fundamental role in our justification of knowledge. In 
reaction to empirical sceptical arguments (that is, the 
impossibility of empirical knowledge being justified in 
making claims about an independent world), they cite our 
intuitive beliefs as providing fundamental knowledge. Their 
fundamental tenet states that without the possibility of 
relying on such beliefs, we can have no justification for 
synthetic knowledge. As Russell wrote: "All knowledge, we 
find, must be built up upon our instinctive beliefs, and if these are 
rejected, nothing is left." (Russell p.11) 
The arguments of such a view range from a simplest 
·:r Russell 1912 
+ Kripke 1980 
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explanation theory to epistemological necessity; yet all try 
to establish intuition as a basic principle or truth, known 
a -priori and being rron~controvertabte. Philosophy's task is 
considered to be one of building a system of knowledge 
consistent with these beliefs - Russell even goes so far as 
to claim that its purpose is to "Show us the hierarchy of our 
instinctive beliefs" (Russell p.11). Anything which conflicts or 
goes against the grain of these basics is to be disputed and 
even rejected. As seen in Part I, this is the very way the 
simple view treats the the complex account of persons. 
Yet such arguments in support of intuition amount to 
little more than a dissatisfaction with the alternative 
empirical scepticism: they claim that without intuitive 
knowledge, we cannot have knowledge about the world. Yet 
this belief that we can or must be able to have knowledge 
about the world collapses into no more than intuition 
itself. There is clear circularity in such an argument, for 
it must be assumed that an instinctive dissatisfaction is a 
powerful enough argument to reject non-intuitive theories. 
If the above argument were its only support, intuition 
would not have a very strong case. However other arguments 
can be and have been used to try to explain its 
justification, rather than point to its necessity. For 
example, the K . * ant1.an notion of a priori synthetic 
* Kant 1787 
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knowledge. This notion, that space, time and causation are 
frameworks which we impose upon the world, can be used to 
~expt-atn .~fnei just-ify other intuitions. In this way, 
intuition is characterised as part of the human way of 
reasoning ~ a way that we cannot avoid~'". The facts it 
evinces may not be necessarily true in all possible worlds, 
but they are true and necessary given our situation in this 
world as rational men. 
Thus beliefs can be given a form of objectivity in that 
they are common to all men, an objectivity which justifies 
our reliance on them for knowledge. Intuitions become 
absolute rather than relative, having fixed truth and 
objectivity. It is true that they are still fundamentally 
subjective in that they are linked to man's perception of 
the world, but they are given a form of objectivity through 
their universality. There is something of this idea to be 
found in Sartre+: that despite the freedom and contingency 
of all things, all humans are still in a universal 
condition, ie. we are all born, we all have labour through 
life, and we all die. 
Subjectivity of Intuition 
However, as mentioned earlier in Section 7.2, the notion 
of intuition is fraught with difficulty, not least in the 
* See also Marr 1982 
+ Sartre 1946 
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fact that intuition varies from race to race, person to 
person. Our basic 'animal' reactions (if we have any) 
bec-ome b-e-fuddTed and modified by subsequent. influences and 
persuasion, resulting in a mixture of dogma and social 
conditioning. The consequence is an apparent relativism, 
for the basic and universal instincts (if there are any) 
become completely screened by these subsequent influences.· 
Thus truth becomes seemingly, relative for there is no 
further ultimate justification or distinction to which to 
appeal other than the intuition. If intuitions disagree, we 
can do no more than acknowledge the validity of both 
_,_ 
opposing views and the relativity of truth. Ayern makes 
just this point with regard to ethical intuitionism: 
••• it is notorious that what seems intuitively certain to 
one person may seem doubtful, or even false, to another. So 
that unless it is possible to provide some criterion by 
which one may decide between conflicting intuitions, a mere 
appeal to intuition is worthless as a test of a 
proposition's validity ••• as far as subjective certainty 
goes, there will be nothing to choose between them. 
Ayer p.109 
Such an objection is simplistic, for it fails to account 
for the possible subtleties of an intuitionist position -
critics like Ayer might be reminded of the logical 
objectivity of basic belie~s compared to the relativity of 
intuitions related to social dogma. Careful modification 
and articulation of the beliefs should 'cream off' these 
relative influences, leaving the basic common reactions. 
* Ayer 1936 
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As such, any objections to the use of intuition can only be 
practical. 
Yet such a 'mere' practicality forms an almost 
impenetrable barrier; indeed the impracticality verges upon 
impossibility. To isolate these fundamental ·beliefs is 
impossible in practice, for to produce a list of tho~e 
beliefs which count as basic, once again seems to result 
ultimately in personal preference. Satisfactory scientific 
testing would involve keeping a person in a controlled and 
isolated environment from conception - something which could 
never realistically be done. 
Moreover, this problem of proof does not rest in mere 
practicality. Intuitions are not empirically verifiable, 
they are known to us subjectively, and the validity of the 
claim to intuition is accessible only to the claimant. Like 
our experience of anything by definition subjective, there 
is great difficulty in explaining how a universalisation of 
their information content can be justified. Hence there is 
also a logical objection against holding intuitions to be 
basics. Since it can be no more than likely that they are a 
universal phenomenon, the conclusions based in them can be 
no more than probable. Any committed intuitionist must 
therefore abandon the rigour of Cartesian doubt and, in 
effect, build the edifice of his knowledge upon uncertain 
foundations. 
r 
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7.3 (ii) Empirical Certainty 
One might at this stage suggest refuge in the writings 
of linguisTic an-d positivist philosophers w_ho argue that the 
meanings of 'knowledge' and 'rational justification' do not 
demand the extremes placed on their definition by Descartes' 
scepticism. They claim that what we mean by knowl~dge is 
knowledge based in methods such as intuition or induction, 
and to exclude such arguments from our justified use would 
itself be irrational. Ayer uses such a justification for 
the use of induction: 
It is a mistake to demand a guarantee where it is logically 
impossible to obtain one ••• For when we come to define 
'rationality' we shall find that for us, 'being rational' 
entails being guided in a particular fashion by past 
experience. 
Ayer p.35 
Such a move though, would be inconsistent with the 
intuitionist 1 s primary objection to empiricism. It moves 
the concept of truth from being about an independent world 
to being something concerning a socially constructed world: 
it robs truth of objectivity and confers upon it relativity. 
However, this empiricist line does produce a possible 
role for intuition as justified knowledge, without involving 
it in the problems suggested in relativity. For to approach 
from this empirical perspective enables intuitive belief to 
have at least the logical possibility of certainty. The 
empirical extreme holds that what is meant by 'table' or 
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'chair' does not depend upon an independent world, it 
depends upon the framework built into the concept. Thus for 
-examp-l-e 't-ab-le_,_ means Ellis particular phenomenon before me, 
'solidity' means when I reach out I feel a certain 
sensation. The intuitive concept will be part of that 
framework and be given its meaning from it. · Thus the 
possibility of 
everyone, for 
verifying 
all that 
the intuition 
such testing 
is available 
entails is 
consultation of the shared and objective framework. 
to 
a 
One does not need to denounce all reference to an 
independent world to make use of this idea, for even if it 
is not the case for all language, at least part of it does 
make use of concepts which do not refer to some further 
'reality'. As Locke acknowledged, the difference between 
the animal and the material is an imposed collective idea 
upon the shifting material. It must be made clear what idea 
is being applied to the material we have before us: for the 
idea might apply to something we consider to be real, such 
as a substance, or to an idea which is clearly a constructed 
notion, such as a nation or company. 
The source for knowledge-about constructed concepts will 
be found elsewhere than in the world, and often we need look 
no further than the social background to the language to 
find the meaning and connotation of the word. This being 
so, we might justify a use of intuition if it is used to 
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judge or understand the meaning of constructed concepts. 
For all the influences, cited earlier as positive objections 
to its use, wifl now coun-t in its favouro The intuition 
will be the product of the same background which produced 
the meaning of the concept. Thus the preconceptions caused 
by society will hold the truth about the meaning· and· use of 
the concept, and consequently knowledge with regard to the 
"'· intuitions society has. A. Rorty" suggests just such a 
possibility: 
Because the definitions of such entities change historically 
forced by changes in social conditions, and in answer to one 
another's weighty inconsistencies, there are layers and 
accretions of usages that can be neither forced into a 
taxonomy nor be safely amputated. 
Rorty p.301 
Logical Certainty of Intuition 
Our intuitions can therefore provide a sense of 
certainty. It is true that they will still be subject to 
the practical problems of subjective interpretation, and 
there remains a problem associated with the relativity of 
response. But the practical difficulty is far less than the 
task facing the realist intuitionist, for the certainty here 
is at least logically possible. Of course, the status given 
to such knowledge is rel~tive, for it has no absolute 
reference to an independent world. But such a sacrifice 
appears necessary if certainty is to be attained. The 
ground rules for such a method are neatly laid out by 
* Rorty 1967 
... 
Johnston": 
The method of theorizing about personal identity solely or 
mainly by_appeal to our intuitive reactions- to puzzle cases--
which exhibit all sorts of variations in kind and degree of 
continuity and dependence would be justified if two 
requirements were satisfied. First, our grasp of the 
concept of being the same person should be able to be 
correctly represented as a grasp of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the application of the predicate "is the same 
person",- conditions that should be cast in terms of 
statements about continuity and dependence, statements not 
themselves to be explained in terms· of statements about 
personal identity. Call this the reductionist requirement. 
Secondly, our intuitive reactions to the puzzle cases should 
be able to be taken as manifestations of our grasp of those 
necessary and sufficient conditions, and not as 
overgeneralizations from the everyday run of cases or 
manifestations of a -particular conception of people, be it a 
religious conception (eg. that people are reincarnatable 
souls) or some more inchoate secular counterpart. 
Johnston p.60 
-."r Johns ton 1987 
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7.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Although this discussion h~s by no _m_ea_ns exh_aus_ted the 
possible arguments in favour of or against intuition, a 
picture does emerge of the difficulties involved. It seems 
that its use can indeed be justified if we are willing to 
sacrifice Cartesian rigour and absolutism. The nature of 
the concept being explored will play a key role in the 
justification of our methods. If it is a natural term, we 
must be satisfied with probability, but if it is considered 
to be a constructed term, then certainty might be possible. 
These fundamental differences are reflected in the debate 
over absolute and relative truth. 
Returning to the issue at hand, it remains to be asked 
whether those who hold the simple view concept of persons 
can justify its use of the imagination and intuition. It 
seems that their concept of the person is far from a 
socially cons true ted idea. Indeed they pursue a concept 
which can guarantee real and objective identity - rejecting 
empiricism for its consequences of convention and loose 
identity. They consider the self to be more than just an 
idea or construction - it ~s experienced, is separable from 
its properties and to an extent more than just conceptually 
dualistic. Moreover, the self is given a role of 
epistemological centrality: without self, we can know 
nothing of real identity, indeed we experience nothing in 
reality. 
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Such a self is hard to characterise as merely 
socially created. It is safe to assume that the intention 
-- - -. 
-· ---
·-
crf -the simpie view- is to produce an objectj.ve and absolute 
concept of persons. 
It must therefore be concluded that the simple view can 
be criticised over the arguments it uses to support its 
claims. The self is not solely supported by these 
arguments, but its dualism and rejection of empiricism rest 
firmly upon intuition. But, as shown, conclusions drawn 
from such premises can amount only to probabilities and 
recommendations. As confirmation or support for theories 
they are able to add likelihood, but as proof or refutation, 
on their own they lack weight and philosophical rigour. 
The simple view must therefore rely upon arguments other 
than intuition or thought experiment to support its concept 
of person. Since it has rejected the possibility of an 
empirical account, it seems that to justify its 
subject/content dualist position, the simple view must 
depend upon a priori knowledge of a different form from 
intuition, upon logical necessity, and upon the appeal to 
the definition of the concept of persons. 
213 
CHAPTER 8 THE CONCEPT OF A PERSISTING SUBJECT 
The next criticism of the simple view concerns the 
Cartesian claim that there is a persistent subject. Critics 
do not deny that the arguments used by Descartes establish 
the necessity of the existence of a thought at the time it 
is thought; but they claim that this is all his arguments 
can establish. Thus the empiricists object that Descartes 
claimed too much when he inferred from the 'cogito' that he 
was a persisting thinker: for a single thought does not 
entail a separable subject, still less a persisting subject. 
Such comments base their reasons in the observation that 
a self is not experienced. Thus some empiricists believe 
that 'self' is empty of any real content over and above 
reference to certain thoughts or chains of experience. This 
line has been explained in Part I: for example Hume claimed 
that, when he tried to locate this self, all that he found 
were individual thoughts or 'bundles of perceptions' - no 
persisting entity or subject at all. According to the 
'hard-line' empiricist, on the basis of acceptable evidence, 
the idea of a persisting self apart from its properties is 
insupportable by the 'cogito' argument. 
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The simple view must therefore defend itself against the 
empiricist objection that the concept of a subject is 
irreducible to properties is merely a convention. 
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8.1 THE SELF IN EXPERIENCE 
The response t_o _such a11 obj_e~ti~n is _t_o _argua, as -LoG-k-e 
does, that the self or subject does not elude empirical 
evidence: we can and do have direct experience of the 
subject~ it is just that this is only possible from a first-
person position. This response relies on the idea that we 
are made aware of ourselves as experiencers through changes 
caused in us by sensation. It is the modification effected 
by this experience which makes us aware that we are active, 
rather than passive, subjects. The fact that we are changed 
by experiences entails that there is something to be 
changed. It is this that is the self. The simple view 
employs this form of argument to give evidence not only of 
the existence of a subject, but of its persistence through 
time as well. 
8.1 (i) Self-Awareness in Perception 
An example of such an approach is the theory put forward 
.J-by Chisholm"' who uses an argument based in the theory of 
perception. He suggests that sensations should no longer be 
described as sense-data, for this implies that they have 
some form of ontological independence from us. Instead, we 
should characterise experiences as modifications of the 
experiencer. If this is done, sensations will be described 
as ways of appearing, characterised by the change brought 
* Chisholm (1) 1976 
about in the subject: 
The sentences in which we seem to predicate properties of 
appearances can be paraphrased into other sentences in which 
we predicat~ properfles onlY ~or tne self or _person -wn.o is 
said to sense those appearances. 
Chisholm (1) p.SO 
The Existence of the Self 
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If this is taken to be accurate, then as we experience we 
are modified in some way. Our awareness of that 
modification is an experience of ourselves, "For in being aware 
of ourselves as experiencing we are ipso facto, aware of the self or 
II person ••• (Chisholm (1) p.51) In effect, by defining 
experience as something necessarily associated with the 
change and existence of the subject, he shows that, in 
existence of the experience, the subject is necessarily 
entailed. 
Moreover, this approach finds support not just through 
the 'Cartesian type' demand that every conscious state has a 
subject, but also in the comments made by Locke. For this 
link between consciousness and the subject is not simply a 
logical move Locke provides evidence of the subject in 
experience: we are made aware of the self because it is 
changed by experience. Thus, in a way similar to the 
description Locke gives of our reflection and internal 
thinking, Chisholm states that in every reflection on our 
experiences we consciously recognise that we are aware of 
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experiencing, and attribute to those experiences the 
property of being related to ourself: 
~ 
If you are now awake and conscious , then you. have certain 
properties such that you are now known directly by yourself 
to have those properties. 
Chisholm (1) p.25 
These claims are a recognition that in the effect of 
sensations or thought we are made directly aware of 
ourselves as subjects of experience - it is not knowledge 
gained in any indirect way or inferred from something else. 
This awareness is of a unity, of one thing being affected by 
disparate experiences; and this is true of consciousness at 
one time and over a period of time. It seems that in our 
experience we can find direct evidence of a single and 
persisting subject. 
8.1 (ii) The Persistence of the Self 
Arguments providing what is thought to be evidence of 
this subject persisting are fundamentally similar to those 
supporting the existence of the self: that through the unity 
of experience we are aware of the unifier. This line is to 
be found in * Swinburne who utilises an argument he 
attributes to Foster+. It states that the existence of the 
soul is proven through our experience of it, not just at any 
one time but as persisting through time. For in being aware 
of a unified experience through time, we are necessarily 
..,, Swinburne ( 1) 1984 
+ Foster 1979 
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aware of the unifier - the subject or self. 
In synchronic terms, we are aware of being the subject of 
many disparate experiences. This awareness is not 
explainable in terms of brain or behaviour continuity, for 
under such a description the experiences and actions are 
still discernible as individual events rather than parts of 
a whole. The unification or linking of experiences can only 
be accurately expressed by reference to a common subject: it 
is the experience of being subject to disparate experiences 
and unifying them which makes us aware of ourselves as a 
subject at any one time: 
••• the only way to bring out the sense in question in which 
the experiences are not distinct is to say that they are 
experiences of a common subject. One person is having both 
experiences. And he is often aware of doing so. 
Swinburne (1) p.47 
Our knowledge of diachronic identity is similarly argued 
for. Once again it is our experience as the unifier of 
distinct experiences, on this occasion those which are 
successive in time, which gives an awareness of ourselves as 
a subject. Swinburne states that in perceptions of the 
world, we experience temporally successive events and 
objects; and our experienc~ of them is of one and the same 
persisting and changing object, not many dis tine t ones. 
Our awareness of these things as successions through time 
forms an experience in itself - an experience of unified 
perceptions. In effect, we are aware of a unified temporal 
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perception, and that experience is unified by us as 
subjects. In this way we become aware of our temporal 
persistence: 
For if those were all the data of experience, S would need 
to infer that the second experience ••• succeeded the first 
(rather than being one which occurred on an entirely 
different occasion). Why he does not need to infer this is 
because it is itself also a datum of experience; S 
experiences his experience as overlapping in a stream of 
awareness. 
Swinburne (1) p.43 
A link to past selves (that is, knowledge of our identity 
over a long gap of time rather than the experience of 
persistence) is also something which we are aware of in this 
way. Our evidence of this relies exclusively upon our 
memories. Swinburne claims that memory is our only evidence 
of the past and, although fallible, enables us to identify 
our present selves with past selves with confidence that we 
are correct. In a similar way to that described by Locke 
(with the difference of the status of memory pointed out) 
Swinburne explains that the memory is directly presented to 
the mind. In this way we are aware of being the same person 
as the subject of those past states, the two subjects being 
unified in our present consciousness by our present self. 
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8.2 A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE OF THE SELF 
The arguments above make use of the distinction between 
direct a-nd indirect empirical evidence: that there is a 
branch of our experience about which we can be certain, the 
existence of ·our particular sensations. The element of 
doubt in empiricism occurs when one begins to make 
inferences about what those sensations and experiences mean 
beyond their existence. In this way, it is recognised that 
we can have certain knowledge of our experience, for we are 
aware of it directly, but we cannot have such certain 
evidence for anything more. In effect, it realises that any 
certain knowledge is limited to the first-person, anything 
beyond that becomes known only indirectly. 
8.2 (i) Knowledge by Acquaintance 
This idea is 
.,. 
described by Russelln. He makes the 
distinction between direct and indirect knowledge, labelling 
them respectively 'knowledge by acquaintance' and 'knowledge 
by description'. He holds that we can know with certainty 
things which are the content of our experience - we are 
acquainted with data such as our sensations and memories in 
a way which they themselves cannot be doubted. By contrast, 
things we know by description are beyond the direct 
perception of our experiences, and so physical objects and 
other public items are not known with such certainty • 
.,'r Russell 1912 
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·Under such a theory, anything which is presented in our 
experience is known with certainty as an priori truth. It 
is not the case that we have to infer anything more to 
postulate its existence - we know that it exists. If this 
is applied to accounts of first-person awareness of 
consciousness, it can be seen that our knowledge bf the self 
is at this level - by direct acquaintance, and therefore ·a 
priori and certain. 
8.2 (ii) Direct Acquaintance with the Self 
Russell expresses this idea, noting the certainty of 
immediate perceptions, and suggesting that they give rise to 
an awareness of ourselves. For, he claims, if the self is 
aware that it is thinking (that is, it is self-consciously 
aware of thinking), it must be aware that it is a self. 
Such knowledge is a direct acquaintance, not merely 
knowledge by description. Thus Russell postulates that in 
our acquaintance with our experience we become aware of our 
relationship to those experiences as an experiencer, and so 
become acquainted with ourselves: 
All acquaintance, such as my acquaintance with the sense-
datum which represents the sun, seems obviously a relation 
between the person acquainted and the object with which the 
person is acquainted. When a case of acquaintance is one 
with which I can be acquainted (as I am acquainted with my 
acquaintance with the sense-datum representing the sun), it 
is plain that the person acquainted is myself. Thus, when 
I am acquainted with my seeing the sun, the whole fact with 
which I am acquainted is 'self-acquainted-with-sense-datum'. 
Russell p.27-8 
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The self, then is something known directly and known for 
certain: it is not inferred from anything other than our 
experience of it and we need not apply any other 
consideration to know of its existence. And it is this 
method of knowing which is of key importance, for it entails 
that self knowledge is not by reference to properties. The 
subject is not aware of himself as anything other than 
having the unanalysable property of being a subject. He 
does not infer his existence from anything, he directly 
experiences it: 
It is something of which we are often aware without our 
knowledge of it depending on our knowledge of anything more 
ultimate. 
Swinburne (1) p.42 
8.2 (iii) The Difference Between Locke and the Simple View 
These arguments demonstrating the experience of the self 
are very similar to those given by Locke. He too describes 
something of which we are aware of in experience: moreover, 
he holds that the unity of experience gives rise to an idea 
or the self as unifier. Yet in Locke the self remains only 
a separable idea, and is in fact reducible to consciousness. 
Thus its criteria of persistence rely upon that 
consciousness: as soon as awareness of self ceases, then 
that self no longer persists. Lockean persons emerge as 
holding only a loose form of identity. 
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However, this is not the conclusion drawn by the simple 
view, which parts company with Locke upon this very point. 
The awareness of the self is, to the rat.ionalist, simply 
awareness of evidence, no more. It does not constitute the 
identity of the self in the way that Lockean consciousnesses 
does: the subject of the simple view is thought to be 
independent of our knowledge or awareness of it, and 
therefore to have real identity through time. 
This division necessitates a further divergence in the 
theories, for the simple view holds that to enable this real 
identity, the subject cannot be reducible to its properties; 
that is to say, it is not equivalent to the mere awareness 
of consciousness. Unified experience of parts may provide 
clear evidence of the self, but it does not constitute its 
identity: 
In simultaneous experience ••• the unity of experience is 
something of which the subject is often aware, and no mere 
inference from the unity of brain and behaviour. 
Swinburne (1) p.47 
This last comment illustrates the clear difference 
between the conclusions drawn by the simple view and Locke: 
for Locke refuses to take the subject beyond the properties 
he experiences, arguing that the self is occasioned by the 
unification; whereas the simple view wishes to uphold that 
it is in fact the other way around, that unification is 
occasioned by the self. Where Locke is willing to extend 
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what he calls self only to that which is aware of being a 
self, the simple view wishes to push the notion beyond 
consciousness-dependent, ephemeral concern. It aims to 
isolate the subject as a consistent and persisting thing, 
linked to the change wrought by all perceptions, conscious 
and sub-conscious. In effect, the simple view's. self is a 
subject which precedes and affects the unity of the 
properties. How then can it argue for this independent or, 
at least logically prior self on the strength of what has 
been proven so far? 
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8.3 THE EXPERIENCE OF THE INDEPENDENT SELF 
8.3 (i) Persistence ~h~~ugh Chang~ 
Support for the independent self might "be found in the 
notion of modification by experience. If some experiences 
make us consciously aware of being affected, then surely 
there must be something which is being changed. This thing 
may or may not be aware of all changes, but the fact that it 
is aware of some, means that it exists. Thus, when it is 
not conscious of being affected by experience, why should we 
not believe that it is, nevertheless still there and being 
affected? 
However, this idea is not enough to prove existence 
beyond the present moment - although it is true we are aware 
of a change, there is nothing to say that the change is not 
just one in a succession of changes in which there is no 
underpinning substratum. For the only evidence we might 
have of such a substrate is our awareness of the past and 
the change to the present; but that knowledge and idea of a 
continuity might amount only to a Lockean type self-
consciousness - an idea that we persist and no more. 
all that we can be certain of is that we are aware 
For 
of a 
change occurring at the moment in time it occurs; more than 
that is only evidence presented to the current consciousness 
by the memory. 
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8.3 (ii) Experienced Persistence Through Time 
More then is needed to support the notion of persistence, 
and the slmpTe view tries to argue for thi.s. As described 
above~'", it suggests that the unity of our 
events entails the persistence of 
experience of 
a subject to temporal 
unify it. Thus the simple view claims that it is not just 
the rather negative idea of the experience of being changed 
but also the fact that we actually experience that 
persistence, that gives proof of a persisting self. Thus 
they claim that it is possible to directly experience the 
persistence of a self through time, rather than just infer 
it. 
However, it is clear that this attempt fails too: for the 
persistence over time they point to, still only achieves a 
Lockean- type persistence. Our experience of time can be 
explained only by the existence of a current state of 
consciousness uniting to it past conscious states: and this 
is so even over a momentary time lapse. The only way we can 
know what has happened a moment before, is by the imprint of 
that past-present consciousness upon the memory which is 
directly experienced together with the current impression of 
consciousness. By comparison of the two states, we get an 
idea of change and persistence: but it is still only a 
current conscious experience making use of the memory. 
·k Section 8.3 (i) 
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8.3 (iii) The Reduction of Persistence to Self-Consciousness 
As such, it may be that the awareness of our persistence 
through time is reducible to a self-conscious thought: for 
we have a memory and a present conscious state, but it is 
only the present consciousness which is known for certain. 
There is no empirical evidence to point to som~ link over 
and above the present consciousness. Thus the experience of 
unity over time still proves nothing more than that there is 
an experience at the moment, which contains within it 
memories of experiences of the moment before. It may be 
that this awareness of past combined with present is all 
that persistence involves; to infer anything beyond the 
Lockean idea of self-consciousness, and the present thought 
of persistence, is to go beyond the evidence available. 
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8.4 THE NECESSITY OF AN INDEPENDENT SELF 
Present direct experience_ w~ll not then give us __gvide_nce 
of a self persisting independently of properties. However, 
there are logical arguments, relating to this direct 
experience, which might be called upon at this stage. 
8.4 (i) The Prior Existence of the Self 
As already noted in Part r*, there is reason to believe 
that the self must exist if experiences are to exist: that 
the subject is a necessary element of psychological states. 
This insight is linked to the problem of circularity in 
objective empirical theories: that psychological states need 
a subject, for without one, no such states could possibly be 
individuated, ascribed to a person, or indeed exist. The 
notion of experiences and properties are thus tied to a 
necessary and underpinning knowledge of the self - and they 
can neither be identified nor made sense of in isolation 
from their subject. The idea of a subject is therefore 
something not necessarily limited to concern or awareness of 
particular properties - it has a necessary life independent 
of its own self-consciousness. Any theory of persons and 
their identity which does not take this into account will 
necessarily fail. 
It is this line of argument which is pursued by Madell+, 
* Section 2.2 (iv) 
+ Madell 1981 
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,.,. 
with reference to McTaggart", in an attempt to show that the 
subject is not only necessary to the identity of persons, 
out our knowfedge of it is entailed -by th~ attribution of 
any properties. In this way he hopes to show that the self 
must exist prior to and independently of any properties of 
the self; and thus that the self must be independent of the 
property of self-awareness. 
Madell argues that the idea that we can attribute any 
properties to the self, without knowledge of that self, is 
absurd indicating that in order to attribute any 
properties we must have prior knowledge of the subject. If 
the subject is to be more than just an idea or convention, 
we must be able to identify it without circular reference to 
its properties; and the only way that such independent self-
knowledge is possible is if we know it directly, and 
therefore independently, of the properties it has. He 
writes that: 
If we consider the truth that 'I am acquainted with this 
sense-datum', it is hard to see how we could be said to know 
this truth, or even to understand what it means, unless we 
were directly acquainted with something we call 'I'. 
Madell p.24 
Thus he concludes, along with McTaggart, that the 
knowledge we have of the persisting self must be independent 
of any knowledge of properties; and that such awareness of 
the self by acquaintance is essential before we can have any 
* McTaggart 1927 
knowledge of ourselves at all: 
••• for unless we were directly aware of ourselves, unless we 
kn~~ _ Ol.lrselves_ I?y__acg~~i!lta_nc~, _ w~_ cou].~ n<:>t _tell that _Ci!!Y 
such description applied to us ••• I can only ~now myself to 
be that one and the same person to whom these various 
descriptions apply, if I have knowledge of myself, an 
awareness of myself, which is independent of those 
descriptions. 
Madell p.24 
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Since such direct acquaintance is possible (as has been 
shown above*), we can have knowledge of the identity of the 
self prior to knowledge of our properties; moreover, if this 
were not possible, we could not have any knowledge of 
ourselves at all. 
8.4 (ii) Prior Knowledge of the Self? 
However, this approach can be criticised on two main 
points. Firstly, it is difficult to see why the self must 
exist prior to the properties. All that is really necessary 
is that self-conscious states have a subject, whether that 
subject; is generated by the states, or whether it has an 
independent existence is unimportant at least to the 
individuation of psychological states. This is clearly 
illustrated in the Lockean account of the subject, in which 
the self is generated by, and not prior to, unified 
perception. For Locke's account has been shown to provide a 
sufficient concept for the individuation and existence of 
psychological properties. Yet it is not the case in Locke 
* Section 8.4 (i) 
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that the self exists independently of self-consciousness: it 
is known simultaneously with conscious states - it is in 
-· ~ffett he~~s~ary to s~lf-cbnsci6us ~tate~, ~ut not different 
from them. It is only through its properties that the 
Lockean self can be known, for the property of self-
consciousness is all that the subject amounts tor 
The idea that the self must be known prior to 
consciousness of it, and indeed prior to the existence of 
self-conscious states, only seems to be necessary if one 
insists that the self is a separable and real thing. There 
is no difficulty in Locke, where the self is defined as 
knowledge of certain states and is thus known at the same 
time as awareness of those states. But where the states are 
thought to belong to a self which is independent, then of 
course it makes no sense to talk of associated properties 
unless one already knows with what those properties are 
associated. However, since the separability of the self is 
the very fact that the simple view is trying to prove 
through this argument, it cannot assume such separability in 
order to make its argument effective. 
clearly be circular. 
To do so would 
Thus it seems that this problem of circularity and prior 
existence is only a problem to theories which demand a 
self/content dualism. Where the self is simply a content of 
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consciousness, no problems of individuation on this level 
arise. 
8.4 (iii) Necessity of Consciousness to Self? 
Thus it must be shown that the self is independent of its 
states of consciousness before any such necessity can be 
enforced. But it seems that this in itself might be 
difficult to understand. 
It is true that we have knowledge of our selves 
independently of any particular property; but this is far 
from the claim that we can know them, or that they can 
exist, independently of any properties at all. It seems 
that there is a fundamental error in supposing that, because 
the self is irreducible to any particular content or 
properties and because we know it directly rather than by 
inference from those properties, it has no properties at 
all. For it can be argued that both the existence and our 
knowledge of the self are in fact dependent upon some sort 
of property: that without them it can neither be known to 
exist, nor indeed exist at all. 
For the claim is that the self is experienced through its 
association with other experiences: that is, we are 
acquainted with it directly when we experience. This line 
of argument therefore depends upon the fact that we do 
experience. It is surely only possible to infer the 
existence of the self from a unified experience, or an 
experience of subjectivity; but without either of these two 
how- can we come t-o know that the self exists at all? 
The knowledge of the self is direct and by acquaintance, 
but it is elicited by experience. Without the experience it 
is difficult to know how we could arrive at any concept of 
self. We are only aware of the self in conscious 
experience; and only have knowledge of the self in a self-
conscious awareness. From this we make a distinction 
between experiences and the awareness of experiences 
giving the name of self to the thing that is aware. But 
without the property of self-consciousness we could not even 
know that the self exists, less so identify it. 
However, this only shows that we need some properties to 
be aware of the self; but it does not show that the self's 
existence depends upon properties, only that our awareness 
of it does. But when one does move on to think about the 
existence of the subject, a similar problem arises, for 
subjectivity needs things to be the subject of: without the 
existence of some conscious sates, does the idea of the self 
make sense? It is possible· to hold that the subject exists 
independently of our acknowledged self-consciousness; but it 
surely cannot exist independently of any properties or 
consciousness at all. The only reason we might have for 
believing so is where there is more to selves than being the 
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subject of conscious states; but so far this has not be 
shown to be true. 
Thus it seems that a mistake has been made: that, because 
no particular properties or content seem to emerge as 
necessary to our knowledge of the subject, no properties at 
all are involved. But it seems that our knowledge of what 
subjectivity entails can only be defined in terms of 
conscious properties: it makes as little sense to talk of 
the subject without experience, as it does to talk of 
experience without a subject. It may be that the self is 
independent of awareness or self-consciousness; but this 
does not entail that it is independent of all psychological 
states. 
Although these suggestions do not conclusively prove that 
the self does not exist independently of properties, they do 
show that to support this fact more argument is needed. It 
seems that by the appeal to experience and direct knowledge, 
all that can be postulated is that the self exists and is a 
necessary part of conscious experience - but no more. 
235 
8o5 CONCLUSIONS 
The modern sim~l!= view builds upon and develops 
Descartes' ideas to produce a rational account of a real and 
persisting self. It uses the fundamental insights of the 
v cogi to' - which needs no more than a full recognition of 
its potential to support their claims. For awareness of the 
self as a persisting subject, though not explicitly 
demonstrated by Descartes, is derivable from his views. 
Our awareness of the self as a subject can be developed 
to a knowledge of the self as a unifier of synchronic 
experiences; which in turn can be extended to an awareness 
of the self as a unifier of diachronic experiences. This 
knowledge takes the form of both a unified perception of 
successive objects, and the unified perception of our 
present self and memories of a past self. In such 
consciousness we are made aware of the self, and that self 
amounts to the unifying experiencer. 
It is important to note that all of these theorists wish 
to put forward not just the idea of a subject, but of a 
persisting subject independ~nt of its properties. From the 
strictly logical insight of Descartes, all that can be 
inferred is that we exist at any one time; but as such, we 
might merely be transient and momentary beings - indeed only 
parts of some other successive and loosely identical being. 
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In defiance of the strictures laid down by empiricists such 
as Hume, the modern simplists insist upon the absurdity and 
incoherence of believing that we are no more than such 
momentary selves. 
However, the simple view fails to show that this subject 
is independent of the properties themselves. All that has 
been demonstrated is that it cannot depend upon awareness 
of the self to exist. That conscious states demand a 
subject entails only that there is a subject: not that it 
exist over and above, or even before, the properties 
existed. The self might still be a product of consciousness 
- it is just that it is not a mere ephemera of a certain 
conscious state. 
The arguments so far, then, amount only to an account 
equivalent to Lockean consciousness. For despite the fact 
that experience needs a subject, this does not" in anyway 
prove that the subject is separable from those experiences. 
Nothing within the experience of this self of the simple 
view points to the fact that it is separable from its 
properties in any way other than conceptually. In other 
words, both the simple view, and Descartes need more than 
experience of the subject to prove their ontologically 
dualistic claims. 
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CHAPTER 9 THE LOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF DUALISM 
From the discussion so far, it has emerged that if the 
simple view is to be seen as a form dualism, then it is 
necessary to defend its claims by methods other than just 
our experience of the self. 
subject/property monism, more 
found. 
To move beyond the Lockean 
rational argument must be 
Such an attempt to support dualism encounters a third 
objection, a criticism which focuses specifically upon the 
separability of the soul from the body. The Cartesian 
argument is based on the belief that because it is possible 
that body and sou~ can be divided from each other, the soul 
is not actually linked to the body, which is therefore not 
essential to its persistence. However, this conclusion is 
far from entailed by the premises, for it is not deductively 
valid to infer actuality and truth from mere logical 
possibility. Thus, Descartes is criticised for taking his 
conclusions be'yond the power of his evidence - inferring 
actuality from what is only established as logical 
possibility. 
Yet there is a reliance upon similar justification in the 
modern accounts too. A's in Descartes, logical possibility 
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is taken to indicate conceptual distinctiveness and is used 
as the basis for the p_o_ss_ihili_t_y_ JLf C!~ttJgt_l _:H~pa_rl! tion. As 
, .. 
shown beforen, our common sense beliefs are.employed to make 
judgements in these imagined scenarios, pointing to an idea 
of ourselves as subjects existing both at one time and 
through time. 
The use of such thought experiments has already been 
called into question.+ Yet, even if they are accepted as 
offering some help in understanding persons, there is an 
additional logical error contained within their use that the 
simple view and Descartes both miss: that the claim of 
actual possibility is derived from the mere logical 
possibility envisaged by the imagination. 
·k Chapter 6 & 7 
+ Chapter 7 
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9e1 LOGICAL CONCEIVABILITY 
It nas been shown thal to make the move from logical to 
actual distinctness of subject and content, Descartes 
employs a notion of God, and in so doing he ensures that 
reality is not merely subjective, but absolute and 
objective. Wanting to admit that logical possibility 
somehow involves actuality, he needs to show that this is a 
fact about an independent world if he wishes to avoid an 
idealistic account of reality. Thus, he invokes the notion 
of an absolute (God), in which all logical possibilities are 
contained - even those beyond the conception of the mere 
mortal. 
9.1 (i} Logical Possibility and Actuality 
The argument above relies heavily on the idea of the 
perfect and omnipotent God: and the idea of this God is 
supported using, once again, the powers and capabilities of 
the imagination. Descartes' God is a god of perfection and, 
it is argued, could not be a mere product of the fallible 
and limited imagination of an imperfect mind. Since 
Descartes acknowledges that his mind is fallible, the idea 
of God must come from elsew~ere. Because we can only get an 
idea of perfection from perfection, God must exist. 
The two above arguments share a common ground in that 
they rely upon the belief that we cannot come by an idea of 
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anything unless it exists. Hence, both the logically 
possible and the Godhead must exist because we have an idea 
of them. But this is to assume that thought and ideas must 
have some corresponding reality to inspire them - that there 
must be corresponding referent for all concepts. But this 
simply is not so. Unicorns are a logical possibility, but 
this does not entail that they exist outside fairy tales. 
Perfection is a logical possibility, but our idea of it may 
originate simply in a negative comparison - that an idea of 
perfection is simply an idea of freedom from all 
imperfections. 
It can therefore be shown that the move from logical to 
actual possibility is not adequately supported by Cartesian 
argument any at tempt to do so will result in dubious 
conclusions. Hence, although the separable self is indeed a 
logical and attractive idea, this does not entail that it 
exists independently of our imagination. 
does, more argument is needed. 
To prove that it 
Despite this, holders of the modern simple view treat the 
presence of logical possibility with great deference 
using it to signify not only that dualism is probably true, 
but that empirical accounts of the self are false. Their 
arguments range f~om . straightforwardly Cartesian-style 
thought experiments, to more complex and linguistic attempts 
to prove the separation. 
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9.1 (ii) Modern use of Cartesian Thought Experiments 
The use of_ ar_gum_ent_s foc~ss_ing on th~ s_~p<!_ral)j..l!_ty of th~ 
self from its properties is common to most .modern dualists. 
Relying on religious beliefs about disembodied souls, and 
the idea of life after death; they claim to show that there 
is nothing illogical about the separation of material and 
immaterial parts of humans. The view believes such ide~s 
to be possible because they are presented in coherent and 
conceivable forms. 
These appeals to religion are supplemented by more 
secular arguments, imagining the gradual and total 
separation of properties from the self. The conclusions 
drawn from such thoughts are very Cartesian: that although 
we can make sense of ourselves devoid of our bodies, we 
cannot even begin to entertain the idea of persisting 
without our self. 
. .. 
For example, Swinburnen uses an argument imagining a 
situation in which the control over his body gradually 
decreases, whilst his control over his wife's body 
increases, finally resulting in his functioning through the 
body of his wife. Swinburne claims that the idea of having 
such control, even partially, of a different body from his 
own is conceivable. As is the further development that he 
imagines, whereby he is no longer restricted to 
* Swinburne 1984 
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controlling just a body, but finds he can function though 
other things in the environment. In this situation, the 
soul no longer seems to be 'embodied' fo.r its power for 
feeling or responding reaches beyond the body, it is in 
fact, disembodied. This argument is used to support the 
logical separability of soul and body, and: 
From the mere logical possibility of my continued existence, 
there follows the actual fact that there is some more to me 
than my body, and that more is the essential part of myself. 
Swinburne (2) p.154 
Madell~" too claims that separation of the subject from 
these properties is logically possible. For we can clearly 
imagine without absurdity, ourselves without part of, or 
indeed all of, our current properties or particular 
personality traits. Yet whilst we can understand such a 
change in our state, we continue to feel it is our state -
we cannot imagine ourselves as not being part of the new 
state. If we do, then it is no longer us. 
Finally, Chisholm combines the insights of both Swinburne 
and Madell in a thought experiment whereby he can imagine 
himself completely separated from his properties, his 
memories, his beliefs a_nd his dispositions+. Like 
Swinburne, he says of such a situation that he can readily 
conceive of their transference to someone else; but like 
-/( Madell 1981 
+ Chisholm 1976 
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Madell finds it impossible to imagine such a transference of 
himself. 
However, unlike Descartes, the modern simple view does 
not attribute certainty to such beliefs, merely probability. 
In agreement with the original objection to Descartes, it 
can be seen to recognise that conclusions from thought 
experiments point only to possibility and conceptual 
reality, and not to actuality. The simple view might be 
interpretted as using these illustrations to show the 
logical possibility of such a dualism, if proof or logical 
certainty is intended then it must be done through other 
arguments. 
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9.2 OBJECTIVE EMPIRICAL DESCRIPTION 
~· 
One such argument, rather than showing the logical 
possibility of the self, tries to illustrate the 
impossibility of providing an empirical account of the 
subject. It bases its arguments in the necessity of a 
subject of experience. . . .. As shown earlier", the subject is 
necessary for any coherent account of experience - to speak 
of experiences without a subject makes no sense. 
9.2 (i) Scientific Description 
This first attempt to prove the truth of dualism makes 
use of an argument linked to the criticisms of objective 
empirical theories mentioned in Part I: namely that although 
the subject defies any attempt to account for it in 
objective empirical terms, it is still a necessary 
ingredient for a sufficient account of persons. The point 
is made that because it is logically impossible to account 
for the self in terms of a reduction to its properties, 
there must be something more to the self that these 
properties. It is thus claimed that a dualism with regard 
to the subject and its properties is logically necessary for 
a sufficient account of per~ons. 
The starting point is this fact that we are subjects; and 
it is claimed that it is by definition impossible to capture 
-.'( Section 8 • 4 
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such a subject in empirical terms. This is more than merely 
a claim that there is in~uit_ively mgre t.Q u~s than 
properties; it aims to show that what we know must be there, 
that is to say, a subject cannot be accounted for in 
traditionally empirical way. Thus there is a necessary part 
of us which cannot be encompassed in an· empirical 
description: therefore, there is a part of us that is 
separable from the properties described empirically. 
The explanation focuses on the nature of subjectivity in 
the self. As a subject, the self is something which feels 
and experiences, rather than actually being that feeling and 
experience. It is the subjective experience of the world 
and the quality of how it seems or feels that is what 
concerns the self or person; in fact the ability to feel is 
what it means to be a person. 
Subjectivity is Beyond Empirical Description 
Such a thing as a subject cannot be described or isolated 
in scientific or empirical terms. 
science to treat things only as 
For it is the practice of 
objects there is no 
language or way to account for subjectivity empirically. 
Science studies what it considers to be objective criteria, 
separating 'measurable' concepts from phenomenological, and 
therefore subjective, manifestations. 
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If this is so, it will be beyond the realms of scientific 
law to give an account of the soul, particularly in form of 
necessary connections between it and the boqy: for it has no 
language to link the subjective to the objective. The 
connections cannot be described, for one half of the union 
is totally elusive to science. Swinburne states that: 
Natural laws then, we assume, dictated how this globe would 
evolve, and so, which arrangements of matter will be bodies 
of consciousness, and just how apparent memories of 
consciousness depend on their brain states. My point is 
that what natural laws in no way determine is which animate 
body is yours and which is mine. 
Swinburne (1) p.25 
Hence, Swinburne claims that it is a fact about the world 
that the body, or properties of the person, are only 
contingently part of the person. It is this lack of 
naturally necessary connections which leads to a conclusion 
that the body is not practically necessary to us as persons: 
for if we study evolution and physics, it becomes evident 
that there is no discoverable natural necessity linking the 
two: 
Not merely is it not logically necessary that a person have 
a body made of certain matter, or have certain apparent 
memories, if he is to be the person which he is, it is not 
even necessitated by the laws of nature. 
Swinburne (1) p.25 
That persons defy any form of deterministic link to the 
body shows not only that the person is independent of a 
particular body but also, more broadly, that the person 
cannot be accounted for in terms of its bodily properties. 
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The rna tch is not explainable for it "needs either God or chance 
to allocate bodies to persons." ( Swinburn~ ( 1) p. ~6) • 
9o2 (ii) Failure of Scientific Argument 
Swinburne's line of argument can be analysed as follows: 
he claims that the subjective is by definition not 
accessible to the realm of empirical inquiry. In doing so, 
he assumes that subjective and empirical descriptions are 
mutually exclusive - that the subjective knowledge we have 
of the self cannot also be accounted for in terms of 
properties. It is this that allows him to draw the above 
conclusions, for if subjectivity excludes all properties, it 
is entailed that the subject cannot be the object of 
empirical enquiry: which in turn points to the existence of 
something which cannot be explained in terms of properties. 
, 
However, in this argument, Swinburne makes an error by 
mixing categories. In the face of the failure of all 
objective empirical accounts, he claims that any attempt to 
reduce the person to properties fails. But this is to 
assume that the objective account of the subject is the only 
possible empirical account. To do so is to equate 
empiricism with mind/body monism and then to argue' from 
this premise, that since consciousness cannot be reduced to 
a description of the body or individual thoughts, the the 
subject cannot be accounted for by empiricism. But in 
equating empiricism with monism, he misses the vita 1 fact 
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that it is possible to hold a mind/body distinction and 
remain an empiricist_. 
For it is exactly this position that Locke illustrates: 
that the self is empirically identifiable in subjective 
terms. Moreover, in Locke this does not necessitate a 
dualism between the subject and properties, for as seen the 
subject is the property of self-consciousness. It is true 
that the objective empiricism cannot provide a sufficient 
account of the subject; but Lockean subjective empiricism 
can, whilst also maintaining that the subject is only 
separable from all properties conceptually. It is true that 
the self is not reducible to plain consciousness, however it 
is reducible to the property of self-consciousness. 
For Swinburne's argument to carry any weight, it must be 
shown why all reductive empiricism fails to account for 
subjectivity. But to do so, he needs to show that the 
Lockean account of subjectivity is not sufficient - that 
the self must be ontologically separable from its 
properties. In other words, for this line of argument to 
succeed, it must be shown that actual subject/property 
dualism is true. But this is exactly what the argument 
itself is trying to prove. Once again, it seems that the 
argument offered to prove actual separability of the self, 
is only effective if it is already known that the self is 
ontologically distinct. 
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9.3 SELF-IDENTIFICATION 
-· 
This argument is a development of the use of self-
J. 
reference described earlier", in which it is established 
that the concept of the self is necessary to individuate 
other properties of the person. This inability to 
individuate the subject in objective and empirical 
description, is joined by an argument to show that we do 
individuate the subject regardless of properties. As such, 
the simple view tries to show that we can, and do, use the 
term 'I' without need to refer to properties at a 11. If 
this is possible, then the identification of the self can be 
achieved regardless of properties. This, the simple view 
might claim, is tantamount to proving that the self is 
separable from the properties - for the two have different 
criteria of identity. 
9.3 (i) The Content of Self-Reference 
The objective empirical accounts of the self, in effect, 
deny that the self has a fixed referent of any sort - they 
explain the use of 'I' by reducing self reference to some 
other form of demonstrative. The nature of this may vary 
from theory to theory: it might be reduced to simply meaning 
'here'; to be no more than a content-less indicator or non-
referent; a non-fixed referent with a varying field of 
applicability; or even something which is a purely 
~~ Section 3.4 
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referential term with no allusion to properties at all. 
Yet analysis by some philosophers of the use of self-
reference indicates that the demonstrative 'I' clearly 
... 
refers to a subject or self; for example, Madell", under 
whose consideration all of the above reductions prove to be 
mistaken. He argues that the position claiming that 'I' is 
not a fixed referent is inaccurate: for we cannot choose the 
extent of our field of reference, but are necessarily 
limited to the range of our unified experience. Moreover, 
to say that it is not a referent proves false for in saying 
'I' we do refer to the subject of sensations. He further 
denies that it is reducible to other forms of demonstrative: 
for use of self-reference evades all attempts to match it to 
expressions such as 'here'; indeed it is the case that all 
other referents are relatively dependent upon the 
possibility of both a fixed and meaningful self-reference. 
Thus, he states that, far from being a mere grammatical 
necessity, the self has a fixed and meaningful referent. 
The subject fulfils the role of being this referent 
perfectly: in that saying 'I' we are expressly referring to 
the subject of our experience, the self and if this is true, 
then the 'I' most definitely does have a content. It cannot 
be reduced to being merely shorthand for a combination of 
-;'r Madell 1984 
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other 'real' referents, for the self, which is the intention 
of 'I', has an ineliminable role in the individuation and 
identification of our properties. 
9.3 (ii) 8 ! 1 as a Logically Proper Name 
In rejecting reductive accounts of 'I', Madell is led to 
adopt the suggestion of McTaggart*, who analyses self-
reference in terms of the use of a logically proper name. 
In this role, the subject is something with which we are 
directly acquainted, not something which is known through 
description, inference or mere convention. When we use 'I', 
we denote an existing and particular thing which is the 
subject of our experience. Because certain knowledge of the 
self is possible, we can be directly acquainted with 
ourselves. The term 'I' is therefore rightfully termed a 
logically proper name, for it is not shorthand for something 
we only know by description. 
Such an idea builds upon the theory of direct 
acquaintance described in Section 8.2. The experiences 
which give us direct acquaintance with ourselves can be 
classed as self-presenting states. They involve individual 
concepts, which refer to individual essences: that is, they 
pick out only one thing at a time, and only ever apply to 
that one thing the self. Hence such self-presenting 
states not only ensure that we are aware of the self, but 
they enable us to use self-referring statements accurately: 
I would say then, that if I feel depressed or if I feel 
happy, or if I seem to see a sheep (seem to me, that is, to 
see a sheep) then I am directly acquainted with myself. For 
in each case, there is a self-presenting proposition which 
implies me to have a certain . property. The individual 
concept implied by the proposition is that of being 'I' or 
being identical with me. And the proposition, since it is 
self-presenting, is known by me to be true. 
Chisholm (1) p.31 
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This individuation is not based in anything other than 
the awareness of the subject - it is made per se - in virtue 
of the thing, not in virtue of some other related factor or 
property. Thus we can isolate the self and individuate it 
without recourse to its empirical or objective properties: 
when we refer to the self, we do so directly. 
9.3 (iii) Identification of the Self Without Properties 
Added to this idea of direct knowledge of the self is an 
argument designed to prove that we can do so without 
reference to any properties whatsoever. To support this 
position the simple view builds on an argument borrowed from 
Castaneda.,.,. This gives an account of a person perceiving 
himself in a mirror, yet not realising that it is himself. 
Despite not recognising his own properties from the 
reflection, the individual is able to refer to himself and 
know himself. Although he ·does not know his properties he 
still knows and is able to individuate himself. 
That this is possible clearly shows that we use self-
* Castaneda 1976 
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referring and individuating expressions regardless of 
properties; and this indicates that the identity criterion 
for our 'self' differs from any criterion of our properties. 
If this is so, and we are able to uniquely individuate 
ourselves independently of the knowledge of our properties, 
we must be something more than, and separable from, those 
properties. Thus Chisholm argues that: 
Castaneda has shown that statement of self-attribution, such 
as 'Jones believes that he himself is wise' (S) is not 
implied by the corresponding quantified statement, 1There is 
an x such that x is identical with Jones and x believes that 
x is wise' (Q). Thus (Q) might be true and (S) false if: 
Jones reads the lines on his hand and takes them to be a 
sign of wisdom; he doesn't realise the hand is his (for it 
is one of many protruding from a blanket); and he is unduly 
modest and entirely without conceit. What, then, does (S) 
tell us that (Q) does not? I suggest that it tells us this: 
'Jones has an individual essence H; he accepts a proposition 
which is self-presenting for him and necessarily such that 
it is true if and only if whatever hasH is wise.' 
Chisholm (1) p.37 
9.3 (iv) Self-Reference and Separability 
Despite the fact that these arguments support the 
existence of a subject which is irreducible, in terms of 
reference and meaning to the various properties that it has, 
they still fail to show that this necessitates any form of 
ontological dualism between the subject and its properties. 
For, once again, it seems as though a mistake has been 
made concerning the lack of any particular properties in 
that, because no particular properties are necessary to 
identify the self, it has been taken that no properties at 
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all are associated with the identity of the self. But this 
is to assume that the individual content or qualitative 
properties of the mind and body are the only properties: the 
role of consciousness or self-consciousness is ignored, yet 
these seem integral to the existence and the knowledge of 
the self. 
Thus the use of 'I' in self-referential terms is an 
extension of the argument claiming that we have knowledge of 
the self independent of all properties. It was argued* 
that this idea failed to prove the separable existence of 
the self; and this extension of the argument gets no 
further. For the fact that we refer to the self 
independently of properties does not necessarily entail that 
the self is completely separable from all properties. All 
that has been shown is that the use of 'I' has the intention 
to refer to more than just the properties associated with 
the self; and from this, one can infer that subject/property 
dualism is possible, but not that it is actual. 
Furthermore, this idea that we are distinct from 
properties has been disputed, for it seems to work at only 
one level of description. Whilst it is certainly true that 
these arguments show that the self is not reducible to its 
constituent properties - that is to say thoughts, emotions 
or body - it does not seem to be so obvious that the self 
* Section 9.3 (iii) 
can be thought of as propertyless. 
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There is a distinction 
to be clarified between having properties which belong to 
the self and the properties which are nece~sary to actually 
being a self. Whilst it may perhaps be true that the self 
needs to know its character or the quality of its existence 
to know and refer to itself, it is becoming increasingly 
apparent that perhaps there are certain properties that a 
self must be in order to qualify or exist as a self; namely 
those associated with being a subject: consciousness and 
even perhaps self-consciousness for example. 
Thus it seems that the claims of propertylessness made by 
the simple view rest in a fundamental confusion between 
individuation and identity of the selfo For whilst it seems 
that we need not know certain qualities to identify 
ourselves, there may be certain properties necessarily 
associated with our identity. This idea will be developed 
later, but suffice to say at present that, the phenomenon of 
self-reference entails no more than the existence of a 
subject that is irreducible to its properties. 
this cannot be concluded. 
More than 
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9o4 CONCLUSIONS 
The simple view arguments supporting subject/property 
dualism, base the claim of separability upon the premise 
that if two things have different identity conditions, then 
they cannot be the same thing. The fact that we isolate the 
self, and indeed experience the self in different ways from 
the way we identify our properties, indicates that the two 
things are somehow distinct. This idea is reinforced by the 
fact, demonstrated earlier, that we can know the identity of 
the self directly. 
The simple view wishes to add to this conclusion the 
notion that we can experience the self with real identity: 
for if this is possible, then the person can have identity 
over a period of time, satisfying both instinctive beliefs 
and moral necessities. If the self is to have persistence 
it cannot be reducible to any properties it has, for such 
identity is considered impossible for anything essentially 
composed of properties or perceived empirically. Moreover, 
the naturally successive nature of our properties means that 
even as a unified collection of our own properties, they 
cannot have a real identi~y over time, because they are 
constantly changing. 
On face 
reflection 
value, 
of our 
this view 
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distinguish between the self and its properties and do not 
feel that the one is reducible to the other. Yet the fact 
that the two are conceptually distinct does not entail that 
they are physically so. Despite the convincing nature of 
these arguments, they still fail to produce anything like 
the proof needed for a dualism. The fact that 'I' has some 
meaning over and above the properties; that it is 
irreducible to those properties; and that it evades 
empirical determination; does not prove that it is anything 
more than a conceptual entity or, as Locke might put it, an 
idea. 
An idea of a self which has no reference, other than as 
an idea, might still fulfil all the above considerations, 
and yet still be only a classification or socially 
constructed term imposed upon the world. Locke's own 
account of self-awareness as consciousness would satisfy all 
the above arguments - that we have an idea or ourselves as 
thinkers, and that the identity criteria for this idea is 
not equivalent to a mere reference to properties. For 
properties and the person are different ideas to Locke, and 
thus to him different things. However, as Locke cannot use 
this as a basis to infer the self as something existing 
separately, so neither can the simple view from the 
arguments so far. 
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Although the self exists and is distinguishable from its 
properties conceptually, it is not proven that the self 
exists separately from its properties in actuality. If the 
simple view intends to claim this, it needs to provide more 
evidence of actual separability. Indeed, as will be shown, 
the problems involved in pursuing ontological subject/ 
property dualism provide convincing reasons for remaining 
with conceptual possibility. 
CHAPTER 10 THE POSSIBILITY OF 
SUBJECT/CONTENT DUALISM 
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Hitherto there has been a concentration upon the 
particular arguments in support of a subject/property 
dualism. The focus has been upon why those arguments fail 
to support the separability between the self and its 
properties. It has not been proven that the suggestion is 
false; merely that it has not been adequately supported. 
However, in this next chapter, the argument will change 
tack: in a development of the ideas already suggested in 
criticism of the simple view and, through an examination of 
the meaning and implications of a subject/property dualism, 
I shall attempt to show how the simple view approach, if 
interpreted as ontological dualism, is likely to be false. 
In addition to his supporting arguments, Descartes 
himself is criticised on this level, for his theory falls 
down when considered in the light of its consequences. For 
in offering a mind/body and substance dualism, he 
necessarily encounters ·practical and logical problems 
associated with mind/body interaction. 
Likewise, the greatest criticism of subject/property 
dualism is that it does not make sense - that, when ·pushed 
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we cannot understand the use of 'I' in total separation from 
properties and, that, logically, it is self contradictory to 
maintain the subject/property dualism whilst insisting on 
the reality of the separable self. 
Although it has been shown that we can use the term 'I' 
with meaning and without reference to any particular 
property, I have suggested that it cannot be used without 
the intention of any properties at all. The following 
sections are developments of that idea from both a 
conceptual and logical point of view. 
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10.1 CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTY 
There are convincing arguments in support of the 
intuition that we are essentially propertyless selves: not 
least that we have an idea of ourselves as something over 
and above, or underpinning, the various properties which we 
have. However, at the same time, we have beliefs about 
ourselves as actually being and having certain properties: 
that when we think of and refer to ourselves, it is rarely 
without the intention of including certain properties within 
our reference. Moreover, this belief is not just that such 
properties are merely associated with us, it extends to the 
idea that without some of them we could not persist. 
If closely studied it seems that our conception of what 
the self is fails to support the suggestion that we are 
propertyless over the idea that we have properties, both are 
conceivable. For despite being instinctively and even 
logically acceptable at one level, it appears that, in 
practice, it is very rarely indeed that we do separate the 
self from the properties and, when it does occur, it is only 
in an abstract sense. The notion of a totally propertyless 
subject holds little meaning or even practical use. 
10.1 (i) Reference to Properties 
As we refer to, think about and even experience 
ourselves, we rarely do so without intention to attribute 
properties of some form. Ourselves and 
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others are 
characterised with certain connotations, whether it be in 
terms of material properties, psychological phenomena or, 
what might be termed, character traits. Even if such 
properties 
rare that 
are removed from our explicit intention, it is 
self -reference is made completely without 
connotation. At the very least we believe we have certain 
potential such as emotional, effective and affective 
ability. All of these things we do consider to be, in some 
way, ourselves. 
Reference to our self normally encompasses some of these 
properties but it is not fixed, and does not always include 
each and every property. In general we use an expanding and 
contracting conception of ourselves, the extent of which is 
determined by the interests and background of the specific 
reference. Thus 1 I 1 might encompass a field of properties 
extending beyond the body .to creative works or children, or 
may be as narrow as the mere subject of experiences. What 
is, or is not, included in the range is dependent upon the 
specific case in point. 
Such belief about ourself is not merely confined to our 
linguistic self-reference - similar accounts can be given of 
both our concern 
unity. What we 
will change and 
for ourselves and our experience of our 
consider of special concern to ourselves 
the range of fear and happiness will 
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fluctuate with situations. In a situation where I am to 
have my tooth out, my dominant frame of reference is my 
tooth and the experience of pain in my mouth; but if I am to 
be tortured for state secrets my field of concern will 
expand beyond my individual self to the nation I am part of 
and therefore attain some of my identity from.· Likewise 
unity, or what I consider to be unified with me, will 
fluctuate, at times encompassing my family, at others merely 
myself as a subject. The point is that, there is a level at 
which our conception of ourself is not fixed and does 
indeed incorporate properties. 
Although in referring to others the range of verifiable 
characteristics is limited to empirical, or inferences to 
empirical, phenomena, in our selves such properties are not 
merely empirically known. We can and do perceive them 
directly and our knowledge of them is a priori. We have 
knowledge of our properties in the way that we have direct 
knowledge of being selves - we are aware of them as their 
subjects in a way which no- one else can be. It is this 
subjective awareness which seems to make such properties 
part of our selves. 
10.1 (ii) The Propertyless Self 
However, it still 
self-reference sense 
propertyless. There 
remains that at the 
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fundamentally the owner or subject of the properties is 
different from the properties themselves, and that what is 
of most concern to us seems to be the subj~ctive experience 
of the self. Properties can be classed as part of us but 
are they essentially part of us? 
Some particular properties are not essentially what we 
call our selves and we believe that we can persist with or 
without them. It seems that a sliding scale of connection 
or continuity to the self can be produced, and the 
importance of properties is proportionally linked to value 
in persistence. The properties at the edge of our control 
are more flexible and their inclusion seems to be a matter 
of preference, consequently they are valued less in terms of 
future survival. At the base of the scale is placed the 
subject of all the properties, and idea of this self is of 
something immovable and fixed. 
To the self is accorded the maximum value for it is 
considered to be necessary for persistence of the person. 
It seems that the person can continue to persist without the 
particular properties possessed at the present time but 
that, at the core of our existence, there is a belief in a 
self without which we will not continue. To change the self 
in a given individual would be to create someone different -
if we lose our self we fear we will cease to be. 
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The capability we have to separate ourselves from 
particular properties indicates that they are not in essence 
us. If sense can be made of pure subjectivity, of the 
subject without certain properties, then surely properties 
cannot be an essential feature of ourselves? 
10o1 (iii) The Self and Non-Specific Properties 
However, it can be asked what a propertyless self 
actually means? How can we grasp what it is to be 
propertyless? If we try to think of, or describe, what such 
a state would entail, it is impossible - we end up imagining 
some sort of property. Even if we consider our persistence 
in a disembodied life after death, we still imagine that 
existence in terms of some form of properties. Moreover, 
the value in having such a self, without the affectations, 
effectations and aspirations offered by the possession of 
properties, can be questioned. 
When closely considered, a propertyless state becomes a 
meaningless persistence and valueless existence. Whilst we 
are willing to give up our particular properties, this is 
not necessarily indicative of a willingness to forego all 
properties in our future. At the very least we would expect 
this bare subject of experience to carry with it the 
potential for experience - remove that and it loses all 
practical value in persistence. 
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It would seem that the value of the self in practice lies 
in its specific continuation, not its complete separateness 
from properties. The specific properties. are valued less 
and it seems that they can change and alter without the 
particular self ceasing to be, yet ultimately the conception 
of a self actually existing without any properties becomes 
empty and meaningless. In practice it appear that we cannot 
separate our self from certain properties. 
10.1 (iv) Having Properties and Being Properties 
It seems, then, that our conception of the subject is not 
actually as propertyless, it is of something which has 
properties. The subject is the subject of something and it 
makes as little sense to talk of the subject without 
properties, as it does to talk of the properties without the 
subject. 
However, it might still be maintained that, whilst the 
essence of the subject is to have properties, this does not 
entail that it is any property itself. Thus, although the 
self has to have some properties to be the subject of, this 
is as far as its connection with properties goes. Such an 
idea is perfectly consistent with the possibility that the 
subject can exist without properties, for under this account 
its essence is in no way dependent upon them. 
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But in reply, one might pursue the suggestion made 
earlier.,"', that, although the self is not reducible to the 
properties it has or owns, it is associated with other 
properties, over and above content. In other words, the 
idea of being a subject is not unanalysable either logically 
or conceptually, for we 
what is meant when we 
can reduce the idea of self 
refer to self, to talk of 
properties that are necessary to subjectivity. 
and 
the 
One such property is surely consciousness, for 
subjectivity itself means the ability to be a subject, which 
in turn means that something is conscious. When we talk of 
the subject what we refer to is the subject of 
consciousness, not some obscure propertyless thing. The 
subjective experience is a conscious one - without ability 
to be conscious the subject makes little sense. Even if it 
is only a potential for consciousness, rather than actual 
consciousness which is the essence of subjectivity, 
potential is surely a property. 
It seems that when we refer to the subject, it is very 
difficult to separate it from its ability to be conscious. 
Since, then, being conscious, or having the potential for 
consciousness, is a property, and consciousness is necessary 
to our idea of being a subject, the self does have a 
property - consciousness. Thus when we think of ourselves, 
* Section 10.1 (iii) 
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we do think of a certain property which is essential to our 
being a self or subject, that is, the property of 
consciousness. 
properties but 
certain other 
We may not think of being ·certain content-
this does not exclude from the reference 
essential properties, such as that which 
enables to have content - subjectivity or consciousness. 
Confusion Between Knowledge and Identity 
It can be argued, then, that when we refer to ourselves 
or think of our selves, we do not think of something which 
has no properties at all, we think of something which is the 
subject of the content of consciousness, something which is 
conscious. It is the thing which has direct knowledge of 
the content of conscious states, including knowledge of 
itself. But the fact that we know it is independent of its 
particular states of consciousness does not entail that we 
mean it has no properties in itself. The self is not only 
something directly known but the thing which directly knows. 
To claim that the self is propertyless would be to 
confuse the way we know or individuate the self with the 
facts about the self. For although we need not consider any 
properties to be aware of its existence (being directly 
acquainted with it through experience), this is not to say 
that it has no properties at all. It is just that we do not 
need to know the properties to know it exists. 
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10.2 LOGICAL INCONSISTENCY 
It has been suggested that, when we refer to the self or 
subject the intention is to isolate consciousness, not some 
completely propertyless thing. That the self or subject 
does have some property is further supported if it is 
considered what is actually meant by 'separable self'. For 
in such an examination it is revealed that, if it is 
intended to refer to something which exists in reality, then 
the concept which 'propertyless self' represents is self-
contradictory. 
It must be made clear then, what the simple view means by 
propertyless self. It has been seen that the claims it 
makes are based upon a differentiation between the 
qualitative and numerical identity of the self: it shows 
that the qualitative identity or content of the person is 
not its essential or numerical identity. Because the 
particular content of mind and body are not necessary to its 
persistence, they cannot be part of its identity. They may 
be used in individuation of the person but they amount only 
to evidence. Thus, the simple view concludes that the self 
is a propertyless thing - .its identity does not coincide 
with its qualitative or property-based description. 
However, it seems that the non-coincidence of qualitative 
and numerical identity does not in itself effect a division 
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between properties and the subject, for it is possible that 
the same results emerge from a division existing only 
between certain properties and the subject. Once again, 
then, it must be asked, What does the simple view mean by a 
propertyless self? Does it mean a subject completely 
separable from all properties? 
10.2 (i) Practical Absurdity 
The idea of a self which is actually separated from 
properties can be reduced to a practical absurdity. Such an 
objection, although recognising the use of 'I' in reference 
to actual objective properties, denies the possibility of a 
referent for the term 'I' without any associated properties. 
Moreover, the existence of self-reference, self-concern and 
even unity of the self are unable to exist without some 
properties instantiating them. 
Interaction 
Firstly, a parallel to the difficulties seen in Descartes 
concerning interaction, emerges in the modern simple view. 
For it insists upon a form of mutual exclusivity between 
subjects and objects - the self cannot have any properties 
since it is pure subject. Yet if this is so, how can the 
subject be affected by and affect the world around it? If 
the self is only subject, how can objects affect it? The 
subject experiences, feels and acts - how can these things 
be achieved unless through some interface with the objective 
world? 
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In making the self a completely separate thing, it 
isolates it from the world and its function, thereby making 
it redundant. 
This difficulty can be extended to the location of the 
self in space and time. In most uses of 'I' we are 
identifying and isolating something - the self. If we have 
a concern for this self, that concern usually extends beyond 
the immediate present; and when considering the unity of the 
self, unified experience is both synchronic ( ie. spatial) 
and diachronic (ie. temporal). As such self-reference 
firmly locates the self in space and time, or at least 
implies an idea of the self as such. Yet if the self is to 
be essentially characterised as separated from its 
properties, it becomes impossible for it to be located in 
space and time. It has no dimensions and, as such, is not 
within dimensions. Thus, if the idea of the self is to be 
used as we do actually use it on occasion, it needs to have 
at least some properties, if only those of dimensions. 
Articulation of 'I' 
Even if one denies that the self is necessarily locatable 
or that it is involved in any interaction problems, there 
are more theoretical difficulties associated with the idea 
of total separation. For it appears to be an absurdity to 
disassociate the articulation of 'I' from the thinker, the 
feeling of concern from the concerned, the experience of 
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unity from the unified. Indeed, it seems logically 
impossible: to articulate 'I' there must be involved 
something which can articulate, which means that what ever 
it is must therefore have the property of being able to 
think 'I'. So, the expression 1 I 1 must involve more than 
just a propertyless subject, it must entail also the ability 
to think 1 I'. Likewise, this can be extended to the 
concern and unity associated with the self: the subject 
having concern for its future must be able to feel concern, 
and the subject which experiences unity over time must have 
some sort of property of being able to experience. 
It might be argued that these are not particular 
properties but are faculties or some other mode. Yet even 
if this is so, they are ways in which to ascribe qualities 
of some form to the self, moreover, qualities essential to 
the arguments disassociating the self from properties. The 
arguments themselves cannot establish the separableness of 
the self, for they rely upon the ability of the self to do 
things, which necessarily involves properties of some sort. 
This is, in effect, the conclusion reached by Descartes -
that the self does have at least one property, and that is 
to think. Descartes' soul does not fall into these 
absurdities, for it has the ability to provide all the 
evidence of its existence from within its essence. 
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Properties Necessary only for Evidence 
However, to argue as above, is to forget the distinction 
between the truth and the evidence we have· for that truth. 
For although these properties enable us to talk about and 
communicate about the self, they are not thereby necessarily 
the self. Indeed, when Descartes ascribed thought to the 
self it was only because he could not imagine the self 
without thinking, but this is to link the essence of the 
self with the way in which we are made aware of it. 
The simple view recognises the intimate connection 
between the properties and the self, characterising it along 
with other a priori synthetic knowledge. It is through 
empirical methods that we can become aware of the self, but 
it is not through empiricism that we know the truth 
conditions for the persistence of the self. Hence, the 
simple view clearly holds that the person is to be 
disassociated from the parts allowing attribution to it. 
However, by enforcing the disassociation of self and 
evidence, holders of the simple view fall into a further 
confusion, failing to distinguish between that by which we 
know the self from that which it is. Thus, although they 
make clear the difference between a self and its 
individuating or qualitative evidence, they fail to separate 
our direct knowledge of the self from what the self actually 
is. For although we may know the self independently of any 
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particular qualitative property, that does not entail that 
the self is not essentially associated with any property at 
all. 
Subjects have to be Subjects of Something 
The above argument shows that in claiming separability of 
subject and properties, the simple view goes beyond its 
evidence, for the dualism envisaged is not necessarily 
entailed by a dis tine tness between some qualities and the 
self. However, these practical disabilities are not in 
themselves reason enough to reject the actual separability. 
To do so would be to assume that evidence is equivalent to 
truth, slipping into an empiricist-type method. Such 
practical insufficiencies can be cons trued as mere human 
limitation, or distortion of the real thing, rather than to 
do with its actual nature. Thus, it is possible to keep open 
the possibility of the concept of a propertyless self being 
pursued by the simple view. 
The theoretical possibility that the self is separable 
from the properties is still an open option - that, even in 
a world independent of human perceptions, the self would be 
separable from its properties. Nothing so far has 
conclusively proved it wrong. 
However, 
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example, it can be asked, What does the subject of 
experience mean unless it is experiencing, and this, surely 
is a property in itself? Yet, despite the attractiveness of 
this line of argument, it is only if one assumes that 
evidence is fact, that one can use it, for it is possible 
that the self is more than just experiencer - that it can 
exist independently of both experiencing and our awareness 
of it: it is just that we cannot know about it if it does. 
One can develop the line, however, by referring not just 
to experiencing but rather to consciousness, stating that 
the ability to have conscious states is what a subject is. 
Thus, although it does not need consciousness to exist, or 
indeed to actually be conscious, nevertheless it does need 
to have the ability to be conscious. And this, in itself, 
as suggested earlier, is a property. 
10.2 (ii) Self-Contradiction 
The above arguments illustrate a need to ascribe the 
subject properties of some sort: that to even comprehend 
what it means to be a subject involves it having certain 
necessary properties. But there is a defence of 
propertyless-ness which views the claim in alternative way, 
that is, it holds that in trying to ascribe these properties 
we are misunderstanding the meaning of the term 'subject', 
that in fact, 'self' refers to a bare particular or 
propertyless substratum. 
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Such a characteristic describes the self as an idea quite 
dis tine t from any properties: it has no particular 
properties itself but is necessary to the existence of 
certain other properties such as psychological states. In 
this way, the self can be defined as something necessarily 
entailed by consciousness, but does not itself' amount to 
that consciousness, and therefore has no properties. As 
such, it is placed at the fundamental level of an 
unanalysable basic - one can analyse it no further than to 
say it is a subject. It is propertyless simply because it 
needs no properties to be understood. 
The self can therefore be described or defined as a 
logical necessity. However, at this level its status is no 
more than an idea or logical concept by which we understand 
conscious states. Its standing might be compared to that of 
bare rna t ter - another concept which is held to have no 
particular properties but which is a necessity to those 
things which do have properties. Bare rna t ter or substance 
is a building block, a thing we know must exist but do not 
necessarily know what it is. It can therefore be made sense 
of as a an idea without knowing of any properties or 
qualities associated with it. 
However, if we want 'substance' to be more than just a 
conceptual tool, if we wish to hold that it actually refers 
to something which exists, something the nature of which may 
277 
be discovered, we must believe it has certain properties. 
To exist, it must exist as something, for with existential 
status comes the status of being, and being involves being 
something. Moreover, if it exists as something, we will 
then be able to at tribute some sort of property to it. 
Thus, if the idea of substance is to be more than just an 
idea, it must have some sort of property. 
Hence, if the self is to exist as more than just an 
abstract concept or term, it must exist in some particular 
concrete form. Since the simple view wishes the self to 
exist in actuality, rather than merely be a conceptual tool, 
it too must exist as something, and if this is so, we can 
attribute some property to it. If subjects are more than 
just ideas then they must have some property, for the 
concept of an actual propertyless self is self-
contradictory. 
10.2 (iii) Subject/Content Dualism 
In effect, what emerges is that the subject/property 
dualism in itself makes little conceptual sense, and this 
can be supported by the logical inconsistency inherent in 
it. That is, the subject cannot be separated from all 
properties, for if it is, it cannot exist in reality, only 
as a concept. If the intention of the simple view is to 
hold that a propertyless subject exists, then it is a self-
contradictory account of persons. 
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To be logically cons is tent, the simple view must 
therefore adopt the notion of a self that does have some 
properties. It would be reasonable to assume, that, if this 
is the case, the intended property is subj ec tivi ty. Their 
line of argument can thus be re-interpreted as intending to 
pick out a self with one continuing and unchanging property 
- subjectivity. This subjectivity is different from the 
properties which the self has, for it is the essence of the 
self, it is what the self is. 
So, once again, the argument arrives at a description of 
the self as being a certain property and as having certain 
other qualitative properties. This marks a difference 
between essence and character, between numerical and 
qualitative identity. The dualism envisaged is between the 
self and what belongs to it, between the subject and the 
content of its mind and body. The simple view can still 
hold that there is a difference between qualitative and 
numerical identity, it is just that 'qualities' must now be 
taken to mean the properties or parts which belong to the 
self rather than all properties of the self. 
What must be considered next is the possibility of such a 
subject/content dualism. That is, an actual separability 
between the subject and the content of the mind, between the 
self and the properties which it has, not between the 
subject and the properties which it is. 
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CHAPTER 11 SUBJECT/CONTENT DUALISM 
The acceptability of the simple view has been shown to 
rest in the possibility of maintaining a subject/content 
dualism rather than the stronger subject/property dua 1 ism 
first suggested. Such an understanding places a different 
interpretation on the claims of the simple view, no longer 
characterising the self is totally propertyless but rather 
that as separable from the content, quality or character of 
its various parts. 
Through this analysis, the interpretation of the simple 
.•. 
view has reached the second option". That is, without 
implying any form of ontological dualism, the self is 
characterised as being more than just thought, action and 
awareness;, it is something which thinks, acts and 
experiences. This view avoids the complete reduction of the 
self into various experiences and properties, emphasising 
the need or a subject of those experiences. It is a dualism 
of sorts - in that there are two things, the subject and the 
content of its experiences - but it is not a dualism which 
implies any form of ontological separability. 
~·: See pg. 185 
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It mti'st now be considered whether the simple view can 
support t~is form of dualism the concept of the 
contentless subject must now be examined. To be consistent 
with simple view demands, it must not only be shown to be 
possible but also that such a self can hold real identity 
through time. In effect, it must possible to produce an 
account of such a subject without necessitating a reduction 
to constitutive properties of body and mind. 
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11.1 THE PROPERTY OF SUBJECTIVITY 
Firstly then, it must be established what the property of 
subjectivity entails. The concept of a single-propertied 
self is very similar to the original Cartesian idea of the 
soul - the essence of the soul is the single property of 
·'· thinking, which persists through time. As seen", to 
maintain this concept, Descartes felt it necessary to invoke 
a further substance dualism which allowed thinking to be 
associated with one indivisible and persistent thing through 
time. 
It is through the existence of different substances that 
this approach effects a subject/content dis tine tion. The 
property of subjectivity differs from other properties 
because it is ascribed to a different kind of substance, 
moreover an indivisible substance. Thus the subject, which 
is a simple thing both at one moment and through time, is 
constituted of the kind of substance which exhibits no 
change, for its property of thought belongs essentially to 
something immaterial, indivisible and therefore capable of 
real identity. Thus the problem of unity at one time and 
persistence with real identity over a period of time, is 
solved. The property of subjectivity cannot be ascribed to 
material changing things, only to immaterial and persisting 
selves. 
·k Section 6.1 (ii) 
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Problem of Interaction 
However, this form of substance dualism runs into 
fundamental difficulties, not least in the problem of 
interaction. In Descartes' version the fact that he insists 
upon the mutual exclusivity of mental and physical 
substances, causes difficulties in terms of how the person 
actually works as an integrated system. If the soul is 
men tal, then it cannot be physical, and if the body is 
physical then it cannot be mental. How then can the soul 
affect and in turn be affected by the body? The substances 
are incompatible and cannot therefore have any form of the 
other in them. How then does the interface between the 
mental and the physical occur? 
The answer to this is that, under such a description it 
cannot, for to find a solution without serious inconsistency 
is almost impossible. The result is a useless and 
impenetrable soul or 'ghost' in an independently functioning 
and self-sufficient body or 'machine'. It is a short step 
from this realisation to the acceptance of a simpler 
empiricist account, discarding the soul as a vestigial organ 
and replacing dualism with some form of monism. 
It is therefore an untenable position to hold that the 
subject attains identity and distinctness from its parts 
through being a different substance. In the face of this 
failure, exclusive substance dualism cannot be accepted as a 
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reasonable account of the self. If the simple view is to 
succeed in its claims, it must provide a more acceptable 
account of a persisting and contentless subject. 
A successful idea of one property persisting unchanged 
through time does not depend upon the postulation of 
different kinds of substances. Real identity is the 
necessary element and to satisfy this, it is sufficient that 
no change occurs. The property of subjectivity need not be 
something completely different from other properties, it 
just needs to persist. It may have separable parts which 
are not essential to it but the basic property of 
subjectivity must be indivisible and persistent through 
time. Hence, if the property of subjectivity can be shown 
to persist unchanged, then there seems little difficulty in 
producing a valid concept without recourse to substance 
dualism. 
It must therefore be shown that subjectivity can in fact 
fulfil this demand: that it does not change through time, 
that it cannot be reduced into a number of different parts 
and, in effect, that subjectivity has a simple rather than 
complex identity. 
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11.2 MODERN SIMPLE VIEW SUBJECTIVITY 
In some of the modern simple view accounts just such an 
account of subjectivity can be found. Within them it is 
held that the self is a single unanalysable property - the 
property of subjectivity. Such an account is to be found in 
the work of both Madell and Chisholm. 
11.2 (i) Experience and Subjects 
As seen in previous sections~ Chisholm makes the claim 
that experiences and the self are uniquely linked. 
Experience is characterised as a modification of the self 
rather than some different or extra entity in combination 
with the self. This suggestion is based in the observation 
that it makes little sense to invoke two separate things 
when one will suffice. For example, if someone is 'hoping 
for rain' there are not two things - the hope and that which 
experiences the hope; there is just one, the subject hoping. 
In Chisholm's description, the self is given the prior 
role - it is experience which is dependent upon the self. 
For it is the self which is modified in consciousness - the 
experience is nothing more than a change in the self, which 
moves from one state to another. There are not two separate 
things, for experience is part of subjectivity. Chisholm in 
effect turns tables upon the reductionist, claiming that 
rather than the self being reducible to properties or 
Eg. p.147 
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content, that content is reducible to subjectivity. It is 
the subject which provides the medium for the content, not 
vice versa. 
Seen in terms of the present discussion, it is clear that 
this theory gives the self a necessary place in experience. 
Without the self the idea of experience makes no sense -
there cannot be just a hope for rain, something must be 
hoping, and according to Chisholm that something is the 
self. The subject is therefore characterised as a necessary 
accompaniment to experience. Such a conclusion allows the 
further implication that the self need not necessarily be 
dependent upon the experience, and thus enables it to have a 
persistence independent of the fluctuations associated with 
the identity of experiences. 
However, the description might equally well be turned to 
a different perspective, reaching an opposing conclusion. 
For it is equally possible, from the evidence available, to 
describe the self as dependent upon experiences. Without 
the assumption that the self exists prior to the content and 
is modified, all that can be claimed is the constant 
conjunction of experience and subjectivity. Hence, this 
line of argument takes the simple view to the Lockean 
conclusion and no further - that the self is the subject of 
consciousness. Although it shm~s that the subject is a 
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necessary feature of experience, it can be concluded only 
that the two are interdependent. 
11.2 (ii) Subjectivity in Experience 
This alternative description, characterising the subject 
as part of experience, is more evident in Madell's account 
.... 
of the self. His theory follows McTaggart", characterising 
the unanalysability of subjectivity as similar to that of 
the concept of redness. Since no criteria are needed to 
understand and know an awareness of redness, it is classed 
as unanalysable. Likewise, on account of the fact that we 
can know our own subjectivity without reference to any 
criteria! properties, the self too is considered to be 
unanalysable. 
The sense in which these things are unanalysable is 
clearly on the level of their meaning. In an account of the 
phenomenon of a red patch no further description or account 
of it can be given except that it is red. Any attempt to 
give further analysis fails to capture the real experience 
of redness - it is something that is known directly, the 
meaning of which cannot be further explained. Likewise,the 
same is true of our experience and understanding of 
subjectivity in general. There seems to be no further thing 
to which we can reduce the concept for fuller understanding. 
"1: McTaggart 1927 
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Substitute descriptions, such as 'awareness1 or 'feeling: give 
partial accounts but nothing captures the true meaning of 
subjectivity. 
It is at this level of the phenomenal experience that 
further analysis is impossible. However, if subjectivity is 
thus characterised as a phenomenal experience, what kind of 
thing is represented by the concept of selfhood? When we 
talk of the phenomenon of redness, there is a sense in which 
the redness does not exist beyond that particular experience 
of it. It is not some objective form-like red thing which 
unites all red things the universal term 'red' is more 
akin to an abstract idea. The reality of 'redness' does not 
exist beyond each experience of it. 
If then, the self is considered to be similarly 
phenomenal, the same will be true of subjectivity. What 
entitles us to call something a subject will be its 
association with an abstract idea, not a 
subjectivity' existing independently of 
real 'form of 
the individual 
subjective experiences. 
will be the particular 
The only reality of the subject 
self being experienced at a 
particular moment. Moreover, like our red experiences, the 
phenomenon of the self will not last beyond the experience 
of it. 
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If subjectivity really is like redness, it would appear 
that it is only a characteristic of certain experiences, 
indivisible from those particular experiences. What is 
more, as such, it exists only within the experience, having 
no persistence outside individual examples of it. Such a 
subject would appear to be essentially the same as the 
Lockean self- that is,a certain kind of phenomenon existing 
no longer than each particular experience of it. As such, 
this analysis • seems to result in a subjectivity which 
persists no longer than the given moment we are aware of it. 
For McTaggart this would pose no problem for he is an 
idealist. But if one wishes to maintain the reality of the 
self beyond the idea - and it would seem that the simple 
view does - then a conflict emerges between the desired and 
the actual status of the self*. 
Moreover, it is difficult to see how this self, which is 
only a kind of experience, can fulfil the moral role 
demanded of it. Not only does it encounter the problems 
associated with non-persistence but the very 
characterisation of the self as a kind of experience seems 
inconsistent with a description of the self as a responsible 
agent. As Vinit Haksar+ remarks: 
Madell might argue that he does allow for the existence of a 
self and so he can account for the activity of the self; we 
are responsible to the extent that our self is involved in 
+ Haksar 1991 
our action. But if the self is just a property like redness 
it is difficult to see how the self can influence actions. 
Haksar p.242 
1lo2 (iii) Subjectivity as a Location 
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An alternative interpretation would be to read the 
meaning of 'property' in a different sense, ignoring 
references to McTaggart and redness. For one might state 
that subjectivity is a locating property of experience. 
That is, just as one could ascribe to my left arm the 
property of being attached to the left side of my body, one 
might also say that experiences of a common self have the 
property of being located within the same subjectivity. In 
this way the property of subjectivity ascribes a position to 
experiences rather than a quality. 
Such a reading does make some sense - it does appear that 
when experiences are ascribed to a self they are being given 
a location. However difficulties arise if this idea is 
examined in parallel to concepts of space in general. With 
respect to space, it can either be denied there is really an 
absolute thing called space the concept stands for a 
constructed idea of relative position; or it can be claimed 
that real space exists independently of the objects in it. 
When applied to the idea of subjectivity as a location, 
neither of these alternatives makes much sense: if it is 
claimed subjects are independent of experience, then as with 
absolute space, it is difficult to avoid a return to the 
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ontological dualism rejected by earlier analysis. Yet if 
the alternative is adopted, then the subject is 
characterised simply as a description of experiences 
relative to each other. This ultimately results in the 
conclusion reached with regard to quali ta ti ve properties -
that subjects cannot exist without the particular 
experiences they are properties of. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to make real sense of the 
person if it is described as merely a location or position. 
For it seems strange that such a neutral non-qualitative 
kind of property, which ascribes no real positive 
characteristic intrinsic to the experience, could be held to 
be an active and moral agent. Once again, under such an 
interpretation, the self as a property of experience fails 
to uphold the necessary moral role of the person. Such an 
interpretation would therefore seem unsatisfactory. 
11.2 (iv) A physical Description of Subjectivity 
However, it might be suggested, that such problems arise 
only if self is treated merely as a phenomenon or property 
of experiences. If, like 'real' redness as opposed to red 
hallucinations, it is thought that something more causes the 
phenomenon of subj ec ti vi ty, then persistence may be 
possible. Moreover, if it is considered that there is more 
to the location of subjectivity than just subjective 
experience, then perhaps more solidity can be achieved. 
2<)1 
To make this clearer I shall return to the question of 
redness and qualitative phenomena. Interpreted this way, 
the theory recognises the fact that redness can be 
attributed a form of existence beyond our experience of it. 
That is, certain pigments and light conditions cause the 
phenomena in our experience - a physical description can be 
given. 
exist 
As such, redness, or the potential for redness does 
unperceived. Similarly, the self might be 
characterised in this way: although subjectivity needs to be 
experienced for a full realisation of it, there is a way in 
which the potentia 1 and the cause of subjectivity exists 
independently of the way it feels. Such a theory pushes the 
subject beyond the Lockean realm of mere appearance. 
To characterise the self in this way is also to move it 
into a realm of further analysability. Under such an 
account neither redness nor subjectivity could be described 
as completely unanalysable. For clearly it is possible to 
give a causal description of the phenomena. Although it is 
true that the full meaning cannot be captured, some account 
of what might be called 'synthetic necessary conditions 11~ 
can be given for the phenomena to exist: gi.ven concepts we 
use and knowledge of the world we have, certain conditions 
appear to effect and be necessary for certain phenomena to 
occur. Whilst it is true that some other cause might 
* For example as found in Kant 
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result in similar phenomena (eg. hallucinations of redness 
are not caused by the usual pigments and light conditions), 
it is considered that certain physical and physiological 
conditions must exist for us to call it 'real' red. 
In this way a partial analysis of subjectivity can be 
given. Although in physical or physiological terms part of 
the meaning of subjectivity cannot be captured, nevertheless 
some of what it means to be a subject can be explained. 
However, analysis takes the concept of subjectivity beyond 
the account given by the simple view, for it links the self 
to certain underlying properties which can be analysed. 
Unanalysability remains on a level of meaning, and we cannot 
produce any criterion by which we identify our selves. But 
this is not to s~y that because of such irreducibility we 
know all that there is to know about mental events or 
subjectivity. As Nagel* points out: 
Even though the concept of a mental event implies that it is 
something irreducibly subjective, the possibility remains 
that it is also something physical, because the concept 
doesn't tell us everything about it. 
Nagel p.46 
The following, therefore, is a suggestion of the 
direction in which the simple view might proceed or be 
interpreted to allow for the idea of a persistent subject. 
* Nagel (3) 1986 
2<J3 
11.3 THE NATURE OF SUBJECTIVITY 
The arguments above show fairly convincingly that 
subjectivity can be further understood by reference physical 
cause. Moreover, there are strong intuitive reasons for 
linking subjectivity to some form of consciousness. If this 
can be shown to be so, then it is not the case that 
subjectivity is the most basic description one can give of 
the self, for reference to some kind of consciousness, or 
ability to be conscious, will satisfy the intention of 
'subjectivity' or 'subject'. What then is the relationship 
between the subject and consciousness? 
11.3 (i) Subjectivity and Consciousness 
To say that the subject is associated or even 
identifiable in some way with consciousness, is not to take 
a Lockean-type view of the self as dependent upon, and 
therefore equivalent to, self-consciousness. For if this 
were the case, then the simple view would fail at the first 
hurdle. If it were basically a Lockean account, then it 
could be straightforwardly denied that the self persists 
with anything but loose identity, for self-consciousness is 
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a psychological state and therefore effectively reducible to 
just another part of the content of the mind or one of its 
constitutive properties. Hence the simple view subject 
cannot be the self-consciousness of Locke. 
The disassociation from self-awareness is a reflection of 
the belief that even if the mind is not aware of itself the 
self may persist. Perhaps, then, the self is equivalent to 
consciousness. However, the suggestion that the 
relationship is a simple straightforward equation between 
subjectivity and consciousness is insufficient as well. For 
if sub-conscious activity of the mind is to be associated 
with the self as a subject, then merely equating it with 
consciousness will not be enough. The definition must 
therefore be refined, perhaps to psychological states. It 
might then, be suggested that whatever goes on in the mind 
or at the level of psychological content must necessarily 
have a subject, and without psychological states there could 
be no subjectivity. Thus the property of subjectivity is 
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associated with, and dependent upon, psychological events. 
Rather than claiming that consciousness makes no sense 
without a subject, it is the idea that psychological states 
make no sense without a subject. 
But once again, this must be modified to include 
potential psychological states. For, in addition to the 
times when we are not self-aware or sentient, the self is 
considered to persist through periods of unconsciousness, 
where no psychological activity can be said to occur at all. 
For it is not the case that mind always has active states -
there are times of complete unconsciousness, for example 
whilst under anaesthetic, when it is doubtful whether 
anything more than autonomous brain events are occurring. 
Nevertheless, it is thought that the subject persists 
through these times when the mind experiences nothing. If 
it were not the case that this is so, then the self would be 
as ephemeral as the self of Locke. Thus, rather than the 
actual psychological states themselves, subjectivity is 
associated essentially with the potential for psychological 
states. 
A clearer picture of a· possible simple view account of 
the relationship between the mind and the subject is now 
emerging, one in which subjectivity is associated with the 
possessor or unifier of psychological states. The self is 
that which is aware and conscious of states, though not 
296 
dependent upon them. Subjectivity essentially involves the 
potential for experiencing and owning psychological states. 
Subjectivity cannot be reduced to simply brain states, for 
they may occur without the existence of consciousness, for 
example in coma patients. It seems fair to say, that if all 
psychological states ceased permanently, then the subject 
would not persist. Hence, it is the potential for states 
and consciousness rather than actual psychological activity 
which is characteristic of the subject. 
Under this account, subjectivity can persist through 
time, for it is the potential and ability to be conscious, 
rather than the consciousness itself which is the subject. 
In this way, the self will not fluctuate with different 
states of the mind, from unconsciousness to self-
consciousness, because it is the thing which has those 
states. Subjectivity persists in the continued potentiality 
to experience and have psychological states, whatever in 
practice that entails. It is thus possible to provide a 
criterion for the persistence of subjectivity, and 
subsequently for the self, it is not criterion-less, nor is 
it unanalysable. 
Does this evidence of further analysis indicate that the 
self cannot in fact have real identity? Furthermore, if 
subjectivity can be equated with some form of psychological 
potential or state, 
dualism is false? 
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does this entail that subject/content 
lL. 3 Cii) Real Identity 
The problem is not in the analysability of the self - for 
although it might be analysable, this does not necessarily 
entail that it cannot have real identity. Irreducibility 
has been linked with real identity because of the problems 
associated with empirically determining real identity, for 
if a thing has reductive criterion, knowledge of identity 
becomes difficult. Since we cannot perceive the unity we 
only infer it through constant conjunction or similarly, 
thus any identity we note may simply be a fabrication or 
loose connection. The only things we know to have real 
identity are those which are not analysable or reducible. 
For if divisibility or separable parts are not possible, it 
is certain that if the thing is present then it has 
persisted with real identity. 
The empirical problem is evident in the Lockean account 
of the self, for his theory is totally dependent upon 
empirical evidence. His problem of identity does not arise 
from the analysable nature of the self but because he 
equates the evidence we have of the subject with the subject 
itself. Thus the self is equated with something which 
cannot persist through time, that is, with self-
consciousness. 
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The status and identity of a thing are therefore at issue 
if it is only known through empirical methods, but if they 
are considered to be unanalysable, then tqey can be known 
even empirically to have identity. Therefore, if the simple 
view wishes to produce an analysable concept, not only does 
it have to be more stable than the contents of 
consciousness, but it should be possible to know it in more 
than just an empirical or a posteriori way. 
From the suggestions so far, it seems that the modified 
simple view does indeed manage this. For although the self 
is analysed in terms of potential for psychological states, 
it is not reduced to the fluctuations of consciousness. 
The ability to have consciousness remains one essential 
property through change. This account produces a subject 
which is both more stable than the Lockean self and which 
has more chance of real identity. 
dependent upon our knowledge or 
For its existence is not 
evidence of it it is 
possible that it persists even when we are not aware. 
In this way, the simple view maintains a distinction 
between the thing and the evidence for it. It is true that 
the subject is not an unanalysable fact, but this does not 
entail that it cannot have real identity. For it is claimed 
that such a self is not dependent upon experience to prove 
its existence - it can be known through direct acquaintance. 
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11.3 (jjj)_ Support for Persistence 
Is it possible, then, to uphold such a concept of the 
self? As seen in Part I, once empirical accounts try to 
give persons an objective and stable existence, the self or 
subject disappears, for objective empirical evidence is not 
possible. Can we therefore have evidence for a. persisting 
subject independent of our experience of it? It is a key 
point of the simple view that it does not rely solely upon 
empirical evidence, it makes a clear distinction between how 
we come to be aware of the self and how its existence is 
proven. 
This returns the analysis once again to the evidence of a 
priori knowledge, as explained in Chapter 8. It was 
established then that, although we are dependent upon 
experience for the idea or awareness of some things, their 
existence and truth conditions do not rest in that 
experience. Our knowledge of the subject is through this 
kind of a priori knowledge. The existence of the self or 
subject is therefore supported logically as well as being 
subjectively experienced and is, therefore, not dependent 
upon self-consciousness to exist. Every time we have a 
psychological state there ·must be a subject, something we 
are made aware of when we experience but which is not 
dependent upon our experience for it to be true. The 
subject is therefore not just empirically supported, or just 
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logically defined, our evidence of it is both empirical and 
rational. 
Such a position allows ontology to diverge from empirical 
epistemology. We know a self exists if psychological states 
exist, not just when we experience it but because it has to 
be there for the states to exist. 
However, this claim of the logical necessity of the 
persistence of the self has only the status of definition. 
Although we can be certain that self-conscious and conscious 
states must have a subject, we are not justified in 
inferring that all states have such a subject, unless they 
are defined in this way. For the empirical evidence we have 
of subjectivity is limited to direct awareness of the self 
in experience - any existence it is thought to have in 
relation to sub-conscious or unconscious states is inferred 
from effects we attribute to it and the belief in some form 
of persistence and identity though time. 
Yet despite the simplicity of believing in a persistent 
subject of all brain states, logically speaking it is still 
possible that the self or subject only exists in those 
states in which we are directly aware of it. The problem is 
similar to the choice between a Darwinist account of 
creation and the description found in the bible. Both 
theories can be explained adequately by their own evidence, 
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moreover the objective evidence available means that each 
theory is under-determined for it it will support both sides 
of the claim, though neither conclusively •. The only reason 
for choosing one over the other ultimately rests in the 
appeal of the theories: it may be more attractive to 
believe in the causal process described by evolution, than 
to adopt a view which holds that the earth was made with a 
ready history (unless one is a six-day creationist). 
Likewise, perhaps the idea of a per sis tent self with an 
accurate idea of its history is more attractive than the 
ephemeral self which arrives in existence with a ready, but 
misleading, account of its history. 
In conclusion, despite their attempts to prove more, the 
evidence which the simple view produces for its account of 
the self, can also be used to support a subject of the 
status described by Locke. 
11.3 (iv) Subject/Content Dualism? 
Is the suggestion for the modified simple view merely a 
reduction parallel to that found in Locke, in which the 
subject is in effect reducible to a content of the mind - a 
thought of self-consciousness? For although in Locke there 
is a distinct difference between the thought of 
consciousness and the other thoughts which the self is 
conscious of, both types of thought are basically reducible 
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to states of the mind. Can the potential for consciousness 
also be reduced to just another state or part of the mind? 
It might be tempting to think so to claim that it 
cannot be anything but another facet of mind. Yet there is 
an important difference between Locke and the simple view, 
for the latter postulates the existence of something which 
is independent of the content, something which does not rely 
upon experiences to exist; it is the potential to have 
experiences rather than the experiences themselves. The 
potential for psychological states is not a state in itself 
- it is property but not a content. Thus, in the simple 
view, it is not possible that the subject be a part of the 
mind, for its relationship to it is one of ownership. 
Yet still a potential problem lingers. For a case can be 
made to support the claim that the self of the simple view 
cannot avoid a reduction to certain physical, rather than 
psychological, properties. The potential for consciousness 
can be described as dependent upon certain physical and 
bodily persistence; for example, without certain brain 
states, indeed without a brain itself, consciousness could 
not exist, less so, persist. The self is still 
characterised as essentially consciousness, but that 
consciousness can be seen to rely on other things. 
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Unless a substance dualism is involved, then 
consciousness must be identified with material substance of 
some sort. Yet dualism, as seen, encounte~s fatal problems 
of interaction, and so the self or subject appears to be 
dependent upon persistence of certain physical states. If 
this is correct, it might be argued that the criterion of 
persistence for the subject can be reduced to certain 
physical properties, and so its identity depends upon the 
existence of certain parts or content of the self. 
Such a problem arises if it is believed that conscious 
states are only possible in the particular cells found in 
our brains, but unless consciousness is thus necessarily 
linked to body or brain states, the connection noted between 
the self and the body is only contingent, and not therefore 
a difficulty. In this case, such properties are of 
practical necessity only: without them the self could not be 
instantiated in the normal way, but they are not essentially 
associated with the self. The link between physical 
properties and the self is not like that between the self 
and potential for consciousness: in the latter case, the 
association is one of definition, whereas in the former, it 
is one of practicality. It is only if the self could not 
exist unless those physical states were present, that the 
connection between them would be logically necessary. 
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In this way, it seems there are crucial differences 
between Locke and the simple view: that where Locke does not 
make a subject/content divide, the simple v~ew does, thereby 
enabling the self to have a persistence through time which 
is not dependent on evidence for the self. Although the 
simple view cannot hold property separability, it can 
consistently support a subject/content distinction, thus 
making possible the persistence of the self through time. 
11.3 (v) Actual Separability 
Despite the success of the simple view in its arguments 
for subject/content dualism, its fails to support this 
divide as an actual separability. Thus, although we do make 
a conceptual distinction between the self and its content or 
properties, this is far from providing proof of such a 
division in actuality. More argument is needed to establish 
the subject as able to exist and persist independently from 
its constitutive properties. 
The interdependence of content and subject has been 
suggested once already with respect to practically necessary 
properties, and this association might be extended to 
encompass certain properties such as the memory, ability to 
experience, ability to be conscious etc; all still general 
attributes, but properties nevertheless. It was suggested 
before that the relationship between the self and such 
properties is one of contingent association rather than 
essential definition. 
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Yet the constant conjunction of the 
self with certain other properties does mean that we cannot 
know it in isolation from properties of some sort. How 
then, can we state with any confidence that it is in actual 
fact independent of those properties? 
Even if one wishes to enforce the distinction between 
essence and practical necessity, it can be shown that it 
makes no sense to talk of a subject in isolation from all 
constitutive properties. Thus it is claimed that even if 
none of them are particularly necessary, that the having of 
properties itself is a necessity, for it is nonsense to 
refer to a subject that not subject to something. 
To illustrate this, it might help to consider the ideas 
of a substratum. This modified simple view, still in effect 
defines the self or subject as a substratum to constitutive 
properties. 
identifiable 
In this sense it is propertyless, for it is not 
with any particular properties. Yet any 
substratum, if it is to be more than just an idea, must be a 
substratum of something. Matter is always found with some 
kind of property whether it is solid, liquid or gaseous, 
and even though it may change through all of these states or 
natures, it is never without a nature or property of some 
sort. Likewise, although the self can be the subject of 
many different kinds of changing properties, it always has 
properties of some sort. 
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It is therefore not possible 
to separate the self from properties in actuality. 
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11.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Far from proving separability from all properties, it has 
been shown that the simple view to be cons is tent needs 
certain properties, both mental and physical, to exist. 
However, this does not necessitate collapse into a Lockean-
type theory, for it maintains certain essential 
distinctions, not found in Locke. The self of the simple 
view is known both empirically and rationally, thus enabling 
us to know that it can persist with real identity, even if 
empirically we cannot judge whether that identity holds or 
not. 
The simple view manages therefore to enforce a 
subject/content dualism; having to forego any claims to a 
substance or subject/property dualism. As such, its subject 
is able to have real identity, rather than just the 
fluctuating existence of Locke. However, this is far from 
proving that such a self is necessarily equivalent to the 
person. In order for this further claim to to be sustained, 
the simple view must be able to explain why the person must 
have real identity; and moreover, that the self can fulfil 
the role of person. 
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CHAPTER 12 REAL IDENTITY 
The simple view has successfully shown that the concept 
of subject/content dualism is viable. However, the analysis 
and arguments considered so far have been expressly 
concerned to illustrate that there is more to persons that 
just the empirically determinable properties which they own. 
This has brought the discussion to focus entirely on the 
proofs and justifications of such a thing - in effect a 
discussion of the isolation of the self. 
Despite the effective characterisation of the self, the 
simple view has still failed to show that it is anything but 
conceptually separable from its properties. It is still 
conceivable that Locke was correct, that, in the end, the 
self and its potentiality for consciousness is only an idea 
we have when we are self-conscious. In the absence of any 
other support, the simple view account must now rely upon 
the necessity of a separable self to epistemology, in 
arguments which appeal to the centrality of a propertyless 
and basic self for our c.oncepts of morality, identity and 
even the external world. 
Even then, having established that the person is 
something more than just a collection of propertie~, the 
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simple view must explain why the self is in fact the person: 
why it is the self which determines personal identity, both 
at one time and through time. The equival~nce relies upon 
the necessity of real identity, for the self is the only 
thing which can have real identity and so, must be the 
person since persons must persist with real identity. Thus, 
to uphold its view, the simple account must now show that 
real identity is necessary to persons, and thus why the self 
is to be identified with the person. 
As seen in Chapter 6, this line of argument was used by 
Butler and Reid: it is inherent in their theory of 
individuation, which characterises the form of loose 
..... 
identity as ultimately a mere question of words"'. This 
conclusion is based in the recognition that this form of 
identity, found in successive objects, is really only· 
attributed in virtue of a conceptual persistence and unity. 
The modern simple view also takes up such a position: 
Madell+ claims that a reductive account of identity is to be 
objected to on a fundamental level, for it entails that 
persons will be like objects, whose identities ultimately 
reduce to matters of convention. 
It is true that some objects are considered to have 
only a loose identity; but the consequence of thorough-going 
"f( Section 6 
+ Madell 1981 
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empiricism is that this is the only form of identity in the 
world. To remove real identity from the realm of actual 
possibilities means that nothing, includi~g persons, can 
have an identity independent of convention. Such insistence 
of empiricism leaves our morality and epistemology without 
much fundamental support. 
The simple view claims that, if persons are not identical 
through time, two problems arise: firstly our current 
foundation of morality will disintegrate; and secondly our 
whole epistemology will crumble. It is argued that all of 
our beliefs and ideas in these areas are built upon the 
concept of a person with fixed and real identity. Thus 
empiricism strikes at the very heart of our epistemology -
its conclusions are contrary to all of our beliefs about 
ourselves and the world. 
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12o1 MORAL CENTRALITY OF THE SELF 
J. As already shown" it is not obvious that an identical 
self is a necessity for our morality. A concept of moral 
responsibility needs only an idea that we persist - such a 
concept is often appropriately applied to complex or 
constructed things. It seems that we can use the notion of 
responsibility without a concept either of ourselves as a 
basic or separable self. The fact is, that our notion of 
responsibility already does work when identity is only a 
matter of convention. 
12ol (i) The Moral Obscurity of the Self 
Added to this problem is the intangibility of the simple 
view's self. Like Locke, the simple view encounters 
insurmountable hurdles when faced with the socially forensic 
role of the person. For the self is essentially subjective, 
and like Locke's person, it is only subjectively known. 
This being the only method of personal individuation, it 
becomes impossible to determine the person from a third-
person perspective. 
It is not that the person is actually determined by the 
self, for as has already been explained, the simple view 
strongly distinguishes between evidence and truth. In this 
* Chapter 4 
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respect then, it differs from Locke's idea of person, for at 
least this simple self has a fixed and objective history. 
Once a deed has been done the agent re~ponsible cannot 
change (unless of course the original attribution of blame 
is mistaken). Thus, in contrast to the Lockean account, 
personal identity here can be objectively determined. 
However, the problem is, how to ascertain that identity 
either in the first instance of praise or blame; or in the 
historical activity of linking a present person with the 
past? 
Like Locke, the simple view describes a self whose 
individuation is only possible from a first person point of 
view. In fact, the simple view is worse off than Locke, for 
its person is logically obscure - whereas Locke's is really 
_ only __ p1"actically ~vasive~_ Fol:' alt'tlo!!gh__the_self of Locke j._s 
created and made by the first person, within the account the 
criteria for its identity are logically accessible: that is, 
that it is thought which makes the person what it is, and a 
thought is an empirical thing. Thus, because Locke's 
thought of personhood is a property which logically speaking 
could be empirically located; unless one believes that 
subjectivity is beyond fhe explanatory power of all 
empiricist description, it is possible to individuate a 
certain person at one time. Although in practice it is 
impossible to know what is in each person's concerned 
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consciousness at any moment; the problem in Locke might be 
considered to be one of practice, not logic. 
However, the simple view's self does not even have a 
logical possibility of being identified from the third-
person perspective. The simple theory maintains that 
subjectivity and objectivity are mutually exclusive~ 
moreover, that subjectivity is beyond the explanatory powers 
of the empiricist. For their subject, unlike Locke's has 
no essential empirical properties which identify it - such 
a role can only be achieved by the constitutive properties, 
which in the simple account are only contingent. The self 
does have a property, but it is an intangible one - the 
potentiality for psychological states - and as suggested, it 
is not dependent upon empirical evidence for its 
persistence. 
Through the insistence upon this fact (which, if it be 
remembered, is based in moral argument) the simple view 
sacrifices any practical moral use it might have had, for 
its propertyless-ness makes it completely intangible. The 
person of this view is logically accessible only to itself -
it is both actually and iogically obscure to any third 
person, by definition. 
12.1 (ii) The Person and Properties 
The forensic nature of person as a moral entity entails 
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that it cannot be obscure to others: the person must be an 
interactive and social thing. However, if it is impossible 
to determine whether a person is present or. not, or whether 
the person present is the same as the one who did the action 
in the past, punishment and reward will become precariously 
justified things. It will be upon first-person testimony 
alone that we shall be able to determine the persistence or 
identity of the person, thus exposing the field of morality 
to the abuses of liars and cheats, who we will not be able 
to find out. It might be argued that this is already a 
problem of morality. However, at present, it is considered 
to be a practical problem, in the simple view, we are 
presented with a logical difficulty. 
Memory 
Worse still is the fact that a person cannot be aware of 
himself as a moral agent without the use of certain 
properties, more specifically, a memory. For unless we can 
think of ourselves as things with a past, and associate 
ourselves with persons in the past, we cannot have an idea 
of ourselves as morally responsible. For first-personal or 
direct knowledge of the past is given to us only through 
memory, something recognised and noted by the simple view: 
as Swinburne points out, the memory is our only directly 
known access -I· to the past and past selves. ' 
* Swinburne (1) 1984 
Without this 
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access to the past, how can we consider or identify 
ourselves as persons? The person, then, must at least 
essentially possess the property of having a memory in order 
to identify itself and know what it is. 
Moreover, the correct function of the memory for the 
simple view will entail the use of further properties·. 
This is necessary because of the phenomenon of mistaken 
memories. It arises because from a first-person perspective 
a false memory has the same quality as a true one - there is 
no way, from pure reference to the memory, that we can 
identify them as false. As seen in Part I, Locke defined 
personal concern only in t-erms of memory present to the 
consciousness, thus to him, 
particular memories were 
historical fact. 
it was not of interest whether 
true or false compared to 
However, the simple view believes that memory must be 
compared to fact, hence it is possible to have a false 
memory leading to an inappropriate identification with a 
person in the past. It must therefore explain how identity 
is something more than just memory, in order both for mis-
identification and mistaken· memory to be possible, and to 
enable what it feels is correct identification. Yet the 
sort of identification which is not through direct and 
therefore fallible access to the past (i.e. memory), 
involves some kind reference to properties. 
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Thus, if we are to have appropriate feelings about 
responsibility, there must be some way of determining the 
veracity of the memory. We must therefo~e have something 
else, independent of the memory, to check remembrances 
against: some other form by which to individuate past 
persons. This will necessarily involve some idea of the 
person couched in terms of properties, for the concept of 
propertyless self is useless in such a situation. Moreover, 
these properties must be somehow necessarily linked to us as 
persons, otherwise they will not be justified as true 
identifiers. 
Without the further use of properties, therefore, it is 
difficult to see how a person can use memory as an efficient 
identifier. Without the use of the memory we cannot have 
direct, non-empirical access to ourselves in the past - and 
thus cannot have an idea of ourselves as persons. 
The moral person of the simple view, in its necessary 
isolation from objective properties, is obscure and unable 
to fulfil a moral function. If the meaning of person is to 
be taken as that of a rational and forensic thing, then the 
real self of the simple view fails to produce a concept 
sufficient to the task of being a person. 
The argument from morality offered by the simple view 
clearly does not hold. To support its dualism then, it must 
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fall back on the wider claim that the real identity of the 
person is fundamental to epistemology. 
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The argument of epistemic centrality claims that, if we 
are to have any knowledge of real identity, or indeed an 
idea of real identity, we must be able to know that 
identity, a priori, in something real. This demand finds 
its roots in the problems encountered by Plato .. 
Plato's theory is developed in answer to the observation 
that the fluctuations of the sensory world present a 
distinct problem of knowledge. The objects of the world are 
presented through our senses in a way which entails that 
they cannot be known: since experiences change from one 
moment to the next we cannot know the true identity of 
anything they represent. Hence, we can know nothing of the 
identity of ordinary objects, and cannot subsequently derive 
our idea of identity from them. The notion of identity must 
come from somewhere else: Plato* claims that it comes from 
knowledge of the forms. Thus not only the real identity, 
but the origin of our concept of identity comes from 
something detached from the ordinary world. 
12.2 (i) A Priori Knowledge of the Self 
The simple view responas the this problem by placing the 
self at the centre of knowledge. Rather than through the 
Platonic forms, followers of the simple view argue that our 
* Eg. The Republic 
319 
knowledge of identity is based on knowledge of the identity 
in the self: that the identity of the persisting self is 
the only thing known in this way with direct and certain 
knowledge. Although we are directly acquainted with our 
experiences as well, it is only the self which is known to 
persist. It is therefore the self which is the source of 
our idea of real identity. 
This self must have an actual existence or it will be 
like any other collective term we give real identity - the 
self, then, must exist in actuality. It is an 
epistemological basic, relative to which we identify and 
have knowledge of everything else. The simple view thus 
presents its objection to empirical accounts as a conceptual 
difficulty: that without real identity in persons, we could 
not know the meaning of identity at all. 
Chisholm adopts just such a view, stating that the 
subject or self can be directly known and experienced 
wit4out recourse to empirical evidence. Its perfect 
identity can therefore be known with certainty, and as such, 
it provides the basis of our epistemology of identity: 
It would seem that, if we can individuate anything, if we 
can pick out anything, then it is not the case that the only 
way we have of individuating things is by relating them 
uniquely to still other things. And it may well be, in 
fact, the only way we have, ultimately, of individuating 
anything is to relate it uniquely to ourselves. 
Chisholm (1) p.31 
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In these arguments there is a use of direct experience as 
the evidence and truth about persons. Our self knowledge is 
presented as something as certain as the d~rect experience 
of our sensations and memories, and is therefore known 
indubitably in the way they are. Yet without experience we 
would not be aware of the subject - we know the self through 
its experiences and characterise it purely as that which can 
feel or experience. Does this mean that our knowledge of 
the self is dependent upon empirical information and 
therefore that the self must ultimately be reducible to the 
consciousness described by Locke? 
The answer is no, for in the account of the simple view 
the experiences made use of do not constitute the person, 
they only give rise to awareness of the existence of the 
person: the truth about persons is something different, for 
our knowledge of the self does not rely upon empirical 
inferences, but is direct and certain. We are made aware of 
ourselves through experiences, but we do not depend upon 
such experiences for certainty of that knowledge. Thus it 
is claimed that knowledge of ourselves is in fact a priori 
(as defined by Russell): 
Thus while admitting that. all knowledge is elicited and 
caused by experience, we shall nevertheless hold that some 
knowledge is a priori, in the sense that the experience 
which makes us think of it does not suffice to prove it, but 
merely so directs our attention that we see its truth 
without requiring any proof from experience. 
Russell p.41 
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As Russell goes on to state, the value of such knowledge 
is that it goes beyond the strict phenomenological limits of 
certainty set by rigorous empirical criteria. Without 
synthetic a priori knowledge we cannot move beyond immediate 
experience and tautology, so can say nothing about the world 
beyond sensation. Thus, the modern view holds that it can 
advocate the existence of something which cannot be 
empirically proven. The certainty of the self, though 
empirically elicited, is not empirically dependent. In 
effect, the modern simple view claims to have broken the 
bonds of strict empiricism; providing a priori synthetic 
knowledge. 
Identity Relative to the Self 
Our self-knowledge, being a priori, is certain and is 
therefore a truth a truth about something with real 
identity. All other things are experienced through their 
phenomena or properties, never in themselves. Real identity 
can therefore be experienced in the subject itself, and this 
is the only knowledge of real identity we can have. 
The direct knowledge of the self, enables us to form a 
paradigm of identity, for it is the only direct experience 
that we have of real identity. From the self we measure 
all else, starting with the very notion of identity itself. 
If the self were not fixed, persistent and spatio-temporally 
continuous, it would be impossible to detect things that are 
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not so continuous, or in fact any motion of any sort, for 
the self's view point would be constantly changing and 
altering. We use the self as a fixed reference point. The 
self is that which we assume is stable, and against which we 
measure all motion and all else that exists. If things do 
not change in relation to the self, then we claim that they 
persist, and if they change then they do not.* 
Since only the self can be known in this way, it is upon 
this knowledge that our knowledge of other identities rest: 
all things are subsequently known relative to the self. 
Objects and even experiences over time, are measured against 
the knowledge of the self, our idea of our own identity 
providing a yardstick against which all things are judged. 
In effect, all things are known by a description relative to 
the self, which forms a base of certain and directly known 
truths. 
12.2 (ii) A Relative Concept of Identity 
The simple view therefore places a fundamental importance 
in the role of personal identity as an epistemological 
building block. If we can know ourselves a priori, which 
the simple view claims we can, we can start to talk about 
the world. Knowledge of the identity of objects and things 
other than the self is logically depen~ent upon our 
knowledge of our own identity. For it is something certain 
* See also Shoemaker 1959 
vv 
323 
and real: once recognised it is instinctively known to be 
true. Our awareness of the identity of the self also gives 
us experience of something the identity of which is not mere 
convention, for its unity, synchronic and diachronic - is 
not something merely inferred but directly known. 
However, such a necessity can be challenged in two ways. 
The first focuses on the claim that such an epistemological 
basic is necessary for knowledge. Without these basics we 
would have an infinite chain of relative descriptions. But 
why is this impossible? Is it necessary that the chain 
stops at a determined point, or can things continue to be 
defined as things in terms relative to each other 
indefinitely? The concept of relative space is a coherent 
notion - identity too might be characterised in this way 
rather than as an absolute description. To assume that this 
is not possible, is to assume a position of absolutism with 
regard to the subject of our perception, and knowledge; and 
this is far from proven. 
However, even if one will not accept the view that 
identity need not be absolute, it can still be doubted 
whether it is necessary for knowledge of identity that the 
self be actually separable. Is it not sufficient that we 
believe the self to be separable with real identity and thus 
take it as our basic? The self might still fulfil all of 
... 
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these roles if it is only an agreed stopping point and its 
position as ultimate reference being mere convention. 
It can be shown then, that we need an idea of a 
persisting self to found· the basis of our current 
epistemology. However, it seems that somewhere. along the 
route the intention of the arguments has been lost; in 
leaving behind the moral and forensic implications and 
connotations of the concept of person, the self becomes 
disassociated from personhood. In effect, somewhere along 
the way, the person has been discarded, allowing the self to 
emerge as the object of interest. 
Subsequently, the epistemological necessity discovered in 
the self does not prove that such real identity must be 
found also in persons. To infer that this is so, it is 
necessary to produce more arguments, identifying the self 
with the person. 
vv 
325 
12.3 CONCLUSIONS 
The simple view can claim to have shown that we can have 
real knowledge of something whirih can have ~eal persistence. 
In doing so, it has success fully shown that we can have 
certain and a priori knowledge of something persisting in 
the world. It is this self which we use as a base for our 
conception of moral responsibility, and it is this self 
which forms the keystone of our epistemology. 
However, despite the fact that we do use the idea of the 
self as something with real identity, such a role can be 
fulfilled by a self which, although conceptually 
irreducible, is actually only conventionally determined. It 
does not appear at all obvious that we need a separable self 
to have an idea of real identity. 
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CHAPTER 13 SUMMARY CONCLUSION 
13.1 THE SIMPLE VIEW 
The simple view is a response to the subjective and 
transient problems associated with the Lockean theory ·of 
personal identity. The result of concentrating on empirical 
evidence for persons is an insufficient account - objective 
empiricism loses the subject, and Lockean persons, although 
having the essential subjectivity, do so at the expense of 
any form of persistence or objectivity. By linking this to 
the nature of our beliefs about the future, the simple view 
shows that our concept of our own future makes little sense 
unless we include within the account of personal identity 
the survival and persistence of a propertyless self. Thus 
the complex view which reduces our identity solely to the 
persistence of certain properties, does not account 
sufficiently for our beliefs about ourselves. 
Such an outcome is considered to be fundamentally 
incapable of producing a worthwhile concept of personhood. 
Both the obscure, privacy of its persons, and their 
fluctuating identity, undermines the base of morality. For 
if we cannot individuate or identify others, then punishment 
and reward on a social scale will be impossible; and if we 
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have no idea of our own or other's persistence, there is 
little reason for moral notions of concern and 
responsibility, either for the past or the future. 
Thus the simple view attempts to produce an account which 
allows the person to have real identity. Taking. a rational 
approach, in the hope of allowing persistence in persons, it 
searches for a further element over and above their 
empirical properties. Their rationalism enables them to 
maintain a distinction between identity and the evidence we 
have for identity - thus allowing the possibility that the 
person is more than just empirical properties we have in 
evidence of them. Hence, the simple view effects a 
subject/property distinction. 
The early simple view, was associated strongly with the 
Cartesian account of the soul their motivations, 
intentions and theories seem to be very similar. Both argue 
for a persisting and indivisible self which is separable 
from its body and individual properties. In consequence, 
the early simple view was judged with Cartesian theories -
being rejected for its failure to produce convincing 
rational argument, its inability to prove the actual 
existence of this subject, and the nonsensical implications 
of the theory. 
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13.1 (i) The Modern Simple View 
The modern simple view has emerged with similar 
characteristics, developing the original s_imple view, and 
many of the cartesian arguments, in an effort to support the 
separable subject. It defines the self as an unanalysable 
and propertyless subject: however, after considering this 
idea, it seems that in order to remain consistent, it must 
be modified to the claim that the self is a single 
propertied subject - in effect a return to the cartesian 
idea of a soul which has the property of thinking. This 
does not in itself license a wholesale adoption of Cartesian 
dualism, along with the troublesome mental and physical 
exclusivity, for the persistence and real identity required 
is satisfiable through some form of substance monism. 
It has been shown that this idea of 
dualism is supportable and consistent 
substance/content 
with simple view 
intentions. Under such an account, the self can have both 
identity and persistence, for it is not reducible to the 
empirical properties it owns. Subjectivity is characterised 
as the potential for psychological states, clearly, not a 
collapse back into Lockean theory of self as dependent on 
its content-property of self-consciousness. 
Such a self is clearly not unanalysable, for its meaning 
can be explained by reference to psychological potential. 
However, this does not seem to be of great importance: what 
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is necessary, is that despite being a reductive concept, the 
subject can be known to persist with real identity. Thus, 
even though direct and empirical knowledge cannot confirm 
persistence, we can know that such selves do persist through 
rational and logical knowledge. 
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13.2 IMPLICATIONS OF THE SIMPLE VIEW 
The simple view does manage to support the idea of a 
persisting and existing self that is not merely reducible to 
its properties. 
13o2 (i) Inconclusive Evidence 
However, the simple view fails to show that this self is 
actually separable. The arguments it employs, such as moral 
necessity and epistemic centrality, do not to show that 
such a self is necessary to a person - either morally or 
conceptually. Moreover, it does not seem that the self is 
necessary to epistemology, other than as an idea; less so 
why such a self should be a person. 
This point, then, is not convincingly argued for. As 
shown, the simple view nowhere produces arguments to support 
an actually separable self - all that can be defended is 
that the self is different from properties. Hence, it fails 
to support that the dualism as anything more than a 
conceptual necessity or possibility: the self is real, but 
the simple view has failed to show that it is actually 
separable from the properties. It therefore fails to prove 
that dualism is actual rather than just an idea. It seems 
that the simple view pushes its dualism no further than idea 
of the Lockean self. 
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Yet, it does have a distinct advantage over the Lockean 
theory, recognising both the empirical evidence of 
subjectivity, but adding the rational and therefore 
evidence-independent knowledge. Unlike Locke, the person is 
not dependent on self-awareness; and thus at least it 
answers some of our beliefs about persistence and enables 
moral rationality to have some real and actual basis. 
13.2 (ii) Moral Obscurity 
However, the moral acceptability is not complete, for a 
second problem emerges: like Locke, the simple view fails to 
produce an objective account of persons. The self is 
obscure to the third-person view point: even though not so 
capricious :itdenti ty-wise as Locke's person, it cannot be 
known to persist either to the self or other people. In 
effect, the necessarily tangible and public person is 
equated with an intangible and private self. 
This clearly means that it does not provide a sufficient 
account of persons, for persons need an objective persona to 
accommodate ideas of responsibility and concern - they are 
social beings. Thus, if the modern simple view wishes to 
uphold the forensic role of ~ person, it will fall victim to 
the problems faced by Locke - the focus of attention on the 
self and its experience of persistence, leaves little room 
for accurate third-person identification or a third-person 
perspective. 
PART III 
A NEW VIEW 
of 
PERSONAL IDENTITY 
I am of old and young, of the foolish as much as 
the wise, 
Regardless of others, ever regardful of others, 
Maternal as well as paternal, a child as well as a 
man, 
Stuff'd with the stuff that is coarse and stuff'd 
with the stuff that is fine ••• 
Do I contradict myself? 
Very well then I contradict myself ••• 
Walt Whitman 
'Song of Myself' 
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CHAPTER 14 MORAL VALUE 
Both simple and complex accounts claim that they have a 
moral foundation upon which their concept of person is 
built; both base their claims in how we use and how our 
morality functions. The complex view looks at the value of 
the person and gives an account in terms of certain 
properties recognised as evincing moral behaviour; the 
simple view argues from intuitions about what we value 
ultimately, expressing its conclusions in terms of an 
irreducible self. 
In the absence of metaphysical arguments producing a 
conclusive account (other than by clinging to a certain 
epistemological approach), before moving further in the 
formulation of an account, the intuitive arguments or moral 
reasons must be reassessed. Perhaps an examination of the 
morality of personhood will help produce a solution to the 
problem of personal identity. Such a move refers back to 
the definition of person, which takes it to mean 'that for 
which we feel concern and which is the unit of 
responsibility'. 
The insufficiencies of both. simple and complex theories 
of personal identity mean that there is little . hope of 
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either side producing an acceptable account. It would seem 
that the ideal theory would involve elements from both sides 
- a combination of both the persisting self .and some form of 
objective properties. This formulation of necessary 
conditions, finds its support in the concept of morality: 
they are the key aspects entailed by any concept.wishing to 
produce an account of persons which fulfil a moral role. 
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14.1 SELF AND VALUE 
The simple view amounts to the claim that what is of 
moral value is the propertyless self or subject. This idea 
of the subject is of central value to us: and the belief in 
its persistence takes a foundation role in belief of our 
persistence. For, it claims, it is concern for this which 
underpins the idea of responsibility for ourselves and our 
morality over time: it is the self for which we plan, hope 
or despair. 
As suggested earlier*, these arguments which use concern 
felt for the future make some intuitive good sense: the 
simple view's concept of self does reflect a concern we feel 
for the self over and above the concern we feel for our 
specific properties. This line employs the belief that 
without the concept of a self, the properties seem to have 
little value. Indeed properties without a self lose their 
sense of uniqueness, individuality and the ultimate value in 
their persistence. 
It is true that there is some comfort in knowledge that 
some of our properties may persist after death; a measure of 
survival seems to be achieved through such things as our 
works, children, 
However, it is 
·k Chapter 9 
ideas 
still 
and even 
generally 
others remembering us. 
considered that once 
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dead the individual no longer exists, that he is gone and no 
longer present in the world. It is of little consolation to 
me that properties like those I have now will exist 
somewhere, if it is not I who experience nor own them. Can 
this claim be supported or understood in any way other than 
merely the vague demonstration and thought experiment 
.J. 
already discussed?" 
14o1 (i) The Value of Self as Experiencer 
In a purely functional description, this value we place 
in the self might be explained in terms of centrality: the 
self is the organising unity, the centre for all input. 
Moreover it is that which experiences and therefore appears 
to be where 'I' am. 
This consciousness of this unity - and thus awareness of 
the self - is of the type described by both Kant and Locke. 
In Kant,+ the unity of apperception gives rise to a 
transcendental knowledge of the self; and as described in 
Locke,# unified experience involves an awareness of the 
self. In both cases this unity is what the self is: the 
value we feel for ourselves as individuals is the value of a 
unified experience. 
* See Part II 
+ Kant 1781 
#Locke 1690 
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In Locke, this' awareness of the self is given through its 
reaction to experience: in effect we become aware that we 
are not just passive receivers of information but 
experiencers affected and changed by that sensation. It is 
through these changes to ourselves wrought by experiences 
that we come to know the self - we feel them and react in 
some way with feelings of happiness, sadness, pleasure or 
pain. Thus it would seem that Lockean self essentially 
amounts to the emotional responder. 
As such it is easy to understand why we should feel 
concern for, and value such a self: it is that which has 
the capacity to feel joy or sorrow; it is what makes us 
something other than merely automata or passive data banks. 
It is in order to experience a feeling of well-being that 
most of our actions are performed; and of chief concern in 
our lives is whether it is pleasure or pain we encounter. 
Hence it would seem to be that which we value most: the 
state of such a self has value as an end in itself, most 
actions are aimed at achieving a certain effect upon the 
quality of our experience. 
If this idea of the self is accepted, these states of 
emotion are to be contrasted with the properties of things 
which cause them. Properties have value, but only in 
respect of affecting the states of the self. A pleasurable 
sight, sound or taste has far less importance if there is 
no one to taste, hear or see it. 
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Indeed it would seem that 
the simple view is correct when it claims that it is the 
experience of such sensations which gives ~hem their value: 
from the first-person perspective it appears to be true that 
if no experiencer is present, there is little worth in the 
persistence of the properties at all. 
The experience felt by the self is therefore to be 
distinguished from the feelings - it is not the particular 
experiences that we value most, it is the having of them. 
What is of value 'per se' is the subject. It is true that 
the subject wishes to feel in a certain way and to be in a 
certain state, but the utility of this state is in our 
ability as selves to experience it. It is not the pleasure 
itself we desire: it is the self having the experience of 
pleasure. 
This theory of value is to be distinguished from any sort 
of utilitarian or consequentialist principle: the end in 
itself is not the happiness, the ultimate value for persons 
is not pleasure, what is valued is the subject which 
experiences happiness or pleasure. Such a distinction 
avoids the peculiar utilitarian conclusions which are a 
result of focussing morality or action solely on amounts of 
happiness or utility: where value is placed in happiness 
regardless of who or what experiences it, the result is the 
sacrifice of the individual to general ideas of happiness. 
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Even in refined versions where pleasure or utility is graded 
- making the higher pleasures felt by more refined persons 
most desirable, and animal pleasure one of the least 
desirable - the focus is not on the subject but the pleasure 
or utility. 
This utilitarian line moves toward the kind of value 
explained in Parfit* and later complex views where the 
quality of the individual becomes more important than the 
individual himself. In the case of any value based on 
utility, the quality of pleasure or happiness or whatever 
the individual is capable of feeling, is of more value than 
the individual. In reality, what is of greatest value to 
us, is that we or some particular individual experiences the 
feelings. The ultimate value is surely in the individual, 
not the feelings. 
14.1 (ii) The Moral Self 
The self characterised as the subject makes sense as the 
source of value in persons because it is that which feels 
and reacts. In moral terms, the self is that for which we 
have interests, we wish it to be happy and free from pain. 
It is the centre of value in our own experience and we 
desire what will cause a feeling of well-being. It is this 
perspective that is of true non-derivative concern to the 
self. Particular qualities are only of interest as producers 
.,., Parfit 1984 
of good or bad conditions affecting the self. 
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Thus the 
persistence of the subject is of primary concern and 
therefore its identity is necessary. 
As such, the self might be used to form a base for moral 
behaviour towards others: a belief that they too are selves 
with such interests (that is, to be free from pain etc.) 
which will modify our behaviour towards them. This concept 
relies upon likening the condition of others to that of the 
self: an idea of our own existential value and the 
subsequent rights we accord the self leads to the ascription 
of similar value to independently-existing others. This 
idea is extended to belief that other persons not only have 
but value an individual perspective on the world like that 
experienced by the self. Non-derivative value is therefore 
ascribed to others and consequently persons are considered 
to have a intrinsic value in themselves. 
It is this form of value that seems to provide the 
foundation of equality and treatment in the writings of 
moral philosophers 
J. 
such as Singer". In searching for a 
universal principle in which to base our treatment of 
others, they find that any· appeal to factual considerations 
such as intelligence, race or creed cannot provide a 
·k Singer 1979 
universal criterion. 
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Interests, however, are common to all 
humans: everyone has interests and everyone should have the 
right to pursue them. He states that: 
Equality is a basic ethical principle, not an assertion of 
fact ••• when I make an ethical judgement I must go beyond a 
personal or sectional point of view and take into account 
the interests of all those affected. This means that we 
weigh up interests, considered simply as interests and not 
as my interests, or the interests of Australians, or or 
whites. This provides us with a basic principle of equality: 
the principle of equal consideration. 
The essence of the principle of equal interests is that 
we give equal weight in our moral deliberations to the like 
of interests of all those affected by our actions. 
Singer p.18-19 
In Singer the central idea that the individual is of 
importance - an individual with concerns and interests is a 
fundamental premise for the rest of his theory. 
Unfortunately it is an insight which in his writings becomes 
subsumed under a utilitarian focus on the quality of life 
available. However, remembering the suggestions made 
... 
earlierft as to why such interests are valued, it might be 
understood why we should give the self a key position in 
morality, and why we attribute and acknowledge its existence 
in others, recognising equality of rights in pursuit of 
their concerns. 
Belief in others as subjects with motivation towards 
their own personal aims prevents us from seeing them in 
solely derivative or objective terms: that is, rather than 
* Section 14.1 (i) 
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using others as means to our own ends, we treat others as 
ends in their own right. It is this attitude which Kant 
approves of as the only basis for moral behaviour: others 
should always be regarded as having non-derivative value1':. 
The foundation of such altruistic behaviour could be 
characterised as an empathy with other selves. 
14.1(iii) The Self as the Source of Non-Derivative Value 
Knowledge of this value and identity of the self is 
direct+ and thus assumes a unique epistemological role, 
essential to the existence of our idea non-derivative value 
and identity. Awareness of such values in the self are by 
direct acquaintance, whereas empirical limitations ensure 
the impossibility of knowing such value in the other by 
anything other than indirect acquaintance or description#. 
Unless we have an idea of such value in ourselves based upon 
something known, how can we defend the idea of the 
possibility of such value in others? 
Epistemological limitations do create difficulties for 
belief in non-derivative value in others. For if it is 
empirically imperceptible (that is, one cannot point to any 
particular experienceable · qualities or properties creating 
the value), from where does an idea of its existence arise? 
* Kant 1781 
+ See Section 8.2 
# See Section 8.2 
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One answer is to arrive at it by argument from analogy: the 
behaviour of others that we observe is recognisable from 
qualities and manifestations we experience _in ourselves. A 
move is thus made from knowledge of what is the case for the 
self, to the inference of the existence of a similar 
subjectivity in others. 
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14.2 PROPERTIES AND VALUE 
Having agreed this much, it must however be recognised 
that we do place a necessary though derivative value on the 
properties we consider to be associated with the person and 
the self. Having claimed that it makes little logical sense 
to talk of experiences without an experiencer*, it must also 
be remembered that neither does it make much sense to talk 
of experiencers without the experience+. Pragmatically and 
logically it would seem that experiences give rise to the 
self, but is this the only value that properties have to the 
person? Do the properties have any other significance to us 
other than as logically necessary to existence of the self? 
Is it the case that we value properties for their quality 
not merely logical efficacy. 
14.2 (i) Properties Affecting the Self 
It is very difficult to make intellectual or emotional 
sense of an entirely propertyless self. If asked so to do, 
it is impossible to envisage without some properties being 
present. Even if it were a possibility, what real value 
would a completely propertyless self embody? We value the 
self for its ability to pe~ceive and respond; but it cannot 
feel unless it has sensations, and these are caused and 
tempered by properties. 
* Section 14.1 (i) 
+ See Section 10.2 
345 
Particular properties affect the self: for example, 
memories produce certain responses in present consciousness, 
psychological states will affect feelings,_ a damaged limb 
will cause pain, and even chemicals in the body have been 
shown to have profound effects upon emotional states. Thus 
we will be concerned with which properties are. capable of 
affecting the self and whether they will be of a benevolent 
or malevolent nature? Value is placed in the particular 
quality of our presently associated properties. 
However, we value our properties not only on this passive 
level but also upon an active level, for some properties we 
have react with, or are affected by, other properties of 
ours and the external world. It seems that certain 
properties will determine the sort of emotion and response 
felt: if a person is sensitive to loud noise, a pneumatic 
drill will cause him pain; a mercenary will not react with 
deep distress to killing; a person who has a high pain 
threshold will regard the graze on his finger with 
equanimity; someone plagued with constant pain may feel a 
greater sense of relief from a temporary reprieve from 
sensation than a person with no such illness. Thus the 
quality of response the self feels is largely determined by 
properties we class as ours, ranging from intellect, 
character traits and temper to memories and past events that 
have formed our psychology. 
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There are therefore manifold influences on the quality 
of experience a subject will feel, all of which affect the 
input quality and the reaction to it. I~ is difficult to 
understand how a self can be affected or changed unless it 
has such properties, unless it is somehow in the objective 
world. The self is thus affected by certain· properties 
which are relatively constant and which it calls part of 
itself and, as such, these are of positive value and 
concern, for they determine not only that life will be 
experienced, but how life will be felt - how painful or 
pleasurable it will be. Hence, properties determine the 
experience of the subject and thus the state· of that for 
which we have interests. 
14.2 (ii) Knowledge of our Properties 
Our belief that we have certain properties stems from our 
peculiar and unique perspective on them. If as Locke 
suggests they are encompassed in our consciousness - that 
is, that we are conscious through them, rather than solely 
of them - then we consider them to be ours. We have a 
special relationship to our objective properties which is 
not held between us and other objects, for we are aware of 
them subjectively. We can· experience them as objects, but 
also as part of us and as parts of the subject. In effect, 
we can feel them to be ours, as well as see them. Thus, I 
know that a part of me has feet because I experience through 
them: I can tread on hard objects which cause me pain; I can 
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sit soaking them in a bowl of warm water, which brings 
pleasure. I am aware of the world through these properties 
which seem to be relatively constant - they are part of my 
reacting, my unified consciousness. They are part of my 
perspective on the world. 
Such properties affect the quality of my experiences, and 
thus my subsequent feeling of pain or pleasure. But such 
properties can also be experienced as objects: that is, I 
can perceive them from an objective viewpoint as well as a 
subjective one. This gives both me and my properties a link 
with the objective world: I can experience myself as part of 
the objective and subjective world. 
Furthermore, I observe similar properties in others and 
believe that they too are properties of a self I can 
acknowledge others to be such as myself. Although I cannot 
experience them subjectively, I can perceive them as objects 
and also infer their existence as subjects. The use of such 
properties as evidence is not as random as in the use of 
evidence presented by the simple view, for here there is an 
established link between objective properties and the self -
one directly experienced ·by the self. Although it is 
possible to have only one example of this - that is in the 
self - it seems that this is enough to infer the existence 
of other persons with properties and selves. 
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Although this method of argument from analogy has been 
widely disputed, there is no other way we can know of others 
selves. All arguments which try to prov.ide an objective 
account of selves or consciousness ultimately fail on the 
point of subjectivity: behaviourism, functionalism and even 
a mind/brain identity thesis cannot provide t·he kind of 
evidence of that which will prove the existence of other 
selves. However, since we know that the self exists in at 
least one case, our treatment of others as if they had 
selves can be explained, if not rigorously justified, 
through the use of analogy. Since we know that in at least 
one case there is a self connected to objective properties 
in a direct way, we believe it may be so of others and treat 
them accordingly. The connection between properties and 
selves is not accidental - there is a real connection we 
know of in ourselves and take to be in others. 
14.2 {iii) Value and Memory 
The constant properties associated with our selves we 
call personality. As such it is a profile of what we are in 
objective terms; the way we can be expected to react; how we 
behave towards others; what we can and cannot do; how the 
past has developed us - there is an endless list. It is the 
properties of our personality which we value, for they 
determine the quality of our existence. The personality 
encompasses not only what we are but what we might be: it is 
how we judge what we are and how others place a value upon 
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us. Our personalities give us a persona - a public image -
and thus provide us with an essential ingredient as persons: 
that we have external qualities as well a$ private selves. 
These properties are not only logically necessary to support 
the self, they are necessary for us to be persons, for they 
are what might be termed 'key person-properties'. 
Crucial to ourselves as having particular properties is 
the memory. This functions on both conscious and sub-
conscious level: the content of remembrance reminds us of 
our qualities and properties; and the cumulative learning 
and knowledge held within the memory forms, creates and 
causes our personalities to be what they are today. Even if 
one believes in genetic determination, it cannot be denied 
that our past has had a unique role in creating our 
qualitative identity. Personality is a product of an 
individual, and the affects of circumstance are contained 
within the memory. Without a memory we would not have 
characters - we would have no background affecting us now, 
neither would we know of ourselves as having any particular 
qualities or traits in the present. 
The value of memory in· this role is described by Mary 
Warnock* in her discussion of memory and personal identity. 
After describing Sartre's+ account she concludes that: 
* Warnock 1987 
+ Sartre (2) 1943 
Perhaps it would be better to say that my past is my life, 
and my life is continuous, with a future as well as with a 
past. What my future will be is a matter of choice, but a 
choice that cannot be made except in the light of the past. 
T11e things I have to choose between would not be as they are 
if my past had been different. My consciousness of myself 
in the present, as a person with choices to make, is a 
consciousness inseparable from what has happened to me. My 
present cannot be divorced from my past, neither can my 
concept of self be separated from my awareness of what I was 
in the past. The person and 'his' past are one and the 
same. 
Warnock p.63 
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Warnock here claims that we are the product of our past 
in a way that is unavoidable - everything we are is somehow 
contained within this body of knowledge, events and 
expectations. Sartre himself goes so far as to claim that 
the past is what we are: it is through knowledge of the past 
and reflection upon it that we are created - the memory 
informs and makes us what we are. Although what has 
happened to us is fixed, as we progress through life we come 
to see it differently - we reflect upon it and manipulate it 
to frame both what we are and what we want to be. Warnock 
summarises this idea: 
In the case of humans ••• since they reflect on what they are, 
there is room for them to determine what they will be, in 
accordance with the interpretation they place upon what has 
happened to them. The past becomes 1 their' past precisely 
because it is the subject of reflection. Although I cannot 
change the past, I can change my view of it, and the use I 
put it to. It is like a teol make in a certain shape, but 
flexible, and thus able to be adapted to new circumstances. 
And thus, Sartre, concludes, my past is me. 
Warnock p.62 
The similarity to Locke in this last notion is striking, 
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it even acknowledges the fact that we make the past our own 
by reflecting upon it and using it to frame our beliefs and 
concerns about ourselves. Moreover, it emphasises the 
strength in the Lockean claim that we are what we think we 
are, our memory playing the crucial role in forming this 
belief. Sartre claims that we are free to decide what we 
want to be, and to an extent this will involve using our 
past how we please. Although Sartre' s concept of selves 
maintains that their pasts have a certain historical 
objectivity (and thus are more fixed than Lockean persons), 
his person is still free to change his beliefs and 
descriptions concerning it. In terms of description and 
interpretation, there is no fixed and absolute past - each 
person is free to make of it what he will. Hence the past 
can always be regarded and treated in a different way and 
there is no predetermined causation from which we can trace 
what we were in the past to what we shall be in the future. 
It must be remembered that memory as used here is a 
qualitative description - what Locke and Sartre achieve is 
to isolate our knowledge of the qualitative self. The 
memory provides us with an idea of what we are, the nature 
of our personalities and how we shall be in the future. It 
is the memory which informs us of the properties of which we 
were aware in the past, of the properties we consider to be 
ours in the present, and of the kind of properties we might 
associate with ourselves in the future. This may change 
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through time whilst we remain quantitatively identical - the 
subject remains but its qualities alter. The memory is 
therefore a vital and necessary thing in the conception and 
formation of ourselves as public and significant creatures. 
l4a2 (iv) Public Value 
It may be tempting to think that self-awareness of 
properties is the most important of our considerations, 
indeed that it describes what we truly are. For it isolates 
what we believe or know ourselves to be independent of the 
opinion of others. The memory provides us with an idea of 
what we are and what to value - according to philosophers 
such as Locke and Sartre, we decide what we are using the 
memory to guide us. Locke might not characterise personal 
identity as the conscious decision described by the 
existentialist creation of the self, but in essence the 
roles of self-appraisal and self-determination are the same. 
However, the memory theory provides an account of persons 
which is really only one side of the description. As argued 
earlier* it is difficult to see how such a fluctuating self 
can be all that there is to a person - for as such it is an 
unknown quality, insufficient to fulfil a completely public 
and socially moral role. There is a strong intuitive and 
moral reason for claiming that the memory, though crucially 
* Section 4.3 (iii) 
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linked to our self conception, is not all that we are. 
There is something independent of memory which is of value 
in the identity of the person. 
It is not just in the belief that they are selves with 
properties causing them alternately happiness or pain that 
we value the properties in others. We also value the 
quality of their properties to provide responses in our own 
emotion. We enjoy the particular properties of others in 
entertainment, knowledge, comfort, and so on, as well as 
being wary of their ability to cause us harm, hurt, and 
anguish. Like our own selves, there seems little worth in a 
purely propertyless other - we cannot gain or lose anything 
from it: it is entirely useless. We cannot even fear for 
its pain or pleasure, for it will have none of these things, 
being unable to experience. 
On a public scale, more so than in private assessment, it 
is believed that persons have a fixed past and degree of 
objectivity in the present. As argued earlier*, some level 
of stability and public accessibility is desired and in fact 
believed to exist in person. It is commonly held that a 
person's past is 0 f some relevance to what he is now and 
what can be expected of him in the future: if the above 
account is correct, then it plays an integral role in the 
creation of the person. The past then, makes us into our 
* Section 4.3 
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present selves; moreover we have a number of associated 
properties which affect the way we act and react. Because 
of the inaccessibility of consciousness . of others these 
properties play a significant role in our assessment of 
other persons and their values. 
We do judge and characterise other persons - it is not 
solely down to the self to determine its own character. The 
third-person description of others is of almost equal 
importance to us as our own perceptions of ourselves for it 
determines whether we are wanted, liked, loved or needed in 
society a position which will affect profoundly the 
quality of our existence. 
However, although what goes into making the person might 
be considered to be absolute, what is chosen as relevant to 
the character of that person now is not. The subjective 
interpretation and selective judgement of personality seen 
in Locke and Sartre extends also to assessment of others. 
All empirical qualities are subjectively interpreted, 
whether they belong to the self or to someone else: when I 
look at someone else, the properties and personality I 
ascribe to him will be the result of my personal 
interpretation. Separate observers might perceive different 
elements and thus the importance of qualities differs. For 
example, the character and value ascribed to a Nazi SS 
Officer by his daughter, will entirely different from those 
ascribed to him by a member of the Jewish race. 
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This 
variety of description extends even to properties unknown to 
the self, but observed in him by another •. In all cases it 
seems that although we consider the referent to be the same, 
the connotation ascribed to any person may well differ from 
account to account. We all make of others what we will, 
and their properties are valued in the significance they 
have for us. 
Recognition of this fact may lead to the belief that 
qualitatively persons are not fixed: that personalities do 
not have some absolute truth about them, thus concluding 
that our desire for certain knowledge of others is 
impossible. Such would be the outcome of any theory that 
claims with Locke that, what is of importance in persons is 
the value and concern they have for themselves or others. 
More so in the existentialist view, for in despair of 
finding any objective truth, it focuses solely on the 
relationship of the subject to the beliefs he has about 
himself and others. 
Yet the phenomenon of different descriptions is also 
consistent with the belief that personalities are in some 
way absolute - but no one is capable of appreciating every 
facet and description of a particular person. Thus if it is 
agreed that the awareness we have of value must be somehow 
underpinned with a stable and fixed past, then the person 
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becomes more tangible and hence able to fulfil his forensic 
role. Any account which does not define the person solely 
in terms of 1 how it seems' should be abl,e to provide the 
historical stability required for such an approach. 
14.2 (v) Stable Personalities 
Belief in the historical objectivity of persons rests 
more easily with beliefs both about ourselves and others. 
We do come to expect certain stability in people - not that 
they might regularly alter completely from day to day. 
Moreover, although each of us might agree that his account 
of a person may differ from the next man 1 s, where such 
conflicts of opinion occur we are willing to accept the 
validity of different descriptions of persons, including 
ourselves. Moreover, such acceptance is not with a 
relativistic intention it is not that we believe each 
description to be true or valid but incompatible with 
others; if we accept them, it is because we take the 
accounts to be additional information, often adding them to 
our own descriptions, in the belief that we are enriching 
our knowledge of that person. 
Usually only a dramatic-revelation causes us to describe 
a person in completely different terms - in such cases it is 
usually believed that the former assessment was wrong in the 
light of new facts, rather than that the person has 
radically changed. Over a period of time we are ready to 
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accept gradual development, but such change is causally 
consistent with the individual's qualities, his past and his 
present. In cases where there is sudden_change or rapid 
alteration, for example debilitating illness, loss of 
memory, or psychological disorder, it is true that the 
personality or properties can radically alter •. often this 
results in irreconcilably differing descriptions of the same 
person, either over time or, in the case of split 
personality, at one time. However in such cases the cause 
is attributed to an abnormal occurrence it is not 
something we expect in healthy persons. The person is still 
described in absolute and fixed terms and the conflicting 
descriptions explained by an abnormal state of affairs 
induced by illness. 
This account of value in properties accords with our 
variable conceptions of ourselves and others - that at times 
we consider certain qualities to be part of us, and while in 
others the same properties are totally disregarded. Because 
such properties are of derivative value they will be more, 
or less, important in certain situations. It is only with 
very close friends or family that we develop a deeper 
understanding of qualiti~, mutability and variety of 
appropriate descriptions; and it is often with these people 
that we desire those things to be more fixed and stable, 
rather than fluctuating with interests. 
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14.3 CONCLUSIONS 
In the basic attribution of human rights the self is the 
touchstone; but in terms of people we wish· to be in contact 
with, relate to, avoid, or engage in any other social 
interaction with, the properties seem to be of greater 
importance. In close relationships we come to value the 
self in another person in terms considering more than merely 
fundamental rights or utility; but even then, unless the tie 
is very strong, properties will influence our attitude 
towards that individual. For the majority of people we 
encounter, the principle value we hold for them is in the 
the qualities and properties they have. 
The qualities we associate with particular people are 
what we call their personalities - and indication perhaps 
that they have something to do with the person rather than 
just the man. These can be consciously known or even 
unknown to the person but they are nevertheless thought to 
be the essential him or her. The personality is something 
to which people do feel strongly connected: it accounts for 
a large part of the value we attribute to others as social 
beings. 
The personality determines how one is treated, how one is 
accepted in society and the value placed on an individual by 
others. The personality is therefore of great and deep 
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value to us as persons, for it is how we are judged by 
ourselves and others - what we are taken to be. In effect, 
personality is a characterisation of the pe.rson: it is to be 
distinguished from mere accidental qualities. 
Thus although the non-derivative value seems to be in the 
act of emotional response, it is difficult to make sense of 
any value in the potential for such response in isolation 
from any properties. Nevertheless it is only the 
propertyless self for which we feel non-derivative value it 
is the self which we value as an end in itself; the value 
qualities have is derivative, being in the role of providing 
experiences for the self. 
It seems then, that if value is taken into consideration, 
the person is not the separable self of the simple view, nor 
the self-consciousness of Locke, nor indeed the properties 
of the complex objective empiricists: the person is a 
combination of all three. The value we place in persons 
cannot be explained without acknowledgement of the 
contribution from all three descriptions of persons - the 
persisting self, the self-aware subject and objective 
properties. 
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CHAPTER 15 MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
To make the basic value of interest the fundamental and 
only criterion of person is not sufficient to account for 
the morality of persons, for it fails to account for the 
moral responsibility we feel and impute and entails that 
those we would wish to excuse from moral action will not be 
excluded. Thus, a morality of personal rights founded 
solely upon equality of interest and utility will include 
amongst its participants not only lunatics and infants, but-
possibly animals too. 
exemplified in Singers's 
These consequences are vividly 
J. discussion of ethics", where he 
takes the extremes of any interest-based morality to imply 
that animals and all sentient beings should be included in 
our personal morality. 
There are of course ways in which one can adhere to an 
interest related ethic yet maintain that animals, infants ot 
lunatics are excluded from the concerns of personal rights. 
For example, one might introduce the idea of self-consciou~ 
interest, thus effectively excluding most animals from thE 
sphere of morality. Or in contrast one might feel that il 
is right to include animals and non-self-conscious huma1 
beings in a morality - they feel pain and pleasure as we d 
* Singer 1979 
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and we afford them the basic rights of freedom from pain 
(except in the case of factory farming, where it appears 
animals are not considered to have such interests). 
However, I wish to argue that even given these 
considerations, a morality of personal rights must include 
more than simply a criterion of self-interested concern. I 
have already shown how this concern might be considered to 
be the source of non-derivative moral value in ourselves and 
others; but more is needed if responsibility is to be part 
of the moral code, and the subsequent system of punishment 
and reward regarded as necessary in most personal inter-
relationships is to be accounted for. 
Thus, although we might explain our source of moral value 
in basic terms of interest and utility, something more must 
be added. Awareness of a subject with certain interests 
does not imply personal responsibility. All that it implies 
is that we have certain concerns about the way we are 
affected by certain input 
-
not that we are in any way 
responsible for the reactions to that experience and any 
subsequent action in response to it. The existence and 
awareness of the self does not entail the existence of a 
responsible self or indeed a self with a notion of 
responsibility. 
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15.1 RESPONSIBILITY AND SELVES 
In order to feel responsible for our actions or to blame 
others for theirs, some idea of agency is needed. We must 
consider that the action was willed or intended by the 
person, otherwise he is not entirely culpable for the 
consequences. We may attribute some degree of blame in the 
form of identifying the individual responsible for the 
action, but there is a degree of reluctance in holding 
individuals morally responsible if their actions were 
performed under duress, diminished control, illness or even 
simply ignorance. What criterion is necessary to the 
concept of person to ensure that it will encompass the role 
of a responsible unit? 
15.1 (i) Attribution of Responsibility 
Primarily, responsibility is attributed to the individual 
who caused the event - we talk of a fallen branch being 
responsible for the hole in the roof. But praise or blame 
is not always attributed to such involuntary acts: what 
appear to be rewards or punishments are often enforced as 
pragmatic solutions, not moral censures. Thus, a particular 
tree might be encouraged ~nd prized for acting as a wind 
shield, or by contrast, felled if the branches start to fall 
on passers-by; but in both cases the treatment is not 
considered a punishment or reward - it is a practical move 
intended to encourage or prevent certain events from 
recurring. 
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Likewise, although a psychopath may be locked 
away for violent behaviour, such treatment is essentially to 
protect the community, rather than as a punishment for 
intended actions. If an action deserves moral credit or 
blame, it is attributed on the assumption of voluntary 
behaviour. 
The importance of this distinction is emphasised as early 
as Aristotle*, who discusses a length the various forms 
under which behaviour can be classed: 
He 
Since moral goodness is concerned with feelings and actions, 
and those that are voluntary receive praise and blame, 
whereas those that are involuntary receive pardon and 
sometimes pity too, students of moral goodness must 
presumably determine the limits of the voluntary and 
involuntary. Such a course is useful also for legislators 
wiLh a view to prescribing honours and punishments. 
Aristotle(2) p.lll 
classifies actions as voluntary, involuntary 
(performed under duress) and non-voluntary (ignorant). Only 
voluntary actions can be considered morally culpable; and 
only then if they are done out of a considered choice, 
rather than unthought reaction. He goes on to define moral 
choice as being distinguishable from desire, temper, wishes 
and even opinion: the res_ponsible act has to be intended 
deliberately with consciousness of the choice; moreover it 
must be something for which we have the power of commanding 
or denying. The morally responsible act, according to 
-1r Aristotle (2) 
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Aristotle, effectively excludes all those without ability to 
consider and reflect upon their actions - such as children, 
lunatics and animals. 
It seems, then, that there is a hierarchy of behaviour 
involving an increasing responsibility, with moral 
responsibility placed at the head, and involving voluntary 
and intended actions. If the agent is to be considered in a 
moral light, then the acts must have been performed 
voluntarily - any influence from determined behaviour is 
often counted as an extenuating circumstance. It is this 
potential as agents that we value most highly in persons, 
and it is this agency for which we feel real moral 
responsibility. If we could not have done otherwise, it is 
not our fault and therefore, no use feeling guilty about it. 
15.1 (ii) Properties and Predetermination 
However, the existence of such free behaviour is the bone 
of great philosophical contention: what characterises a 
truly voluntary act? Can we really be totally free to will 
and do as we choose? The problem emerges as a conflict 
between free will and determinism: the difference between 
the view that every event ·is causally determined, and the 
belief that we have a free will overriding any such 
determinism and making all our intended actions completely 
voluntary. 
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Physical and psychological traits can be entirely 
explained as the product of outside influences: we are born 
with certain genetic structure; we do not choose our parents 
nor formative social background, and we cannot control the 
events that might affect our psychological or physical 
character. Thus any product of these will be determined: it 
is logically possible that a causal explanation of any 
resulting individual or action can be given. In effect, our 
character and our actions are no more than the product of 
uncontrollable circumstances - ultimately we cannnot help 
what we are or do. 
It would seem tha·t, if a straightforward empiricist 
approach to persons is taken, then this conclusion is 
unavoidable. If the person amounts to no more than his or 
her properties, and the identity of the person can be 
explained in terms of those properties - their continuity 
and historical objectivity then that person will be 
totally accounted for in any description of those 
properties. Since properties are causally related and 
considered to be 'out there' in the world of objects, the 
person will presumably have both a causally traceable past 
and future. The person will be causally determined. 
If this is so, why should we feel responsible for our 
actions? We can feel concerned, because the action or event 
will affect our experiences. Moreover, we might be 
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identified as the cause of the act in the way that we might 
blame a branch for wrecking a greenhouse. But unless we can 
control what we are and do, can we be held morally 
responsible? It is argued that unless we have a will, 
somehow disconnected from our properties, we cannot be held 
responsible for our deeds nor classed as true agents. For 
in effect we are no more than sophisticated machines or 
animals. 
This requirement, that moral behaviour be completely non-
determined, is articulated most forcefully in Kantian 
.. , 
ethics'. Kant states that an act can only be virtuous if it 
is performed completely voluntarily. Moreover, it is not 
enough that our acts are perfo~med free from duress, for 
even those who are naturally inclined to be good are not 
automatically virtuous people. The act cannot be performed 
merely out of inclination, it must be actively decided upon. 
The truly moral act must then be totally free from any 
determination caused by our nature. 
Hence, it is claimed that, if we are to be morally 
culpable, we cannot be made up of solely determined 
properties. Some part must be free from causation, to 
enable voluntary behaviour for which we can be held 
responsible. The concept of a free will tries to solve this 
problem of volition, providing a part of persons which can 
-.'c Kant 1781 
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override the determination of our properties. It accounts 
for the belief that at any time we could have done things 
differently. 
If we are to have free will, we must have an idea of a 
propertyless self: the self, in its propertyle·ss-ness, is 
free from such constraints to act and feel as it wills. It 
would seem that a self which is essentially disassociated 
from properties is a necessary element in our conception of 
moral responsibility. Perhaps then the simple view was 
correct in its claim that the separable self is the 
foundation of morality - but for the wrong reasons. 
15.1 (iii) Agency and Causation 
The solution of free will, however, engenders a further 
difficulty concerning responsibility. For it is claimed 
that responsible acts cannot be totally free from causation: 
if they were, our behaviour would be random or mere 
accident. As such, 'free' behaviour is nonsensical and 
uncontrolled: if an act is totally uncaused it cannot be the 
product of a volition. In effect, an impasse is reached -
we cannot be responsible if determined, yet if our acts are 
uncaused, we cannot be responsible for them either • 
.. , 
Chisholm' describes the difficulty as follows: 
The metaphysical problem of htnnan freedom might be 
summarized in the following way: Human beings are 
responsible agents, but this fact appears to conflict with 
* Chisholm (3) 1964 
an indeterminist view of human action (the view that the act 
or some event that is essential to the act, is not caused at 
all. 
Chisholm (3) p.24 
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There have been many theories at tempting to reconcile 
free will with determinism - most amounting to a kind of 
freedom which entails what we call free behaviour, such as 
volition or choice. They state that although this behaviour 
is caused by someone or something, it is of a type which we 
consider to be voluntary, therefore it is free to an extent 
and we can be held responsible for it. 
Yet if we accept such theories - in effect that freedom 
is a social construction rather than a reality - we still 
encounter the problem of determinism at a deep level. Can 
we help what we do? If we cannot, then social punishment 
cannot realistically be imposed as a penalty, but must 
remain only as a method of removing anti-social elements. 
If it were thought of as punishment for deeds we could not 
help, then social law would not be particularly just. There 
is a need for a real distinction rather than just a 
labelling process if we are to feel and act genuinely in a 
moral light both towards others and in acceptance of 
responsibility. 
As remarked earlier,* our actions cannot be totally 
·k P• 369 
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uncaused for that would entail complete disassociation from 
responsibility for them too. This idea is reflected in our 
beliefs that blameful or praiseworthy acts should be 
consistent with a certain personality in ourselves and 
others. Deeds done out of character or at random are 
considered to be exceptions or often are blamed upon 
something other than just the agent, even to the extent of 
absolving the person of moral responsibility. We do believe 
that a person has certain qualities or properties that are 
decisive in the decision-making process and these are 
considered to be traits or tendencies which can be used to 
explain the choices made. If the choice conflicts with this 
anticipation then it is often the case that we make 
exceptions in the judgement or attribution of 
responsibility. 
Yet the causal process seems to be unlike a 
straightforward cause and effect - for one trait or event 
might have any one of a number of effects, both on the 
development of the person and on his reactions. We can 
trace a causal line backwards using hindsight to locate the 
source of any action, but to predict of future behaviour 
would be either extremely aifficult or impossible. If one 
were aiming to reconcile freedom with determinism, any 
prediction would prove impossible in practice, for the 
number of options available to any particular agent would 
make any calculation beyond the next minute fiendishly 
complex, producing an incomprehensible number 
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of 
possibilities. If however, one wished to remain a free will 
advocate, one might describe the choice at any one juncture 
as completely free the choice of which path is not 
influenced by anything other than the will: hence it is 
impossible to predict. 
There is, then, a sense in which some determinism is 
demanded in moral actions - in effect that they be a result 
of who the person is: that his behaviour is caused by a 
character or personality. Indeed, some would claim that the 
choices at this fundamental level determine the character of 
the self and so are of fundamental value. For example, 
Charles Taylor* writes of fundamental evaluative choices 
that: 
This radical evaluation is a deep reflection, and a self-
reflection in a special sense: it is a reflection about the 
self, its most fundamental issues, and a reflection which 
engages the self most wholly and deeply. Because it engages 
the whole self without a fixed yardstick it can be called a 
personal reflection •• ; and what emerges from it is a self-
resolution in a strong sense, for in this reflection the 
self is in question; what is at stake is the definition of 
those inchoate evaluations which are sensed to be essential 
to our identity. 
Taylor p.126 
Thus it is claimed that, such things as personality, 
belief, background and genetic determination do contribute 
towards actions; but at a fundamental level we choose what 
affects or causes our actions: we decide what we do by 
'~' Taylor 1976 
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assessing and reflecting upon our basic beliefs and 
personality. Thus sense can be made of the apparent dilemma 
facing any moralist: by an appeal to some.thing other than 
normal causation being the creative source of the agent. 
The character of the person cannot result merely from a 
natural inclination for that would not be free: ·it must be 
made from undetermined choices. These reflections form the 
bedrock of subsequent action, determining what the person 
will become. In this way the argument returns once more to 
a very Sartrean perspective: that we are free to choose what 
to make of ourselves, and this is the fundamental basis of 
morality. 
15.1 (iv) Experience of Freedom 
Whether determinism be true or false, the fact remains 
that we need a concept of voluntary and intended action to 
make sense of responsibility. However, this idea of being 
free agents is not simply a logical concept: it is something 
experienced within the self. Willing and acting with effect 
can be experienced subjectively knowledge of voluntary 
acts and their effects in the objective world is direct. We 
experience both as the acting subject and the affected 
object. For example in lifting my arm I can feel myself 
doing it subjectively, as well as watch it occurring 
objectively. It is through the ability to control 
properties volutarily, and through experience of our own 
actions and reactions, that we come to an awareness of 
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ourselves as responsible agents: we experience ourselves as 
voluntary actors when we can control intent and action. 
Like basic value of interests,* our understanding of 
ourselves as subjects with wills is used as an analogy to 
form the belief that others too have such wills.. Strawson+ 
bases the resentful attitude that comes with moral blame on 
the belief that others intend to cause their actions. Thus 
we hold others responsible for behaviour we consider they 
caused, believing that they too can choose whether or not to 
cause certain events. It is this belief in an agent with 
not only feelings but ability to act voluntarily, that is 
the basis for inter-personal 
relationships. 
* See Section 14.1 (iii) 
+ Strawson 1962 
and responsible moral 
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15.2 OTHERS AND RESPONSIBILITY 
If the suggestions of the previous section are correct, 
we believe that we have a free will and that we can choose 
to be what we want; we can choose to act in the way we wish; 
and we are free to act and react as we please. However, 
there still remains a difficulty: that is, the self is a 
public being - it has a public responsibility as well as a 
privately felt one. 
15.2 (i) Public Persons 
As mentioned numerous times before the concept of persons 
and the drama of responsibility is not something enacted 
solely at an individual or subjective level. Guilt, pride 
or blame are concepts which do not extend merely to our 
concern for our own present and future: they involve the 
effect actions have upon others, and the impact their 
actions have upon us. Even if we were to insist that every 
action is ultimately a selfish action and every concern 
reducible to the effect felt by ourselves, the existence of 
others must still be recognised, for they affect us and we 
hold them responsible for that effect. 
That the term 1 person' does have a social and public 
meaning we cannot deny even if we wish to argue over the 
motivation behind it. As such the identity of persons must 
have some form of third-person objective identification: for 
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if persons are to be punished, to have rights, to be moral 
and responsible agents in society, some method of 
individuation and reliable identification is necessary. 
This need for empirical identification can be illustrated 
by envisaging a situation parallel to the fable .of the Ring 
of Gyges. If persons were intangible like the invisible 
person with the magic ring, would they continue to be moral? 
If we thought that we could not be identified, would we 
continue to use our concept of social responsibility 
continue to feel guilt or blame for our actions? 
Less cynically, if identification methods were not based 
in some certainty, it is questionable whether we could bring 
ourselves to impose a system of punishment. If the 
connection between the subject or person and his empirical 
properties is contingent, then we cannot be certain that the 
properties are indicative of the person. Such contingency 
may leave open the possibility that innocent men be punished 
for crimes of others, simply because those punishing base 
their knowledge of identity on intrinsically fallible 
evidence. 
As with all thought experiments it is not possible to 
produce certain answers from these suggestions, but they do 
serve to show that the effect of being unable to identify 
persons with confidence would involve a change of current 
375 
conditions comparable to those imagined in a thought 
experiment. For to undermine the ability to individuate 
would be to use the term 'person' outside its normal 
operating conditions, and thus to subject it to strains 
under which it does not at present have to function. To 
avoid taking the concept beyond its normal usages, and thus 
to provide an accurate account of the concept of person, we 
must therefore ensure that the criteria provided do enable 
objective identification of persons otherwise what is 
produced will not be an account of our current concept of 
personhood. 
If then, the concept of person is removed from the 
tangible realm, our existing methods of identification and 
blame could not persist. It may be that under such changed 
conditions the notion of social responsibility which lies in 
ability to determine accurately individual agents, would not 
continue. If the person is to have inter-personal 
relationships and personal responsibility is to be extended 
to others, although the self is a necessary element, more 
than this is needed for the criteria of persons. 
The way we individuate ·persons other than ourselves is 
through emp~rical properties. This point is uncontentious, 
for it is difficult to imagine any other method apart from 
some form of psychological information, which in itself must 
be presented in an empirical way if it is to be effective in 
public. 
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Empirical properties are the only access others 
have to the agent. We must infer the existence of any 
aspects of others believed to be beyond prpperties - even a 
personal testimony from the subject itself must be empirical 
to a third-person observer. It is our practice to judge and 
evaluate a person on the strength of these properties and 
they are all our only source of evidence in this respect 
concerning others. 
This empirical nature of our social dealings leads some 
... 
philosophers to behaviouristic or functionalistic accounts,n 
in ·effect stating that this is all there is to the person. 
The extent of our use of the properties of persons is indeed 
almost behaviouristic, and in public the properties 
including behaviour, past acts and personal statements are 
considered to be the person. They are this personality, or 
character, and are taken to be that person - we have nothing 
more than this to go on. This point is made by Sartre+ when 
he writes that: 
In life, a man commits himself, draws his portrait and there 
is nothing but that portrait ••• What we mean to say is that a 
man is no other than a series of undertakings, that he is 
the sum, the organisation, the set of relations that 
constitute these undertakings. 
Sartre (2) p.42 
However, the arguments hitherto, if sound, have shown the 
individual person must be more than just the sum of his 
* For example Ryle 1949 or Dennett 1978 
+ Sartre (2) 1946 
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properties; that the self is necessary to the concept of 
person. Thus behaviourism or functionalism, though 
providing an accurate description of pa~t .of what it means 
to be a person, is not sufficient to account wholly for 
persons. 
15.2 (ii) Properties as Evidence of the Self 
The simple view recognises the close relationship between 
the self and its properties and characterises it as one 
between a thing and its evidence. Thus it claims that 
properties can be taken as evidence of the self, though they 
must not be identified with the self, for the self is 
separable from the properties. Yet if the connection 
between evidence and object is to be of any real value, we 
need to know that it has some sure and necessary foundation, 
rather than some coincidence or constant conjunction. The 
simple view claims that the memory tells us of our past and 
provides evidence of our past public selves, but how can 
this be so if the self is objectively propertyless? 
The simple view relies upon the credulity principle for 
justification, but as argued ." earlier' this can give us 
nothing but likelihood based on intuitive responses. The 
most that. the simple view can ensure is that it is likely 
-,': Chapter 7 
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that we can rely upon our properties to inform us of the 
person and its identity. Moreover, even if we accept that 
memory is simply good evidence of personal identity, it is 
difficult to understand how this might be so, given the 
nature of the self. It is intangible, not in space or time, 
and a subject possessing real identity. How then can 
tangible, temporal and spatial objects without strict 
identity be signs of the self? The problem seems to reduce 
to a case similar to the mind/body problem: how can the 
mental affect the material, and vice versa? How does the 
connection work? 
It has become clear that the concept of person must 
include properties within its definition of the essence of 
persons. The self cannot extend to such boundaries and 
though essential is not sufficient to provide an accurate 
account. To regard the self as the person would be to place 
limitations disqualifying it from its proper function. The 
new concept may attain a certain and absolute identity but 
it sacrifices the present meaning of the concept • 
..... 
It has been argued before"' that certain properties are 
necessary to support the self practically rather than 
conceptually. What emerged was the idea that the self is 
not separable in fact from certain properties and therefore 
if those properties were present, so too might a self be. 
"~' Chapter 11 
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This might provide a solution to the problems of the 
intangible self: for it would entail that the self is not 
intangible - its identity with certain prop~rties means that 
it has a certain physical and therefore publicly 
identifiable aspect. 
If it is the case that the self is inseparable from its 
properties, we can explain more coherently why the 
properties are reliable evidence of the self: it is because 
the self is necessarily dependent upon those properties in 
every instance that we know of. We experience the 
connection in ourselves, and understand a relationship 
between ourselves and certain properties; a relationship 
involving our dependence upon them and a direct awareness of 
them. If this is the case then we are justified in judging 
and administering justice based in individuation by 
properties, for the properties are part of the person - a 
reliable part of them. However, if the use of properties in 
identification of persons is simply the identification of 
selves, then such a suggestion has disadvantages. Indeed 
the objections make it impossible to to be satisfied with 
the self as the person. 
Change and Properties 
The first is a problem which is common to all attempts to 
account for identity in empirical terms: that contingent 
properties make possible complete changes in empirical 
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appearance, and if this is so, then we can not rely upon 
them to indicate persistence of the self. The major thrust 
of this objection can be dealt with fairly. easily with the 
suggestion that degrees of change are tolerated in 
properties, but only gradual developments restricted by 
continuity. There are rules applying to different things 
defining the identity conditions we set for them, which 
allow successions of material 
renewal. 
and eventually wholesale 
Total or rapid change, or even in some cases gradual 
development, is not tolerated in persons. There is 
difficulty in cases where the development is drama tic or 
instantaneous and it can be difficult to judge whether or 
not the person has indeed survived. For example in the case 
of the repentant or reformed character, it can be disputed 
as to whether he is still responsible for his crime; many 
people would not wish to feel responsible for the actions 
they performed as children: it is sometimes thought that the 
senile or insane are no longer the same person as they were 
before illness struck. 
This answer provides a satisfactory reply for the 
empiricist, who reduces the person to its properties, but 
it does not help to explain the relationship between the 
properties and the self. For as noted earlier,* particular 
1: Chapter 11 
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properties do not seem to be necessary to the self - the 
self is considered to be independent of its qualitative 
identity. Some properties are practica~ly essential to 
enable instantiation of the self, but a necessary connection 
to specific properties has not been explained. If this is 
so, then properties can change 'ad hoc' yet the self 
persist. 
Furthermore, it is possible that whilst certain 
properties exist, no self is present - such as might be 
evidenced by a corpse, a machine or even an animal. If it 
is the case that the properties are present, yet there is no 
self, then the properties cannot be an exclusive indicator 
of the self. Such a state of affairs will entail that we 
cannot be assured that the properties indicate a self at all 
- the self as described still has no necessary public image, 
for it can only be identified as a self by itself. 
Thus the connection between particular properties and the 
self can amount to no more than contingent evidence and 
cannot therefore bear the burden of the concept of person, 
nor adequately explain our faith in properties as 
indicative of persons. If the self were the person, the 
contingent links between the person and its manifestation 
would allow its identity to persist through complete and 
radical empirical change, 
continuance of properties. 
or its cessation despite 
This clearly does not reflect 
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the demands and conditions within which we employ the notion 
of the person - if it were the case, the concept of person 
and responsibility could not continue to be used in the way 
it is. 
The insufficiency is not confined to practice, for the 
contingency of properties with respect to selves entails 
that it becomes logically impossible to be certain of 
accurate identification of persons. Such difficulties have 
-'( 
already been discussed with respect to Locke'- that even the 
self is not immune to mis-identification of its past selves. 
Yet if we cannot feel certain of the logical possibility of 
identifying the person, we could not employ the form of 
punishment and reward with regard to personal rights that we 
do. For the ascription of justice would be subject to a 
logical rather than just practical difficulty of accurate 
identification. Certainty would be beyond all possibility. 
15.2 (iii) Properties as Necessary to Individuation 
In consideration of personal identity, it must be also 
remembered that the self is not the sole unit of concern in 
moral responsibility either to the self or to others. 
Moral acts are not only v~lued or noticed because they are 
initiated by selves, for they are performed by properties 
and qualities of persons. Such properties are not valued in 
"l'' See Chapter 4. 
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forensic terms simply for their supporting role of the self; 
they are considered to be the person and just as responsible 
for the actions as the self. Without the characteristic 
personality the self could not be a person: it could not act 
or feel, let alone feel responsible, or be responsible for 
particular properties. 
The value and importance placed in objective properties, 
and the fact that they are not used merely as evidence of, 
but considered in some way to be the person, indicates the 
strength of their significance. It would seem that in 
addition to being evidence of the self, they also have value 
and significance in their own right. The properties are not 
merely of derivative value to identifying other persons - we 
consider them to be part of other persons. The properties 
are subsequently used to individuate and locate others, and 
they are used with confidence in their accuracy. 
Moreover, it is clear that this use of properties is not 
merely from a third-person perspective. As described 
~·· earlier', at some levels of self-consciousness our 
properties are an important part of ourselves, and we feel 
not only concern but also responsibility for those 
properties. The value of ourselves is tied up with being an 
experiencer through certain properties: we identify 
ourselves as having certain characteristics, and perceive 
,•: Eg. Chapter 14 
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ourselves to be public objects as well as private subjects. 
Our qualities and potentials, traits and characteristics 
provide our public persona. 
Properties are thus necessary to our characterisation as 
individuals in society; moreover, I have also .argued that 
they are necessary to the identification of our selves in 
... 
the past and in the present". Without the existence of 
properties, especially the memory, we could know neither 
what we are nor who we are; we could not identify with 
properties now or in the past. 
Obviously this is a crucial link to our awareness of 
responsibility, for if we do not know ourselves, how can we 
feel responsibility? We might know of certain properties 
causing certain acts, but will be unable to associate them 
with ourselves or others; we might be aware of the actions 
of a past person but be unable to identify him with anyone 
in the present. Without the memory and the existence of 
certain and person-properties, the notion of responsibility 
could not function. 
* Eg. Chapter 14 
385 
15.3 THE ASSOCIATION OF PERSONS AND PROPERTIES 
If properties play an important role in the determination 
of responsibility, how are the properties associated with 
the person? It is clear that the qualities and 
personalities of persons develop, change and modify over 
time - how can we understand our 
particular set of properties? 
responsibility for any 
15.3 (i) Self-Determination of Responsibility 
If we are to follow the conclusions of the first section 
of this chapter, the link between the person and its 
properties is a matter of personal choice. The self decides 
what it will become - it uses and relates to different 
particular properties at distinct times, developing and 
changing not only its personality, but the responsibility 
felt any of its actions or properties as well. Thus, 
responsibility is concerned primarily with self-
consciousness and concern. 
The problem associated with such freedom is similar to 
that described with respect to the theories of self-
determination put forward ~y Locke and Sartre. Both claim 
that the self creates its character, it chooses what to 
count or discount as its properties, and decides what will 
or will not affect it and its actions. Such ideas result in 
a strange concept of responsibility. In the Lockean view, 
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what emerges is an agent responsible only in the present, 
and solely to himself - the past fluctuates and spins with 
the phenomenology of the psyche. In Sartre the difficulties 
are just as bad - he too produces a theory in which persons 
are not responsible for their pasts, only for their present 
and future. 
Sartre maintains that individuals are not responsible for 
things done by them in the past - all that concerns them is 
what they make of themselves in the present, and what they 
will become in the future. In our self-creation there need 
be no remonstration about past selves, for the present self 
is new and different and cannot be held responsible for some 
other self now gone. The person can describe the past acts 
in causal terms, pointing to why and where the present self 
came from; but the choice over which memories to involve in 
its personality is entirely free for the self to make. I am 
free to use the past how I will; I am free to become what I 
will; as such I am free from the responsibilities of a past 
for which I no longer feel concern. 
What emerges is a reinforcement of the idea that any 
theory placing identity ·of persons in 'how it seems to 
them', rather than something more objective and stable, 
involves a deviation from our normal belief in historically 
fixed responsibility. If the person is continually re-
created, it cannot be responsible for particular past 
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actions - only those which he notices and feels concern for. 
In Locke the concern is an involuntary act - we do not 
really choose to notice some memories anq not others; in 
Sartre the choice is for us to take - and we must feel 
responsible only for those things we really associate with 
our present selves, but in both the self and its 
responsibility is detached from the past in a way which 
disregards completely the role of other persons in moral 
responsibility. 
15o3 (ii) Public Concern 
The crucial point that both Sartre and Locke forget is 
that our personalities and qualitative nature are of 
importanc~ and value to others as well as to ourselves. It 
is not only the self that is affected by its properties; 
not only the self feels the subsequent concern. Others are 
affected by the properties of any person: they feel concern 
for those they love; they value the persistence of certain 
properties and they can be hurt by another's actions. Hence 
the past and the present of a person is known and of 
importance not only to himself but to others too. The 
relevance of certain properties and past actions cannot be 
discarded through the disinterest of the self, for they may 
well still be of deep and grave concern to others. 
For example, if the actions of an individual have brought 
children into the world or caused the death of someone else, 
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these deeds make their mark upon the world in ways that 
cannot be removed by a simple decision by the self. Even if 
a child is forgotten by its parent 9< it .still exists to 
mark that past deed, and that deed still remains of concern 
to someone who will hold the parent responsible for the 
act. Just because the parent has ceased to feel 
responsibility it does not make the act, the child or the 
remaining concern a falsehood. If the mother of a child is 
killed, even if the murderer ceases to feel guilt, the act 
remains in the world, and the child may continue to condemn 
the killer. Other people will remember andassociate certain 
pasts and characters with certain persons, even if those 
pasts are no longer present in the consciousness or concerns 
of that person. 
It is true that the concern and responsibility felt for 
others can shift and change as it does in the self: what is 
of importance in others today, may change by tomorrow or may 
still be present in ten years time. Moreover, an 
understanding that persons become removed from the past is 
reflected in the Statute of Limitations. Yet even so, the 
fact that we do associate others with concern and 
responsibility, indicates that the person as a social and 
forensic thing cannot be solely determined by the self -
others have a part in it too. Even if responsibility is 
limited to the concern or blame felt for voluntary actions, 
rather than anything more absolute, others must be taken 
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into consideration. And if moral blame is thought to entail 
something objectively fixed to past events and acts of 
individuals, then it will be independent o( the concerns of 
any individual - whether the self or the other. 
15.3 (iii) Independence of Person Properties 
The claim that properties of persons are independent of 
_,_ 
concern is made by many, one of whom is Shoemaker"'. He 
links third-personal criteria of persons to the possibility 
of an objective world. If persons have an identity 
independent of the way things seem to them, then there is a 
possibility that others exist in an independent reality. 
The immediacy and certainty of first-person memory 
claims, which plays such a central role in Locke and Sartre, 
is recognised by Shoemaker. He does not wish to deny the 
direct knowledge we gain seemingly through the memory - he 
states that it is a necessary truth that " ••• if one remembers 
an event, then one must have direct knowledge of the event at the time 
of its occurrence". (Shoemaker p.13) Furthermore, if I claim 
that I remember breaking a window yesterday, it is 
necessarily entailed that I sincerely remember breaking the 
window. Such a claim is a first-person memory claim, which 
is based in no criterial evidence, just upon the direct 
knowledge of the memory. It cannot be analysed in terms of 
conclusions drawn from memory claims. Memory statements are 
* Shoemaker 1959 
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therefore either known or they are not, it is senseless to 
to talk of them being true or false: 
Normally I can identify a past experience only as one I 
remember. And when this is so, there cannot arise any 
question whether I remember the experience or any question 
as to the ownership of the experience. In such cases, where 
one's knowledge of a past experience is based solely on 
one's memory, there is no room for the employment of 
criteria of personal identity. No question of ~dentity 
arises, and hence there is none to be settled by reference 
to criteria of identity. 
Shoemaker p.163 
Thus, like the direct knowledge we have of our 
experiences, which are known a priori, we have a direct 
knowledge of the content of our memory. In experience the 
certainty lies in the content and consciousness - not in 
what they may tell us about anything further; likewise we 
can be certain of the content of memory: what we cannot be 
so sure about is what it tells us about the past. 
Of great importance to Shoemaker's claim is that memory 
claims are generally true if made sincerely: our belief in 
the truth of our first-person sentences is attributed to the 
fact that when employed sincerely, first-person memory 
statements are usually true. (Shoemaker claims this fact is 
a necessary feature of this type of statement and of human 
beings - a type of basic credulity principle as found in 
Swinburne.,':) However, they are only considered to be 
generally true: within such claims is included an essential 
-!( See Chapter 7 
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element of corrigibility that there is an objective 
yards tick against which these claims are measured. It is 
the existence of this corrigibility which is used as an 
argument against using the self as a sole criterion of 
personal identity. 
Perceptual and memory statements are corrigible because 
of their non-personal and objective content. The 
fallibility of memory thus arises in the non-personal 
element of the claims - that is, in their correlation with 
certain objective criteria. That is to say that although it 
makes no sense for me to make a false claim about that fact 
that my pain is like that of a dagger in my leg, the claim 
does not necessarily imply that there is a dagger through my 
leg. The same is true of first-person memory statements. 
For although it makes no sense to say that I make a false 
memory claim about my dropping a brick on my toe yesterday, 
the claim can be shown to be mistaken when it is found out 
that I was in bed asleep all day. 
Such a contrast can only be provided if we have reliable 
criteria of identity, other than self-knowledge and memory 
statements. To give such claims any value at all, we need 
external criteria that will verify or falsify the fact that 
I dropped a brick on my toe, or whether there is in fact a 
dagger through my leg. We need the presence of others to 
provide an objective assessment of the claims. 
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This will allow corrigibility of memory claims, but not 
affect the validity of the personal statement. It is 
necessary that first-person claims are sometimes 
falsifiable, in order that we have a non-solipsistic 
metaphysics. For, if my claims about experiences were 
always true, then there would be no difference between what 
I claim seems to me, and what in fact is - exactly the kind 
of conclusion drawn by Sartre or Locke. 
Thus the ability to determine another's identity emerges 
as a necessary component of the world as we perceive it. 
The tension created by the two forms of identification 
working with each other produces an epistemology and 
structure of reality that neither can support on its own. 
The self must be a necessary foil for the physical, and the 
physical a necessary manifestation for the self if we are 
not to regress into a solipsistic account of existence. If 
we are to have faith in our structured perception of the 
world and the possibility of a behaviouristic and idealistic 
world is to be avoided, then the self linked to the body is 
necessary. The identity of the person as subjective and 
objective emerges as necessary feature in our epistemology. 
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15.4 CONCLUSIONS 
It seems that the moral value and responsibility felt by 
the self is echoed in value felt for other.people, and what 
concerns us in both cases can be perceived subjectively or 
objectively. We need to be aware of both self and 
properties to provide us with a coherent notion of value in 
a person: if we concentrate on one or the other the value of 
the person is imbalanced and useless. Such a combination 
is recognised by Strawson'~ in his discussion of our moral 
considerations. He states that we enter into inter-personal 
relationships only if we recognise both aspects: if one is 
missing, then we no longer have a moral interaction: 
What I want to contrast is the attitude (or range of 
attitudes) of involvement or participation in a human 
relationship, on the one hand, and what might be called the 
objective attitude (or range of attitudes) onto another 
human being, or the other... The objective attitude may be 
emotionally toned in many ways, but not in all ways: it may 
include repulsion or fear, it may include pity or even 
love, though not all kinds of love. But it cannot include 
the range of reactive feelings and attitudes which belong to 
involvement or participation with others in inter-personal 
human relationships. 
Strawson p.66 
I would claim that personal relationships involve more 
than just viewing the person in a subjective light - that to 
make sense of the self. as a person with value and 
responsibility, objective aspects must be a necessary part 
of our expectations as well. 
-:, S trawson 1962 
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CHAPTER 16 A NEW CONCEPT OF PERSONS 
It seems 
that what 
established 
from the discussion of 
must be achieved is 
opposites: the new 
the previous chapters, 
a reconciliation of 
view must effect a 
combination of the simple and complex views - the person 
must be accounted for in terms of both properties and a 
self. This 
material and 
in 
the 
turn entails a compromise between the 
immaterial; the a posteriori with the a 
priori; and a subject and an object. Ultimately, the new 
concept demands that some thing can satisfy the empiricist 
claims with those of the rationalist. If this proves to be 
impossible to effect, then the foundation of our concept of 
morality and the inter-personal rights we associate with it, 
becomes illusory. 
'Person' is the self and the properties, but if 'person' 
is to be more than just a convention, it must be shown that 
the concept can work in a real way. It might be suggested 
at this point that it does not matter if 'person' is a 
constructed concept - that its use and meaning will remain 
unchanged even though based only in an idea. However, the 
implications of real persons go beyond just the issue of 
morality and value - it will be seen that, if the 'person' 
is something real and can be known, not only will the 
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concept provide an explanation of moral foundation, but it 
will answer some of the fundamental problems of 
epistemology. 
An association between self and properties will affect 
epistemological considerations. The difficulty envisaged is 
similar to that used against the simple view's account of 
the same relationship: that without certain necessary links 
between the self and the associated properties, such 
properties may not be taken as evidence of the self. Even 
in this new view, it is still necessary to account for the 
relationship between the self and the properties. If the 
self is to be knowable as a person, some form of empirical 
evidence is needed, otherwise it will remain logically 
obscure. If properties are to be used as this evidence, 
some necessary link between them and the self must be 
established. 
Moreover, in the case of the new view, the potential 
problem is intensified, for it bears not only on the 
knowledge of the existence of the self, but upon the 
existence of the person as well. It is true that the 
properties are the person and thus pose no difficulty being 
direct evidence. But how these properties are those of a 
particular person, or indeed a person at all, also needs to 
be explained. For the nature of properties is shifting -
the particular properties appears to be a contingent matter, 
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different properties constituting the same person at the 
same and different times. Thus there is a gap between the 
evidence of personal properties and the person: at one level 
particular properties do not entail particular persons; and 
on a more fundamental level person properties do not 
necessarily entail the existence of any person. 
The following then, is a suggestion as to how the person 
might be constructed. It has been shown that the self might 
be practically dependent upon certain properties - not just 
that of subjectivity, but certain physical and psychological 
properties relating to the potential for consciousness. If 
this link can be examined in more detail, not only might it 
help explain the association between the self and its 
properties, but also, from such an explanation an 
understanding of the links between the self and the person 
may emerge. There are several profound difficulties not 
removed by the discussion, as it stands it is only a 
suggestion as to how such an i nves tiga tion might proceed. 
To provide a complete account at this stage would require 
another complete thesis. 
0 
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16.1 THE PHYSICAL SELF 
The connection between the self and certain properties 
may be more than just one of constant or accidental 
association. If mental events can be shown to be identical 
with physical events, then there is a possibility of 
correlating the self with the brain. If such a mind/brain 
identity thesis can be found, it might provide an account of 
the self in terms of identity with some physical aspect of 
the individual, which in turn will provide the necessary 
links between the self and the person-properties. 
16e1 (i) Mind/Brain Identity 
A form of mind/brain identity thesis provides the most 
convincing theory of mind at present available. For by 
equating mental events with physical brain events it removes 
the problem of trying to find causal and interactive 
relationship between the mental and physical. Rather than 
the brain causing mental events or affecting them in some 
way, such a theory holds that they are in fact the same 
thing. 
However, a straightforw~rd reductive type account, such 
as that offered by Smart* or Feigl+, is not sufficient. For 
it has been conclusively shown by subsequent theorists, that 
such accounts fail to provide accurate descriptions of 
-/( Smart 1959 
+ Feigl 1958 
consciousness. 
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Even though they recognise the different 
meaning or description associated with mental events, their 
theories do not go far enough. It seems that the peculiar 
nature of consciousness - that it defies a straightforward 
reduction to the physical - must be given room. 
For example, any attempt to correlate the mental with the 
physical in terms of type identity proves elusive, indeed 
philosophers J. such as DavidsonA deny the possibility of 
providing any form of correlative laws between mind and 
brain events. All attempts to match the form of 
consciousness, or even the existence of consciousness, with 
certain brain events seems impossible. It may be that the 
difficulty is pragmatic and that the problem will be solved 
with time, but it has been suggested that the problem lies 
deeper than this. For the strange nature of subjectivity 
entails that a scientific description of consciousness will 
prove impossible+. Nagel# makes such claims for 
subjectivity, though shows distinct hesitance over trying to 
provide a solution - except to recognise the gap between 
subjectivity and objectivity. 
It is, however, still p"ossible to maintain an identity 
thesis despite these difficulties. A form of token identity 
-:( Davidson 1980 
+ See also Section 9.2 (ii) 
# Nagel (1) 1964 & (2) 1979 
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will allow the continued identification of mental and 
physical, though denying the possibility of formulating 
strict inferential laws from a certain physical state to a 
certain mental state and vice versa. Thus, although it is 
not possible to predict consciousness, it can be correlated 
with hindsight. In effect, this line of argument claims 
that no mental event will occur without some corresponding 
physical event. In this way, consciousness is given a more 
flexible association and its fluctuating nature more 
accurately represented. 
16.1 (ii) Mind/Brain Identity and Subjectivity 
Although it is a version of a mind/brain identity theory, 
to link the mind to the brain in this way is not to suggest 
that the two are the same: the brain is a practical 
necessity to the existence of consciousness, not an 
essential criterion of its identity; moreover, the link 
between them is contingent. Although it is not 
characterised as ontologically separate, such a mind is not 
reducible to its content or its physical side. For to 
reduce one to the other would be to provide some sort of 
simile, and that is not what is being attempted. The 
suggested thesis holds that they are aspects of the same 
thing, not that they are the same property, reducible to one 
another. 
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There is a crucial element in the mind, not describable 
through the physical description its subjectivity. 
Although mental events are identifiable with material 
things, they also have a necessary and different subjective 
description. Such a description involves the experience of 
the phenomena: what it is like to feel certain things - what 
the quality of the experience is. The material description 
describes the event, and might even one day describe the 
actual content of the mental event, but only the subject can 
know what the experience of the event is like. 
Thus, in the case of mind it is not possible to reduce 
the subjective to the objective because the two are 
different accotH~ts describing alternative aspects of the 
same thing. A mental event has at least two key 
descriptions - the objective and the subjective - if one is 
missing it is not a mental event. Both have the same 
physical underpinning but the descriptions are not 
concerned with the same qualities. The self and the 
physical are conceptually irreducible because they are like 
two different branches of the something deeper - perhaps the 
mind. 
To make this clearer, consider an analogy with colour. 
Blue can be described in terms of bare physics or in more 
phenomenological terms of what it seems like. Despite the 
completely different accounts that arise, they are both 
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considered to be valid descriptions of the colour blue. One 
description cannot be reduced to another, for they carry 
\-lith them completely different connotations. \rJhat it is 
like to see blueness will not be captured by a functional 
description of what it takes to cause blueness, yet this 
does not entail that they are accounts of different 
underlying things. Moreover, blueness would not exist if 
either were missing, for both the underlying mechanics and 
the phenomenon are necessary to the possibility of real 
blue. The pigment without the light or phenomenon is only 
potential blue; the phenomenon without the physical 
properties is a hallucination. 
Continuing this consideration of primary and secondary 
qualities, one might say that the self adds a tertiary 
quality to mind what it feels 1 ike to experience the 
secondary qualities. Thus, selves and properties have the 
same underpinning primary qualities which cause the 
secondary tangible manifestation available to be seen or 
sensed publicly and, furthermore, have the tertiary quality 
of what sensations feel like when experienced. 
Thus, even though the descriptions appear to conflict, it 
is possible to produce a reduction of sorts, although not in 
·'· terms of meaning". One might characterise this form of 
* See also Section 11.2 (iv) 
reduction as a cross-disciplinary 
descriptions from different levels of 
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equation, linking 
science or knowledge 
though allowing that they apply to the same basic thing. 
Thus although on the surface it would appear that the 
accounts conflict, in reality they are simply different 
accounts of the same thing. For example, the description of 
a chair given in terms of energy may well appear to conflict 
with a description of it in terms of its being a solid 
object upon which to sit, but this does not entail that both 
descriptions do not apply to the same thing. 
Such areas of descriptions are proposed in the work of 
Lowe*, who considers different disciplines of science to be 
incommensurable and, in terms of meaning, irreducible. Thus 
the dicipline of psychology will give descriptions which 
appear to conflict with the science of neurophysiology, even 
though they may describe the same thing. One might compare 
this to the apparant conflict between physiology and folk 
psychology. 
16.1 (iii) Consciousness and The Brain 
What then is this consciousness? How does it connect 
with brain events? It has been suggested how it might be 
characterised, but what are the causal mechanisms behind it? 
* eg. Lowe (1) 1991 
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One suggestion is that consciousness is something 
integral to brain states: that the impulses themselves 
contain consciousness within them. Under this account there 
is not a two stage event - the impulse and the awareness of 
the impulse, but only one thing - the impulse containing 
awareness in it. This is similar to the straightforward 
identity thesis, which postulates an exact identity between 
brain states and mental states. 
However, as seen, this does not explain the ephemerality 
of consciousness or the reason why some states are 
consciously experienced and others are not. To provide an 
accurate account, it must be explained when subjectivity 
actually occurs and, under a basic mind/brain identity 
thesis, such an explanation would need reference to some 
other factor over and above the brain states. In effect, it 
would result in a contradiction to the claim of reduction: 
for in order to explain consciousness in some brain states, 
reference to something more than simply the brain state 
would be needed - clearly not a straightforward reductive 
identity. 
A second suggestion mfght postulate the existence of 
special self-conscious and conscious states exhibited in 
specialised types of brain state. The suggestion is that, 
consciousness is a particular kind of thought with a 
particular kind of brain state associated with it. Yet 
difficulties arise with this idea too. 
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For it enforces a 
strict distinction between types of brain states with the 
result that some states are labelled or defined as unable to 
be conscious. Yet the brain seems to be more flexible than 
this would suggest, indeed, the scientific evidence we do 
have of the brain's capacity would suggest the.opposite -
that brain states are capable of all kinds of functions, and 
that the ability to hold particular content is not 
necessarily confined to certain areas of the brain. 
Moreover, such a type-identity account pushes the idea of 
consciousness close to Locke's thought of self-
consciousness, which would entail that consciousness exists 
only at the time of certain thoughts of consciousness, and 
does not persist through time. As a theory of mind/brain 
identity this is acceptable, for it is not trying to define 
the persisting self, but it does mean that consciousness is 
as ephemeral as the individual contents of the brain. 
Another suggestion holds that consciousness is linked to 
a unified coalescence of brain states which, in their unity, 
give rise to consciousness. Thus all brain states might be 
thought of as having the potential for consciousness despite 
not being conscious until in a particular system. Once 
within that system the control is centrally organised and 
consciousness is possible. This characterises consciousness 
as analogous to the foam on the wave, but without the 
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dualistic intentions of epiphenominalism: for it can still 
be classed as an identity theory since consciousness is not 
something other than the unified working of the brain. 
However, even this account fails to explain why some 
contents are conscious and others are not. If all brain 
states are part of this unified system, why are some 
conscious and others not 1 The presence of consciousness 
seems to depend upon more than merely an account of physical 
states. It seems that perhaps subjectivity is an 
unanalysable base, for it is impossible to sufficiently 
describe consciousness without reference to the subject. 
However, it is possible to further analyse consciousness 
if the account is moved from an individual identification of 
mental events with brain events, to a broader identification 
of consciousness with the brain as a whole. In this 
development of the third view above, it is suggested that 
consciousness is a level of the brain which, as a whole, can 
control its varying levels of awareness. Thus consciousness 
might be described as some form of attention to content and 
information - an ability that can be applied to most states 
and which can be on differing levels of awareness. 
Consciousness is simply the functioning brain using and 
noticing certain information at different levels of 
cognition. 
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Neither need the selectivity of consciousness trouble the 
account, for the identification of consciousness with a 
level of cognition can be paralleled to any other system 
developed for efficiency in function. Nature has many cut 
off points and varying levels of concentration ~ it is an 
ability necessary for survival: if it were the case that 
complete and constant access to all data was possible, the 
system concerned would be unable to act. For example, the 
lion would starve through inability to pick out suitable 
prey from other animals; the bat would not be able to fly 
for all the obstacles picked out by a comprehensive sonar; 
and the human would be unable to use objects because it 
would not be able to isolate them from other data. 
Cognition enables us to formulate objects and information in 
ways which are of use to us with a screening process 
filtering out unnecessary data. Why should this not be so 
in the case of consciousness as well?* 
This suggestion de-mystifies consciousness: it is nothing 
mystical or strange in the sense that dualists would have us 
believe; but neither is it something as flat and anonymous 
as the reductionist would have us believe, for it does add a 
mystical strangeness to the quality and experience of life. 
Such a theory draws consciousness down to a level of 
interpretation of information - consciousness adds more 
* See Section 4.3 (i) 
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depth, understanding and quality to the information. 
Perhaps, then, consciousness is nothing more than the 
brain's ability to be conscious and self-conscious with its 
own varying degrees of subjectivity. It is not necessary to 
postulate some further persisting subject - the brain and 
its unified control of itself is ample to the task. 
16.1 (iv) Pan-psychism 
If it is the case that all brain states have some 
potential for consciousness, does this mean that all matter 
has such consciousness? Physical brain states are reducible 
to cells, atoms and particles and, on the most basic level 
of description, are the same as other forms of matter. As a 
consequence of this, everything might be described as 
conscious: for if these particles can make consciousness 
whilst they are in the brain,. surely they retain that power 
once they are no longer part of the brain? Does the 
mind/brain identity thesis suggested entail that everything 
is conscious? 
Firstly, there seems little objection to the belief that 
consciousness might be a dimension of physical matter, it is 
only if one effects a mutual exclusivity of consciousness 
and matter that this is not possible. Consciousness may be 
an extra dimension of matter - one only known in first-
person awareness and, therefore, in humans, only in our own 
brains. 
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However, the theory being suggested is not so crude as to 
hold that everything experiences the consciousness in 
matter. There is no logical absurdity in the suggestion 
that basic matter has the potential to be conscious but that 
this does not entail that everything is conscious. It may 
be that such consciousness is only caused when the matter is 
in a certain system, which, as a unit, 
consciousness and even self-consciousness. 
generates 
The more 
sophisticated the unit, the higher level of conscious 
awareness achieved. 
One might illustrate this claim by analogy with other 
systems. Hydrogen and oxygen atoms can constitute water 
with liquid properties; but it is not the case that every 
hydrogen and oxygen atom is watery, nor even that they have 
latent water in them. When transferred to other types of 
things they can take on other properties such as becoming 
breathable air, causing large explosions, etc. Oxygen and 
hydrogen are flammable on their own as gases, yet when 
combined they become a liquid with one of the least 
flammable natures. Similarly, the particles which go to 
make up our human cells with a life force, may exist as 
decaying matter and inert soil. Thus, there seems no reason 
against the suggestion that all matter has potential for 
consciousness, but that it is only when in certain forms 
that it manifests itself as consciousness. 
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Such a theory of 1 pan-psychism 1 might facilitate 
explanation of the development of consciousness, for it 
would no longer be something in addition .to the animal or 
man, but something intrinsically bound up with their 
physical nature. It would allow consciousness a natural 
place in the evolutionary scale, linking it with the 
sophistication and control of the brain. Indeed, it may be 
possible to induce consciousness and self-consciousness 
through increased control and ability to manipulate the 
brain. 
For example, it cannot be denied that awareness and 
intellect can be developed and encouraged in children though 
stimulation and social interaction; perhaps then, this 
treatment helps develop consciousness and self-consciousness 
in our young. The function of consciousness and self-
consciousness in isolated and rejected children is 
notoriously maladjusted - this may be because they have not 
had the form of coaching and help needed to stimulate 
consciousness in the way humans use it. 
Perhaps then, levels of consciousness or kinds of 
consciousness might be induced by behaviour and learning: 
different behaviour and social interaction developing 
varying forms of consciousness in the individual. Differing 
cultures might develop distinct kinds of consciousness; 
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indeed, such variations are strongly evident in widely 
separated tribes or nations. 
Such divides are clearly evident when language is 
considered: for language is a key social tool, used for 
communication of culture and learning, and is· thought to 
give access to different concepts and understanding. One 
can increase and develop areas of one's personality or 
character by the use of concepts unexpressed by one's own 
cultural background. If then, this development and change 
is possible on a level of language, so might it be possible 
on a level of consciousness: that is, it may be possible to 
change the nature and level of one's consciousness with 
training and cross cultural access in other areas. 
Moreover, such change in consciousness might be extended 
to other animals, especially the more sophisticated, such as 
primates, dolphins, and even cats and dogs. Increased 
exposure to human behaviour and human attitudes toward 
domestic animals, does result in change of behaviour and 
apparent increase in consciousness. It may, of course be 
that we merely impose human structure and analysis of 
behaviour on them - a danger of all arguments from analogy; 
but there is certain behaviour which seems very difficult to 
explain without reference to some form of increased 
consciousness. By teaching animals language, do we in 
effect give them the power to be self-conscious? 
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A Functional Description 
The above suggestions are an attempt to provide an 
account of consciousness not only in terms of its identity 
with certain brain states, but in its functional role as a 
level of cognition. The subjectivity of consciousness is 
cons is tent with both of these descriptions, for it. simply 
provides a further level of description of the functional 
... 
states. As Dennett suggestsn, to define consciousness on a 
physical or functional level is not to deny that it has a 
further subjective description. 
Yet the suggestions above do not simply provide a merely 
objective functional account, but attempt to define 
subjectivity itself in a cognitive functional role. Thus, 
subjectivity provides a crucial description of cognition 
from a first-person view point, an account which cannot be 
ignored by any complete theory of cognition. The subject is 
that which performs the role of interpreter and processor of 
input and output, no matter upon which level this occurs. 
The person shares a similar role with the addition of 
access to self-consciousness and volition. The model I have 
suggested is consistent with both identity, behavioural and 
functional accounts of the"mind: it is an attempt to extend 
them by recognising the essential role of subjectivity in 
any complete description of mind and persons. 
* Dennett 1979 ch. 9 
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16.1 (v) Exclusive Descriptions and Transitivity 
It might be objected that the descriptions of 
consciousness and of physical states cannot be of the same 
thing, for they each contain reference to properties which 
cannot be held in the other description. It is suggested 
that if this is so, then the transitivity of identity 
entailed by Leibniz's laws, is not upheld - the properties 
of one cannot be held by the properties of the other. 
However, such a criticism is mistaken, for the simple reason 
that it confuses the properties ascribable to the object 
with properties contained in different descriptions of that 
object. 
Although the accounts are of the same fundamental thing, 
the perspective of each description excludes certain 
properties and includes others - it is impossible to include 
primary qualities in a phenomenological description and, 
likewise, it is not easy to include secondary qualities in a 
primary account. Hence, the properties ascribed in each 
description cannot be included in the alternative - their 
contents are not transitive between accounts because they 
describe the object in different kinds of terms. This does 
not mean that the descriptions are of different objects, 
simply that they are different aspects of the same object. 
Thus, it is not a suggestion that the object baring one 
account must automatically be excluded from being described 
under the other, 
descriptions only. 
hold that because 
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for the exclusivity exists between the 
To agree with the criticism would be to 
a description of an individual as an 
artist does not include the same properties as a description 
of the same person as a sky-diver, they describe different 
persons. It is only if the two are inconsistent with one 
another that they become irreconcilable and thus thought to 
be of different objects: for example, if one account 
describes as an Olympic swimmer, and the other has the 
misfortune of never being able to learn to swim 
The physical description of brain events is not 
sufficient to account for mental events because it excludes 
subjectivity. Hence, although we can give subjective 
experience an objective pragmatic description, the real 
meaning and quality of the experience is lost in doing so. 
What is essential to the self or mind is that it has a 
subjective awareness, without this dimension the whole 
theory will merely be another version of traditional 
empiricism. Subjectivity is what makes mental events 
different from all other physical things, for without the 
subject the brain is not a mind, and without the brain the 
mind cannot persist. Thus-the new theory does not advocate 
a drift into straightforward materialism, for it maintains 
the existence of the self as intentionally dis tinct from 
properties. 
414 
Despite the differences involved in the definition the 
mind and the brain, it is possible then to link the two: 
they are the same thing under different . descriptions, in 
much the same way as we might describe the same table under 
a description referring to atoms and one to the table 
qualities. 
16.1 (vi) Self/Brain Identity 
From the above suggestions, there seems no logical reason 
why the mental should not be identified with the physical. 
Might then, subjectivity or the self be identified with the 
brain? Is it possible to hold a self/brain identity thesis. 
Such an identity thesis is at first sight attractive, for 
since the self involves potential for consciousness and must 
be interactive with certain properties both to be conscious 
and to be a person, practically speaking it must be 
associated with a normally functioning brain. 
Moreover, when the character and function of the brain 
are considered, the similarity between them and the role of 
the self becomes more apparent. For the brain is associated 
with consciousness and experience, conveying the necessary 
impulses to allow sensation - the brain unifies all of our 
sensory and conscious activity and can be characterised as 
having the potential for consciousness. The brain is the 
possessor of individual thoughts and, like the self, it is 
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considered persist through time, being irreducible to its 
content. 
The similarity in both function and character and the 
constant conjunction of the brain and the self, lead to the 
suggestion that they are in fact the same thing.· The brain 
might be described as the physical embodiment of the self, 
and the self as dependent upon the brain - that in effect, 
the self or subject is impossible without a properly unified 
and functioning brain. 
Such an identification is supported when one considers 
the effects on consciousness and self-consciousness when 
there is a malfunction of the brain. In split personalities 
there seems to be a bifurcation in awareness of subject. 
The unit supporting and creating consciousness is divided, 
effecting a division in the conscious experience and in the 
subject. The cause can be cured through physical treatment, 
which forges a link between the brain and subject - one in 
which the subject is not associated with something detached 
and extra to the brain, but something necessarily linked and 
attached to it. 
The self and consciousness might therefore be 
characterised as identical with the brain and its processes: 
that there is an identity between them in fact, although 
their meanings are not reducible to each other. The 
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existence of the brain does not ensure that consciousness or 
a subject exists, it is only that it is necessary if 
consciousness is to exist. However, it is not enough that 
merely a brain present, it seems that the brain must have 
the potentiality to be conscious and to function normally. 
Otherwise, it seems that the self or subject cannot function 
normally either. 
This self/brain identity thesis allows the connection 
between the self and its physical properties to be 
understood. For if the self is identical with certain brain 
activity, which in turn is connected to certain other parts 
of the body, a chain of real links can be traced. Although 
the existence of certain properties will not provide a 
sufficient account of the self, for they do not necessarily 
entail the self, they can be inferred to exist if the self 
does, for they are necessary to its instantiation. Certain 
properties can therefore be taken as indicators of the self 
- indicators in more than an accidental way. 
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16.2 SELF PROPERTIES AND PERSON PROPERTIES 
' 
Whatever account one gives of the particular properties 
necessary to the self, it must be remembered that such 
properties are of derivative value only. Their existence 
and persistence are desired only as a means to achieving the 
existence and persistence of the self. As such they are 
not, strictly speaking, the properties of the person, they 
are what we might term self-properties. As suggested*, the 
person has properties \vhich might be classed as person-
properties which are valued per se, not for the 
instantiation of some further thing. What, therefore, is 
the link between the self and these person-properties which 
enable the existence of a person? 
16.2 (i) Person Properties 
Person-properties are those which ensure that the person 
is a socially interactive thing. They are not necessary as 
particulars to the person, for they are valued in their 
effect or for their character, rather than in themselves. 
It is a qualitative rather than quantitative identity which 
is required of them: the demand is for type similarity 
rather than token persistence and, as such, loose identity 
in such properties will be acceptable for the demands of 
continuation over time. 
-.•: Chapters 14 & 15 
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The possibility of practical interaction between the self 
and these properties should not prove difficult. The 
connections described between the self and the self-
properties indicates that some form of actual interaction is 
possible. If the self is connected to its necessary 
properties there seems little objection to ex-tending its 
interaction to other properties that may not be essential to 
its existence. The exact connections may not at present be 
known but, as before, the problem is merely one for 
empirical investigation. 
16.2 (ii) The Unified Person 
of the connection becomes more Where explanation 
interesting is in the link which connects the self to 
certain person-properties to form a person: What it is that 
makes selves and person-properties into persons? A 
description referring to more than merely the person is 
needed if we are to produce a real and non-circular account 
of personal identity. If it is simply stated that what 
connects the two is being part of the same person, the 
status of person is left at issue, for the connection is a 
nominal one conferred as a classification. 
explanation of personal · identity such 
Moreover, as an 
an appeal to 
definition is clearly circular, for to give such an answer 
presumes that we know the identity of the person to which 
they belong. 
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The obvious and most straightforward suggestion is that 
the link is one of co-consciousness that the person-
properties are the same person as the self if they are self-
consciously experienced by the self. In this way the two 
are linked in a real way to become a person. This can be 
used this to explain not only how the self might be joined 
to the properties but also how certain sets of shifting 
properties belong to the same person: they are all objects 
of consciousness of the same self. 
However, as already encountered with respect to Locke in 
numerous instances, the phenomena of self-consciousness is 
not enough to provide a solid link. If we rely upon how the 
person seems, what appears to the self to be its parts, what 
the self chooses to have associated with it and so on; then 
the person becomes something impossibly ephemeral. Sturdier 
and more objective links are necessary if we are to produce 
a functional concept of persons there must be the 
necessary link through objective unification. 
Further conditions can be provided for personal identity 
in terms of the practical conditions which will ensure this 
co-consciousness: that is·, if we follow the model being 
developed, the same brain. If the self can be practically 
linked to the brain's consciousness of unity of perception, 
then the unity of the personal properties can be described 
both in their internal connection and their conjunction to 
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the self, as being part of the same brain's consciousness. 
The actual empirical account may well vary and develop with 
increased knowledge, but the basic connections must be 
retained. It is these which form the criteria of identity 
for the person. 
Considering the broad range of properties we associate 
with persons and their fluctuations, it might seem hard to 
produce a fixed association or criterion of identity which 
does not dissolve into the choice or convention found, for 
example, in Lockean concern. However, there do seem to be 
certain limitations beyond which we cannot choose our field 
"'· of reference - as was pointed out by Madelln. When talking 
about our actual person, rather than works, we cannot choose 
the limits of the field of reference. 
Perhaps then, the 'I' in physical and psychological terms 
is delineated by those things we can be directly aware of? 
It seems that the self is essentially defined in this direct 
acquaintance, that anything we directly and subjectively 
feel as belonging to us is legitimately part of us. Thus 
our directly experienced bodies and psychological states, 
and those states that we might potentially be directly aware 
of even if not so at this time, are parts of us as persons. 
The potentiality is maintained by the continued persistence 
of the brain, despite lack of actual consciousness. 
* Madell 1981 & Section 9.3 
r,.. 
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It must, however, be recognised that the psychological 
and personal unification of properties are not all that are 
involved in persons, for properties beyond the psyche and 
brain are valued too. As suggested earlier*, these factors 
must be accounted for in any effective concept of person: 
persons and their identity extend way beyond the most 
intimate psychology - the body, the works, the offspring, 
even the tribe or nation can play an important role. The 
necessity of their persistence functions on a sliding scale 
dependent upon the importance of the situation and the 
perspective of the identifier. Certain properties become 
more and less significant, yet keep a basically stable scale 
of importance, with the fundamental necessity of self 
remaining fixed and a generally decreasing value as the 
encompassing consciousness expands further. 
Yet these too might be explained in terms of connection 
to the self and its potential of direct awareness. All of 
these things are causally related to the self and brain in 
some way - we can trace lines of causation back to the 
originator, that is, the subject. Even those properties 
attributed to a person which may not be directly known by 
that person are attributed by others on the strength of 
belief that they are somehow controlled or caused. Thus, 
once again, although the direct awareness is not actual, the 
potential is thought to be there through sub-conscious 
* Eg. Chapters 14 & 15 
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action of the brain; and since the brain is identical with 
the subject the connection is made. Although the subject 
may not be directly aware, such awareness is possible by a 
concentration of consciousness either through drawing 
attention to the property, by concentration the 
consciousness on it or, through some deeper method, such as 
hypnosis. 
16.2 (iii) Criterion of Identity? 
The person emerges as a self with certain associated 
properties connected through either causal links or direct 
awareness to that self. What is a property of the self is 
that which the self can be directly aware of, or associated 
with, in terms of causation. Yet the properties can and do 
fluctuate - there is a sliding scale of importance. How 
then, can a non-circular criterion of identity for the 
person, which maintains the persistence of the person, be 
established? 
Because of such fluctuation, it appears difficult to 
produce a solid list of which criteria must be present. In 
fact it is impossible, because value is a matter of degree, 
the qualitative identity of the person can be a matter of 
degree too. What remains fixed is the unification to the 
self but the properties unified may fluctuate and change, 
the derivative value of the person consequently changing by 
degrees with them. It can become a matter of debate whether 
423 
a person persists in such qualitative terms or not, and it 
is a matter of perspective and importance of situation which 
will finally determine the qualitative identity and whether 
it persists or not. 
Thus the identity of persons relies in both qualitative 
and numerical identity: the person persists quantitatively 
if the self remains and persists qualitatively if certain 
associated properties remain. Both forms can be objectively 
discerned and subjectively known: the former maintaining an 
absolute form of identity, the latter a perspective relative 
account. Yet both must work in tandem if the identity of 
persons is to fulfil the function of person, and if the 
mind/body identity theory is adopted, such an account will 
prove possible. 
This account suggesting the identification between the 
self and the person might at first seem circular: for the 
properties of the person are the properties of the self, and 
the properties of the self are those which can be directly 
known by the self; however, to know which properties are 
directly know to the self involves prior knowledge of what 
the self is. 
However, this is not so, for two reasons. Firstly, the 
knowledge we have of our properties is direct and a priori*. 
* See Olapter 9 
Ownership need not be inferred in a 
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two-stage 
identification, involving first knowledge of ourself and 
then knowledge of ownership - it is only in the case of 
individuating others that such a process is necessary. 
Knowledge of ourselves and our properties is direct and 
without inference. It is not even necessary that we know 
who we are to be able to attribute properties to ourself., 
for in the very act of being directly aware we can be sure 
that they are ours. Unless some form of psychic telepathy 
is possible, we can be sure that if we experience something, 
then it is our experience. 
Thus, knowledge of our properties is rather like Lockean 
self-consciousness - if we are aware of them then they are 
ours. Where Locke's theory stumbles is in the movement 
beyond present knowledge to knowledge of the past, for such 
a move involves an inference about what the experience or 
memory tells us, and such inference can be mistaken. Locke 
thus claims that only a first-person identification is 
possible and that objectively the self is nothing. However, 
in this new theory, objective identification is recognised 
as possible, and such objective continuity enables the self 
to be identified independently of its own awareness. 
This point touches upon the second reason for non-
circularity of the proposed account: for the association 
between self and properties is not merely one of actual 
\ 
·, 
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direct awareness but of potential awareness. The connection 
between properties and the self is considered to persist 
even when the self is not aware of it, and_ this is possible 
through the identification of the self with the brain. 
Thus, although properties are defined as those potentially 
and directly known by the self, they can also be defined as 
potentially and directly known by the brain. Although the 
self is known directly to itself and its essential criterion 
of identity defined in this way, it is also identified 
practically with the brain and thus an additional 
contingent criterion of identity can be provided. 
This identification between the self and the brain 
enables an objective, self-independent criterion of identity 
for the person. For it means that properties and 
persistence can be attributed objectively rather than solely 
subjectively. The properties of the self can therefore have 
potential for being directly known if they are associated 
with the brain even when the brain is not aware of them. The 
association of the subject with unconscious, subconscious, 
conscious and self-conscious states can therefore persist, 
even if the self is not directly aware of any such link. 
It might be objected at this stage that the association 
between the brain and the self is not only contingent but 
also fails to produce a sufficient criterion for persons: 
for the existence of the brain does not ensure the existence 
of the self or subject. 
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The self seems to be something 
extra to a brain and therefore the self cannot be defined in 
terms of being simply a particular brain. Is it not more 
the case that the brain is defined in terms of relationship 
to the self? 
Such an objection, however, comes from an assumed dualist 
position: it assumes that the self is something over and 
above the brain, the relationship being characterised as one 
of ownership or constitution rather than numerical identity. 
However, I would stress that this is not in keeping with the 
suggestion of the identity theory which is concerned to 
identify the brain and self on a numerical basis. The 
fluctuation of consciousness has been sufficiently 
explained, and the association between self and brain 
described through reference to a functional unified brain. 
Furthermore, it is not the case that the subject is 
something caused by the brain - it is the brain. It may be 
that the conscious self is not sufficiently described by 
reference solely to the brain, but the subject is, if it is 
identified with a healthy living brain. 
It is true that if one ignores subjectivity completely in 
the description of person then the account will fail. As 
noted with respect to early identity theories, a failure to 
incorporate this dual aspect results in insufficiency. Thus 
a brain on its own is not enough to account for the meaning 
427 
of person, and self on its own is insufficient as well. To 
achieve a satisfactory account and criterion of persons one 
must include both brain and self, both objective and 
subjective dimensions, both public and private aspects. 
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16·3 CONCLUSIONS 
The theory emerging as the 'new view' holds that the 
identity of persons is something objective as well as 
subjective, that the properties and the self are essential 
to the person, and the person is determined through a 
balance between objective and subjective criteria through a 
recognition of both numerical and qualitative identities. 
Such a state of affairs can be provided for in a mind/body 
identity theory of persons - an account which recognises the 
subjectivity and objectivity of identity in persons. 
What emerges is a concept of person which has affinities 
with Strawson's concept of person: that is, 'person' is 
concept of which one can predicate both physical and mental 
descriptions. However, unlike Strawson, the new view 
provides an attempt at an analysis of person into terms 
referring to consciousness, potential subjectivity and 
necessary properties. It is not the case that one can 
ascribe either mental or physical predicates, it must be 
possible to ascribe both. 
This simple combination of both accounts is an attractive 
solution it plugs the gaps which create the greatest 
difficulties for both the simple and complex views. For the 
simple view can provide for the insufficiencies of the 
complex account, introducing the extra element of the 
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persisting self; and the obscurity of the simple self is 
lifted by the existence of necessary properties such as 
those of the complex view. 
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CHAPTER 17 PROBLEMS OF THE NEW VIEW 
The apparent common sense of the combined view has been 
avoided in the past for definite and very deep set reasons -
strong intuitive responses prevent the assosiationof mental 
ans physical, moreover, there are certain hurdles that must 
be cle&red before such a collaboration of accounts can be 
accepted. All of the difficulties can be reduced to the 
general problem posed by the depth of potential 
incommensurability in the simple and complex accounts. 
It would be impossible in the space available in this 
thesis to completely dispel all of the problems associated 
with the new view - the current research has focussed on the 
adequacy of the existing theories of personal identity, the 
main intention being to show the necessity of a new view to 
replace the existing bifurcated approach to topic. The 
following, however, are some indications of the problems 
likely to arise, and some suggestions for an approach 
towards solving them. 
On a functional level problems arise over interaction. 
The new view retains the simple view's idea of a contentless 
and single-propertied subject. However, if it is separable 
and essentially subjective, how can it be necessarily linked 
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in a causal relationship, or indeed identified with 
objective properties? If agency and personal responsibility 
are to have any real" justified basis it must be 
ontologically possible that the two (objective and 
subjective) be mutually effective, the self must be the 
originator of actions performed by properties in a public 
arena. Moreover, it must be possible to show that despite 
the proposed identification of the subjective with the 
objective, some form of real (as opposed to conventional) 
persistence and identity is available. 
The new view must therefore be able to deal with these 
problems all of which affect the moral notions associated 
with persons: that is interaction, a reconciliation of the 
objective with the subjective person, an explanation of how 
real identity can be retained, and some account of how 
effective identification can take place. 
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17Q1 THE NEW VIEW AND INTERACTION 
Is it therefore possible to combine the self with the 
properties in a way that forms actual links rather than 
those of mere classification or social convention? Can an 
account of persons be produced which gives more than just 
linguistic explanations of the links we infer between selves 
and properties? If the new view is to be possible it must 
be explained how the self is linked in a causally 
interactive way to properties. 
17.1 (i) Interaction and Dualism 
The ·actual source of the difficulty occupying the 
mind/body problem (as levelled against Descartes*) need no 
longer create an insurmountable obstacle to the subject/ 
content dualist. The connection between mental and physical 
can now be regarded as a question for empirical 
investigation rather than metaphysical debate: there is a 
causal relationship between the mental and physical, what it 
actually is we may not know but, the fact remains that the 
two do interact in some way. Only if it is insisted that 
mental and physical are mutually exclusive, does interaction 
pose anything but a practical problem. 
This idea is put forward clearly and convincingly by 
Lowe:+ 
* Descartes 1641 
+ Lowe (1) 1991 
I am aware of no good argument, by Descartes or anyone else, 
in support of his doctrine of unique and exclusive 
attributes. Accordingly, I am perfectly ready to allow that 
psychological substances should possess material 
characteristics (that is, include physical states amongst 
their modes). -
Lowe p.lOS 
The chief stumbling block was ••• Descartes' doctrine of 
unique and exclusive attributes. How could something 
essentially immaterial get to grips, causally., with 
something essentially material, and vice versa? But 
psychological substances as I conceive of them are not 
essentially immaterial, and thus I see no difficulty in 
principle about their entering into causal transactions with 
their physical environment. 
Lowe p.107 
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The envisaged difficulty for interaction is not therefore 
logical but practical: if a theory does not allow the 
possibility of there being such a link, then there is 
something wrong with the description or characterisation of 
mental and material substances. The apparent mutual 
exclusivity of the Cartesian substantial dualism should not 
necessarily be perceived as the source of great worry for 
todays dualist. 
17.1 (ii) Simple View Dualism 
However, as 't'( seen , problems do arise if the dualism 
claims complete separability of the mental and physical 
making them distinct in actuality as well as conceivability. 
Such are the claims of the simple view of the self, which 
subsequently does encounter the problems concerning 
interaction. If the characterisation of the self describes 
·:: Chapter 10 
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something which is solely a subject, a question arises of 
how such a subject can be the subject of anything? If it 
has no properties at all, it is difficult to explain how any 
form of interaction might take place, for there is no 
interface for the connection. Hence the simple view, 
although not essentially Cartesian, places the self in a 
position similar to that of the ghost in the machine. 
Indeed the fate of such a self will be worse, for it has no 
objective qualities or properties other than the potential 
for subjectivity. 
One possible reply to the objection might take a similar 
position to the defence of Descartes described above: that 
the mind/body interaction problem is a matter for scientific 
rather than philosophical investigation. Thus the 
inconceivability we are faced with now is symptomatic of a 
conceptual difficulty, not an actual impossibility. As with 
the sugestions above, the answer lies in the fact that the 
two do interact. 
Such an answer is not, however, so readily available as 
it was to the Nee-Cartesian, for whereas 'mental' and 
'material' are terms given to facets of the person we 
experience and consider to be real, the concept of the self 
as an actually separable thing is debatable and its status 
is consequently less straightforward. Thus an appeal to 
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factual interaction ot 'the way things are' cannot be made 
with quite such confidence. 
In addition to this, whereas Cartesian dualism involves a 
difficulty which might be solved through subsequent 
empirical description, the problems associated .with simple 
view dualism cannot be so helped. For the very definition 
of the separable self prevents all possibility of finding 
some method of interaction, since it will have no properties 
to effect the interaction. Logically speaking therefore, 
the interaction cannot be explained except in terms of 
accidental or contingent association - it fs difficult to 
foresee what form any other account ~ould take. 
17.1 (iii) Interaction in the New View 
Inability to provide even a hope of necessary links in 
the explanation of interaction excludes the simple view's 
separable self from a role as part of the person. However, 
the suggested modification of the self claims that both 
practically and logically it is difficult to drive a wedge 
between selves and some properties necessary to its very 
existence. If this is so, then there is a necessary, rather 
than merely accidental, link facilitating a simple 
explanation of interaction. 
The suggested account of the previous chapter is based in 
our current scientific knowle.dge: describing the self as 
436 
dependent upon the persistence of the same brain, for it is 
the brain which physically unifies all experience and seems 
to form the most basic unit necessary for t~e persistence of 
the human self. Thus the self is characterised as no more 
than consciousness of the brain's work of unification of 
experience. It may not be possible to list the exact type of 
properties needed for the instantiation of the self, but 
this difficulty is empirical not logical. The fact remains 
that some properties are logically required for self to 
exist. 
Whatever the mechanistic description turns out to be, if 
it is allowed that the self is dependent upon certain 
properties, interaction is no longer a problem except in 
terms of empirical understanding. Given this account, it is 
clear how it is possible for interaction to occur. If the 
self somehow arises out of the properties and is dependent 
upon them for existence then a necessary connection exists 
between them. 
The new view of personal identity can therefore avoid the 
problems associated with the interact ion between mind and 
body, self and proertie~, whilst still maintaining a 
conceptual dualism. It remains to be seen whether this form 
of mind/brain identity can maintain a concept of person as a 
moral being. 
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17.1 (iv) Objectivity and Subjectivity 
It might however be objected that the identification of 
the subjective with the objective involves a logical 
contradiction. That is, it is impossible for something 
which is an ess~ntially public and accessible object also to 
have qualities which are private and accessible only to the 
subject. This problem arises if one accepts a necessary 
mutual exclusivity between the objective and the subjective 
between physical objects and subjects: such an 
impossibility would hold if the exclusion of subjects were 
part of the definition of physical. 
There are strong arguments in favour of maintaining such 
an exclusivity. The nature of our subjective experience 
points to a seeming independence from all physical 
properties: our perceptions of space and time vary widely 
from the corresponding objective world; it is possible to 
make sense of partial and complete independence from any 
properties; it is impossible to reduce the meaning of 
subjectivity to anything remotely physical or objective. 
The problems are summarized neatly by Nagel: 
There are types of problems here, both deriving from the 
subjectivity of the mental. One has to so with the 
attribution to mental entities and events of properties not 
entailed by mental concepts. The other has to do with 
properties that seem incompatible with mental concepts. 
Nagel p.31 
However, most of these objections appear to be based upon 
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what we can and cannot imagine or intuitively accept. As 
argued in Chapter 7, the use of imagination and intuition is 
fraught with difficulties and should not be allowed unduly 
to colour our conclusions. In the case of mental events and 
subjectivity, it may be that our intuitions are wrong 
through lack of understanding or knowledge of what really is 
the case. As Nagel writes: 
If something is in fact impossible and yet we seem to be 
able to conceive of it, this need not mean we are actually 
conceiving of something else similar to it which is 
possible. We may be conceiving of no real possibility at 
all, though we fail to realize it because we so not know 
certain necessary truths about the things we are thinking 
about. 
Nagel p.47 
Indeed, there seems no empirical or a priori reason why 
such exclusivity should obtain. The possibility that 
psychological states might also have physical modes has been 
..,_ 
voiced already in connection with the quotation from Lowe" -
be it only on a level of substances. Moreover, it is an 
acceptable idea to some philosophers of mind, for example 
Searle+, who writes of mind and body: 
Just as the liquidity of the water is caused by the 
behaviour of elements at the micro-level, and yet at the 
same time it is a feature realised in the system of micro-
elements, so in exactly that sense of 'caused by' and 
'realised in' mental phenomena are caused by processes going 
on in the brain at the neuronal level or modular level, and 
at the same time they are realised in the very system that 
consists of neurons. And just as.we need the micro/macro 
distinction for any physical system, so for the same reasons 
we need the micro/macro distinction for the brain •••• 
*See section 17.1 (i) 
+ Searle 1984 
Searle p.22 
To summarise: on my view, the mind and the body interact, 
but they are not two different things, since mental 
phenomena just are features of the brain. One way to 
characterise this position is to see it as an assertion of 
both physicalism and mentalism. 
Searle p.26 
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It seems that an attachment to Cartesian material and 
mental exclusivity informs a resistance to their combination 
or association. The difficulty raised against the suggested 
reconciliation appears to be one of dogma rather than 
logical impossibility. For if one denies that by definition 
mental and physical are exclusive of one another, then the 
way is cleared to allow that objective and subjective 
descriptions are simply accounts of the same thing from 
different perspectives. It is true that an objective 
description cannot also include a subjective one, but such 
incommensurability does not disqualify the two descriptions 
from applying to the same thing*. 
Moreover, if our current knowledge and beliefs about the 
brain and consciousness are taken into account, some form of 
identity thesis seems to be the most acceptable theory. The 
brain clearly is associated in some way with conscious 
experiences all the reliable empirical and scientific 
evidence available points to the likelihood that it forms a 
vital role in the production of consciousness. If thenJthis 
* See Section 16.1 (ii) 
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much is accepted, to identify consciousness with brain 
events is the simplest explanation of their connection. To 
assume that brain events are a link in a chain to some 
further representation, involving more than just the brain, 
pushes the theory into a dualism or mystical association, 
entangling it in the difficulties of interaction. An 
identity theory of the form being 
produces the simplest and most 
proposed, 
acceptable 
at present 
account of 
subj ec ti vi ty, especially given the rejection of dualism 
suggested earlier. 
To accept such an account is not to deny the unique and 
strange nature of consciousness, for the identity thesis 
does not 'explain away' consciousness, but postulates a 
causal not qualitative description. The quality and 
character of consciousness retains the private perspective, 
giving a unique internal representation of our passage 
through the world, space and time. Such perceptions will 
differ widely from the physical, more objective input, 
giving the idea that consciousness is somehow disconnected 
from physical properties. However, such disparity is 
consistent with a dual aspect theory one possible 
explanation is to see the difference in terms of variation 
in concentration and attitude toward the information 
received~·,. 
* See Section 16.1 
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The theory is similar to a form of epiphenomenalism - it 
characterises the mind in a causal relationship with the 
brain. However, unlike early forms of epiphenomenalism the 
new view sees the mind not as separable or additional, but 
as being realised by, or identical with, the brain processes 
.... 
themselves". Consciousness under this description is part 
of the brain - it is the brain's awareness of itself. 
This line provides a new approach to the problems of 
both mind and persons. It is an empirical account, giving 
only contingent conditions for minds and persons as found in 
humanity. Although it may be that the ideas they encompass 
are applicable on a broader scale - that non-human forms are 
eligible for personal rights too - I would suggest that it 
is this human 1 person' and 'mind 1 which forms the ground-
pattern for our concepts. An explanation of the causal 
mechanisms of human persons may therefore help not only to 
show that they represent more than just created concepts, 
but also explain why they have a dual subjective and 
objective nature. 
The association of the physical with the mental is by no 
means proven by these comments, but they do show that it is 
at least possible, and if the identity thesis is possible, 
then the new view's 'person' retains the possibility of 
being a real thing rather than just convention. 
* See also quotation from Searle on p.441 
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17.2 IDENTITY ~ 
The first problem facing the new account on a moral level 
concerns the disparity between properties and the self which 
depends upon them for existence, and consequently the 
association be tween se 1 f and the person. For even the 
necessary self-properties will be, as all properties, 
essentially ephemeral, whereas the self is considered to 
persist. Even if the quality of mental events continues, 
the exact thoughts or material constituents will change over 
time. How then can the self, which is a thing with real 
identity, moreover a thing which is valued as a token, be 
sustained by properties which hold only loose identity over 
time? 
17.2 (i) The Idea and Persistence 
This difficulty is really only a pseudo-problem 
and can be answered directly from Locke. He warns quite 
clearly of the danger ensuing from incorrect perception of 
distinct ideas, stressing that we must make clear what it is 
that we are identifying. The properties which allow the 
self to exist are not equivalent or reducible to the self -
the two are quite separable ideas. The identity of the self 
is not therefore reducible to the identity of the shifting 
properties maintaining it, only to the subject unifying 
them. The ideas are of completely different things and thus 
the criteria and form of their identity can vary. 
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Likewise, in the suggested new view, the idea of the 
propertyless self is separable, even though not detached 
from properties. Such a self does persist through change 
because it lacks specific properties. Thus, 'self-
reference', 'self -concern', and 'self-unity' all refer to 
something classed as propertyless because they do not always 
refer to specific properties. Thus, when we talk of the 
self we mean 'this locus of experience': there is no 
intention of signifying any token properties but there is a 
necessary connotation engaging the type of properties needed 
to ensure that experience. Selves are not therefore 
actually propertyless, for they cannot be detached from 
properties of some type; but neither can they really be said 
to depend upon any specific properties. 
Hence it is reasonable to claim that although the 
specific properties might come and go, the self continues to 
persist. For although it is not possible to reduce the self 
to any sort of account using particular psychological 
connections, it is still possible to give an account of a 
persisting self which includes necessary connections to 
physical/mental properties. The self can be described in 
terms of certain necessary connections to properties, rather 
than necessary connections to certain properties. 
The Thought of Consciousness 
Despite the above solution, a problem still remains 
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concerning the thought of unified self-consciousness. If 
the unity of the self relies solely upon the self-conscious 
thought, then, as explained with regard to Locke, the self 
will exist for one moment only, then cease to exist with the 
next thought of self-consciousness. 
An at tempt to avoid this difficulty by identifying the 
self with token or type material events, will not help -
they too shift and change, for even though thoughts of 
consciousness is linked to particular material events, 
matter shifts and changes just as much as subjective 
experience does. Therefore, even with a material/mental 
event identity thesis, stability of the self through time 
cannot be established. If the self is to persist through 
time it must be established that the subject is more than 
merely a material or mental thought of unity. 
17.2 (ii) Identity and the Brain 
If it is to persist in actuality rather than just 
conceptually, 
more stable 
the self must be 
than individual 
associated with 
thoughts. The 
something 
property 
sustaining the self must persist through change in the way 
that the self does. The brain fulfils this particular 
role, and if the self is considered to be physically 
dependent upon a particular brain, then its persistence and 
experience of unity can be explained. The brain objectively 
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unifies thought and persists through time - the self is the 
subjective awareness of such continued unification. 
There is however, a fundamental problem associated with 
the persistence of the self through time. Similarly to the 
way in which the original simple view cannot disassociate 
the self from experiences and thereby encounters persistence 
problems, this new view links the self to brain events which 
themselves fluctuate and change. Hence, the problem of 
persistence arises: even though the brain seems to persist 
as a unit, its identity is only that of a complex form, 
dependent upon substance and material change. This is a 
problem which must be faced by any theory demanding real 
identity though not \vishing to espouse a form of ontological 
dualism. In the rejection of any real separability, is it 
necessary to sacrifice real identity? 
Given that the self must be somehow associated with 
changing matter, how can it really persist? It is true that 
such persistence is not unchanging or of a basic thing - the 
qualitative identity does change. However, there is a way 
in which the brain can be seen to persist in a manner that 
is not simply a reduction to complex identity, and which 
might explain why we believe the self to persist through 
time. 
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Persistence of the Idea of the Brain 
Returning once again to the Lockean insistence that we 
identify the idea clearly, it can be claimed that 
numerically the brain persists. We have a concept which 
delineates a certain neurological system and given certain 
conditions that system can be said to persist - even if it 
is no longer qualitatively identical. 
However, as noted before, to place persistence merely in 
the concept is not enough. It may be that such a concept is 
merely a construction - that there is in fact nothing real 
to which it corresponds. Such concepts have identities 
which are merely conventions and for persons this form of 
identity is not enough. If the self is being identified 
with the brain, and the identity of the self depends upon 
the identity of the brain, then unless the brain really does 
persist the self will have no real identity throueh time. 
Identity in Substances 
.... 
It was noted in the first part of this thesis" that some 
philosophers, for example Quine+, claim that all things 
empirically known have identities reducible to convent ion. 
Such objects have identities only in the structures we 
bestow upon our percept ion and no more. However, it is 
equally possible that although screened by our perceptive 
* Section 1.1 (iii) 
+ Eg. Quine (1) 1960 
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priorities, there are identities independent of perception. 
Although we perceive some structures and not others, this 
does not entail that no persisting objects really exist -
the difficulty is that we cannot objectively perceive such 
persistence. 
The postulation of an independent world is of course an 
idea with many pitfalls but if anything is to be achieved 
beyond idealism, then some assumption of real objects must 
be made. Whether a correct reflection of reality or not, 
we do make distinctions within our experience, 
discriminating between things \vi th and without independent 
existence and persistence through time. 
For example the contrast between artifacts and organisms. 
Whilst we delimit the identity and persistence of artifacts, 
we do not have such control over natural organisms or 
natural kinds. Such things have an existence independent of 
our conventions, existing as units and persisting whilst 
their systems continue to function. For example, an animal 
persists if it remains a viable system, similarly so for a 
tree or an amoeba. Likewise, one might claim that the 
brain is a unit which persists in a manner that 
artifacts and abstract concepts do not. It is a biological 
entity - a system which maintains a numerical identity over 
above the change of its parts. 
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This idea of independent persistence through change is to 
be found in the Aristotelian conception of substance - an 
idea used by Lowe: 
I am prepared to defend what I take to be a more or less 
Aristotelian conception of this notion. That is, I shall 
follow the Aristotle of the Cate~ories in takin~ a 'primary' 
substance to be a concrete individual thing or particular', 
or 'continuant' ••• Events, though concrete individuals, are 
not substances by the 'Aristotelian' account because they 
are not entities capable of persisting through qualitative 
change ••• 
Lowe (1) p. 880 
One might therefore treat the brain as something which 
has such an independent persistence through qualitative 
change. If one calls it an Aristotelian substance, making 
it of a kind with a horse or a tree, then like these other 
substances, the brain can be attributed an identity through 
change. Under this description then, it can be claimed that 
the brain does persist: it is something which is not 
reducible to its parts the functioning brain exists as 
something more than just its individual constituents. 
17.2 (iii) Reduction to Complex Identity? 
It can be criticised that the above account is a game 
with words and definitions, moreover that it achieves no 
more than the Lockean 'idea' of persistence. If one 
remembers the original Butler/Reid demands on real identity, 
it seems that if the brain is like other 'substances', then 
its identity is in doubt. For it is not only artifacts 
which cause Butler and Reid concern, but organisms as well -
indeed, their accounts expressly deny that complex forms 
such as animals can have real identity. 
It is true that we cannot perceive the persistence in 
forms or 'substances' undergoing changes: if we employ a 
Humean identity criterion, then we should deny their 
persistence. However, in the case of ourselves and our 
brains, we have two different perspectives from which to 
describe the same thing: an objective, indirect description 
and a subjective, direct awareness. It might be argued that 
our subjective view point gives us unique knowledge of our 
brains, a knowledge which involves a direct experience of 
persistence. The unity objectively and uncertainly ascribed 
to the brain is confirmed by an awareness of unity from the 
first-person perspective. Unlike all other objects of 
which we can have no such reinforcement of identity beliefs 
- we have privileged and direct access to the brain and its 
continuity. It is this access which gives us the idea that 
we persist, and this idea, which is not complex, forms our 
notion of selfhood. 
If it is possible to justify a claim of real identity in 
the dual aspect theory, is it similarly now open to allow 
the complex view back into the realm of acceptability? For 
if the a hove at tempt is successful, then it is equally 
possible that other complex accounts can maintain a real 
persistence in persons. 
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I would agree that this is indeed a possibility, but only 
if the complex account is willing to accept some notion of 
the self. For the new view is not a straightforward complex 
account, it combines the necessity of properties with an 
equal necessity for a self. This is not the straightforward 
reductionism of most complex accounts, for the self and 
subjectivity resist complete analysis. Such a recognition 
is not usually present in complex accounts, which deny the 
elusiveness of the self, reducing it completely to 
properties. It is only if the possibility of a subject in 
addition to the objects is recognised, that one can pursue 
the above line of defence and fall back on a dual aspect 
account. 
17.2 (iv) Identity Just Imagined? 
It is evident that this last suggestion pushes the 
defence of the new view into areas of explicit speculation. 
It can also be objected that, whilst modern complex accounts 
are at least rigorous in their acceptance of loose identity, 
the new view deludes itself. For there remains an insoluble 
problem concerning evidence a problem endemic to any 
theory postulating subjectivity. 
The problem of real persistence is insoluble if certainty 
is demanded. It involves the wider epistmological problems 
affecting all but the most ardent idealist theories. 
Moreover, the attempts above to avoid the problems of the 
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complex identity entail that the new view heavily relies 
upon subjective confirmation. This, as mentioned numerous 
times before, can produce evidence which although directly 
known, is basically corrigible. 
The difficulty is the familiar problem encountered by any 
attempt to rely upon subjective evidence - it was faced by 
Locke and the simple view, and now creates problems for the 
new view. For if all we have as evidence of persistence is 
our individual experience of it, then all that can be known 
for certain is that the self exists at the moment it is 
aware of itself, no more. 
of the brain is likewise 
Our evidence of the persistence 
flawed, for it relies upon the 
veracity of the subjective testimony - and such a statement 
can never be certain. 
However, whether mistaken or not, the new view has at 
least one advantage over the simple and complex accounts: 
where the simple and complex views conflict with the use and 
function of our concepts, at least the new view attempts to 
reflect the beliefs underlying our concepts. Even if in 
reality our persistence is no more than an idea, it is 
recognised that this idea of identity informs all our 
subsequent beliefs and attitudes towards others. The 
perception of our persistence is evident and strong enough 
for us to use it as a basis for morality. Un 1 ike those 
theories which claim that this idea should be dismissed or 
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isolated from properties, the new view allows the idea to 
form a solid base. 
It is clear that the line of argument above is far from 
perfect. Moreover, it begs the question to a degree-
relying on the subject to endorse the notion and advantages 
of subjectivity. However, what is being attempted is to 
show that the new view has a't least some possibility of 
producing an internally coherent view - even if, at this 
stage, rigorous justification and empirical evidence has not 
been produced. 
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17.3 IDENTIFICATION 
There is, however, a further problem concerning public 
inference of the existence of the self. If the persistent 
self is to be identified only loosely with the brain, it 
will not be possible to infer the presence of the self from 
the evidence based in properties. For although the. 
existence of a self entails the existence of a brain to 
support it, the existence of a brain does not necessarily 
entail the existence of the self. Brains do not ensure 
self-consciousness or even consciousness. 
Thus, it is possible that a brain exist, yet there be no 
consciousness or self present - as for example, dead bodies 
or individuals in a brain-dead coma. Moreover, even if 
consciousness is present, this does not necessarily entail 
that self-consciousness or any kind of awareness of unity. 
If then, we are to argue by analogy to the existence of 
other selves, and consequently treat them as ends in 
themselves and responsible agents, there must be some form 
of necessary correlation between certain properties and the 
self. Knowledge of the content and function of the brain is 
important for knowledge of the existence of the self: there 
must be some link with certain thoughts namely those which 
---~-~---- - ~ 
ensure self-consciousness. If the self 
identified with token or type brain events 
become possible. 
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is further 
then this may 
There is of course a problem caused by the existence of 
selective consciousness: we are not always directly 
conscious of all the events occurring in our brains - things 
pass unnoticed and we don't always remember or even 
experience dream 
activity occurs 
activity. A vast 
sub-consciously. 
amount of 
How then, 
the brain's 
can it be 
assumed that the existence of material events ensures the 
occurrence of mental subjectivity? 
A defense might take the form of denying that a subject 
need always be conscious - certainly the sub-conscious can 
have a subjective effect, for even if we do not directly 
articulate the thoughts of the consciousness, they can have 
a profound effect on both our actions and our emotions. The 
sub-conscious does affect our present self-consciousness, 
for has its share in determining how we subjectively 
experience life. 
At present it is not possible to determine the exact 
correlation between types of material event and their 
content so, although we can make the inference that events 
of consciousness are likely to be occurring, we cannot know 
their quality - that can only be discerned by the subject. 
455 
Yet it may become possible with increased scientific 
development to isolate the correlations between material and 
mental events, either on a token or type. basis. If this 
happens it may well be possible to determine what the 
content of the thought is: whether a person is conscious, 
self-conscious, remembering, and so on. 
This being so, it would be possible to know whether there 
is a self~conscious person present and even the sort of 
thoughts he is having; but it would remain logically 
impossible to know the subjective experience of those 
thoughts. Nevertheless, the existence of the correlation 
between material activity and mental activity will provide 
us with a public mode of inference: for if the material 
manifestation of thought is occurring, we can be reasonably 
sure that the subjective side is occurring too. 
17.2 (i ). Inference by Analogy 
There is a further problem in the idea of the new view -
that of transferring the correlation from one person to a 
universal law from results produced on a subjective 
testimony. However, if enough experiments are done, some 
attempt at a probable correlation is possible and the 
likelihood of particular material and mental identity 
accepted. In the case of animals this will be more 
difficult, for the differences in physical structure may 
well intensify the subjective differences to totally alter 
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the state of consciousness, and the correlation cannot ever 
be tested - unless animals learn to talk. 
Although on a day- to-day bas is we cannot perceive the 
brain events occurring, we do use other methods by which to 
infer the mental activity from material events. In 
testimony from the self, observation of behaviour and the 
recognition of the functional role of mental states 
inferences are made concerning the existence of other 
selves. Although such descriptions appear to be purely 
objective, there is an inference of subjectivity involved, 
for these judgements too are based ultimately in analogy 
from the self, though it is a weak mind/body correlation. 
Through the mind/brain identity theory of the new view the 
inference from objective to subjective can be strongly 
supported. 
There is, however, still a fundamental problem to be 
addressed concerning the justification of arguing from 
analogy. A theory which bases its arguments upon just one 
verifying instance is precariously supported, and by using 
analogy, we are doing just this. In such arguments a move 
is made from the one instance of consciousness and selfhood 
experienced in ourselves, to the claim that all other 
persons are likewise conscious. Yet the fact that it occurs 
once, cannot guarantee that consciousness occurs in all 
things. 
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It is in an attempt to avoid this problem that 
philosophers have produced objective accounts of mind such 
as those characterising mental states in ~ehaviouristic or 
functional roles*, and even those identifying mental events 
with physical events. However, despite reflecting the way 
we identify other minds, these theories fail to account for 
the subjectivity which seems to fundamentally characterise 
mental events. In effect, any solely objective definition 
necessarily fails to account for the self or its experience. 
But if this is so, if an element of subjectivity is 
essential to the existence of a mental states, how can we 
know that other minds exist? Can the subjective be 
objectively identified? 
Wittgenstein's 'private language argument•+ has been 
generally invoked in reply to this question: it has been 
used by both those wanting to answer 'No' to the question, 
and by those who want to answer 'Yes'. His argument 
suggests that a private language is an impossibility, for to 
formulate a language one needs not only ostensive definition 
of its referent, but some form of objective and public 
existence too. Objectivity is necessary for corroboration 
and consisteny in the lab~lling function of the language, 
and moreover, it is essential if others are to understand 
our meaning. Thus although one can point to essentially 
* Eg. Ryle 1949 & Shoemaker (2) 1984 
+ Wittgenstein 1953 
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private experiences, one can not formulate any general rules 
or language by which to label concepts, for in their privacy 
they lack any form of objectivity both to ourselves and to 
others. 
Hence it is concluded that, if we cannot. produce a 
language about essentially private experiences, either such 
private experiences exist but we cannot talk about them, or 
when we do talk about them, we are not really referring to 
essentially subjective things. Physicalists such as Ryle* 
use Wittgenstein's argument to deny the existence of any 
states over and above the physical processes. For, they 
claim, such essentially private states cannot be talked 
about and therefore, when we do talk of mental states, we do 
not refer to anything which is essentially private. 
However, the argument can also be used to support the 
existence of subjectivity which is not essentially private+. 
Rather than denying that subjectivity exists, it claims that 
since private language is impossible, subjectivity must have 
some kind of recognised public form. To deny that 
subjectivity exists is plainly wrong, for it can be proven 
in at least one case - ourselves. Moreover, when we talk 
about our own mental states we do refer to this 
subjectivity, using it comprehensibly in a public way. 
~( Eg. Ryle 1949 
+ Eg. Carruthers 1986 
This, then, according to the argument, means 
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that 
subjectivity can be objectively understood. 
Far from dispelling the possibility of subjectivity, the 
private language argument can be used thus to support the 
existence of the subject and the possibility. of knowing 
about the self in others. Indeed it can be used to support 
the claims of this thesis - endorsing the suggestion that 
mental events do have a physical description on a brain-
identity level and also in terms of both functional and 
behaviouristic description. The private language argument 
helps to explain the meaning of mental states, and the 
belief that they are inferable from the physical. 
It is true that this is still only an argument from 
analogy, and it seems that even the most sophisticated 
attempts cannot avoid this problem. However, what is of 
interest is the meaning we give to mental states, not 
whether such use of analogy is rigourously justified. 
According to this argument, mental states have both a 
subjective and objective meaning: they are both private and 
public things. For the fact that we can and do speak 
publicly about mental events, and moreover understand each 
other in this language, indicates that there is an objective 
dimension to those events about which we can communicate. 
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Even if the analogous argument cannot be rigorously 
justified, it emerges as a form of argument used and 
classified in a similar to general induction* - although we 
cannot be philosophically justified in employing analogy, 
the use of it is nevertheless what we mean by 'rational'. 
Whether justified or not, the use of analogy forms the base 
of the way we think and talk about mental events in others. 
It explains the premises upon which we form our beliefs of 
other minds, other selves, other persons and consequently 
morality itself. 
-The mind/body identity theory can therefore support the 
inference from properties to selves. If a token or type 
theory is adopted, linking mental events to material events 
unified by one persisting brain, then the inference of the 
existence of a self from the presence of certain properties, 
is a justified move. Although we cannot be certain that a 
self exists, we can be reasonably justified in assuming so: 
for the connection between selves and properties is not 
contingent but necessary. 
*See Ayer 1936 and Section 7.3 (ii) 
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17.4 CONCLUSIONS 
It would appear from the analysis that on its own the 
self cannot provide a sufficient cha~acterisation of 
persons. The concept of persons is of more than just that 
of a self - persons are agents with deeds and behaviour, 
they are interactive, social beings. Persons, in effect 
have properties of certain sorts which make them persons, 
otherwise they are not complete. Persons are essentially 
public entities and without some necessary element of public 
tangibility, recognizability, and interaction, the concept 
of person could not function accurately. 
Objective characterisation is therefore not merely to 
ensure a publicly accessible self. As described by the 
simple view, selves have no public image as parts of their 
essential nature. In their propertyless-ness they fail not 
only because of their obvious lack of essential properties, 
but also in their intangibility to all but themselves. Even 
if they were to have some necessary link to properties by 
way of practical instantiation, properties associated in 
this way would be merely derivative to ensuring the 
existence and persistence of the self. It has been 
suggested that persons are more than just selves, their 
properties are not just associated with individuation or 
evidence: they are part of what a person essentially is. 
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However, the self must not be completely dismissed from 
any account of persons. If the intimations of the previous 
chaptersa are correct, the existence of the self proves to 
be a necessary element of person-hood. Belief in a 
property-less self is integral to our notion of morality and 
personal rights, for without such a concept the notion of 
responsibility cannot prevail over determinism. If our 
actions are ultimately determined by factors other than pure 
agency it is no longer logically possible to feel, nor 
attribute, responsibility and its attendant responses of 
praise or blame. Thus the removal of free will would 
undermine the inter-personal relationships of responsibility 
and agency in both the public and the private realms. 
The person is therefore reducible to two basic elements -
the self and properties - and any criterion of personal 
identity must combine these essential and necessary 
ingredients. An account of synchronic identity will somehow 
involve the presence of certain properties in combination 
with a self; a diachronic description will amount to the 
persistence conditions necessary for the self with these 
properties. Any attempt to produce a coherent theory of 
personal identity must somehow bring together what have so 
far been firmly separated: it must reconcile the simple and 
the complex views. 
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The simple and the complex views contradict each other: 
the former insisting that only the real persistence of the 
self can satisfy the needs of personal identity; the latter 
claiming that the real identity of substances or properties 
is unimportant to persons. It would seem therefore, that 
the combination of two theories might involve an internal 
inconsistency. However, such a threat can be dissipated 
if the compromise be viewed differently: if the positive 
claims of each view are accepted, and the negative points 
rejected. The result will be an theory holding that 
personal identity involves both the persistence of the self 
with real identity AND a continuity of shifting properties. 
The inclusion of parts of both the simple and complex views 
in the new criterion of personal identity does not, on this 
level, involve any form of logical contradiction. 
It has been suggested in this chapter that the new view 
might be realised in actuality if some form of mind/identity 
or dual aspect thesis were true. Although such an account 
is based in empirical observation and the links are only 
contingent, the characterisation is enough to explain a 
functional concept of person as \ve use it. Consciousness 
may exist in different forms elsewhere, or even in 
sophisticated artificial intelligence systems, but the way 
it is experienced and accounted for in humans can be used to 
explain and support our notion of morality with respect to 
persons. 
L~6L~ 
It has been put forward that personal identity consists 
in a combination of self and property identity. t~hilst it 
seems necessary that we have an idea of the self as 
persisting with real identity, this can be combined with an 
idea of fluctuating properties associated with that self to 
form a person. The self alone cannot constitute the person, 
for as such it has no public place - nor indeed can it be 
known. The properties alone cannot be the person, for a 
self is necessary to satisfy our beliefs concerning 
persistence, identity and freedom. 
The new view therefore does effect a certain compromise 
between the various accounts of personal identity. A person 
appears to be a complex object in that it has identifiable 
parts to which it is reducible. Moreover, it can be 
translated into these terms and persistence conditions of 
some sort, not referring to persons, can be provided. 
However, the complex characterisation is not that of the 
straightforward empiricist, for whilst part of a person's 
identity includes the continuation of something with loose 
identity, within the description is included the actual 
persistence of a thing with real, irreducible identity - the 
basic contentless self described by the modified simple 
view. It seems that the complex person of properties and 
the simple person without them are both necessary to a fully 
functional concept of persons. 
465 
Despite the attempts to dispel some of the problems of 
the new view, the project is still largely incomplete. 
Difficulties remain in the areas discussed the 
reconciliation of the subjective and objective, the problems 
of achieving real identity, and the ability to identify 
other selves. Moreover, the repercussions concerning 
freedom and free wi 11 under the new view have yet to be 
sorted out. Most of the suggested solutions have ultimately 
taken refuge in somewhat lackadaisical arguments like 
Nagel, I find that at this stage the compromise theory has 
"the faintly sickening odor of something put together in the 
metaphysical laboratory" (Nagel (3) p.49) 
However, although the new theory remains largely 
unsupported, I have given some suggestions or pointers as to 
how it might avoid its greatest difficulties, and thus have 
a chance of possibility. The strongest support for the 
suggestions lies in explanatory power: they help describe 
the way things appear to be set up and the preconceptions we 
have about things - whether they be concerned with mind, 
brains, agency or persons. 
anything in my suggestions, 
I cannot claim to have proven 
but they do provide a fresh 
approach to an area of argument which seems to have reached 
a stalemate. 
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CHAPTER 1~ APPARENTLY FUNDAMENTAL IRRECONCILABLE$ 
As was mentioned in chapter 3.1, the new view of personal 
identity not only encounters particular . difficulties 
associated with 'person', but enforces a re-assessment of 
broader epistemological classifications. It is not merely 
the difficulty of combining material with immaterial and 
the persistent with the transient, the subject with the 
object: for these are indicators of a more fundamental 
disharmony - that separating empirical and rational accounts 
of epistemology and ontology. 
If the claims and description of the new view of personal 
identity are correct, then they will amount to a combinatior 
of both the rationalist and empiricist perspectives. A~ 
argued, the person is a self plus properties, and both oj 
these aspects can be given a subjective and objectivt 
description from the same perspective. The account wi L 
fail if either description is not present, for subjectivit 
is necessary to our moral conception; objectivity for th 
functioning of person as Tesponsible in society. 
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l8al THE TENSION OF PERSPECTIVE 
The claims of the new view therefore combine both 
empiricist and rationalist perspectives: that we can have 
knowledge of persons both a priori and a posteriori in a way 
which does not relegate one of the forms of knowledge to 
second best. Empirical knowledge is not reduced to mere 
evidence and rational knowledge is not confined to intuition 
or definition. Thus it is possible to have both rational 
and empirical knowledge of the object and subject in the 
same thing. 
18.1 (i) Empiricism and Rationalism 
The apparent incoherence of such an account stems 
directly from the traditional divide centring on problems of 
knowledge and scepticism. Such difficulties arise from the 
demand for certainty in our knowledge: belief in a world 
independent of our perceptions cannot have complete 
certainty, for we are ultimately limited to our individual 
perspective upon it. This tension arising between the 
subjective and absolute accounts of the world is explicable 
if characterised as the difference between a first and a 
third-person view point. 
We experience the world from our own first-person 
perspective yet try to make judgements upon it which remove 
that unique view point and incorporate a general third-
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person perspective into the account. Our first-person 
perspective is necessarily subjective: anything experienced 
is done so from our unique point of view, ~hether we impose 
our preconception upon belief or merely our particular 
spatial perspective, the resulting account of the world will 
be unique and necessarily one sided. In contrast, the 
attempt to remove the particular perspective is a push 
towards objectivity: to try to describe the world from a 
general rather than particular position. Attempts to 
produce objectivity are traditionally associated with the 
removal of all sensible or essentially experienced or 
secondary properties, carried out in an effort to remove all 
subjectively determined elements. 
The most extreme example of this 
. .. 
is found in Platon. In 
an effort to achieve objectivity he excludes all phenomenal 
properties experienced, relying purely upon ir[tellec t and 
conception. As a result, Plato's knowledge is removed 
entirely from the world of sensory information (and any 
world thought to cause such experience) to an independent 
and intellectual realm of forms. 
The empirical/rational debate can be understood in terms 
of this tension between the subjective and objective 
accounts of reality. The empiricist abandons hope of 
producing any knowledge of the world in perspectiveless 
-!c Plato 
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terms. He is convinced of our confinement to subjectivity, 
producing theories inherently sceptical and usually 
idealistic about the possibility of an independent world. 
The only certain knowledge, it is claimed, is that to be had 
through the perceptions, for they are directly known and 
incorrigible. The knowable world thus contracts to become 
no more than a phenomenological thing: talk of anything mote 
is empty or merely convention. 
By contrast, the rationalist clings to belief in an 
objective reality. From Plato to the present, he has 
attempted to provide accounts of a world apart from the 
ephemeral of our minds. The hope is that rationality can 
provide a perspectiveless account of knowledge of the world 
- one not clouded by preconceptions of subjectivity. 
Kant's synthetic a priori knowledge is an attempt to 
combine subjectivity with some form of . * necess1.ty : he 
imposes a framework of a priori certainty upon an 
empirically manifested world. In the realm of phenomenal 
experiences he does manage to introduce an element of 
certainty; but it remains essentially subjective, even 
though it is common to all subjectivity. Moreover, to 
achieve synthetic necessity the objective and real world is 
forced beyond sensory accessibility to a strange and 
-lc Kant 1781 
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remote place never known in itself. 
The result of this conflict and the. parallel divide 
between the simple and complex views, is that each account 
'cuts off its nose to spite its face'. Both result in world 
views which are acceptable in some respects though 
objectionable in others. The theories are fragmented and 
insufficient with large gaps or problem areas. As Nagel~·, 
writes of this problem: 
The problem of bringing together subjective and objective 
views of the world can be approached from either direction. 
If one starts from the subjective side, the problem is the 
traditional one of skepticism, idealism or solipsism. How, 
given my personal experiential perspective, can I form a 
conception of the world as it is independent of my 
perception of it? And how can I know that this conception 
is correct? ••• if on the other hand one starts from the 
objective side, the problem is how to acconmodate, in a 
world that simply exists and has no perspectival centre, any 
of the following things: (a) oneself; (b) one's point of 
view; (c) the point of view of other selves, similar and 
dissimilar; and (d) the objects of various types of 
judgement that seem to emanate from these perspectives. 
Nagel (3) p.27 
The flaws in each account are endemic to their approach, 
for each paints only part of the picture of reality 
obscuring the other parts by their uncompromising stance. 
The empiricist sacrifices independent and objective reality 
for the sake of certainty; the ra tiona list forsakes true 
comprehension or real understanding for the sake 
objectivity. 
* Nagel (3) 1986 
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18.1 (ii} The Complex and Simple Views 
This basic problem has been clearly exemplified in the 
debate over personal identity. Paralleling the subjective/ 
objective conflict their accounts polarise on similar lines. 
The complex account of persons is clearly the result of 
recognised subjectivity: all versions are attempts to 
account for the person in purely subjective terms. They 
characterise a person as what can be experienced and no more 
to suggest the existence of more amounts to mere 
speculation. Thus the person is neatly reduced an account 
of its phenomena or properties. The person is essentially 
these properties, and the criteria of personal identity 
focus upon the empirically knowable. 
The simple view, by contrast, seeks to to provide an 
objective account of persons. In stripping the person of 
all phenomena it at tempts to achieve maximum obj ec tivi ty, 
thereby giving the person a status of a real thing rather 
than conventional, man-dependent entity. Thus the person is 
reduced to the propertyless self - the most objective entity 
we can imagine. This kind of self is described by Nagel: 
The picture is this. Essentially I have no particular point 
of view at all, but apprehend the world as centreless. As 
it happens, I ordinarily view the world from a certain 
vantage point, using the eyes, the person, the daily life of 
TN as a kind of window. But the experiences and the 
perspective of TN with which I am directly presented are not 
the point of view of the true self, for the true self has no 
point of view ••• 
Nagel (3) p.61 
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Each type of approach in its way succeeds in producing a 
theory which makes some sense; yet each also makes 
sacrifices that are fatal to their accounto. 
The complex view fails to explain or encompass any valid 
notion of subjectivity, where it does, it is not the 'real' 
self needed for moral foundation. The simple view produces 
an incoherent or isolated notion - something which fails to 
interact or do anything. These problems are clearly 
articulated by Nagel: 
The subjective features of conscious mental processes ~ as 
opposed to their physical causes and effects - cannot be 
captured by the purified form of thought suitable for 
dealing with the physical world that underlies the 
appearances. 
Nagel (3) p.15 
If we try to understand experience from an objective 
viewpoint that is distinct form that of the subject of the 
experience, them even if we continue to credit its 
perspectival nature, we will not be able to grasp its most 
specific qualities unless we can imagine them subjectively. 
Nagel (3) p.25 
This mutual exclusivity does not only produce 
insufficient accounts but the subsequent theories produced 
are self-refuting. Inconsistencies arise when it is 
realised that the account of person offered by each view 
ultimately conflicts with the starting place and background 
epistemology of its approach. 
Consider first the complex view. The empirical account 
of persons results in the rejection of the subject, for 
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phenomena cannot produce any evidence for persons which 
includes a subject - it is not empirically accessible. The 
result is that there is no longer a subject to give a 
subjectively defined account. Hence, in effect, the very 
subjectivity of perspective is denied in the consequences of 
its approach. 
The simple view encounters similar problems. In stripping 
the subject of all its subjectively discerned properties, 
the self becomes meaningless and unreal. It cannot 
conceivably be a subject, for its ability to experience and 
have a subjective experience is denied. Thus the 
consequence of trying to give an account of the a real self 
through objectivity, results in an incomprehens~ble and 
obscure thing which cannot satisfy the function of a 
subject, or be comprehended as real. In effect, the chosen 
approach of each side can only be satisfied by an account 
produced by its opposite. 
18.1 (iii) Resolution in the New View 
It seems that there is a need for some form of 
collaboration. If the two accounts do combine, the 
resulting theory is consistent and the person becomes a 
possible concept. The combined view accords with beliefs we 
have about persons that they have both a public and 
private existence. Interaction is not necessarily an 
impossibility and can be made to make sense: the properties 
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will be provided with a subject and the subject will be 
given properties to work through. If a joint approach to 
the person is accepted, the person can both function in the 
world and be known with an element of certainty: for the 
propertyless subject is recognised and knowable through 
links to both self and person-properties. The person is an 
object and a subject and is objectively and subjectively 
known. The complex and the simple accounts are thus shown 
to be intimately connected, neither making a viable theory 
upon its own but needing the compliment of its opposite. 
The recognition of a subjective and objective account of 
knowledge and the world as a possibility rather than a 
potential disaster helps to solve apparently insoluble 
contradictions. That empirical properties in the world are 
contingent and ephemeral seems to conflict with the 
possibility that their objects are real and persistent: yet 
both accounts seem indispensable. As Nagel writes: 
If 
The question is how to combine objective and subjective 
values in the control of a single life. They cannot simply 
exist side by side without interference, and it seems 
impossible to give the authority to either in deciding 
conflicts between them. 
Nagel (3) p.8 
we consider each description as a different 
perspective on the same thing, it is possible to reconcile 
the two in a subjective and objective account. The fact is 
that most things do have ephemeral natures as well as real 
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identity - the two are different ways of describing the same 
thing. Unless we recognise the possibility of this dual 
description, and indeed the necessity of including both an 
objective and subjective description of our knowledge, we 
are condemned to a one-sided and partial account of 
ourselves and the world. 
For in such an account we achieve a description of 
something which is known both subjectively and objectively 
by the same person. The role of the self is integral to the 
combination, for it is the self which knows itself as both a 
subject and an object - the only thing which can be known 
for certain in this way. 
This centrality of the self has long been recognised: 
since Descartes first articulated the 'cogito' it has had a 
central role to play. Kant recognised the self as the 
bridge between the nouminal and phenomenal world, claiming 
that, the free will necessary to the moral self can only be 
achieved through the existence of that self in a phenomena-
less and therefore non-causal state. 
The new view takes the centrality farther - it is the 
self which provides us with certain evidence of an objective 
and subjective thing. If we did not know the self as both a 
persisting subject and fluctuating object, we could not know 
anything to a have such identity. 
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16.2 EXAMPLES OF ANTINOMIES 
The existence of irreducible aspects of reality is 
* clearly recognised in Kant • As explained, he postulates a 
dual world - the objective nouminal world and the subjective 
phenomenal domain. The two are irreducible to each other 
but both are necessary to produce an accurate description of 
the way things are. The fundamental irreconcilability is 
further recognised in the antinomies, a set of apparent 
contradictions: both sides are deducible through reason yet, 
logically, the two should be contradictory. They could be 
classed as arising out of the empiricist and rationalist 
approaches to knowledge, like the problems of the self and 
body, as differing descriptions of the same thing: an 
objective fixed and absolute account, and a subjective and 
fluctuating one. Kant writes: 
This antinomy, not arbitrarily invented but founded in the 
nature of human reason, a_nd hence unav~idable and never 
ceasing, contains the following four theses together with 
their antitheses: 
1 
Thesis: The world has, as to time and space, a beginning 
(limit). 
Antithesis: The world is, as to time and space, infinite. 
2 
Thesis: Everything in the world consists of [elements 
that are] simple. 
Antithesis: There is nothing simple, but everything is 
composite. 
3 
Thesis: There are in the world causes through freedom. 
Antithesis: There is no freedom, but all is nature. 
-I: Kant 1781 
4 
Thesis: In the series of the world-causes there is some 
necessary being. 
Antithesis: There is nothing necessary in the world, but in 
this series all is contingent. 
Here is the most singular phenomenon of human reason, no 
other instance of which can be shown in any other use of 
reason. If we, as is commonly done, represent to ourselves 
the appearances of the sensible world as things in 
themselves, if we assume the principles of their combination 
as principles universally valid of things in themselves and 
not merely of experience, as is usually, nay without our 
Critique unavoidably, done, there arises an unexpected 
conflict which never can be removed in the common dogmatic 
way: because the thesis, as well as the antithesis, can be 
shown by equally clear, evident, and irresistible 
proofs ••• and reason therefore perceives that it is divided 
against itself, a state at which the skeptic rejoices, but 
which must make the critical philosopher pause and feel ill 
at ease. 
Kant sc.50 
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The acceptability of irreconcilability - the idea that 
this is the way things are, that they both fluctuate and are 
fixed, that there is an absoluteness and a relativity about 
the world - extends to many areas of knowledge, not just 
those of philosophical concern. It underlies many of our 
basic beliefs about ourselves and the world. 
18o2 (i) Perspective in Morality 
From what has been discussed, this attitude is evident in 
a philosophical account of. persons but it is also strongly 
characteristic of our everyday beliefs about ourselves and 
others. As shown*, we have distinct ideas of ourselves as 
both fixed and changing. When considering our past we have 
-:, Chapters L4 & 15 
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a clear notion that it is our past and that we are in 
connected with it through identity, yet at the same time we 
are willing to disassociate ourselves .from that past, 
absolving our consciences of responsibility for the deeds 
done, and believing that it is possible to make a fresh 
start in a complete break from the past - in effect that we 
can and do change over time. 
This attitude does not extend just to ourselves - we 
believe it of others as well even though the conviction of 
its truth may be weakened and less certain. The history of 
others is important to us, as are their qualities and 
properties: they make a difference to our appraisal and 
value of who and what they are and give us an idea of what 
to expect of them. Yet at the same time it is felt that we 
can judge a person anew, reappraising them on what they are 
now by recognising the possibility of change and the 
difference it can bring about in value and responsibility. 
In effect we have a conflicting belief about others too -
that they are both persistent and changing through time. 
The effects of this belief have repercussions within 
morality and moral behaviour, characterised by the conflict 
between altruism and utility. Both in ourselves and in 
others there is a distinct tension between considering the 
person to be of value to some further end - either happiness 
or usefulness, and the need to value persons in their own 
479 
right - as an end in themselves. Moreover, this attitude 
can be seen in the attribution of responsibility: that we 
are unwilling to condemn individuals for behaviour not done 
voluntarily, yet demand some notion of causality in 
responsible action. 
1~.2 (ii) Definition of the Person 
We have an idea of the person as something which is fixed 
and changing and, as suggested, this might be characterised 
in terms of the self and its properties. Both exist in the 
person, both are necessary to the person, and the person is 
thus considered to be a combination of potentially 
contradictory elements. 
These contradictions extend to beliefs in the what we are 
as persons - there are strong and conflicting concepts of 
selves as being somehow perfect yet at the same time flawed. 
For we aspire to some ideal of perfection and purity in our 
lives and behaviour, in the belief that that is what makes 
us good (no matter what it is that one aspire to), yet at 
the same time we are conscious of the fact that we have 
human frailties and weaknesses essential to being human. 
Moreover, it is generally recognised that the qualities we 
ascribe to ourselves and others often aspire to some 
pureness of form - such as bravery, or humility, yet without 
the opposing factors of cowardice or pride we would become 
imbalanced and somehow worse. In effect, we have a belief 
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that there is a perfect black and white quality we wish to 
encourage, yet at the same time find that if it is nurtured 
to the detriment of other traits we can become completely 
imbalanced. 
That we can reconcile ourselves to this contradiction is 
exemplified through its existence in many religious and 
moral codes - most exhort the believer to move closer to 
perfection whilst at the same time recognising the inherent 
'weakness 0 in humanity. For example, in Christianity, the 
existence of 'sin' is a recognition of our human condition: 
we were fashioned in perfection but are all born with the 
original sin of Adam. This tension in us is exemplified by 
belief that Christ, the Son of God and therefore perfect, 
was made man, thus becoming also imperfect. Though for some 
this is difficult to believe, it is a sustainable belief for 
the religious and accepted as the truth about the way men 
are. It is perhaps a reflection of the belief that we have 
a share in the divine and a share in the natural and that 
the two, though conflicting, exist alongside each other. 
18.2 (iii) The Individual and Society 
On a wider level of identity there is a tension between 
ourselves as individuals and as being part of a tribe or 
social group. There are strong beliefs concerning ourselves 
as individuals with potential for being and acting 
independently of our social surroundings and upbringing, 
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whilst at the same time it is difficult to understand how we 
come to be characterised, except through our social identity 
the individual gains a great deal of character and 
potentiality through the tribe, even understanding himself 
in contrast to other social groups. The two seem 
interdependent: the individual cannot exist ·unless the 
society provides a background against which to define 
himself, but the society cannot thrive without the life-
giving individuality - without originality it may become 
stagnated and dried up. 
When this dilemma is extended to action within society 
the problem emerges with force. There is a real conflict 
between acting for the society and acting in self-interest -
whether to behave with the interests of the social group in 
mind, doing actions which may harm the self, or whether self 
preservation must be a deciding factor for behaviour. This 
tension surfaces in the divisions created in Mill's 'On 
Liberty .-1( where individualism is promoted for the good of 
society but it is also recognised that, if unchecked, such 
individualism might cause the disintegration of society. 
The difficulty creates problems over the imposition of 
social rules: there is a strong belief that an individual 
should be free to choose and be responsible for its actions, 
yet without rules, the individual may find it difficult to 
"i'c Mill 1859 
act, not knowing how to make or base a decision. 
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What 
emerges are two conflicting truths that both 
individualistic and herd-like behaviour ar~ necessary to the 
continuance of both the individual and society. If one 
exists but not the other, chaos ensues. 
In case-law yet another recognition of tension can be 
seen. This is a perfect example of the belief that 
absolutes exist alongside the undeniable uniqueness of each 
individual situation. The fundamental absolutes of law are 
laid down, yet each case is judged and evaluated on its own 
merits, with all circumstances of its particular background 
taken into account 
18.2 (iv) Absolutes and Relativity 
It seems that in our beliefs and laws of society we have 
a concept of absolutes which co-exists with the recognition 
that everything seems relative. The concepts we have imply 
a universal truth, yet when applied to the world it is found 
that they occur in conjunction with so many influences from 
other factors, that a unique situation is born. The world 
does not provide a pure vacuum in which absolutes function, 
no situation provides a pure case ~oncerning only one 
concept, so absolutes are corrupted, changed and modified, 
until they seem to no longer exist. As Plato noted*' 
nothing in the world seems to rna tch up to the absolute 
* Eg. 'The Republic' 
483 
concepts we have despite that fact that we do have strong 
beliefs in their existence. 
The problem remains then, whether absolutism is just a 
habit or belief or whether these things really do exist. Is 
truth to be found in abstract concepts 0r changing 
experiences? If the account of this thesis is correct, the 
answer is, that it must be a combination of both: without 
the knowledge of ideals and absolutes we become lost, for 
there is no starting place or framework to work within; yet 
without the belief in individual circumstance, we become 
unbending, idealistic, and naive. Neither forms the whole 
truth on its own; truth and wisdom is made up of a 
consideration of both. 
18.2 (v) Perspective in Art 
Art can be seen as an attempt to achieve the bird's eye 
view of reality to combine the absolute with the 
subjective. The artist has a conflict to re-produce - he is 
trying to present the world in a universal way, yet needs to 
do so from his subjective position. 
the two, the product achieving 
The best works combine 
a 'play' between the 
objectivity of the world and subjectivity of experience: if 
the work tries to become too objective, 
copy and uninteresting; if it becomes 
it remains just a 
too subjective or 
the obscurity of a abstract, intelligibility 
private perspective. 
is lost to 
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The difficulty is implicit in certain letters of 
Cezanne.,.: For example he writes of painting a seascape in 
which many of the colours look flat, yet we know that they 
are not, they are part of a three dimensional extension. I 
therefore becomes part of the work of the artist to include 
both the subjective impression of flatness and the knowledge 
of the objective reality of depth. Schiller+ too writes of 
the external and internal world of the artist, claiming that 
the good work of art is a 'play' between reality imposing 
upon the artist, and the artist imposing upon reality. 
Thus, it might be considered that the greatest works of 
art are those which balance the relative with the absolute -
at tempt to show that the truth of the way things are is 
perspectiveless, whilst maintaining that every approach to 
the world must have a perspective. The great play wi 11 
present more than one side of its story - we are shown the 
different perspectives, with the play attempting to provide 
the all embracing 'gods eye' viewpoint. 
One of the great values in Shakespeare is exactly this: 
that his depth is produced in the recognition of a conflict 
of interests. The struggles he portrays can be seen as 
disparities of perspective, and the truth or understanding 
of the problem is brought out for the audience by the 
.,., Cezanne 1946 
+ Schiller 1793 
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presentation of those different perspectives: the good guys 
are rarely completely good; the bad usually understandable. 
18.2 (vi) The Centrality of the Self 
The central role of the self and self knowledge in all 
these examples has been recognised and seized 'upon by the 
existentialists. For example, Merleau-Ponty* discus~es 
relationship between art and the mind, locating the artist 
at the centre of the interaction between the objective and 
subjective: 
Essence and existence, imaginary and real, visible and 
invisible - a painting mixes up all our categories in laying 
out its oneiric universe of carnal essences, of effective 
likenesses, of mute meanings. 
Merleau-Ponty p.65 
He criticises the scientific approach as one of trying to 
create a perspectiveless description for inevitably this 
will lead to an insufficient account. He writes: 
Scientific thinking, a thinking which looks on from above, 
and thinks of the object-in-general, must return to the 
'there is' which underlies it; to the site, the soil of the 
sensible and opened world which as it is in our life and for 
our body - not that possible body which we may legitimately 
think of as an information machine but that actual body I 
call mine, this sentinel standing quietly at the command of 
my words and my acts. 
Merleau-Ponty p.56 
He thus places an emphasis upon the self as having a body 
as well as a being with thought - its objectivity is crucial 
to our knowledge of the real world and its subjectivity is 
* Merleau-Ponty 1961 
crucial to an accurate presentation of the world: 
The enigma is that my body simultaneously sees and is seen. 
That which looks at all things can also look at itself and 
recognise, in what it sees, the 'other side' of its power of 
looking. It sees itself seeing; it touches itself touching; 
it is visible and sensitive for itself. It is not a self 
through transparence, like thought, which only thinks its 
object by assimilating it, by constituting it, by 
transforming it into thought. It is a self through 
confusion, narcissism, through inherence of the one who sees 
in that which he sees, and through inherence of sensing in 
the sensed- a self, therefore, that is caught up in things, 
that has a front and a back, a past and a future ••• 
Merleau-Ponty p.58 
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Although the existentialist intention is to deny the 
possibility of objective truths, focussing instead upon the 
importance of the subject and its being in the world, the 
crucial of role of the subject links it to the suggestions 
of this thesis. For to the existentialist the knowledge we 
have is essentially linked to our experience of 
subjectivity. The last comment in the quotation above 
recognises the key role played by the self's knowledge and 
experience of itself. 
It is the intention of this thesis to suggest that such 
knowledge enables us to move beyond the subjective truth 
limiting the existentialist, to an understanding of the 
absolute as well. For it is through awareness of a 
subjective/objective dualism in ourselves that we are able 
to comprehend the dualism and contradiction of the world. 
It is the experience of absolute in combination with the 
relative in our self which enables us to comprehend and 
believe in the same for all reality. 
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If we want to make a 
fitting description or a wise account of our selves and the 
world - we must include the subjective and objective view 
points. 
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CHAPTER 19 SUMMARY CONCLUSION 
19.1 THE SELF AND THE PROPERTIES 
From the discussion it appears that th~ new view's 
concept of person is not a logical impossibility. It has 
been shown that a self does not entail the person on its own 
but needs consciousness of certain person-properties and 
that the person-properties cannot be a person without the 
self. Moreover, this account of the connection is 
reinforced in the powerful understanding of ourselves as 
both having and being properties. It can also be shown that 
the connections do in fact exist and provide a sufficient 
account of personal identity. 
It is not enough just to combine the two elements under a 
joint classification: it must be possible to discern the 
person as a .persisting real thing. For it has beer 
established that it is necessary to produce a concept oJ 
personal identity which is both actually real and which i: 
knowable with certainty not merely for proof of th 
existence of the person but to enable the concept o 
responsibility used in morality to function. 
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It has been shown that the properties and the self are 
separately discernible in some way, moreover that both 
exist: as the simple view shows, the self is experienced by 
the self; as the complex view shows the the person-
properties are straightforwardly observable. The new view 
attempts to show that the combination of both self and 
properties is not only perceivable through presence of the 
separate parts, but also as a unified whole. The suggested 
connection might be characterised by some form of co-
consciousness - that the self is joined to the properties by 
the potentiality of direct awareness of them. 
19.1 (i) Knowledge of Properties 
The self has direct knowledge of its possession of 
properties through its knowledge of its own existence. In a 
way similar to the knowledge of our existence through the 
'cogito', existence of the self entails the existence of 
certain properties, that is, ability to experience, act and 
so on. Thus the self can make a logical inference from 
knowledge of its existence to the knowledge that it has 
certain properties, namely those necessary for the 
instantiation of the self. The self therefore knows itself 
as an object as well as subject - an a priori knowledge that 
selves have certain objective properties. 
In addition to the bare logical proof of Descartes, the 
self can have a different form of direct knowledge of its 
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properties: for a distinction can be made in the field of 
our immediate experiences between the type and nature of 
that experience. We are aware of some things as objects 
independent of us but we are also aware of certain things as 
subjects of them - they are part of ourselves. For example, 
I can experience parts of my body as objects b.ut also as 
part of me - I can see my leg through my eyes but I can also 
perceive my leg through my nerves and 'feel' it. Those 
experiences which I perceive as a subject I consider to be 
mine. Any property belonging to me in this way is 
experienced in an incorrigible and direct way, which does 
not divide the experience from the experiencer, they are the 
same thing. 
It is clear then that there is a definite and empirical 
link between the self and its properties, and this defines 
properties of the self in terms of subjective awareness. 
There seems little logical objection to taking a further 
step to characterise a connection between the self and its 
person-properties also in this way. If this is so, self-
consciousness of person-properties is the vital link which 
makes a person known to the self. If we are self-
consciously aware of certain person-properties then we are 
persons. 
An objection to this characterisation of person-hood 
might be that the capriciousness of self-awareness makes an 
unsuitable base for personal rights. 
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We are far from 
constantly aware of all our properties - what happens when 
we are not self-conscious of vital pe~son properties? 
Moreover, persons have properties that are continuous even 
if we do not feel conscious of them, and we attribute 
properties to others which they may, or may not be, directly 
aware of. Does this mean that we are not the same person as 
those properties or that they are not part of a person? 
A further moral problem concerns the fluctuation of 
properties, for the objective history of the self is also 
necessary to the system of punishment and personal 
responsibility we have. We could not objectively discern 
persons in a Lockean or simple view sys tern, for as shown, 
such accounts entail that the identity of the person would 
depend upon the self and its particular present 
consciousness. Although it cannot be certain, it is likely 
that if this were so, our notion of moral responsibility 
could not persist as we use it. 
Such considerations point the way to a belief that the 
truth about personal identity must lie in something more: 
there needs to be some form·of co-consciousness which is not 
merely the subjective phenomenon - one that can link the 
subject to the properties at times of unconsciousness and 
lack of awareness. Although the ability to subjectively 
recognise certain properties is necessary for properties to 
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belong to a particular self; this does not provide a 
sufficient account - self-awareness and co-consciousness is 
only a symptom of some more profound connection. 
19o1 (ii) Mind/Brain Identity 
The link being looked for can be provided in a mind/brain 
identity theory. Such an account portrays self-
consciousness as a phenomenal aspect of the brain's 
functional unification. Material brain events and thoughts 
can be identified in a token or type way, and the persistent 
self-consciousness through time can be identified with the 
unified brain. The physical and the mental are different 
descriptions of the same thing: the objective and subjective 
are both aspects of mind. 
The new view claims that the self has an objective 
reality, rather than an ephemeral subjective impression; 
that co-consciousness is upheld independently of phenomenal 
impressions by the unified brain. 
Hence, it may be that the connection between the self and 
its properties can be reduced or explained in terms not 
referring explicitly to this self-consciousness. But as 
before, this question is one of mechanics derivative to 
exemplifying the desired connection of self-consciousness 
and no more. The brain is not sufficient to the concept of 
person-hood, for the brain does not entail the existence of 
a person. 
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Thus although the existence of a person will 
entail that there is a brain, a self and certain other 
person-properties present, the same is not true of the 
opposite: none of these factors individually entail that 
there is a person present - only self-consciousness can do 
that. 
--------------------~--~~---· ~ 
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19.2 THE NEW VIEW AND MORALITY 
The above characterisation fits well with our beliefs 
about what persons are. 
19.2 (i) The Attribution of Personal Rights 
A set of properties without the notion of a connection to 
a unified self-conscious subject does not have personal 
status: neither robots nor dead bodies have full personal 
rights - and even babies and lunatics have such rights only 
on the presumption of potential full person-hood. Likewise 
the conflict between maintaining or removing life support 
from patients can be described under the possibility of 
there being or not being a self-consciousness (or potential 
for a subject) still present. Finally, the attribution of 
punishment or reward is based upon the ideal assumption that 
actions are controlled by self-consciousness - without this 
vi tal link, then actions are not considered to be truly 
morally reprehensible. 
Thus the reduction is only to practical conditions 
necessary to maintain the relationship of co-consciousness: 
the essence of the link between properties and the person is 
purely that of co-consciousness, anything more is 
subordinate to achieving that link. This is clearly shown 
by the fact that it takes only the removal of the belief in 
495 
self-conscious unity to justify a removal of personal 
rights. 
For example, the uncontrolled acts of the drunk or insane 
are punished not for their responsibility in acting, but 
either to punish the wilful act of getting drunk .and into an 
irresponsible position, or to protect the community from 
further crimes. On an everyday scale even acts done 
unwittingly or out of character are punished for the agent's 
inability to exact the proper self-control rather than 
responsibility for the act itself. In each case, the idea 
of personal responsibility is weakened, though individual 
responsibility is not. 
I seems that full personal rights are essentially based 
in the belief that the individual or agent is in full self-
conscious control of and is aware of his properties, or at 
least they are based upon some ideal condition with 
appropriate modifications and allowances. The apparent 
problem of non-continuity of this self-consciousness can be 
easily explained in a way similar to that used by memory 
theorists: that it is a general connectedness or continuity 
of self-consciousness and the potential for unity_ that links 
the self to properties. Any personal rights attributed to 
individuals without such self consciousness is done so in 
the belief of their potential or past ability to enjoy this 
state. 
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19.2 (ii) Others and Selves 
We thus have experience of a connection between ourselves 
and our personal properties. However, sue~ a connection is 
still not a sufficient criterion of identity for the person. 
For, although the connection entails that the person can be 
subjectively known and individuated, and that it can have a 
fixed his tory, it does not explain how this person can be 
objectively or publicly known. Although it is obvious 
that we can publicly experience both self-properties and 
person=properties, this is not enough to infer the existence 
of a person from a third-person perspective. To be a 
functional criterion of person it must be possible that the 
self, properties and the link of self-consciousness be 
identifiable by others. 
It has been claimed that self-knowledge of properties is 
a priori and certain but that such knowledge is logically 
private. The unity experienced by the self is not something 
possibly experienced by others - it is something which in 
itself gives rise to the particular self. Anyone 
experiencing the subjectivity will be that self. 
It is through the links between the self and its 
necessary self-properties that we can have direct evidence 
of other selves. Although the properties necessary to the 
self will not entail with certainty that there is a self 
present, we have some justification for making the inference 
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since there is a necessary connection rather than just 
contingent or accidental coincidence. Given other 
corroborative evidence, for example that of self-testimony 
or other person~properties, we are justified in inferring 
the existence of the self. Thus unlike knowledge of others 
in the simple view, we can have supported knowledge of other 
selves be it only probable and based upon inference. 
Certain properties may be taken as evidence of their 
existence, for the links between empirical manifestations 
and the self are necessary. The self of this new view does 
have a public manifestation. 
19·. 2 (iii) Others as Persons 
However, the above is still not complete evidence of the 
person, for as seen, the self is just a part of the person. 
There is also evidence that personal properties are linked 
to a self in self-consciousness. The form of argument above 
can additionally be used to give knowledge of the person. 
Like the existence of the self, the connection of person-
properties to the self must be inferred. Although the 
existence of person-properties does not entail a person, 
they are part of the person and therefore, if present in 
conjunction with the self-properties, indicate a high 
likelihood that a person is present. Once again, the 
inference is justified, for the criteria being used are 
necessarily linked to the person. Although third-person 
identification of persons is not infallible, the evidence of 
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persons is based upon knowledge that connections that are 
infallibly known do exist. 
It would seem therefore that our evidence of person-hood 
in others must be inferred from known connections holding 
within ourselves. Although this is indirect an~ corrigible 
evidence, this evidence is based in direct and incorrigible 
knowledge in our own particular instance. Whether justified 
or not, this characterisation is evidenced in our use of 
personal identity and beliefs about others. We do accept 
that our knowledge of others is fallible, being willing to 
adjust and modify our judgements on the matter. Identity is 
notably difficult to be certain of, but such uncertainty 
indicates a belief that.there is a right and wrong answer 
rather than that the judgement is entirely relative. The 
seriousness with which we take the making of identity claims 
is partly due to the belief that there is an objective and 
real identity to be found. We believe that there is a real 
and persisting thing that we call the person. 
Like the foundation of moral behaviour and personal 
rights, the knowledge and beliefs about others is inferred 
from analogy. Although· this method has been widely 
challenged and rejected, it seems that at present there is 
no other way that we can come by a belief in other minds. 
It is because we experience ourselves as subjects with 
objective parts, that we can infer the existence of other 
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subjects though their objective manifestations. The 
inference is based in knowledge of something real the 
foundation of that knowledge is in the a priori awareness of 
the self. 
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19.3 CONCLUSIONS 
The knowledge we have of the self and person can be seen 
to provide a central touchstone for our beliefs and ideas 
about the rest of our experiences. 
in identity through change in 
The awareness or belief 
the self, serves as a 
measuring stick for identity in other things: both giving us 
the original idea of identity, and serving as a base 
relative to which we determine other identities. 
Not only does the experience of the self provide 
awareness of identity, but it may be the source of our ideas 
of the absolute and the relative in reality. For we 
experience ourselves as persons both subjectively and 
objectively - we know ourselves both as persistent things 
and as changing things. It may be that it is through this 
self-awareness, that we come to frame our expectations about 
other objects of empirical perception - that perhaps they 
too have some unity and persistence through time not 
discernible in an objective empirical way. 
The main objections against the possibility of a person 
being a hybrid of the self and properties can be 
circumnavigated without too much difficulty. It is 
conceivable that the self and its properties can be 
connected in a real rather than just conventional way and, 
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moreover, that such a connection can produce a criterion of 
identity which will not be question begging. 
The foreseen combination of complex and simple accounts 
does not pose any fundamental barriers for either our 
conception or our knowledge of person. Although. it has not 
been conclusively proven to be true, it provides a more 
convincing account of persons than either the complex or 
simple view in isolation. 
CONCLUSION 
I believe in you my soul, the other I am must not 
abase itself to you, 
And you must not be abased to the other. 
Walt Whitman 
'Song of Myself' 
CONCLUSION 
In examining the concept 
thesis has concentrated upon 
complex and simple accounts. 
of personal 
the central 
502 
identity, this 
divide be tween 
The opposing theories have 
been evaluated with respect to their ability to produce a 
concept of persons which will fulfil the role of a forensic 
being. Thus, the criticisms suggested, are not made solely 
in consideration of the coherence of supportive arguments, 
but also on the ability to provide accurate accounts of a 
person as a moral agent: whether value and responsibility 
are sufficiently met by the concept, whether the resulting-
person can be objectively and reliably identified. 
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1 THE COMPLEX VIEW 
The complex view of persons was the first account 
examined. Within this account the person is portrayed as 
fundamentally reducible to a set of criteria, all of which 
are empirically verifiable from a third-person or first-
person perspective: whether it is the phenomenal and first-
person self or the solid more tangible properties, all are 
basically reductions of the person to a list of properties. 
The value and importance of persons is in the way they seem, 
the qualities and properties they have and the utility they 
provide. 
1 (i) Advantages 
The advantage of such a view is that it makes persons 
ostensive - they can be individuated and understood in a 
public way. Even the fluctuating Lockean self is 
comprehendible, for its value can be defined in terms of 
consciousness. The person is thus defined in a solid way: 
its nature, value, identity and existence can all be 
explained and translated into further terms. 
In the field of morality this is of great significance, 
for it fits well with the notion of utilitarian ethics, 
being consistent with the utility principle we operate with 
regard to both ourselves and others. As argued, it is 
practically impossible to separate properties from the 
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concept of persons - both in straightforward value and in 
terms of responsibility. Without empirical criteria of 
identity, the person becomes obscure, even meaningless. 
1 (ii) Disadvantages 
However, in its restriction to empiricism, ~he complex 
account falls down. By concentrating upon properties, the 
complex accounts characterise persons as objects rather than 
subjects - a description which loses part of the meaning we 
associate with ourselves and others. Whether the subjective 
account of Locke, or the more objective developments of more 
recent complex view holders, the person cannot have 
persistence with real identity. As demonstrated, the 
complex view cannot therefore account for the conception of 
selves in terms of value, morality or responsibility. 
Clearly recognisable in its accounts are the sort of 
conclusions which also arise out of a utility-based ethic. 
Since a utility ethic results in ridiculous and discordant 
theories - something more must be added if we are to provide 
a sufficient account of persons. 
Most of these problems have been raised in the simple 
view's objections to both· early accounts and more recent 
empirical accounts of persons. Hence, in response to the 
failure of the empirical accounts to overcome these 
difficulties, the discussion moved on to consider the 
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alternative suggestions put forward by the simple view. 
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2 THE SIMPLE VIEW 
The simple view recognises the intuitive insufficiency of 
the complex accounts, and suggests that ·by defining the 
person as the subject, the problem is solved. Such simple 
view theories produce dualist conceptions of persons, the 
main distinction being between self and properties. The 
self emerges as the essence of the person, the physical and 
mental properties are merely contingent accessories. These 
theories exclude all content-properties from the identity of 
the person. 
2 (i) Advantages 
As an account of the self and its identity the simple 
view is mostly viable but as a theory of persons it provides 
only half of the necessary facts. For if the self is the 
sole criterion of person, then persons will become 
essentially private, obscure and even nonsensical entities. 
However, more important is the role the simple view plays 
in reinstating rationalism as a viable form of knowledge: 
the awareness we have of the self undoubtedly provides a 
priori knowledge of an object, and therefore a priori 
knowledge of the world. The simple view therefore reduces 
the spectre of scepticism from the horizon of epistemology. 
By proving that we have knowledge of real identity in the 
self, the simple view makes possible real knowledge about an 
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object - real in the sense of non-inferred. Moreover, the 
self is knowledge of more than just knowledge of fluctuating 
perceptions - the self persists through time. 
2 (ii) Disadvantages 
However, this line of reasoning is limited. The 
knowledge that such an account deems possible is accessible 
only to the self. Although this brings proof to the claims 
of previous rationalist accounts, it goes no further than 
self-knowledge. For the knowledge of the self is 
essentially subjective and, as such, it is unique and 
particular. Self-knowledge cannot be generalised to make 
use of it in further epistemology: the possibility that this 
knowledge is general and objective cannot be proven by the 
simple view. Apart form providing us with a solid and real 
use for our beliefs about identity and the world, the self 
cannot make the epistemological advances hoped for. 
The insufficiencies of the simple account draw attention 
to even more fundamental problems in philosophy. The limits 
imposed upon the simple view by its rationalist aspirations 
clearly parallel the limitations of all rationalist accounts 
- pointing to the insurmountable problems set for them by 
. 
their approach. The conflict in the realms of personal 
identity are the conflicts of the epistemological debate 
carried through all philosophical enterprise. Until these 
basic approaches are sorted out, one cannot begin to 
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understand the force behind, nor the reasoning towards, the 
solutions offered by various theories. 
It has been found, then, that in the end the evidence 
supporting both sides is underdetermined: neither is 
supported conclusively by their arguments, the:i.r claim to 
acceptability being ultimately determined by the 
methodological approach each endorses. The empiricist 
claims validity because he bases his claims in experience -
he is empirically rigorous; the rationalist claims he is 
right because he satisfies basic beliefs and intuition, 
basing his arguments in certainty rather than doubtful 
experience = he is rationally rigorous. How then is it 
possible to decide between them without necessitating a 
full-scale investigation into epistemology? 
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3 THE NEW VIEW 
The attempted solution was to undertake a re-examination 
of morality and the consequent demands placed on anything 
playing the role of person. It emerged that to fulfil its 
moral function~ the person must have both a content-less 
self and properties: if either of these is missing then the 
resulting account will be insufficient. In effect the 
forensic nature of persons entails that any effective 
account of them must combine the simple and complex views. 
3 (i) Combination of the Complex and Simple Views 
In response to the above findings, I have suggested a new 
view: essentially a combination of the dichotomy at present 
existent in the conceptions of personal identity. The new 
view recognises the necessity of both a self and properties 
to the concept of person, stating that the two are essential 
criteria if persons are to be both morally valued and 
responsible for their activities. The self explains a 
possibility of free will and altruism; the properties 
provide tangibility, consistency and recognition of utility. 
The new view postulates a form of dualism which describes 
an objective/subjective divide: that material and mental are 
not necessarily exclusive of one another but are 
descriptions of the same thing. A mind/body identity theory 
has emerged as the simplest explanation of mind and body 
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interaction, with a recognition of the functional and 
cognitive role of consciousness. The mind is described as a 
combination of the mental and material; the self is 
identified with the brain; and the person emerges as the 
self and its properties. This is not to reduce subjectivity 
to material; nor objectivity to mental; it is to postulate a 
new conception recognising the co-existence of both. 
The resulting person has real identity and persistence 
through change, yet also has the ability to change and 
fluctuate on a qualitative level. The numerical and 
qualitative identities do overlap to an extent, though not 
completely. Even if the account is not accurate, it does 
fulfil the demands on the concept of 1 person' more 
comprehensively than either the complex or simple view in 
isolation. 
3 (ii) Moral and Epistemological Implications 
In the new view the position of the self and its body is 
paramount - it is central to our knowledge of all else. 
This is the most far-reaching insight of the new view: that 
the subject has real knowledge of both objective and 
subjective experience of the same thing. That the self can 
be known both objectively and subjectively. 
As with the arguments from analogy described earlier with 
respect to morality and identity of others, it has been 
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suggested that it is from our ideas and knowledge of our 
selves as objects and subjects that we generate the idea 
that all things are similarly describable. That is, the 
intuitive realisation that empirical and rational 
descriptions can somehow rest together may come from the 
recogn~tion of this as a truth in the self. 
It seems that the existence of antinomies fundamentally 
pervades the structure that we impose upon our conception of 
reality and, I would suggest, it is an idea originating in 
the self. It may be that such analogies are misguided and, 
in fact, that the self is the only thing for which such 
descriptions are possible; but nevertheless, the analogy 
provides an explanation of how we come to have the belief 
that the truth we are aware of in ourselves, also extends to 
others and the world. 
The concept of 'person' emerges as a pivot for knowledge, 
the central basis of all epistemology. The direct awareness 
of the self gives us certain knowledge of something non-
trivial, whilst at the same time we can also experience that 
thing as something with a fluctuating and changing nature. 
From this pattern known in ourselves we can explain and 
understand our assessment of other minds, other identities, 
and indeed the other objects of our perception. The 
essential tension existing in the self and person provides a 
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model for the rest of our knowledge: it gives us an idea of 
both the absolute and the relative existing side by side. 
The role of personal identity in philosophy is therefore 
not confined to being merely a particular example in a 
broader debate. For the discussion of this thesis indicates 
the extent to which personal identity affects and effects 
conclusions of fundamental epistemological concern. 
Personal identity plays a key role in proofs of 
possibilities - concerning synthetic a priori knowledge and, 
more deeply, the reconciliation of the empirical and 
rational conceptions of reality. The inconsistencies 
revealed by personal identity are more than just a way to 
criticise the conflict, they point squarely to the 
incoherency within isolated views and the necessity of 
combining opposing accounts. 
3 (iii) The Potential for Persons 
The new view of personal identity provides an account of 
persons which enables a justified return to the belief that 
persons are more that just rna terial things. The purely 
empirical scientific description has been shown to be 
insufficient and, with i·ts failure, is opened up the 
possibility of human value resting in more than just 
utility, for it allows the the possibility of intrinsic 
value. Thus, we must look not only to science to tell us 
the truth, we must look to accounts which try to capture and 
convey the feeling of living, the 
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experience of 
subjectivity, the complexity of emotion and the worth of the 
spiritual: the descriptions of culture and social 
interaction. In times past this role was played by 
religion, stories and myths, but in our increasingly secular 
society there is a need to focus upon these alternative 
attempts to convey more than just empirical accounts of 
ourselves as persons: for without some recognition of these 
accounts of the self, the morality of persons will become 
distorted. 
Yet the failure of the simple view has shown that the 
intrinsic value Q!f the self cannot be made sense of in 
isolation from properties - that although there is more to 
persons than just physical or psychological properties, the 
'more' is not all that there is of value. In effect, the 
new view establishes a balance between the body and the 
'soul': both are recognised as viable and worthwhile parts 
of persons; both are necessary to the concept of person and 
neither is subordinate to the other. Any knowledge about 
human life and existence must reflect this balance. It is 
no longer acceptable to produce an exclusively scientific 
description but neither is ·it acceptable to produce a purely 
spiritual account. A fuller and more mature understanding 
of persons is to be gained through both. 
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The new view therefore tries to strike a balance: it 
recognises the body and the soul to be equal partners. 
I believe in you my soul, the other I am must not abase 
itself to you, · 
And you must not be abased to the other. 
Walt Whitman 
'Song of Myself' 
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